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ABSTRACT
This is a study about the relationship between the ethical sphere 
and Christianity in Kierkegaard’s thought. Against the tendency 
among Kierkegaard scholars to emphasize the continuity between the 
ethical sphere and Christianity, I tried to show through this 
study that in Kierkegaard’s writings there was a very strong 
emphasis on the discontinuity between these two spheres.
I started by asking whether there is a difference and 
discontinuity between "rationalistic ethics" (the ethics of the 
person who is in the ethical sphere) and Christian ethics. 
{Chapter One} Firstly, in the examination of Abraham’s act of 
faith in Fear ani Trembling, X showed that even in this book there 
was a hint of a new ethics which follows from faith. To answer
the question as to whether there is a clear description of this 
new ethics, I turned to Works &£ In the examination of this
book, I identified the ethics of Christian love, and asserted that 
the ethics of Christian love was different and discontinuous from 
merely human love. In the next section, I examined Christian 
ethics as the ethics of Christian discipleship. Through an 
examination of some parts of fhiloapphioal FriflBttttg and Training 
in Christianity I argued that Christian ethics, as understood by 
Kierkegaard, is different from merely ethical discipleship and 
semi-Pelagianism. Throughout this chapter’s discussion I argued 
that Christian ethics was not only different from the ethics of 
the ethical person, but also antithetical to it. For ethics based 
on merely human love was criticized severely in Works jfif. Love, and
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the merely ethical discipleship and semi-Pelagian discipleship 
were regarded as misunderstandings of Christian ethics.
I turned, in the second chapter, to the consideration of the 
problem of becoming oneself. In this chapter, I firstly examined 
the second volume of Elther/Qp, and argued that the ethical self 
was an autonomous self which tried to be itself by itself. In 
contrast, the Christian self is totally dependent on God in its 
becoming itself. I drew this conclusion from an examination of 
Tht Siokneas unto Death. In this examination, I argued that even 
though there were some ambiguities in this book, despair as sin 
was clearly understood only by the Christian who believed in the 
forgiveness of sin by God and had faith. Only the existing 
individual who is in faith is regarded as overcoming the despair 
and having become a "self" (or "spirit”). I pointed out that in 
their understandings of the eternal, of the power of self, these 
two understandings of the self were different from one another.
In the last section of this second chapter, I raised the 
question of the understanding of the self of the person in 
religiousness A. By an examination of the Socratic understanding 
of the phrase "one can be oneself in relation to God" and an 
analysis of Socratic inwardness, I argued that those in 
religiousness A had a different God, or different conception of 
God from the Christian God. I also argued that this difference 
between their respective conceptions of God was the fundamental 
reason for the difference between the Christian understanding of 
becoming a self and that of the person in religiousness A.
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In the third chapter, I examined the problem of epistemology. 
Firstly, I drew out, from Kierkegaard’s various pseudonymous 
writings, the presuppositions and epistemological standpoint of 
the natural man. Then, I compared this with the Christian 
epistemological standpoint which was drawn from Kierkegaard’s 
later writings. I argued that in his later writings there were 
very clear indications that the Christian has an epistemological 
standpoint which is substantially different from that of the
natural man.
I turned then to an examination of Kierkegaard’s journal 
entries, and showed that even though he himself could not always 
think in the way which he asserted that the Christian should 
think, Kierkegaard did not compromise and say that it was proper 
and inevitable for us to mix the Christian standpoint and the 
natural man’s standpoint. Rather, he strongly resisted the idea 
that such a mixture was Christian.
Next I returned to one of Kierkegaard’s early pseudonymous 
writings, Philosophical Fr«Lgffl>ftfeg. to show that Kierkegaard’s 
ultimate intention in writing this book can be interpreted in a 
manner consistent with his later writings. I argued that even 
though, because of the ambiguity in this book, there are other 
ways of interpreting it, it is also possible that the Socratic 
standpoint and the Christian standpoint are two exclusive views of 
reality as a whole, and that even in this book Kierkegaard tried 
to show the difference and discontinuity of the Socratic 
(humanist) standpoint and the Christian standpoint. According to
this interpretation of Kierkegaard’s intention, he who has the
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Christian point of view should see and consider everything from 
the Christian standpoint; for him, there is no autonomous realm to 
be thought of from the Socratic (humanistic) standpoint.
Based upon this examination, I concluded that for Kierkegaard 
Christian ethics follows on from Christian theology (his Christian 
theistic faith), and the understanding of becoming oneself also 
follows on from the Christian’s stance of faith (so that the 
Christian self is regarded as the "theological self”), and his 
epistemological standpoint is also Christian. In this sense, 
there is a wide gap between the Christian sphere and the ethical 
sphere, or to put this another way, their direction is different: 
one is theistic and one humanistic. For Kierkegaard, to be a 
Christian thus involves a change in one’s ethics, in one’s 
understanding of becoming oneself, and in one’s epistemological 
standpoint.
Then, I drew out some implications for Kierkegaard’s theory 
of the existence-spheres as a whole and suggested some 
implications for Christian theology today.
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INTRODUCTION
This is a study about the relation of Christianity to the ethical 
sphere in the thought of S/ren Kierkegaard. In this study, I am 
trying to explore the question of whether Kierkegaard thinks that
being a Christian involves a transition from the way in which the 
natural man lives, such that all aspects of human life - our
ethics, our understanding of what it means to be a self, and our 
perspective on truth - are transformed. If this is the case, then 
there is a fundamental difference between the way in which the
natural man thinks and lives and that of the Christian.
I will examine this question by looking at Kierkegaard’s
understanding of the nature of the interface between the ethical 
sphere and the Christian sphere.[1] My purpose in this is to
demonstrate that there is a qualitative difference between the 
ethical sphere (as "the ethical mode of existence”) and the 
Christian sphere (as "the Christian mode of existence”), such that 
one may say that these two different spheres are actually rival 
views of life. Hence, to be a Christian is to overcome the
ethical view of life. If there were still to be some remnants of
the ethical view of life in one’s mode of existence, then one 
would not yet be in the Christian sphere in the decisive sense. 
In other words, the overcoming of the ethical sphere is a genuine 
overcoming and passing beyond. Therefore, I shall also show that 
one’s transition from the ethical sphere to the Christian sphere 
not only affects one’s way of life, but also affects one’s
epistemological standpoint, although this aspect of the
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transformation is expressed very obscurely in Kierkegaard’s
writings. In other words, the Christian has a total life-view
based on his Christian faith. With regard to this, another
closely related point can also be made: Kierkegaard’s work shows
that if there were a religiousness, or a religious view of life
which did not break with the ethical view of life, then that
religiousness or religious view of life would not be a Christian
one, but one of immanence, which Kierkegaard sometimes calls
religiousness A.
Some explanation of the terms which I use, especially the
terms ’’aspect’* and ’’sphere”, is required here. By ”sphere” I mean
one’s mode of existence, one’s outlook and way of life. As is 
well-known, there are, according to Kierkegaard, basically three 
spheres in which a person can be: the aesthetic, the ethical, and 
the religious spheres.[2] These three different ways of life are 
sometimes called "existence-spheres"[3] or ”the stages of 
life"[4]. As we shall see, what is interesting about 
Kierkegaard’s spheres of life, is that from within each sphere of
life there is a complete life-picture. In this sense, Kierkegaard 
sometimes calls these spheres ’’interpretations of existence"[5], 
or, as I usually say, "views of life"[6].
However, if we consider Kierkegaard’s use of the terms ”the 
aesthetic", "the ethical", and "the religious", it is also the 
case that the person in each sphere will have aesthetic, ethical
and religious aspects to his life. For example, the person in the
ethical sphere has aesthetic, ethical and religious aspects to his
life, but he sees these aspects from the ethical view of life.
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Likewise, the person in the Christian sphere also has aesthetic,
ethical and religious aspects to his life, but he sees these
aspects from his Christian view of life. Thus I am distinguishing
between the word "sphere" and the word "aspect". For, it appears
that Kierkegaard uses the terms "the aesthetic", "the ethical", 
and "the religious" in two different ways. Sometimes he uses them 
to mean "views of life" ("spheres"), and sometimes to mean 
"aspects (or components) of life". In relation to "the ethical", 
Stephen Evans makes a similar point when he says: "It is helpful 
here to distinguish two uses of the term ’the ethical’: as stage
or existence-sphere and as a component in human existence."[7] I
think the same can be said about "the aesthetic" and "the
religious" as well. If this is so, it is very important to bear
in mind these two ways in which Kierkegaard uses these terms ("the 
aesthetic", "the ethical", and "the religious"), otherwise it is 
very easy to misunderstand their meaning in relation to the
spheres of life.
What is interesting is that each "sphere", as an outlook and 
way of life, affects these different aspects of life. So, as I 
shall show in this study, if one is in the Christian sphere, one 
has one’s own total view of life which is based on Christianity; 
one has a Christian view of the aesthetic aspect of life, of the 
ethical aspect of life, and of the religious aspect of life. 
Therefore, the Christian sphere as the Christian outlook and way 
of life is different from both the aesthetic sphere and the 
ethical sphere. It seems obvious that a Christian who has a
Christian view of the aesthetic aspect of life and of the
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religious aspect of life ("religion” in the restricted sense of 
the word), is different from the aesthete who has an aesthetic
view of life. What is difficult to discern is whether the
Christian has a different understanding of the ethical aspect of 
life from the person who is in the ethical sphere. This is the
reason why I am mainly concerned with the relation of the
Christian sphere to the ethical sphere. Hence I shall attempt to
show Kierkegaard’s strong emphasis on the discontinuity between 
the ethical sphere and the Christian sphere. I think that 
Kierkegaard, in his various writings, emphasizes the radical 
discontinuity between them; the emphasis on the discontinuity is 
greater than the indications of the continuity.
One of the basic motivations of this study is my concern 
about the tendency among scholars of Kierkegaard to emphasize the 
continuity between Christianity and the ethical sphere. Some 
scholars believe that Kierkegaard stands firmly in the position of
asserting that the ethical is somehow continued in the Christian
sphere, and that there is continuity among the spheres. We can 
find two group of scholars who hold this view.
Those who belong to the first group try to find the remnants 
of the Hegelian dialectic in Kierkegaard’s thought and interpret 
the spheres of life in relation to it. From the Hegelian 
dialectic which they believe they have detected in Kierkegaard’s
spheres of life, they draw the conclusion that the relation 
between the spheres is basically that of continuity. For example, 
Stephen Dunning says that his own interpretation of the stages as
a progression, or a systematic development "from the aesthetic
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through the ethical and culminating in the religious”, "implies 
continuity rather than radical discontinuity among the stages."[8] 
Hence, for Dunning, the relation between the ethical sphere and 
the Christian sphere is also that of a progression, or
development. He thinks that there is a Hegelian dialectical
relationship between spheres, and therefore, the religious sphere 
is the synthesis of the aesthetic and the ethical. (He even tries
to see such a Hegelian dialectical movement within each sphere 
except for the ethical stage). However, his book as a whole is an 
attempt to show this Hegelian dialectical relationship between the
stages.[93) He says:
In dialectical terms, the ethical consciousness opposes a 
logic of reciprocity [which is the logic of the ethical stage] 
to the aesthetic logic of contradiction. It is the tension in 
this opposition that propels the self forward and lays the 
foundation for the dialectic of inwardness in the religious 
stage.[10]
As he himself is aware, and indeed asserts, here he tries to see
the Hegelian dialectic, and says that "Kierkegaard continued to
think in the Hegelian, mediating terms."[11] For Dunning, 
therefore, the aesthetic stage and the ethical stage are necessary 
elements (or stages) for a self to advance to the religious stage, 
for the religious stage is understood as the culmination of this
process, or "the dialectical fulfillment of the aesthetic and the
ethical stages."[12] It is true that Dunning distinguishes 
"systematic, progressive development" from the Hegelian claim 
"that a particular line of development is 'necessary’."[13] In 
this sense, he admits the existence of a "leap" in that
development. However, in so far as, in his understanding of the
dialectical relationship between stages, being in or passing
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through the aesthetic sphere and the ethical sphere is the
necessary condition for one’s development to the religious sphere,
I cannot help thinking that Dunning denies only one aspect of the 
necessity of this development. He denies that one must
necessarily develop from the ethical to the religious; but the
ethical stage itself is one of the necessary elements of one’s 
being in the religious stage, in the sense that one must be in the
ethical stage before going to the religious stage, and that the 
ethical view of life is an important element in the religious 
stage. In this sense, he says:
It [the dialectical structure of the theory of stages] is a 
dialectic in which the initial stage [the aesthetic stage] is 
one of contradiction, contradiction is in turn negated by 
reciprocity [of the ethical stage], and then contradiction and 
the reciprocity are united in paradox [in the religious 
stage].[14]
In this Hegelian sense, he sees the relationship between the 
ethical and the religious as that of a development or progression 
which implies continuation of the ethical into the religious 
stage.
In this respect, his interpretation of the stages of life is 
very similar to that of S.U. Zuidema, who also observes these 
stages of life in relation to Kierkegaard’s use of dialectic, 
which he thinks has not been clearly removed from the influence of 
Hegel’s dialectic. He says:
It [the subsequent stage] transcends the preceding and at the 
same time takes the preceding into itself in its own unique 
way. Hegel’s dialectic is unmistakenly present here. Each 
following stadium or stage includes within itself a higher 
synthesis with the preceding; it is constituted by a higher 
synthesis with the preceding...The idea of a revolutionary 
evolutionary leap binds together and synthesizes these 
different attitudes toward life as steps of an ascending
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life....The truth of the ethical stadium also recurs in the 
religious field in an intensified and sublimated way.[15]
Hence, there is a basic continuity between the ethical sphere and 
the religious sphere. What is defined as the ethical, by the
person who is in the ethical sphere, is also included in the 
Christian’s understanding of the ethical aspect of life; the
ethical is positively elevated into the religious sphere.
Louis Dupre also indicates that Kierkegaard’s spheres of life
should be considered as "an application of Hegel’s dialectic to
Christian philosophy of life.” He continues:
As dialectical moments, they are so intrinsically linked with 
one another that they only receive their ultimate meaning from 
the whole, which is determined by the final, the religious 
moment.[16]
Hence, for Dupre", ’’ethics... is a necessary step in the realization 
of man’s true nature.”[17]
As we have seen, such an interpretation of the spheres of
life as a progression, or development, is closely related to the
Hegelian dialectic which can be well harmonized with these terms
(’’progression” and "development”). At this point, we have to ask 
whether Kierkegaard really has such a Hegelian dialectical element
in his dialectic of existence. It is true that he uses the term
"dialectic” and this term has a close relationship to the Hegelian
dialectic. However, Kierkegaard is very careful when he uses this 
term in his writings; he tries to eliminate the Hegelian
connotation from it. When he designates his dialectic
"qualitative dialectic”(CUP, p. 347 and passim) in contrast to 
the dialectics of Hegel, which he looks upon as a "quantitative
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dialectics”, he has a very clear sense of a distinction between
them. Kierkegaard’s qualitative dialectic is a dialectic which is
related to the qualitative change of existence; it is ”a 
pathos-filled transition.”(JP, III, 2339(Pap. IV C 12))
Here is the place of a leap, which describes that particular
qualitative change of existence. The quality of existence is 
changed in the act of a leap. He contrasts it with the
quantitative dialectic by which he means the Hegelian dialectic.
In an entry in his journals he says:
[Everything] depends upon making the difference between 
quantitative and qualitative dialectic absolute. The whole of 
logic is quantitative or modal dialectic, since everything is 
one and the same. Qualitative dialectic is concerned with 
existence.(Journals, No. 584(Pap. VII 1 A 84)=JP, I, 759)
In the quantitative dialectic, there can be an Aufhebung. and 
therefore quantitative accumulation and advancement can bear the 
synthesis. Hence, Kierkegaard cannot find any sign of qualitative 
change in this quantitative dialectical movement.[18] For, in 
Kierkegaard’s opinion, there is continuity, synthesis, and 
identity in this quantitative dialectical movement. That is why 
he coins this new phrase ”the qualitative dialectic”, for what he 
is interested in, ”this concrete existential individual” (what the 
Germans would call Existenz) cannot be properly understood or 
posited without a change in the quality of existence. This change 
in the quality of existence involves a real change in one’s view 
of life. That is, in Kierkegaard’s dialectic of existence, there 
is a real ,change in one’s view of life. In Kierkegaard’s opinion, 
two different views of life are mutually exclusive.[19] As Paul
Ricoeur says: ”A dialectic without mediation this is the
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Kierkegaardian dialectic.”[20] Hence, we may say that there is a 
difference between the dialectic of Kierkegaard and the dialectic 
of Hegel and the Hegelians.[21]
So I am not persuaded by the assertion that one can find a 
kind of Aufhebung in Kierkegaard's dialectic. And I question why 
some eminent scholars try to relate Kierkegaard's dialectic to
that of Hegel. Even though they have found the so-called 
existential character of the Hegelian dialectic (which had not 
been understood properly until they had explained it)[22], it is 
one thing to have an exact understanding of Hegel's dialectic, and 
it is another to put that understanding into the reading of 
Kierkegaard's work. Even if Kierkegaard had misunderstood the 
dialectic of Hegel, only his own understanding of it can be the 
background against which he thought. In this sense, I cannot 
agree with those scholars who see the Hegelian dialectical 
movement in Kierkegaard's spheres of life, and assert that the 
ethical sphere (as the ethical view of life) is somehow continued 
even in the Christian sphere. The reason why I cannot agree with 
them should become clearer in the course of this study.
There are other scholars who also hold that the ethical
sphere and the Christian sphere are closely related, but do not 
base their interpretation of this relationship on the existence of 
the remnants of the Hegelian dialectic in Kierkegaard. They try 
to base their interpretation of this relationship on the passages 
which they quote from Kierkegaard's writings. Reidar Thomte can 
be a representative of this second group of scholars.[23]
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Thomte points out several facts which are related to this 
relationship. Firstly, he says that "he [Kierkegaard] never spoke 
of the ethical as being dethroned by the religious.”[24] After 
asserting this, he quotes several passages from Kierkegaard's 
writings (mostly from the Postscript):
1.
highest
"The ethical is the 
."(COP, p. 133).
absolute and in all eternity the
2. "The ethical is the highest task for every human
being." (COP, p. 135)
3. "The ethical requirement is for every individual."(CUP, p.
284)
4. "The ethical is an expression for the
God-relationship."(CUP, pp. 122-■23, 138)
5. The religious sphere liesi so close to the ethical that
"there is a constant communication between the two".(CUP, p.144)
6. "The religious sphere possesses the ethical"(Papirer, VII 
B 235, P. 20).
7. A person "must have passed through the ethical in order to 
arrive at the religious stage."(CUP, p. 347).
From these quotations, he concludes that: "There is, therefore, 
no conflict between the ethical and the religious."[25]
Secondly, he asserts that "Kierkegaard presents only one 
great choice: Either the aesthetic mode of life,...sc. the ethical 
mode of life comprehended within the religiosity of immanence and 
culminating in Christianity."[26] In relation to this assertion he 
quotes the following: "There are three stages: an aesthetic, an
ethical and a religious....But in spite of this triple division
the book is nevertheless an either-or. The ethical and the
religious stages have in fact an essential relationship to one 
another."(CUP, p. 261) "Three stages and yet one
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either/or.”(Papirer, VI B 41, 10).
In relation to both the first and the second points, Thomte
merely quotes several passages from Kierkegaard. He just assumes
that the meaning of these passages is obvious. However, these
passages are among the most ambiguous passages found in
Kierkegaard. So, according to the interpretation of these 
passages, the meaning may vary. For example, quotation 7 comes 
immediately after the sentence: "[The] different spheres must be 
kept clearly distinct, and the qualitative dialectic with its 
-de.Qjsj.ye mutation ±hat changes everything so that what was highest 
in one sphere is rendered in another sphere absolutely 
inadmissible, must be respected. ” (CUP, p. 347, emphasis given). 
Applying this to the ethical sphere and the Christian sphere, this 
sentence seems to imply that what was highest in the ethical
sphere is rendered absolutely inadmissible in the Christian 
sphere, thus, it suggests the exact opposite of what Thomte has 
said. (But at this stage in my thesis I wish to reserve judgement 
as to which interpretation is correct.)
Secondly, in relation to these quotations, we have to bear in 
mind the fact that there is some discussion of the ambiguity 
surrounding the term "the ethical” in Kierkegaard’s own writings. 
It is very difficult to be immediately sure what meaning of ”the 
ethical” Kierkegaard has in mind in each particular context. 
There are some scholars who are careful enough to notice the 
different meanings with which Kierkegaard uses the term ”the 
ethical”. For example, Evans says:
Actually Kierkegaard uses the term ”ethical” in several
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different senses. The first is the ethical viewed as a 
stage...Kierkegaard also speaks of the ethical in a new sense, 
the sense in which it is an essential aspect of religious 
existence.... The difference between the two ethics is that the 
first is a science "which can strictly be called ideal" while 
the second "begins with the real"(CD, p. 18).[27]
Mackey also says:
In Climacus’s usage "the ethical" is identical with inwardness 
or subjectivity. This ±s not £he ethical .".akage £ji lifgj.a 
aafiUEted M JadgP HAlKelJU "To be ethical" is, for
Climacus, simply another way of saying "to be human".[28]
Therefore, it is difficult to identify the exact relationship
between the ethical sphere and the Christian sphere by merely 
quoting several passages from Kierkegaard’s writings (especially, 
his pseudonymous writings) without thinking of their contexts.
Prom this observation I propose that in order to discuss the
exact relationship of the ethical sphere to the Christian sphere,
one should compare the general orientation, presuppositions and
consequences of one sphere to those of the other. Without such a 
discussion, it is easy to distort the exact relationship between
them. Hence, I shall try to provide such a discussion in this
study.
As these critical comments on the claim that there is a
continuity between the ethical sphere and the Christian sphere 
suggest, this relationship can be observed differently. Indeed,
certain commentators hold that there is a new ethics in the
Christian sphere, and that here there is radical difference
between the ethical sphere and the Christian sphere. For example,
Regis Jolivet says:
[The] religious gives birth to a new ethic [which contrasts
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with] the ethical of the pre-religious stage, which made 
religion subordinate to itself as one of its own 
element....”[29]
And in this new ethics (Christian ethics), as Malantschuk says, 
"the redeeming grace of God is the presupposition for man’s 
ethical decision and action."[30] Paul Holmer and Klemke 
(following Holmer) also assert that the ethical and the Christian 
spheres are genuine ethical alternatives.[31]
As far as the observation that there is a new ethics in the
Christian sphere is concerned, my interpretation is closer to
Jolivet and others than the scholars whose interpretation is
outlined above. However, I think that the difference and
discontinuity between the ethical and the Christian spheres is not 
only confined to the difference in ethics. Rather, there is a 
total and fundamental difference between the ethical sphere and 
the Christian sphere, which involves not only ethics, but also the 
understanding of the self and the epistemological standpoint, as I 
shall seek to show in this study. In this sense, this study may 
be of value if it leads to a more exact understanding of the 
relationship between the ethical sphere and the Christian sphere, 
and it may offer a partial contribution to the problem of the 
spheres of life in general.
The importance of this study, however, is not confined to the 
quest for an exact understanding of Kierkegaard’s 
existence-spheres. As the difference between the ethical sphere 
and the Christian sphere is great, so also is the difference 
between, on the one hand, the theology of those who think of this
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relationship as one of continuity and, on the other, the theology
of those who think that there is discontinuity. Therefore, the 
question as to whether the ethical sphere is to be overcome, or to 
be continued in the Christian sphere, is important not only
because it is inherently interesting but also because of its
implications for theology. Determining whether a person believes
the ethical sphere is continued or overcome in the Christian
sphere will reveal a great deal about his theology and his 
understanding of human life as a whole.
As a matter of fact, this is part of the wider question,
often considered in western thought, under the discussion of the
relationship between reason and faith, or between faith and works.
Even today this problem has not been resolved or become outdated.
Part of the importance of Kierkegaard lies in the fact that he
sees this problem in its modern form and tries to solve it at the 
beginning of the modern age. As a modern man[32] living after the 
Enlightenment he knows that the spirit of the world (Zeitgeist) of
his time and of the future is of such a kind that it makes man
turn away from Christian truth, and advances modern paganism which
does not know transcendence in sensu strictu, but only immanence. 
As Miller says: "[The] nineteenth century was busily bending all 
its intellectual and poetic and moral efforts to the task of doing 
away with the transcendence of God."[33] Post-Enlightenment men
want to be their own master. And now people attempt to attain the
whole truth through their own endeavour. Men will not acknowledge
other truths than those attained through their own observation and
logical reasoning. There cannot be any other ethics apart from
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the one which men themselves have found or regulated - autonomous
ethics. Now we have come of age; we are adults and can be 
ourselves by ourselves. As Michalson says: "The autonomous self
gradually becomes the criterion for what can be considered truly 
revelatory.”[34]
Kierkegaard stands squarely in the middle of this critical
situation.[35] He faces the problem of the relationship between 
Christianity and the Enlightenment view of the world, truth, the 
self, and ethics, relentlessly and with open eyes. He never 
attempts to evade it. So the main question for Kierkegaard is: 
how can one become a Christian in this modern situation, in this
post-Enlightenment age? What does it mean to be a Christian in
the modern age? Is it now impossible to be a Christian? Must one 
change the characteristics of Christianity in order to be a
Christian, as a modern man? These are the questions which 
Kierkegaard, as a post-Enlightenment man, has to face and to which
he tries to provide an answer. Such a quest for a solution to
this problem is of itself worthy of careful consideration. 
Moreover, when we consider the position of Kierkegaard in relation 
to the development of modern theology[36], we cannot deny the 
importance of this consideration of the relation between the
ethical sphere and the Christian sphere.
In particular, in the light of recent trends in theology, 
this study can, I hope, play a corrective role by reflecting 
Kierkegaard’s position in relation to the thought of Kant, Hegel, 
and Schleiermacher. For theology since the 1960s has become much
more human-centered and has been moving away from a transcendent
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God. As Alan Race puts it: ’’[Attention] has shifted to
developing notions of divine immanence: God must work in and
through the created order, and mostly of course through the human
capacity for creative goodness.”[37] In particular, there is a
very strong Hegelian tendency in modern theology. We can mention
several theologians who either base their theology on Hegel’s
thought or modify Hegelian thought: Juergen Moltmann[38],
Eberhard JuengelL39]» Wolfhart Pannenberg[40], Hans Kueng[4l],
process theologians[42] and strangely even Karl Barth.[43] At the
same time, since the 1960s there is a revival of interest in
Schieiermacher. James Torrance reports this revival as follows:
One of the fascinating features of theology in our day is the 
revival of interest in Schieiermacher in the same century 
which has witnessed the most radical questioning of both his 
method and point of view.[44]
Even before the 1960s many theologians tried to develop their
theologies on the basis of Schleiermacher’s insights. Hence,
Schleiermacher is regarded as ”a theological teacher not only of
the past, but above all, of the future.”[45] Perhaps, we may name
Paul Tillich as one of the representatives of this tendency[46],
even though we should remember that his theology is highly
distinctive, and a personal creation. He says:
Hy decision [about the question as to whether the attempt to 
construct a synthesis out of the elements in theology...or 
whether a return to the orthodox tradition with some 
modernization is the right way]...is thoroughly on the side of 
Schleiermacher.[47]
Some critics think Rudolf Bultmann is also under the influence of
Schleiermacher. For example, Richard R. Niebuhr has written that 
"the intellectual tradition Bultmann embodies draws many of its
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insights ultimately from Sehleiermacher, although that fact has 
not been much acknowledged."[48] Many other theologians are under 
the direct or indirect influence of the Schleiermacherian approach
to theology. George A. Lindbeck says that what he calls the
experiential expressive approach to theology and religion, which 
"is particularly congenial to the liberal theologies influenced by 
the Continental developments that began with Sehleiermacher”[49], 
is "so pervasive in contemporary theology and at the same time so 
variegated that it is hard to decide on any one author to serve as 
an instance. "[50]
However, it would be more accurate to speak of the presence
of a combination of the thought of Kant, Hegel, and Schleiermaoher 
in the thought of modern theologians: as Paul Ricoeur describes 
his position as a "post-Hegelian-Kantian"[51]> and John E. Smith 
speaks of the "Kant-Hegel Syndrome" in philosophical theology.[52]
Hence, a clarification of Kierkegaard’s position in relation 
to Kant, Sehleiermacher, and Hegel is important for modern 
theology. In particular, an inquiry as to whether the ethical 
sphere is continued or not in the Christian sphere is vital for a 
clarification of Kierkegaard’s position. As we shall see, 
Kierkegaard supports the view of a transcendent God who can also
enter into the realm of time and space. I think that this is 
something that has been missing in modern theology, and therefore 
I think that Kierkegaard is worth considering in relation to a 
tradition in which this appears to have been lacking.
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How then should we tackle this basic problem of the
relationship between the Christian and ethical spheres? In order
to show the fundamental difference between the ethical sphere and
the Christian sphere, I shall approach this problem by examining 
three questions that arise in relation to Kierkegaard: (1) does
the Christian have a different understanding of ethics from the 
person in the ethical sphere?, (2) does the Christian have a 
different understanding of the problem of becoming a self?, and 
(3) does the Christian’s faith have an effect on the cognitive 
aspect of human life, in the sense of whether there is any change
in the way in which he thinks? That is to say, is there any
difference between the ethical person’s understanding of what
truth is and that of the Christian?
These three issues are representative of different types of
categories which are, in fact, approximately related to the
traditional three divisions of philosophical inquiry: axiology
(the question of value), ontology (the question of being, which 
includes the question of the self), and epistemology (the question 
of knowledge). But in the division of the argument of this study,
I did not a priori use the traditional three branches of
philosophy and try to relate them to Kierkegaard’s material. I 
think that in Kierkegaard’s writings these three different 
questions (i.e., (1), (2), and (3) above) are latent, and this
allows us to consider a very wide spectrum of thought and life.
As we probe the issue deeply, it becomes evident that the
understanding of the relation of the Christian sphere to the
ethical sphere is inseparably bound to questions of axiology,
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ontology, and epistemology. Therefore, I shall discuss these
questions in turn, and that discussion will form the substantial
part of this study.
I shall start, in the first chapter of this study, with a
consideration of the question of whether the Christian has a
different understanding of the ethical aspect of life ("ethics") 
from the person in the ethical sphere. That is, I shall begin by 
an examination of the axiological aspect of this interface between
the ethical sphere and the Christian sphere. In this first
chapter, Fear and Trembling. Works of Love, and some parts of 
Philosophical Fragments and of Training in Christianity will be 
the main texts under discussion. The main point with which I 
conclude this chapter is that the Christian is understood by 
Kierkegaard to be consciously under God’s command at every moment
in his life. Hence, the Christian’s ethics is different from the 
ethics of the person who is in the ethical sphere.
From the comparison of ethics we turn, in the second chapter, 
to the problem of self. That is, we shall approach the problem of 
the difference between the ethical sphere and the Christian sphere 
from the perspective of the problem of becoming a self. In 
demonstrating this difference, the ethical person’s understanding 
of becoming a self as expressed in the second part of Either/ Or 
and that of the Christian as expressed in The Sickness unto Death
will be extensively compared. This comparison will conclude with
the observation that while the ethical person thinks that he can 
be himself by himself, the Christian believes that he can only be 
himself in relation to God who is conclusively revealed in the
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Christ event. Another problem which will also be discussed in
this second chapter is the relation between one’s understanding of 
becoming a self in religiousness A and that of religiousness B.
Concerning this problem, we shall point out both some similarities
between religiousness A and B, and the substantial difference
between them. In connection with this, one may make a very good
point that one’s sense of what it means to become oneself depends
on the God to whom one relates.
In the third chapter, we shall turn to the most subtle 
problem in this quest for the interface between the ethical and
the Christian sphere: can the thesis that in the Christian sphere
everything changes also be applied to the cognitive aspect of
human life? If so, in what sense? Can we say that the
’’epistemological standpoint” of a person is, in a sense, affected, 
or changed in relation to faith? As these questions suggest, in
the third chapter, we shall explore the epistemological aspect of
the difference between the ethical sphere and the Christian
sphere. A survey of Kierkegaard’s reflections on the relation
between philosophical reason and faith will show that a tension
must inevitably exist between the empirical approach which says
that our reason does not change, does not have a positive relation
with faith, and the soteriological approach which says that our
epistemological standpoint also must be changed when we become
Christians. Kierkegaard has not given us a contradiction-free
solution to this difficult problem. However, Kierkegaard’s great
contribution is that he is not satisfied with one easy answer, but
points out the difficulties of the problem and tries to illuminate
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them deeply and from all sides through rigorous thinking. After
studying Kierkegaard, therefore, we are in a much better position
to grasp the complexities of the relation between the natural 
man’s "epistemological standpoint" and that of the Christian.
On the basis of this discussion, we may conclude that for 
Kierkegaard, the Christian is a man who, in principle, has 
transformed all aspects of his life because of his faith; his 
understanding of ethics, of the problem of becoming himself, and 
even the "epistemological standpoint" are different from that 
which he had when he was in the ethical sphere. Whenever 
Kierkegaard mentions the Christian, he is thinking of such an 
ideal Christian.(cf. AN, p. 35) Such an ideal is both the basis 
of concrete Christian existence here and now and, at the same 
time, the task to be accomplished. In principle, he is already 
such a Christian, but, in reality, he has to endeavour moment by
moment to be such a Christian. This is one of the main reasons
why Kierkegaard hardly ever dares to call himself a Christian. He 
is aware that he and many other so-called Christians do not, in 
reality, always stand in this ideal position. In reality, the 
so-called Christian may also be swayed by the attitude and
rationality of the ethical man whenever he is not faithful to the
object of his faith. But Kierkegaard also asserts that such 
cannot be the true portrait of the Christian. At the very least, 
the Christian, for Kierkegaard, is a person who is always 
transforming his ethics, his conception of the self, and his 
epistemological standpoint into the ethics, conception of the
self, and the epistemological standpoint which are based on faith
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Therefore, the "leap" between the ethical sphere and the Christian 
sphere implies the abandoning of the presuppositions and view of 
life of the ethical sphere and the reconstructing of an outlook 
and way of life which is true to the characteristics of
Christianity
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CHAPTER ONE
ETHICS
Let us begin this quest for the relationship between the ethical 
view of life (the ethical sphere) and the Christian view of life 
(the Christian sphere) as understood by Kierkegaard, with a 
consideration of the relationship between the ethical person’s 
understanding of ethics, and that of the Christian, expressed in 
several books by Kierkegaard. In this chapter, I shall show that
the Christian as understood by Kierkegaard has ethics which is
based on Christian faith.
There is an interesting question here. For Kierkegaard, as a 
descendant of the Reformation, thinks that for the Christian 
ethics comes out of theology. In other words, the Christian has 
jathifis xhicJi Is fin Jhi_s Christian view o£ life, so that his
ethics may be designated "Christian ethics", or "the ethics of 
faith"[1), or "the ethics of grace"[2] (to use Dupree’s words). 
Naturally there is an interesting conflict here, for the term 
"ethics" is generally understood in the world as the ethics of the 
ethical sphere. Hence the basic question of this chapter is: 
what is the relationship between Christian ethics (which comes out 
of Christian belief in God) and a general ethics of human
practical reason? In what follows I will call these two ethics
"Christian ethics" and "rationalistic ethics", respectively. We 
may see a similar question in relation to the Reformers in the 
16th century.[3] However, the situation is heightened in
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Kierkegaard as compared with the Reformers; (i) because for 
Kierkegaard living in the 19th century, there is a certain
secularity to the realm of ethics which is there before the 
question of the relation of this realm to the relation to God 
arrives on the scene. And (ii) since Kant has sharpened the issue 
as to what ethics is and has given that realm its own integrity - 
indeed to the point that every duty to God becomes a duty towards 
ethics and relating God’s command to ethics would be something
"immoral ”, and which contravened this scene.
In this situation, Kierkegaard I think shows us how Christian 
ethics should be. In the final analysis, I want to show that 
Christian ethics is quite different from the ethical person’s 
understanding of the ethical aspect of human life. Rather,
Christian ethics is antithetical to rationalistic ethics. In the
ethics of the ethical person the justification for ethics comes 
from one’s application of the categorical imperative, whereas in 
Christian ethics justification for ethics comes from one’s
relation to the Christian God. This fundamental difference
between the place of ethics results in all kinds of difference 
between Christian ethics and the ethics of the ethical person.
In order to show this difference, I shall, in the first 
section of this chapter, examine Fear and Trembling. For Fear and 
Trembling is the book which is mainly concerned with the relation 
between the ethical and the religious. In the examination of this 
book, first its complexity and ambiguity will come to the 
foreground, rather than a clear difference between two ethics.
However, in the final analysis, it will be suggested that even
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this book hints at the difference between these two ethics.
I shall then, in the second section, examine a clear
description of Christian ethics in Works of Love. Here the
difference between "rationalistic ethics" and "Christian ethics"
will be considered through a discussion of two different
understandings of love. In this section Christian ethics is
considered as the ethics of Christian love.
I shall then, in the third section, consider Christian ethics 
as the ethics of Christian discipleship. In this discussion
Training is Christianity and some part of Jhilosophical Fragments 
will be the main texts to be examined, but I shall refer to other
texts to elucidate my discussion. Here one of the most clear
points will be made that, for the Christian, only the acts of
"following" Jesus based on the belief that Jesus is the God-Man, 
who is the Saviour and at the same time the Teacher (the example), 
are regarded as the Christian ethical acts in the real sense.
Based upon this three step examination we shall then conclude
that the Christian is understood by Kierkegaard to be a disciple, 
whose "following" Jesus may be identified with works of love, 
which are the expression of his faith in the God-Man; and that 
therefore his ethics is different from, indeed antithetical to, 
the ethical person’s understanding of the ethical aspect of life.
I
Let us then start with Fear and Trembling: A Dialectical Lvric
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published under the pseudonym "Johannes de Silentio". What I want
to do in this section is to show that in Fear and Trembling there 
is a certain sense in which this may also be said to pertain:
every act of the believer has to come out of his faith in God.
Thus one’s religious ethics follows from one’s belief in God. As
we have mentioned in the introductory part of this chapter, there 
is an interesting conflict here, for the term ’’ethics" in the
world, and especially in 19th century Denmark, and therefore in 
this book, Fear and Trembling. is understood as the universal 
ethics of the ethical person.[4] Hence the basic quest of this 
section is to seek what is the relation between religious ethics 
which comes out of theology and a general ethics.
Yet Fear and Trembling is one of the most complex books of 
Kierkegaard.[53 One of the most difficult matters for 
interpretation is how to understand Abraham’s act of paradoxical 
faith in this book. In this section, therefore, after briefly 
summarizing the main theme of this book, I shall examine Abraham’s 
act of faith by (1) analyzing his double movement of faith, and 
(2) considering the meaning of the teleological suspension of the 
ethical. Through this discussion I hope to show that the 
believer, who is exemplified by a knight of faith in this book, 
has a quite different understanding of the ethical aspect of human 
life from that of the ethical person, whose understanding of 
ethics is distinguished by the characteristics of universality, of 
autonomy, and of a post-Enlightenment sense of rationality.
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By way of introduction, let us briefly survey this book. As
suggested above, its main theme is how to understand the
Abraham-Isaac case in Genesis chapter 22, especially in relation
to the understanding of ethics.
In the ’’Prelude” Johannes provides four quite different
poetical versions of understanding this case, each of which is an 
attempt to depict the exact situation and meaning of this event.
These descriptions come from a certain man’s wish ”to be present
in that hour when Abraham raised his eyes and saw Mount Moriah in
the distance, the hour when he left the asses behind and went up 
the mountain alone with Isaac.”(FT, p. 9=FTL, p. 26) This man's 
wish is even described by Mackey in the following way: ”In his
disenchantment he desires to achieve an imaginative
■ggAteapgr_a.nejL_ty yjtfr AbCflfrgffl in the moment sL his or.deflj.. ”[6] But 
Johannes, as we shall see, gives the impression that none of these 
four versions can be a proper understanding of this case.
In the first description, two sayings of Abraham are 
contrasted with one another, one spoken to Isaac (outward 
expression) and the other spoken to God as prayer (inward 
intention). "Stupid boy,” Abraham is portrayed as saying to 
Isaac, ”do you think I am your father? I am an idolater. Do you 
think it is God’s command? No, it is my desire.”(FT, p, 10=FTL, 
p. 27) But Abraham is further described as saying to himself in a 
low voice, ”Lord God in heaven, I thank you; [after all] it is
better that he believes me a monster than he should lose faith in
you.”(FT, p. 11=FTL, p. 27) That is, Abraham pretends to Isaac
that he is a selfish idolater who desires to sacrifice Isaac, lest
Page 34
Isaac should lose his faith at the thought of God demanding the
sacrifice. To this description, Johannes relates the story of the 
mother blackening her breast in order to wean the child. In this
situation "the child believes that the breast has changed, but the
mother - she is still the same, her gaze is tender and loving as 
ever."(FT, p. 11=FTL, p. 28) Similarly, even though Abraham 
looks different, he is the same as ever in his love. There is no
breach of his paternal love.
In the second description, Abraham offered Isaac but got
Isaac back, so he could return home with him, just as in the 
Genesis story. But "[from] that day henceforth, Abraham was old;
he jasulh not for .get that had ordered hua to do this. Isaac
flourished as before, but Abraham’s eves were darkened, and he saw 
jov no more."(FT, p. 12=FTL, p. 28, emphasis given) In a word, 
he lost his faith. From then on, he continued living in
resentment of God’s dreadful demand.
In the third description, after the event Abraham is supposed
to ride out alone to Mount Moriah. He is further described in the
following way: "[He] threw himself down on his face, he prayed
God to forgive him his sin, that he had been willing to sacrifice 
Isaac, -that the father had for-gotten his duty to his son. "(FT, p. 
13=FTL, pp. 28f., emphasis given) However, it is also said that 
"he could not comprehend that it was a sin that he had been 
willing to sacrifice to God the best that he had."(FT, p. 13=FTL, 
p. 29) So there is a tension within his mind.
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In the fourth description, Isaac who "saw that Abraham’s left
hand was clenched in despair, that a shudder went through his 
whole body" lost his faith, even though he never talked to anybody 
about this.(FT, p. 14=FTL, p. 29)
As we have mentioned above, these four attempts to understand
the Abraham and Isaac case are not satisfactory for Johannes. So 
Johannes asks "who is able to understand him [Abraham]?"(FT, p. 
14=FTL, p. 29) and just gives a "Eulogy on Abraham" who is the 
father of faith.(FT, pp. 15-23=FTL, pp. 30-37) After that, 
however, he tries to suggest another understanding of the case, 
and this is the main body of the book. In this attempt he shows
"the prodigious paradox of faith, ...a paradox that gives Isaac 
back to Abraham again...."(FT, p. 53=FTL, p. 64) Johannes’ final 
understanding of this story is expressed in the form of three 
problemata: (1) "Is there a Teleological Suspension of the 
Ethical?"(FT, pp. 52-67=FTL, pp. 64-77) (2) "Is there an 
Absolute Duty to God?"(FT, pp. 68-8l=FTL, pp. 78-91) (3) "Was It 
Ethically Defensible for Abraham to Conceal His Undertaking from 
Sarah, from Eliezer, and from Isaac?" (FT, pp. 82-120=FTL, pp. 
91-129)
Actually, these three questions come from Johannes’
understanding of the ethical aspect of life. His understanding of 
ethics is partly Kantian and partly Hegelian.[7] However, this 
partly Kantian and partly Hegelian ethics is quite compatible with 
modern theories of ethics, except that of emotivism. The
"ethical" in this book is particularly similar to the
universalizability requirements that R.M. Hare expounds.[8]
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Let us then consider the characteristics of the ethical in
FT. According to Johannes de Silentio, "the ethical as such is 
the universal."(FT, pp. 54, 68, 82=FTL, pp. 64, 78, 91)[9] And, 
as the universal, the ethical has also the following three
characteristics.
Firstly, "as the universal it [the ethical] applies to 
everyone, which from another angle means that it applies at all 
times."(FT, p. 54=FTL, p. 64) In other words, as Dunning says, 
"the ethical is a matter of categorical imperatives, duties that
are obligatory without regard to particular circumstances."[10] 
The moral obligation is an unqualified imperative, the rule that
is binding on all persons everywhere.
Secondly, the ethical is self-contained (immanent): "it
rests immanent in itself, has nothing outside itself that is its 
telos [end, purpose] but is itself telos for everything outside 
itself, and when the ethical has absorbed this into itself, it 
goes not further."(FT, p. 54=FTL, p. 64) Therefore, the ethical 
is as such the divine(cf. FT, pp. 60, 69=FTL, pp. 70, 78), 
"since," as Perkins says, "it is supposedly an all-inclusive and 
complete modus explicandi of all human duties."[11] Even though 
the ethical person uses the term God, as Kierkegaard says, "God 
comes to be an invisible vanishing point, an impotent thought; his 
power is only in the ethical, which [is the content of 
existence]."(FT, p. 68=FTL, p. 78) That is, from the perspective 
of the ethical view of life, even God must be subjected to the 
ethical (i.e., the universal).[12] This is clearly expressed in
Kant's contention that Abraham ought to have responded to the
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so-called divine command as follows:
That I ought not to kill my good son is certain beyond a 
shadow of a doubt; that you, as you appear to be, are God, I 
am not convinced and will never be even if your voice would 
resound from the (visible) heavens.[13]
See also Hegel’s following assertions:
[The] secular is capable of being an embodiment of the 
true...it is now perceived that morality and justice in the 
state are also divine and commanded by God, and that in point 
of substance there ±s nothing higher mere sacred. [141
The true reconciliation whereby the divine realizes itself in 
the region of actuality is found in the ethical and legal life 
of the state.[15]
The ethical life fPie Sittlichkeit1 is the divine spirit 
indwelling in the self-consciousness of this actual present 
age as a people and its individual members....[16]
Therefore, in the final analysis, according to the ethical view,
only the ethical itself is the absolute. Hence there is no
special duty towards God. In one place, Kant makes exactly the
same point: "There are no special duties to God in a universal
religion, for God can receive nothing from us; we cannot act for 
Him, nor yet upon Him.”[17] One’s duty is not to God but only 
towards one’s neighbour and society, for in carrying out one’s 
duty one does not enter into relationship with God but only with
other men.
This point is quite similar to the ethical understanding of 
Judge William, another pseudonymous author who represents the 
ethical sphere. For Judge William also, God is the universal 
background to his life, and he accepts his duty as from God. His 
relationship to God is never separated from what is universal, and
always understandable to all men. God does not in any special
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sense break into or intervene in his life. Hence it is difficult
to equate Judge William’s God with the God of Christianity, even
though Judge William thinks that his God is the God of 
Christianity.[18] One of the logical implications of this immanent 
understanding of the ethical is that ethics is understood as
rationalistic ethics, in the sense that only what the human being
is able to think of can be the basis and contents of ethics.
Thirdly, the ethical is the disclosed, the manifest.(FT, p. 
82=FTL, p. 91) Self-disclosure is the third characteristic of the 
ethical understanding of the ethical aspect of human life.[19] 
From this perspective, as Perkins puts it, "if one cannot explain 
what one is doing and why to his fellow man,” then this inevitably 
means that "something is indeed suspicious about one’s 
motives."[20] This characteristic of self-disclosure presupposes 
that everybody can understand such self-disclosure, insofar as it 
is an expression of the universal. Judge William says in 
Either/Or that "the beauty of the universal consists precisely in 
the fact that all understand it."(E/OL, II, p. 342=E/0, II, p. 
338) In this sense, ethical language is a public language, a point 
closely related to the rationalistic character of this ethical
thinking.
From the first characteristic of the ethical and the ethical
task comes the first problem: ”Is there such a thing as a
teleological suspension of the ethical?” According to Johannes, 
the first ethical task is that one should express oneself 
constantly in the ethical and therefore abolish one’s
particularity in order to become the universal.[21] Yet the
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Abraham and Isaac case stands against this understanding of the
ethical task of human being. Abraham’s case cannot be understood 
as those of tragic heroes (e.g., Agamemnon’s, Jephthah’s, and 
Brutus’s cases).(FT, p. 59=FTL, p. 69) Abraham’s case is totally 
different; ”he overstepped the ethical entirely and possessed a 
higher tel os outside of it, in relation to which he suspended [the 
ethical sphere].”[22] In short, "the story of Abraham contains, 
then, a teleological suspension of the ethical."(FT, p. 66=FTL, 
p. 77) By this assertion, Johannes answers affirmatively the 
question, which he has asked at the beginning, as to whether there 
is such a thing as a teleological suspension of the ethical, even 
though Johannes himself cannot understand such a thing. For him
as a person who has a view of life which is quite compatible with 
the ethical view, such a teleological suspension of the ethical is 
"unthinkable”(FTL, p. 71) or "inconceivable”. (FT, p. 61)
The recognition that Abraham has teleologically suspended the
ethical thus makes Johannes think of what is that telos in
relation to which this teleological suspension of the ethical 
takes place. He assumes that such a telos. as we shall see, can 
only be God or the absolute duty to God. So he again asks: ”Is
there such a thing as an absolute duty toward God?”(FT, p. 
70=FTL, p. 80) Johannes thinks that such an absolute duty towards 
God is possible only in the paradox of faith. Yet ’’[the] story of 
Abraham contains such a paradox."(FT, p. 70=FTL, p. 81) If 
Abraham is the true knight of faith and the father of faith, there 
must be an absolute duty towards God, or Abraham as the knight of
faith ”is lost”.(FT, p. 81=FTL, p. 91)
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The third problem ("was Abraham ethically defensible in 
keeping silent about his purpose before Sarah, before Eliezer, 
before Isaac?") comes from the third presupposition of the 
rationalistic understanding of ethics which Johannes has; that is, 
one’s ethical task is "to work [oneself] out of [one’s] hiddenness
and to become disclosed in the universal."[23] Whereas "[the] 
authentic tragic hero sacrifices himself and everything that is
his for the universal... in this...he is the beloved son of
ethics"(FT, p. 113=FTL, p. 122); Abraham cannot speak because 
"no one can understand" him.(FT, p. 113=FTL, pp. 122-23) So it 
is said of Abraham that "he speaks in a divine language, he speaks 
in tongues".(FT, p. 114=FTL, p. 123) But such a possibility of 
silence which is beyond the demands and charge of the ethical view 
of life can be only if "there is a paradox, that the single 
individual as the single individual stands in an absolute relation 
to the absolute."(FT, p. 120=FTL, p. 129) This is a brief survey
of the book.
Having briefly surveyed the basic structure of the book let
us turn to the main question of this section: how should we then 
interpret Abraham’s act of faith? In my opinion, when Johannes 
discusses the story of Abraham, he is thinking of Abraham as a 
paradigm of paradoxical faith. By "paradoxical faith" I mean the 
faith which believes something paradoxical "by virtue of the 
absurd". In the case of Abraham, as we shall see, he believes 
that God will give Isaac back to him even when he draws the knife. 
As far as the form of faith is concerned, this paradoxical faith
is the same as Christian faith; for, as we shall see, Christian
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faith which believes the absolute paradox of the God-Man is also
paradoxical faith. It is true that the concrete object of faith
is different: Abraham does not believe in the paradox of the 
God-Man (since he was before the God-Man existed on earth), 
whereas the Christian, to be a Christian, should believe in the 
God-Man. However, the structure and form of their faith are quite 
compatible.[243
Indeed, there are some parallel examples which Johannes uses
in order to make the characteristics of faith clear, and these
examples are drawn from the Christian stories. The first example
is the story of the Virgin Mary who conceives Jesus 
"miraculously".(FTL, p. 75=FT, p. 65) The second example is the 
story of an Apostle who was not offended by the absolute 
paradox.(FT, p. 66=FTL, p. 76, emphasis given) The third example 
comes from Luke 14:26: "If any one comes to me and does not hate
his own father and mother and wife and children and brothers and
sisters, yes, and even his own life, he cannot be my 
disciple."(FT, p. 72=FTL, p. 82) Johannes thinks that this 
demand of Jesus is "a remarkable teaching on the absolute duty to 
God."(FT, p. 72=FTL, p. 82) He also thinks that this demand has 
more or less the same character as the demand which had been given 
to Abraham. So he says: "Anyone who does not dare to mention 
such passages does not dare to mention Abraham, either."(FT, p. 
75=FTL, p. 85)[253
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Moreover, there is a direct assertion that "Abraham 
represents faith."(FT, p. 56) So we can speak of Abraham as "an 
example of faith"[26], or "a type” of the believer[27], or "the 
paradigm of faith according to which all instances are to be
declined in all cases" in the sense that "Abraham’s faith is the
pattern after which the Christian must model his own belief."[28] 
Indeed, Johannes says that "he [Abraham] acts by virtue of the 
absurd....He gets Isaac back again by virtue of the absurd."(FT, 
pp. 56f.=FTL, p. 67) Johannes also calls Abraham "the father of 
faith".(FT, pp. 18, 82=FTL, pp. 33, 92) This term presupposes 
the affirmation of the homogeneousness of the faith of Abraham and
Christian faith. It is true that the Jews also use this term to
refer to Abraham. However, when Johannes uses this term in this 
book, he is thinking about Christian faith (clearly that is the 
case in Kierkegaard’s case, in Denmark in the 19th century) and 
thinks that Abraham is the father of this faith, as did St. 
Paul.[29] I think this is more appropriate than Kierkegaard’s 
later understanding of this case as a typical Jewish thought which 
is against the Christian thought.[30] The following quotation 
shows the close relationship between Abraham’s faith understood by 
Johannes and the Christian believer understood by St. Paul and
Jesus.
[Abraham] was...great by that power whose strength is 
powerlessness[31], great by that wisdom whose secret is 
foolishness[32], great by that hope whose form is madness[33], 
great by the love that is hatred of oneself[34],(FT, pp. 
l6f.=FTL, p. 31)
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From these several points I conclude that in this book
Abraham is regarded as a paradigm of paradoxical faith. When I am
saying this I do not disregard the difference of situation between
the Christian and Abraham. But I think that there is a
typological relationship between them. I am also supposing that
Kierkegaard believes that God the Son was before Abraham (even 
though He was not yet the God-Man). Therefore, I am saying that 
Abraham is a paradigm of the believer who has paradoxical faith.
Having said that Abraham is described as the paradigm of the 
believer, we now need to develop an exact understanding of
Abraham's act of faith. In order to understand the act of faith
of the knight of faith, firstly, I shall analyze the double 
movement of faith which the knight of faith makes; and secondly, I 
shall consider the meaning of the teleological suspension of the 
ethical. Through this consideration, I hope to show that despite 
some ambiguities, for the knight of faith who has paradoxical 
faith, his "acts of love" result from his belief in God.
Firstly, let us think about the problem as to in what exactly 
consists Abraham's act of faith in this story. In order to 
understand this movement of faith, one has first to understand 
what Johannes calls the movement of infinite resignation. For 
Johannes contrasts the movement of infinite resignation with the 
movement of faith, and also contrasts the knight of infinite 
resignation who is making the movement of infinite resignation 
with the knight of faith who is making the double movement of
faith
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What is then the movement of infinite resignation? This is
the movement in which one resigns everything infinitely. Such 
resignation enables one to ’’become clear” to oneself with respect 
to "one’s eternal validity”, giving a sense of the infinite by
freeing oneself from the demands of the finite. Hence if Abraham
had been a knight of infinite resignation, then he would have done
as follows:
He would have [marched up] to Mount Moriah, he would have 
split the firewood, lit the fire, drawn the knife. He would 
have cried out to God, "Reject not this sacrifice; it is not 
the best thing I have, that I know very well, for what is an 
old man compared with the child of promise, but it is the best 
I can give you. Let Isaac never find this out so that he may 
take comfort in his youth." He would have thrust the knife 
into his own breast.(FT, pp. 20f.=FTL, p. 35)
According to Johannes, this movement of infinity, that is, the
movement of infinite resignation, is the movement which man 
hifflsgll can £iake Jac himgelf. (cf. FT, pp. 51f.=FTL, p. 62) 
Johannes says: "It takes a purely human courage to renounce the
whole temporal realm in order to gain eternity."(FT, p. 49=FTL, 
p. 59) As Stendahl says, "this [the knight of infinite 
resignation] is not ’Abraham’, but ’Socrates’."[35] In another 
place, Johannes calls Socrates’ ignorance "the infinite 
resignation", and says, "[this] task alone is a suitable one for 
human capabilities...."(FT, p. 69=FTL, p. 79) Shestov even says 
that "Socrates was a knight of resignation and all the wisdom he 
bequeathed to mankind was the wisdom of resignation."[36] So 
Johannes himself can assert that "I can resign everything by my 
own strength".[37]
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This movement of infinite resignation can be identified with 
the movement of repentance.[38] And yet this repentance is in the 
power of human; "The.] can make the movement of repentance under 
his own power. "(FT, p. 99=FTL, p. 109. emphasis given) So 
Johannes says that this movement of infinite resignation is "a 
purely philosophical movement” which he dares say he is "able to 
make if it is required."(FTL, p. 59=FT, p. 48) For it is a 
movement which can be carried out in immanence, and which 
everybody can make.
In this sense, we may assimilate the movement of repentance 
in Fear and Trembling to repentance in the second volume of
Either/Or.T391 Both of them are still in the realm of immanence
and quite different from the repentance of Christianity which 
involves the consciousness of sin. In relation to Judge William’s 
concept of repentance Perkins makes a good point: "For the Judge, 
repentance is the bright expression of the ethical and the ethical 
man is capable of achieving it without external aid, i.e., divine 
grace."[40] Hence it is understandable that Dunning, amongst 
others, asserts that "it is clear that it [the movement of 
infinite resignation] must be classified as ethical."[41] Indeed, 
this movement of infinite resignation is quite compatible with the 
ethical sphere as the view of life. By this movement of 
resignation one gains one’s "eternal consciousness".[42] And "in 
the infinite resignation there is peace and rest."(FT, pp. 45, 
49=FTL, p. 56, 60)
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However, I am not sure whether the movement of infinite
resignation is only in the realm of the ethical sphere. One might 
think that it is not only in the ethical sphere, since it is also 
the characteristic of what Climacus later calls religiousness 
A.[43] But religiousness A is quite compatible with the ethical 
sphere. Therefore, one can detect an ethical understanding of the
ethical aspect of life in the movement of infinite resignation
which the person in religiousness A makes. In relation to the God 
to whom the knight of resignation relates, he can only make the 
movement of infinite resignation, and that is the end. There is
no return back to the finite, and there is no new creation by God.
In contrast with the movement of infinite resignation, the 
movement of faith consists of a double movement. First, there is
the movement of infinite resignation. But it is immediately
followed by the movement to the finite.(cf. FT, p. 38=FTL, p, 
48) That is, by faith one gets back the finiteness which one has
given up. Johannes says: "He resigned everything infinitely, and
then he grasped everything again by virtue of the absurd."(FT, p. 
40=FTL, p. 51) Actually, the situation is more like the following 
saying of Abraham: "But it will not happen, or if it does, the 
Lord will give me a new Isaac, that is, by virtue of the 
absurd."(FT, p. 115=FTL, p. 124) Hence, as G. Clive observes, 
"had he [Abraham] despaired of getting Isaac back, he would have 
lacked faith, the capacity to believe in the possibility of the 
impossible."[44] Here is his faith. "By faith," as Mackey says, 
"he receives the world, symbolized by Isaac, after he has let it
go."[45] There is thus "a new creation by virtue of the
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absurd.«(FT, p. 40=FTL, p. 51)
This is "repetition" in Kierkegaard's sense of the word (that 
is, not just monotonous repetition of the same thing which goes 
back to the same first without any change, but fulfilling 
repetition which goes to a higher place), though this concept was 
enlarged later by another pseudonymous author Constantine 
Constantius.[46] For repetition is the same as the double movement 
of faith.[47] In this sense, the repetition remains transcendent
and the word "transcendent" must be understood in the Christian
sense: only God is able to grant this repetition. Indeed 
Kierkegaard says that repetition "is a transcendent, religious 
movement by virtue of the absurd which sets in, when you have 
arrived at the limits of the wonderful. "[48] We can thus agree 
with Mackey when he says that in "the Christian believer the
paradox of Abraham will repeat itself when he attempts to live the 
new life that is given to him beyond the extremity of guilt and 
condemnation."[493 Actually, it is here in this double movement of 
faith that the paradoxical character of faith (which Abraham has) 
appears. This very point is one which Johannes intends to show in 
Fear and Trembling.f501 Because of this unfailing faith in God 
Abraham can receive Isaac with joy and thanksgiving.(FT, p. 
36=FTL, p. 46)
Here one important question can be raised: can the movement
of faith be a movement which is added to the movement of infinite
resignation? So that if one makes the movement of infinite
resignation, then what is needed is to make the second movement to
the finite? Or is the double movement of faith as a whole a new
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movement which one should make? In the next few paragraphs I want
to show that the double movement of faith as a whole is completely
different from the movement of infinite resignation.
At first glance, however, the way in which Johannes puts his
discussion may suggest that the former is the case. That is, if
one has made the movement of infinite resignation, only the second
movement of finite is needed. For one thing, there is a passage
which runs as follows:
Infinite resignation is the last stage before faith, so that 
anyone who has not made this movement does not have faith; for 
only in infinite resignation do I become conscious of my 
eternal validity, and only then can one speak of grasping 
existence by virtue of faith.(FT, p. 46=FTL, p. 57)
So it is understandable that there are some scholars who think
that the movement of infinite resignation is a pre-condition of 
faith[51], or that one must be a knight of infinite resignation 
before becoming a knight of faith.[52]
However, when we look at this problem closely, we can find
that this is not the case. For in the movement of faith, the 
first movement of infinite resignation must also be related to 
that of faith. Arbaugh and Arbaugh say: "Faith does include
infinite resignation before God but it also include trust in face
of the absurd...it is. r^jaA.gp&-tipji Milk jAiyineix j.psjjr.e.d tcaafc 
added to it. Abraham still believed in God’s promise in the very
moment when God required him to destroy the instrument of
promise."[53] Mackey’s following description of the situation also 
makes it clear that there is a close relation between resignation
and faith in Abraham’s case. He says that "even while he gave him
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up, Abraham believed that God would not require Isaac or that, 
requiring him, He would yet give him back.”[54]
Hence the infinite resignation of Agamemnon is quite
different from that of Abraham who makes this movement of
resignation in relation to his faith. Only if Abraham had done 
something for a great ethical cause (cf. FT, p. 21=FTL, p. 35) 
would he have been a tragic hero just like Agamemnon who offered 
his daughter for the welfare of the nation. If this were the
case, Abraham would also be only in the movement of infinite
resignation, and his movement of infinite resignation would be
"the surrogate of faith"(FTL, p. 46), or "a substitute for
faith."(FT, p. 35) But Abraham in the real story offered Isaac
still having the faith that God is faithful to His own promise.
This point is clear in the following quotation:
But what did Abraham do?...During all this time he had faith - 
he had faith that God would not demand Isaac of him, and yet 
he was willing to sacrifice him if it was demanded. He had 
faith by virtue of the absurd.... He climbed the mountain, 
and even in the moment when the knife gleamed he had faith - 
that God would not require Isaac.(FT, pp. 35f.=FTL, 46)
According to this passage, the double movement of faith is carried 
out thoroughly only by faith. If there were no faith from the 
first, Abraham’s act could not be regarded as the act of faith, 
the movement of faith. According to Johannes, "he [the knight of 
faith] is continually making the movements of infinity, but he 
does it with such precision and assurance that he continually gets 
finitude out of it."(FT, p. 40f.=FTL, p. 51) Hence there is a 
difference between the infinite resignation of the movement of
infinite resignation and the infinite resignation of the movement
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of faith.
Accordingly, the movement of faith is different from the
movement of infinite resignation from the first. Hence the double 
movement of faith is a totally new movement. As far as the first
movement of infinite resignation of the movement of faith is
concerned, it looks similar to the movement of infinite
resignation. However, even at this stage the movement of faith is 
different from the movement of infinite resignation in so far as 
the infinite resignation of the movement of faith is related to
faith.[553
From this consideration, we can think that while the movement 
of infinite resignation is quite compatible with the ethical view
of the ethical aspect of human life, the movement of faith is 
quite incompatible with the ethical understanding of the ethical 
aspect of human life.[56] And at the same time, we can also think 
that there is a new way of looking at the act of the knight of 
faith. This new way of looking at the act of faith can become 
clearer in the consideration of the meaning of the teleological
suspension of the ethical.
Let us then think about the exact meaning of the teleological 
suspension of the ethical. The true character of the teleological 
suspension of the ethical appears in comparing it with the cases
in which there is no question of a teleological suspension of the
ethical itself. Johannes lists three cases which are similar to
the Abraham-Isaac case, but yet do not have a teleological 
suspension of the ethical: the cases of Agamemnon, of Jephthah,
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and of Brutus.(FT, p. 58=FTL, p. 69) These tragic heroes are 
still in the ethical. Actually, these oases are alluded to in an
attempt to see if the sacrifice of Isaac can possibly find a place 
within the confines of ethics.(cf. FT, p. 57=FTL, p. 67) What
Johannes finds is that whereas the acts of these heroes can be
ethically justifiable, the case of Abraham cannot be understood in
this way. These tragic heroes are confronted with a situation in 
which public (social) and private morality conflict. Their 
sacrifices, as the result of ethical consideration in this 
conflict, are higher expressions of the ethical. Hence they "can 
claim", as Swenson suggests, "a higher ethical justification for 
[their] deed."[57] In the comparison between the ethical duties, 
one ethical duty (e.g., keeping a whole nation) appears as higher 
than another duty (e.g., keeping one’s child’s life). So they put 
that higher ethical duty above the other duty. Hence when the 
tragic hero has to sacrifice his own child for the greater good of 
the whole nation, people somewhat easily understand this behaviour 
and even respect him for the courage in carrying it out. His act 
of sacrifice is understandable by all and in the realm of the 
universal. Therefore, since everything is moving only in the 
realm of the ethical sphere[58], there is no question of a 
teleological suspension of the ethical. Moreover, the idea of a
teleological suspension of the ethical itself, for him who has the 
ethical understanding of ethics, is contradictory.
Only when a higher tel os outside of the ethical enters, there 
is a teleological suspension of the ethical. In this case, the
telos is not a higher ethical telos, for it is outside the ethical
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sphere. Hence even the thought that this telos is outside the
ethical is itself outside the ethical sphere as a view of life.
But this does not mean that Johannes who thinks of this
teleological suspension of the ethical in relation to Abraham’s
case is outside the ethical sphere. He only sees that for Abraham 
there is a teleological suspension of the ethical, and asserts 
that he cannot understand such a suspension as Abraham makes. 
Johannes is only in the realm of religiousness in general, which 
is later designated religiousness A by another pseudonymous author 
Johannes Climacus.[593 And yet, as we have seen, according to the 
rationalistic view of ethics, which the person in religiousness A 
has, the ethical is the absolute telos.(FT, p. 54=FTL, p. 64) 
That is, within the rationalistic view of ethics, there is no 
question of a teleological suspension of the ethical. If there is 
any question of a teleological suspension of the ethical, then it
means that the case is outside the ethical view of life. What
Johannes means by a teleological suspension of the ethical is that
the ethical sphere as a whole is suspended for the interests of a 
higher telos outside the ethical sphere. Then, the person who is 
involved in this teleological suspension of the ethical by
accepting a telos outside the ethical, is also outside the ethical 
sphere by the act of faith. As Hannay says: "He places himself 
outside the self-sufficient universalistic ethics.”[60] Indeed, 
Johannes describes Abraham in this way; "By his act he overstepped 
the ethical entirely."(FTL, p. 69=FT, 59)
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What then is the tel os which makes this teleological
suspension of the ethical? Johannes does not give us a direct
answer to this question. But he intimates that God, or the 
absolute relationship with God is the telos.(cf. FT, p. 59=FTL, 
p. 70) Abraham carried out God’s command not from the 
rationalistic judgement of what is universal, but for the sole 
reason that God commanded it. His primary concern is sincerely to 
devote himself, and what is dearest to him, to God. So we can 
agree with Valone when he says that ”what Kierkegaard wants to 
argue is that a moral philosophy must be subordinate to God."[61]
In relation to this, let us ask, how does one live after
experiencing the teleological suspension of the ethical? Does one 
live in the ethical sphere, or does one live by faith at every 
moment of one’s life? That is, does "the ethical” as a view of 
life (’’sphere”) reappear after the momentary teleological 
suspension of the ethical, or is the ethical view of life 
continuously suspended in the existence of the knight of faith?
Some commentators think that this suspension is only
momentary. For example, Arbaugh and Arbaugh say that ”the man of 
faith...feels obliged to temporarily set aside or suspend it [the 
universal imperative of the ethical].”[62] So after the momentary 
exceptional experience, the knight of faith lives according to the 
ethical imperative. According to this interpretation of the book, 
one may draw out from Johannes’ discussion of this story an 
understanding that what is ethical is absolute; the ethical in the 
ethical sphere is the ethical in the Christian sphere; the ethical 
is always the same. And, as we can see in this book, there can be
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"a teleological suspension of the ethical” for a moment for a
religious person. As far as his ordinary life is concerned, he is
an ethical person who is under the duty of the ethical imperative. 
Yet if there were a direct command of God at a special moment,
then there ought to be such a suspension of the ethical for a
moment. And after that moment, he would return to the ethical 
sphere; the ethical is absolute for him as for the person in the
ethical sphere. Therefore, the difference between the ethical 
person and the religious person can only be found where there is
such a direct intervention of God.
Is this really the case? We have to look at the text more
carefully. According to Johannes, Abraham is always in relation 
to God at every moment in his life. As Mackey says, "[Abraham’s]
whole life after faith is a new creation in which he does not the
least thing but ’by virtue of the absurd’."[63] If he is not doing 
this continuously, he cannot be the knight of faith.(cf. FT, p. 
122f.=FTL, p. 131) Hence the movement of faith is continued
throughout his life; "at every moment, he makes the movement of 
faith."(FT, p. 115=FTL, p. 124) As Johannes says, "every moment 
of his life he buys the opportune time at the highest price, for 
he does not do eys.P the slightest thing except hSL -virtue c£ the 
absurd."(FT. p. 40=FTL, p. 51, emphasis given). In one place, 
Johannes describes the life of one who is making the movement of 
faith as follows: "[To] live happily every moment this wav by
virtue of the absurd...not to find rest in the pain of resignation 
but to find joy by virtue of the absurd - this is wonderful."[64] 
The movement of faith is the task of his existence; faith is "a
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task for a whole lifetime."(FT, p. 7=FTL, p. 23) "Fear and 
trembling” of faith continue to the last hour of a believer’s 
life, who has fought ”the good fight [of faith] and kept the 
faith". He has fear and trembling of faith at every moment in his 
life, for he exists coram Deo at every moment. [65]
Actually, in Fear and Trembling, what is emphasized is the
continuation of Abraham’s faith. Abraham — who by faith
"emigrated from the land of his fathers and became an alien in the 
premised land"(FT, p. 17=FTL, p. 31), who by faith "received the 
promise that in his seed all the generations of the earth would be 
blessed"(FT, p. 17=FTL, p. 32), who believed this promise even 
when "it became unreasonable"(FT, p. 17=FTL, p. 32), who by 
faith "accepted the fulfillment of the premise"(FT, p. 18=FTL, p. 
33), who "had fought with time and kept his faith"(FT, p. 19=FTL, 
p. 33) — believed God and his faithfulness even in the situation 
in which everything seems to be lost and "even in the moment when 
the knife gleamed".[66] Here we can see the continual nature of 
his faith. His faith is not something which exists at one moment, 
but soon disappears at the next. He believes in God at every 
moment. If Abraham has faith, he always lives in the paradoxical
relationship of faith. If we understand the double movement of 
faith in this way, we can understand that "faith is a way of 
life". We can also understand the true meaning of the spiritual 
trial. If Abraham did not have faith, if he lived only in the 
ethical sphere before this event, this event cannot be a spiritual 
trial, for there is nothing that can be shown through this trial. 
Only if Abraham lived by faith continuously can this event be an
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occasion in which Abraham shows the faith which he had and keeps
even in this situation. This' book shows clearly that Abraham 
continued to believe in God and His promise; he did not doubt even
for a moment. At every moment he made the movement of faith.
The life of the knight of faith can also observed in his
relation to the absolute duty to God. When he made the movement
of faith, for him as the knight of faith, the ethical which had
been the absolute, the divine, "reduced to the relative in
contradistinction to the absolute relation to God."(FT, P.
71=FTL, p. 81) His ethics is not autonomous but comes from his
relation to God. As Dupre says, "the relationship with the
Absolute in faith has changed the whole perspective of
ethics."[67] He only lives by faith. He carries out God’s command 
Hillinglx sj-BURly. Xegausg fiod .gomsuided IL. He al&ayp lives in 
lively relation with God, (of. JP, IV, 4462(Pap. X 3 A 394)) Or 
else "faith has never existed".[68]
Here there is one of the differences between the ethical
person’s understanding of ethics and the Christian’s
understanding. From the perspective of the ethical person, what
is rationalistic and autonomous is the ethical. If we understand
ethics only in terms of the rationalistic understanding of ethics, 
then we have to say that the act of the knight of faith cannot be 
justified (in terms of the ethical understanding of the ethical 
aspect of life). He cannot be ethical from the perspective of the 
person who is in the ethical sphere. He is outside the universal
which is the fundamental character of the ethical understanding of
the ethical aspect of life. From the perspective of the ethical
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sphere, he is irrational, behaving heteronomously and fanatically.
But from the perspective of the knight of faith, what is
important is not what is autonomous and rationalistic, and
therefore what is regarded as the universal by the ethical person.
What is really important for the knight of faith, is that which is
in relation to God. For the ethical person like Kant, however, 
such a relation to God, as Perkins says, "is heteronomous, 
unnatural, irrational, and ununiversalizable."[69] However, he who 
has known the living God "determines his relation to the universal
by his relation to the absolute, not his relation to the absolute 
by his relation to the universal."(FT, p. 70=FTL, p. 80) Yet 
this can happen only when we see the possibility of understanding 
the ethical aspect of human life differently from the perspective 
of the ethical person.[70] Only when we accept the existence of 
the telos which is outside the ethical sphere, can we see the act
of the knight of faith differently from the person who is in the 
ethical sphere. Only in the teleological suspension of the
ethical is there a possibility for one to see the act of Abraham
as the act of faith.
To repeat, from the perspective of the ethical person Abraham 
is "crazy"(FTL, p. 86) or "mad"(FT, p. 76); his act in this 
story is irrational or morally perverse.[71] But if one has a 
perspective in which one can think of a teleological suspension of 
the ethical, then one sees the situation differently. As Evans
says:
The person who lacks [faith] will find these commands 
unintelligible....But the trusting believer will see things 
otherwise. Because he believes...he regards these commands as
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.aufcj.eg. [72]
Or, as Carnell says:
When Abraham learnt what it meant to live before God (coram 
Deo), absolute devotion to the details of the ethics was 
replaced by the absolute devotion to the will of God.[733
From this perspective of faith, the believer can say that 
"love to God may bring the knight of faith to give his love to the 
neighbor."(FT, p. 70=FTL, p. 80) His love to his neighbour - 
which can be understood as the basic expression of Christian
ethics - is based on his love to God.[74] For the believer, 
therefore, ethics is not autonomous, it is dependent on God.(cf. 
JP, IV 4768(Pap. X 4 A 141)) As Blanshard puts it: "The ultimate 
source of right and wrong is the will of God, and the knight of 
faith...will at every moment of life be in the service of his 
royal master [God],"[75] Here appears a new ethics which is 
different from the autonomous, rationalistic, and immanent ethics 
of the ethical sphere.[76] Perkins also sees this point and says: 
"[Kierkegaard’s] principle task here is to set forth the problem 
of a religious ethics when faced by the demand of a rationalistic
ethic."[77] The absolute relation to God makes the believer 
understand the ethical aspect of human life from the perspective 
of the absolute relationship with God.(of. JP, I, 894=Pap. IV C 
72) From this standpoint, Kierkegaard, in one of his journal 
entries, says: "Kant held that man was his own law (autonomy) 
i.e., bound himself under the law which he gave himself. In a
deeper sense that means: lawlessness or
experimentation. "(Journals, No. 1041=JP, I, l88=Pap. X2 A 396) 
For, as Malantschuk says, "from the religious standpoint, it
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appears that even man’s best endeavors in the human-ethical domain
are basically an expression of self-assertion. ”[78] Hence we can 
agree with Kerrigan when he says: "Kierkegaard came to discern in
the faith of Abraham...willed renunciation of autonomous
will.... "[79] Johannes describes the situation of the knight of 
faith in the following way: "Anyone placed in such a position is 
sn effiignant frjom ihe sphere the jjniyfinssi. "(ft, p. 115=FTL, p. 
124, emphasis given) He no longer lives in the sphere of the 
universal, that is, the ethical sphere and religiousness A which
is commensurable with the ethical view of life.
Up to now we have closely examined several points which lead
us to the conclusion that in Fear and Trembling a tension between
the rationalistic understanding of the ethical aspect of life and 
that of the knight of faith is discussed in depth. In the course
of our discussion we have seen that the principle by which the 
knight of faith acts is quite different, and incompatible with 
that of the ethical person. We have also seen that religiousness 
A, which is shown in the person and thought of Johannes de 
Silentio, is quite commensurable with the ethical sphere. These 
points show that what is ethical in the ethical sphere would be
the absolute and the best which man could think and do, if there
were no God who had such a particular relationship with man. 
However, we have also seen complexities and therefore, the
possibility of a different understanding and interpretation of the 
problem of ethics as it is treated in Fear and Trembling. This 
makes me ask it there is some other book in which Kierkegaard more 
clearly shows this difference between the ethics of the person in
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the ethical sphere and Christian ethics. With an affirmative
answer to this question, let us turn to Works of Love.
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II
In this section, I want to show that Christian ethics
understood by Kierkegaard as the ethics of Christian love in Works 
of Love is based on his Christian faith.[1] This implies the 
following three things. Firstly, Christian ethics of love is a 
response to the Christian God’s love. Secondly, Christian love 
always has this God as its middle term; Christian love is one’s 
relationship with others as one relates to God. Thirdly,
Christian ethics as understood in terms of love also has social
implications. That is, Christian love can also be applied to
social relationships.
In the course of this discussion, a clear contrast will be
made between the Christian understanding of love and the
understanding of the person in the ethioal sphere. As we shall
see, it is difficult to say that the Christian and the natural man
have the same understanding of ethics, and that Christian love is 
merely the identification of the ethical relationship between one 
man and another. For, as we shall show, their conceptions of love
are substantially different from one another.
Before proceeding to show this, a brief understanding of the
text which we shall examine in this section is in order. It is
very obvious that Works of Love is a book in which Kierkegaard 
develops his understanding of Christian ethics in terms of "works 
of love".[2] This book is quite obviously a Christian writing. It
has a subtitle which makes this fact clear: Some Christian
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Reflections in the Form of Discourses. True to this subtitle, the
book is in a sense a kind of exposition of some verses in the New 
Testament (e.g., Luke 6:44, Matt 22:39, Romans 13:8, 10, I Tim
1:5, I John 4:20, I Cor. 8:1, 13:5, 7, 13). And in this book, as 
Croxall says, "New Testament ethics are taken seriously and 
literally."[3] This ethics is considered to be the ethics of 
Christian love. Kierkegaard makes it quite clear that in this
book he is talking about "the love about which Christianity 
speaks."(WL, p. 7) He sometimes speaks very directly of 
"Christian love".(WL, pp. 7, 20, 25, 41, et passim) This book is 
not a neutral reflection on the theme of love, but rather it is a
Christian reflection on Christian love. But this does not mean
that what is considered in this book is only a part of love as a 
whole. On the contrary, Kierkegaard believes and asserts that 
Christianity "has made manifest what love [really] is."(WL, p. 
44) So for him "Christian love is the essential love, as, from the 
Christian viewpoint, there is only one kind of love."[4] For
Christianity "has transformed everything, has transformed all 
love."(WL, p. 119) So only Christian love is regarded as the true 
love, love divinely understood, love eternal, and love the supreme
good.
Let us then begin the main discussion of this section: the
proposition that Christian ethics as works of love are based on
Christian faith. As I have indicated, this proposition will be 
discussed from the following three perspectives: (1) Christian 
ethics as expressed in Works of Love is a response to the
Christian God’s love, (2) Christian love has this God as its
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middle term, and (3) Christian ethics as works of love has social 
implications.
(a)
Let us start with a consideration that Christian love is a
response to the Christian God’s love. This point is rather less 
obvious in the main discussion of love in this book. However, 
this is what is presupposed in it, and there are some indications
of this fact in this book. One of the most important indications
of this can be found in the ”Prayer” at the beginning of the 
book. (WL, p. Jj) The inexhaustibly fertile contents of this prayer 
cannot be analyzed in full here. However, we can make several 
important observations about it. First of all, it must be borne 
in mind that the one who is the object (or, more accurately, the 
other subject) of this prayer, the one who hears this prayer is 
the Christian God. He is understood in this prayer as the triune
God. Kierkegaard repeats three times this clause "How could 
anything rightly be said about love if Thou wert forgotten”, and 
after each of them he calls God ”Thou God of Love, from whom all 
love comes in heaven and on earth”{God the Father}, ’’Thou, our 
Saviour and Redeemer, who gave Himself to save us”{God the Son}, 
and ”Thou Spirit of Love”{God the Spirit}. He makes this prayer 
to this triune God. Secondly, therefore, when he speaks of God as
”God of Love” or ’’Thou who art love”, these cannot be understood 
as reducing God to the concept of love, or the principle of love,
or love itself understood as an Abstract. To repeat the
old-fashioned expression, Kierkegaard calls God love, but does not 
call love (as an abstract concept or the principle of love) God.
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Kierkeg&ard’s God is personal.[5] God, for Kierkegaard, cannot be 
reduced to an abstract principle of love. And thirdly, only in
relation to this personal triune God can one properly speak about
love, and works of love. One may say that only when one comes to
know God can one know what love is, not the other way around. God
who loves us, who gave Himself to save us, and who reminds the 
believer to love as he is loved by this God, is the fundamental
presupposition of Christian love. If this is the case, what is
described in relation to God the Father is also best understood as
being related to this special love, "the Agape of the Cross", to 
use Nygren’s words. [6] Then the expression, "so the lover is only 
what he is through being in Thee", for example, also means that
one can love only in relation to this trinitarian God who
expressed His love in His salvific works, rather than generally
that everybody who loves in any sense is in fact in God.
To put these three points in a sentence, we may say that
Kierkegaard understands God’s love as the salvific love of the
trinitarian God. God the Father is described as the origin of 
love "from whom all love comes"; God the Son as the one who
conclusively expressed this love through giving "Himself to save
us all"; and God the Spirit as the one who makes us know and
remember the sacrifice of love which God the Son offered.
From this trinitarian-soteriological understanding of love,
Kierkegaard draws out the characteristics of Christian love which
we as Christians have to express. That is, first of all, to love 
as we are loved by God; to love our neighbour as ourselves. 
Moreover, since it is based on God’s love which accomplished the
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redemption and is under the works of the Holy Spirit, it is
"without claim or merit". In this sense, this prayer succinctly
reflects what Kierkegaard tries to say in this volume as a whole.
But some people may raise an objection that such a trinitarian
understanding of love is expressed here because it is a prayer and
so follows the traditional way of expressing one's prayer. So let
us think about whether such a trinitarian-soteriological 
understanding of love is confined to this prayer, or can also be 
found in other places in this volume.
It is true that expressions about the Trinity are rare in 
this book. We have already suggested the reason for this: in
this book Kierkegaard presupposes the traditional understanding of
the Trinity.[73 There is, however, one place in which Kierkegaard
clearly speaks of the Trinity centering on God the Son. He says:
He was One with the Father, and in community of love was One 
with the Father and the Holy Spirit, He who loved the whole 
race, our Lord Jesus Christ....He was indeed the God-Man, and 
so eternally different from every other man, but He was, 
nevertheless, also true man, tried everything human.(WL, p. 
125)
This description centres on God the Son who was incarnate as
Jesus. But it is quite clear that the incarnate One is One with 
God the Father and the Holy Spirit and that He is the God-Man,
true Godfvere deus) and true manfvere homo) at the same time.
Such an understanding is presupposed throughout the book. For
Kierkegaard, who thinks of the event of Incarnation as that of 
love in order to save us (i.e., salvific love), frequently 
mentions this love of God. For example, he says: "God loved us
first....[When] the question was about reconciliation, God was the
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one who came first". [8]
Hence God’s love is prior. However, as Kierkegaard says in
one of his journal entries, "all by himself no man can ever come
to think that God loves him. This must be proclaimed to men.
This is the gospel, this is revelation."(JP, II, 12l6(Pap. VIII 1 
A 675)) And according to Kierkegaard, Christ and the Christ event 
is the expression of God’s love for us. Christ is our Saviour who 
saves us. [9] Hence we may say with Mackintosh that "we find no 
cause to doubt the truth of [Kierkegaard’s] impassioned 
affirmation that for him also the certainty of God’s fatherly love 
in Christ was the Archimedean point."[10] But at the same time 
Christ is our Teacher(WL, p. 99), or Pattern.(WL, pp. 214, 
233)[113 That is to say, Christ saves us to make us follow Him. 
What is emphasized in this book is that what must be learnt and
imitated is love expressed by Christ.[12] Through Christ we learn 
of the nature of God’s love. Actually, this book asserts that 
Christ is the only source of true love. Kierkegaard says that 
"what love is, divinely understood, this the best of men could 
learn only from Him [Christ]."[13]
Let us then consider at length how Kierkegaard understands 
the love of Christ. Basically, Christ "loved by virtue of the 
divine understanding of what love is."(WL, p. 90) By this 
assertion Kierkegaard emphasizes the difference between the human 
understanding of love and the divine understanding of love.
Throughout this book, Kierkegaard observes the conflict between 
the human (understanding of) love, or the earthly love, or worldly 
(understanding of) love, on the one hand, and the divine
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understanding of love, or spiritual love, or Christian 
(understanding of) love, on the other.[14] And he says: 
"[Christianity] really knows only one kind of love, spiritual 
love."(WL, p. 116. cf. pp. 118f.) And this love is concretely 
revealed by the God-Man. This is one of the strongest assertions 
which Kierkegaard makes in this book.(cf. WL, pp. 21, 44, 89f, 
97f.> 116, et passim) In this sense, Kierkegaard himself thinks 
that this book is "the powerful polemic."(JP, V, 6111(Pap. VIII 1 
A 559)) What is the fundamental difference between "true love as 
God understands it" (or "spiritual love") and "earthly love"? 
This we shall consider in detail in relation to the second point
of this section that Christian love is love which has God as the
middle term. Here I shall just point out three characteristics
which are expressed in Kierkegaard’s description of Christ’s love.
First of all. Christ’s love was "the fulfilment of law", and 
therefore "the fullness of the law".[15] (When Kierkegaard speaks 
of the law he is speaking of the law of God.[16]) When Kierkegaard 
speaks of Christ’s love as "the fulfilment of law", he is thinking 
of two closely related points. One of them is the fact that
Christ’s love was one which accomplished completely the demand of 
God; what was demanded in the law was thoroughly carried out by 
Christ. In this sense, he is the fulfilment of the law. But
there is another point which we also have to consider in relation
to this phrase "the fulfilment of the law". That is that the
ultimate demand of the law of God is love in the divine sense. In
relation to this point Kierkegaard says:
[There] is no more conflict between the law and love than 
there is between the sum and those numbers whose sum it is; as
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little as there is conflict between the vain attempt to find 
the sum and the successful finding of it, the happy decision 
that it has been found.(WL, p. 86)
Here we can see the profile of Kierkegaard who is overcoming and
transcending the traditional Lutheran dualism of law and
gospel.[17] And according to Kierkegaard, Christ's love satisfied
the demand of love as the sum of what is demanded in the law.
The second characteristic of Christ’s love drawn from Works
jq£_ Love is that Christ’s love was perpetually active. (WL, pp.
8lf.) His love is always new, for he always actively loves with
the love of eternity.(WL, p. 82) Such an activity can only come
from the fact that He loves with love as it is divinely
understood. Hence this activity of love also implies the
limitlessness of His love in loving others.(WL, p. 129) Christ's
love as perpetually active love is boundless in its activity of
loving.
The third characteristic is closely related to the last one, 
for the fact that "His love recognized no difference” (our third 
point) can also be observed as an expression of the fact that He 
always loved actively (our second point). His love did not know
any difference. In this sense His love was limitless in its
width. As Kierkegaard says, ”His sole wish was that everyone .?
should become His disciple.”(WL, p. 82) Christ loved with love 
which had these characteristics. Kierkegaard says:
•f*
He [Christ] Xsyejd ±y ylrt.ue of the .fl.iy.ine under.s.t.anfli,ng of 
what love is.... Therefore His whole life was a terrible 
collision with the purely human understanding of what love *
is....Thus Christianity came into the world, and with 4
Christianity came the divine explanation of what love is.(WL, 
p. 90, emphasis given)
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So far we have discussed the love which Christ showed us.
Having discussed the characteristics of God’s love revealed in
Christ’s act of love, we have to ask: how does this love relate
to our acts of love? In the next few paragraphs, I shall discuss
this.
The existence of the God-Man as the only true expression of
love divinely understood urges us to respond to this divine 
love.[18] In this sense, Christian love is basically a response to 
God’s love expressed in the existence of Jesus Christ as the 
God-Man. [19] The fact that one is loved by Christ in this way 
makes one aware of one’s responsibility to love others in the same 
way. In this sense, Kierkegaard speaks of Christ as the 
pattern.(WL, pp. 23, 214, 233) What Kierkegaard wants to say here 
is that the Christian must be aware that he is the one who is
supposed to resemble Christ. In this act of resembling Him, one 
can resemble God and be God’s fellow-labourer.(WL, p. 52)
We have already observed that God definitely expressed His
love in the redemptive love of Christ. Hence the Christian is
commanded to love as a person who was enabled to love, not by his 
own power, but with the love which was given to him. To put this 
differently, the spontaneity of Christian love, as Arbaugh and 
Arbaugh say, ’’springs directly from the life of faith. ”[20] Hence, 
in relation to the Christian’s experience, there is no conflict 
between God’s command and one’s spontaneous love. For, as Watson
well observes, Christian love "means a whole-hearted surrender to 
God, whereby man becomes God’s willing slave, content to be at His 
disposal, having entire trust and confidence in Him and desiring
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only that His will should be done."[21] Here we can see one of the 
basic differences between the Christian perspective, on the one
hand, and the ethical perspective and the perspective of
religiousness A, on the other. Let us consider this matter more
closely.
In one place, Kierkegaard asserts that love is a matter of 
heart and of conscience by using biblical referenced Tim. 1:5). 
He says that "[love] must be from a pure heart, and of a good 
conscience, and of an unfeigned faith."(WL, p. 111, 119) When he 
says this, he is thinking of heart and conscience as understood by 
Christianity. The heart of which he is thinking is not neutral, 
but is related to God. "[This] heart," says Kierkegaard, "must be 
bound to God.... the heart must be bound inimitably to God, if it 
will be pure. "(WL, p. 120) Likewise for him conscience is also
basically related to God. As he says: "[What] is conscience? In
the conscience it is God who looks at a man, so the man must in
everything see God. Thus does God educate."(WL, p. 304) In
another place, he speaks of conscience as the
God-relationship. [22] In this sense, Croxall is quite right when 
he says that "there is no conscience, according to Kierkegaard, 
without God."[23] Hence love comes from the heart bound to God, 
and of a good conscience which is regarded as the
God-relationship. This means that if our heart is not bound to
ansi If PUL po-PaUed conscience does pot know the
GP.d-reJ-^-tjPlLsMp, ip the repl pepge pe eppppt love with the love
divinely understood. In other words, only in relation to God can 
we understand and do what is commanded by God.(WL, p. 21) So only
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when one is in relation to God is there no conflict between the
divine command to love and spontaneous love. When such a person
loves, he loves voluntarily and spontaneously, but he is basically
commanded by God to love.
In this sense, Christian love, as a response to God’s love,
is regarded as duty. Here is a new understanding of duty. From
this Christian perspective, duty is not something which can be 
found out autonomously by rationalistic, and universalistic moral 
judgement as understood in the ethical sphere and religiousness A. 
Rather duty is what is commanded by Christ.[24] When Christ says 
that "Thou shalt love", then that is precisely one’s duty.(WL, p. 
20) The Christian is commanded to love others as he was loved, and 
"such a commandment has not originated in any human heart."(WL, 
pp. 20-21) We have already observed that this love of God is 
definitely expressed in the redemptive love of Christ.
In another place, Kierkegaard shows this (i.e., that 
Christian love is one’s response to God’s love expressed by
Christ) by using the concept of debt. He says that love may be
regarded as an infinite debt. At first glance, the meaning may be
ambiguous. But when we see the intention with which Kierkegaard
uses this concept, we can understand that by debt Kierkegaard
means a debt of love which the Christian owes God. Let us first
quote one passage.
However, love is perhaps most correctly described as an 
infinite debt...Generally we say about the one who is loved, 
that through being loved he becomes a debtor...[but] he who 
loves is [also] in an infinite debt...when the lover gives 
what is infinitely the highest gift one man can give another, 
his love, then he places himself in an infinite debt.(WL, p. 
143)
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In this passage, Kierkegaard says that both the one who is loved
by another and the one who loves another are in an infinite debt.
He intimates that one can easily understand this expression in 
relation to the one who is loved by somebody else. But by saying 
that the one who loves is also in an infinite debt, he indicates 
that he is not talking about an ordinary case of the debt of love. 
Here we have to ask what makes Kierkegaard assert that "to love is 
to assume an infinite debt.”(WL, p. 152) It is not easy to answer 
this question, but one may find a clue in Kierkegaard’s emphasis 
on remaining in debt. That is to say, the true lover always
wishes to remain in debt; he does not think at any moment that he 
has done all the things which he has to do in relation to the 
person he is loving.(cf. WL, p. 152) For, as Shmueli says, "the 
love of others is a debt that constantly increases even while one 
attempts to pay it off. It is an infinite involvement; the more 
one loves the more one needs to love. ”[25] So in a 
love-relationship one must do everything but "fear only one thing, 
that he might thus do everything so that he would get out of 
debt.”(WL, p. 145) The duty to love thus includes the duty to
remain in the debt of love to each other. So there is no
resting-place in the works of love.[26] The true lover is always 
awake and working, for such a lover always feels himself as a
debtor.
Kierkegaard describes such a debt-relationship in the 
following way, (and here we can finally find the answer to the 
question raised above):
This debt-relation is carried over into the relation between 
man and God. It is God who, so to speak, kindly takes charge
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of the demand of love; by loving a man the lover comes into an 
infinite debt - but also a debt to God as guardian of the 
beloved. Now comparison becomes impossible, and now love has 
found its master.(WL, p. 153)
Here God is expressed as the master of love, and it is asserted
that everybody must be related to this God in their love. So in
the end, one is in an infinite debt only in relation to God. "God
is love", says Kierkegaard, "hence the individual must remain in
debt - as God judges him, or as he abides in God, for only in the 
infinitude of debt can God abide in him."(WL, p. 154) Hence the 
one who places himself in an infinite debt in loving others thinks
and acts in relation to God at every moment of his life. He is
always in an infinite debt in his loving. For "before God [we 
have] by no means been able to pay the debt of loving one 
another!"(WL, p. 155)
But here one of the most difficult questions may be raised: 
can one love in this way by oneself? Kierkegaard gives a very 
definite answer to this question: it is not possible for one to 
love others with this love by oneself. As Malantschuk correctly 
observes: "The distance between a person’s ability and the ideal 
is at its greatest here [the divine command of love], which makes 
man’s need of grace especially obvious."[27] That is to say, one 
can carry out this divine command of love only in relation to the 
works of God the Spirit. So the true lover can only be described 
as follows: "[The true lover] breathes in God, he draws the
nourishment for his love from God, he is strengthened through 
God."(WL, p. 197) In this sense, God is the origin of love. And
in relation to this, Kierkegaard says that "a man’s love is
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grounded... in the love of God....[Human] love mysteriously 
grounded in God’s love."(WL, p. 8) So it is now clear that love 
divinely understood, or Christian love is a response to God's
love, and at the same time, this response also comes from God’s
love itself. So Christian love is, as Arbaugh and Arbaugh say, 
"the spontaneous expression of one's very being after [one] has 
been transformed by faith....[And it] is made possible through
divine grace, a power without which one could not fulfil the
good....”[28]
However, here one must be aware that Kierkegaard does not 
suggest any infusion of God's love which works automatically.[29] 
For Kierkegaard, one is before God, or related to God at every 
moment of one’s life. And in relation to God, one always finds
oneself as a person who has not yet accomplished what is demanded.
Kierkegaard himself confesses:
[I] shall admit, that many times it has offended me, and that
I am still very far from imagining that I have fulfilled this 
commandment [of love], which to flesh and blood is an offense, 
and to wisdom foolishness. (WL, p. 49)
This limitation is not only his, for every Christian has to make 
the same confession. Nobody has reached perfection and
Christianity does not teach that we can accomplish the perfection 
of love. Hence the Christian loves spontaneously, but he always 
feels that he has not completely accomplished what is demanded by
God
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Why is this the case? One of the reasons can be found in the
nature of Christian love. As we have seen, Christian love is not
something which can be accomplished at a moment once-for-all, 
rather it is a continuous activity, pure activity.[30] This also
implies that one cannot depend upon oneself even in one’s 
loving.(WL, p. 6) Kierkegaard says: "And how often has not a 
victory been won in vain, if the victor then became proud, 
conceited, arrogant, self-satisfied, and thus lost just through 
having conquered I "(WL, p. 269) For man is always in need of God. 
Without God he is too strong (in an ironical sense) by himself, so 
he does not love in the true sense and does not feel the necessity 
of being loved. However, such a man falls precisely at the moment 
in which he thinks that he is standing. Hence Kierkegaard says: 
"A man only stands then after having overcome everything, when he 
immediately, at the very moment of victory, ascribes the victory 
to God."(WL, pp. 269f. ) This is the way love always behaves. In 
this sense, Kierkegaard says that "this is the highest and truest 
wealth of the devout that he needs God"(WL, p. 9), and that ”it 
is a saving grace if you do it [to love others in the Christian 
sense]."(WL, p. 50) Such a true lover does not claim any merit, 
for he always thinks that only God does all things, and he also 
"understands that before God he is simply without merit.”[31]
Now we can understand the seriousness of the question of 
whether one can love others in the Christian way by oneself. The 
reason for the negative answer to this question lies in the fact 
that Christian love is not something which one can do by oneself.
It is possible only in relation to God. Hence we can assert, as
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we have intimated at the beginning of this discussion, that
Kierkegaard thinks that love divinely understood is originally
God’s love and the spiritual response of the human to this divine 
love.[32] This is the first characteristic of Christian love. In
the discussion of this characteristic we have also observed the
absolute difference between merely human love and Christian love.
This difference will be clearer in the discussion of the second
characteristic of Christian love.
(b)
The second characteristic of Christian love - that "God is the
middle term in one’s love" - is basically a logical consequence of 
the first characteristic, that Christian love is of divine origin 
and therefore the spiritual response of human beings to God’s
love. Kierkegaard uses this expression "the middle term" to
characterize Christian love. For example, he says:
WorJ-dly -Wi-Sdom believes that loye is a relationship between 
.B&JQ and. ©am fihxiistianitx tga.qhes that loye is a relationship 
.b&tKeen jaan - ~ jbsiLl. ihat jju. that Gjasi is the jaihdle
term.(WLr p, 87, Kierkegaard’s emphasis)
The fertile meaning of this sentence cannot be properly described 
within the limits of this section. Here I just want to adumbrate 
the meaning of the clause that "God is the middle term", by
considering it in relation to three related elements of Christian
love: "love to God", "love to neighbour", and "love to oneself".
I think that the meaning of "God is the middle term" can well be 
produced in our consideration of these related elements of love; 
"love to God" as the whole of love, "love to neighbour" as the 
outward expression of love, and "love to oneself (in the proper
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way)” as the inward expression of love. These three elements 
cannot be separated in the activity of love; they may be called
three aspects of one love. And here is the meaning of ”God is the
middle term of love.” Let us consider these three elements in
turn. .
Firstly, ’’love to God” as the origin of Christian love as a
whole. According to Christianity, God is the only One who is able 
to be the object of love. [333 In this spirit, Kierkegaard can say 
that God is not only the third person in every love-relationship, 
but that He Himself is in fact the only beloved object. 
Kierkegaard uses the expression ”love to God” and the strangely 
coined phrase ”God-relationship” interchangeably. For the true 
God-relationship is the relationship of love; to have a 
relationship with God is to love God. In one of his journal 
entries, Kierkegaard says: ”If a man really honestly says: God 
is love, then this man eo ipso has only one desire, to love God 
(who is love) with all his heart and all his strength.”(JP, I, 
538(Pap. X4 A 624)) Yet, as the expression ”God is the middle 
term of love” suggests, Kierkegaard tries to see God in the love
relationship between people as the one who is the most central in
their love relationship. So it is important for Kierkegaard to 
put the God-relationship and ”love to God” in the foreground. He 
says that "ultimately love to God is the decisive thing; from it 
stems love to the neighbor, but paganism never suspected this. 
They left God out.”(WL, p. 48) For Kierkegaard ”love to God” is 
the origin of human’s spiritual love as a whole. Without ’’love to
God”, there is no love at all.
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The criterion of being in Christian love, therefore, is only
"love to God", or a God-relationship. Kierkegaard says:
However beautiful a love-relationship has been between two or 
among many, however absolutely this love has been to them the 
source of all their happiness and all their blessedness in 
mutual sacrifice and renunciation, whether all men have 
praised this relationship - if God and the God-relationship 
have been neglected, then from the Christian viewpoint it has 
not been love, but a mutually enchanting illusion of love.(WL, 
p. 87, of. WL, pp. 98f.)
As this quotation shows, for Kierkegaard the God-relationship is
the most important thing; it is the matter of life and death in 
relation to love. In this sense, in some places Kierkegaard 
speaks of the God-relationship as the supreme good. (WL, pp. 42f., 
190)
The mention of the supreme good (summum bonurn) makes us think 
about something more than the God-relationship as being the 
criterion of love. For in this book, the God-relationship also 
appears as the standard of love, and therefore of Christian ethics
and living. Here is another place in which we can detect the
absolute difference between Christian ethics and other ethics in
the world with regard to love. Kierkegaard says:
The world simply does not notice that such a man [the 
Christian as a lover] has a totally different standard for his 
life, and that this explains the whole procedure quite simply, 
while, explained according to the world’s standard, it becomes 
quite meaningless. But since the world does not realize and 
does not wish to realize that this standard, the 
God-relationship, exists, hence it cannot explain such a man’s 
conduct as anything except a peculiarity - for the fact that 
it is Christian conduct naturally cannot occur to the world, 
which as Christian certainly best knows what Christianity 
is.(WL, p. 164, emphasis given)
Hence, for the Christian, the standard of ethics is the 
God-relationship which is not the case in any other ethics.[24]
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Whereas "[the] pagan and the natural man have the merely human 
self" as their standard (SUD, p. 81=SUDL, pp. 211f.), 
Kierkegaard’s Christian has the divine standard.[35] To say that 
the God-relationship is the standard for Christian living has two
kinds of implication.
First of all, it means that the Christian is always in the 
presence of God, that is, he must be aware of being before God at 
every moment in his life.[36] The true lover "does not forget that 
he is before God, wherever he is."(WL, p. 294, cf. JP, III, 
2407(Pap. VIII 1 A 89)) Hence the consideration of what is 
morally right and wrong must be done in the presence of God, that 
is, in relation to God. Kierkegaard says that "it is God who must 
decide what in every case is love."[37] God-relationship means 
one’s awareness of being before God, and such a person who is
aware of being in the presence of God cannot help but obey 
God.(WL, p. 98)
Secondly, to say that the God-relationship is the standard of 
Christian ethics also implies the absoluteness of God’s standards.
As we have discussed in the last part of this section, there is 
nobody who dares to assert that he has accomplished and reached 
the standards of God. God’s standards always make us nothing[38], 
or "less than nothing".(JP, VI, 6823(Pap. X 4 A 663)) For God’s 
standard is so far above ours that it destroys our relative 
differences.[39] "Therefore," says Kierkegaard, "the merely human 
understanding finds it so difficult."(JP, I, 515)
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Here we may raise the question of how this "love to God", 
this God-relationship, is expressed in relation to other people.
By raising this question we have already turned to the second
-element of Christian love - "love to one’s neighbour". Love for
God is inevitably expressed even in one’s relation to others.
This is one of the main characteristics of love for God. For
Kierkegaard Christian love is always actively expressed even to
others as in loving one’s neighbour.[40]
However, here one important point must be emphasized. That 
is, the love for one’s neighbour does not completely express or 
exhaust love for God, as some people suggest.[41] One should love
God with all one’s heart and with all one’s soul and with all
one’s mind: one should love one’s neighbour as oneself.(WL, p. 
17) There must be a clear difference between one’s "love to God" 
and one’s "love to others".[42] If there is no difference between 
them, if one’s love for one’s neighbour completely expresses or 
exhausts one’s love for God, then the neighbour becomes one’s
idol, and then this love is not love, but idolatry. So 
Kierkegaard emphasizes that God and love for God must be put 
first; "Christianity teaches that God has the first priority."(WL, 
p. 121, cf. JP, III, 2428(Pap. X2 A 63)) The command that we 
should love God is prior to the command that we should love our 
neighbour and gives content and meaning to it. This is "[because]
man primarily belongs to God before he belongs to any other
relationship, he must first be asked whether he has taken council 
with God and with his conscience."[43] So even in love for one’s
neighbour the love for God or God-relationship is the most
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important factor.
Therefore, Kierkegaard understands love for neighbour in
relation to love for God. The concept of loving one’s neighbour 
is used by Kierkegaard in a very special way; it does not mean 
just loving others in the ordinary sense.[44] It cannot be equated 
with the Kantian categorical imperative of "[acting] in such a way 
that you always treat humanity...in the person of every other, 
never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an
end".[45] In order to see these points, we have to look closely at 
Kierkegaard’s concept of neighbour. According to Kierkegaard,
only when God is the middle term is there any chance at all of
discovering one’s neighbour. Love for God is the source of one’s 
love for others.(WL, p. 130) Hence without God, without 
neighbour; "it is only in company with God that one discovers 
[one’s] ’neighbor,’ for God is the middle term".(WL, p. 64)[46]
Therefore, there are two things which must be borne in mind
when we think about the concept of loving one’s neighbour. The
first thing is, as we have observed, that Christian love for one’s
neighbour springs from the same root as Christian love for God - 
the divine love. In short, the divine origin of Christian love is
the first thing which makes Christian love different from Kantian
ethics. Another thing which also must be borne in mind is the
fact that the reason why Kierkegaard is talking about loving the 
neighbour is only because Jesus Christ commanded this love just in 
this form; "Thou shalt love thy neighbor."(WL, p. 15, et passim, 
cf. Matt. 22:39) What is important to him is to "act according 
to the command and orders of Christ, [and to] do the will of the
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Father."(JP, III, 3023(Pap. XI 1 A 339)) We cannot avoid the 
naivety of Kierkegaard. He just accepts this command. But, as
Michael Paul Plekon says, this is the most important aspect of
Christian love: "Most importantly, this love is the mandatum
novum, the new commandment of which Christ spoke...It is ordered: 
you shall love."[47] This command is the starting point of 
Kierkegaard’s discussion of this subject.[48] This is something
already given. He just assumes that the concept that one should 
love one’s neighbour is given as the command of love, and that 
Christianity comes with this command. Here is one of the
fundamental differences between the Christian ethics of love and
any other forms of ethics. In relation to this, the Christian and 
Kierkegaard himself are not ashamed of being observed by Kantian
ethicist as heteronomous and authoritarian.
Based upon this understanding we can agree with Arbaugh and
Arbaugh when they say: "Is this Christian duty a Kantian
imperative? Indeed it is categorical, but on non-Kantian
gr.9.undg.«,f.t.t.A Christian joyea Kis neighbour because it is the will 
of God that he does so, not because the neighbour needs or merits
it."[49] Bowen also thinks that for Kant the form of the
categorical imperative is itself more important than God, the 
commander, and says that "Kierkegaard obviously thought that Kant 
had the cart before the horse" and regards it as "inversion of 
priority."[50] Hence, pace Friemond who thinks that Kierkegaard 
should be regarded as a direct follower of Kant[51], there is a
fundamental difference between the ethics which comes from the
Kantian categorical imperative and Christian ethics which follows
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Christ’s command to love one’s neighbour.
The Christian is thus commanded by God to love his neighbour
without any discrimination. This also implies that to love one’s
neighbour is to love him as he is. One should not love the
imagined form which he himself has projected from his own
imagination on the actual person, but the actual person 
himself.[52] Hence the true lover can only be described as 
follows: ”[He 1 loves every man according to his own
charact eri s t ic s,.he seeks the other ’s own. ”(WL, p. 218, 
Kierkegaard’s emphasis) So in true love, it does not matter 
whether the one to be loved has faults, or weaknesses, or 
imperfections. For "in earnestness and truth he loves them as 
they are.”(WL, p. 135) Hence the genuine Christian lover forgives 
others and believes that God is able to create love in their
heart.
There is one more step for the Christian lover to take:
helping the other man to seek God. For true love, the ’’sacrifice
would precisely consist in helping the other man to seek God.”(WL,
p. 214) In another place, Kierkegaard says again:
A love-relationship is threefold: the lover, the beloved, the 
love; but the love is God. And, therefore, to love another 
man is io help him to love God, and to be loved is to be
helped to love God. (WL, p. 99, emphasis given)
Hence helping the other man to seek God is the most important
aspect, and the ultimate expression of one’s love. Thus
Kierkegaard says again: "The love which does not lead to God, the 
love which does not have this as its sole goal, to lead the lovers
to love God, stops at the purely human judgment as to what love
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and what love’s sacrifice and submission are....”(WL, 92f.) Yet 
when we consider the point that to seek God is, for Kierkegaard, 
the only way in which one becomes oneself, we also have to say 
that to help the other man to seek God is also to help him to be 
himself in the real sense. (WL, p. 225) In order to help someone 
to be himself, the Christian lover helps him to seek God. Here is
the best expression of one’s love for another.
Now it is clear that for Kierkegaard only the Christian
expression of love, which is based on Christ’s command of love for
one’s neighbour, which does not have any limitation in its width
and depth, which depends only on God and His love, and which helps
others to be themselves by seeking God, is true love. For
Kierkegaard, ”[all] other love...is nevertheless perishable, it
merely blooms."(WL, p. 7) In this spirit, Kierkegaard says:
[Wherever] Christianity does not exist, the intoxication of 
self-esteem reaches its maximum, and this intoxicated 
exaltation is what is admired. But earthly love and 
friendship are the highest expression of self-esteem; they are 
the I intoxicated in the other I.(WL, pp. 46f.)
From this observation Kierkegaard draws out the conclusion that 
what is regarded as true love in the world in reality is 
idolatry. (WL, p. 48) What is regarded as love in the world, as 
idolatry from the perspective of Christianity, does also have the 
following three characteristics: changeability (WL, pp. 25-31), 
not being free (WL, p. 32-33), and being liable to come to 
despair.(WL, pp. 33-36) In short, it is not eternal.(WL, p. 16)
"But Christian love is eternal...it has the truth of the eternal 
in it.”(WL, p. 7) In this spirit Kierkegaard also says: "But the 
Christian love abides, and just for that reason it is...it must be
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believed and it must be lived."(WL, p. 7) «
How is this true love then expressed in relation to oneself?
In this question we are entering the discussion of the third
element of Christian love - the "true love to oneself". Yes, we
said "love to oneself". How can it be? Did not we say that true ..
expressions of love are demonstrated only in self-denial, or 
self-sacrifice? Yes, we said precisely this in our discussion of 
"neighbour-love", and Kierkegaard emphasizes that "[true] love is 
the self-denying love."[53] Therefore, it is understandable how 
one could assert, as Nygren does, that Christian love "has no 
place for self-love. Christianity does not recognise self-love 
Christian....Agape cannot recognise any such thing as a 
justifiable self-love."[54] However, Kierkegaard says that one can 
love oneself in the true sense.(Cf. JP, III, 3771(Pap. X 5 A
53)) So there are two kinds of love to oneself: love to oneself
which must be negated in the activity of love and love to oneself r
which is expressed in the activity of love, which is "self-love in 
a good sense"[55], or, as Gene Outka calls it, "a proper or 
justified or true self-love"[56]. Hence the activity of love is ?
also observed as a transformation of one’s "love to oneself" from
the negative one to the positive one, from the egocentric one to a
purely theocentric one. Fran this transformed, theocentric, X
viewpoint, as Lindstroem says, "the new signification of the word
self-love is capable of expressing something essential concerning ,
man in his capacity of being a creature whom God has created and
given a special mission to. "[57] ''
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It is true that according to Kierkegaard, the positive and
true love for oneself which is expressed in the works of love is 
closely related to self-abnegation, self-denial, or
self-sacrifice. But this self-denial is not a way in which one
can assert one’s spiritual welfare. Rather, this self-denial must
be regarded as the normal attitude of a human being towards God 
and others and himself. This paradoxical truth can properly be
understood only In relation to the problem of becoming a self
which we shall consider in the next chapter. As we shall see, for 
Kierkegaard, to be oneself in the real sense of the word is
possible only in relation to God, and this relation to God is
expressed to others as the love for one’s neighbour. In order to
be oneself, one first should be sober. In relation to this
sobriety, Kierkegaard says:
Everywhere where Christianity exists there is also 
self-abnegation, which is Christianity's essential form. In 
order to live as a Christian, one must first and foremost 
become sober; but self-abnegation is exactly the transition 
through which a man, in the meaning of the eternal, becomes 
sober. (WL, p. 46)
Hence "loving oneself in the true sense", which is one of the 
important elements of becoming oneself, Kierkegaard regards 
positively. And along with love for God and love for one’s
neighbour, love for oneself constitutes true love. And true
self-love can only be found in love for one’s neighbour; true 
self-love is self-abnegation which is an inward expression of love 
for one’s neighbour.[58]
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Now we have examined all of the elements of Christian love -
one’s love for God, one’s love for one’s neighbour, and one’s love
for oneself. We have shown that these three elements of Christian
love are closely related to one another. In fact, the meaning of
Christian love can be summarized, as I have intimated at the
beginning of this discussion, with the expression that "God is the
middle term of one’s love". This expression firstly shows the 
priority of the "love to God"; secondly, the relatedness of the 
"love to God" and the "love to one’s neighbour"; and thirdly, the
possibility of true love for oneself in relation to God. In this
sense, the second characteristic of Christian love can be found in
this expression "God is the middle term of the Christian’s love".
(0)
Now let us turn to the problem of social ethics. Does Kierkegaard 
have social ethics? The answer to this question depends on one’s
conception of social ethics. If one thinks that social ethics
should be dealt with from a different perspective to that with 
which one deals with personal ethics, then one should say that 
Kierkegaard does not have any social ethics. For example, D.D.
Williams says:
Kierkegaard lacked a social ethical doctrine of agape which is 
no less concerned to break through to neighbour, but is less 
naive about how social orders corrupt human 
relationships.... Kierkegaard’s doctrine remains
inadequate.[593
For, according to Kierkegaard, the Christian sees the problems of 
social ethics with the same eyes with which he sees the problems
of personal ethics. We have seen above that the Christian regards
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Christian love as spiritual love and applies this spiritual love
to his ethics. So his ethics can be designated as "Spiritual 
ethics", because he thinks that the accomplishment of the summum
bonum in his ethics is possible only under the influence of the
Holy Spirit. The Christian, as understood by Kierkegaard, thinks 
that one should apply the principle of love even to problems of
social ethics. Kierkegaard thinks that the basis of social ethics
is also commanded by Jesus Christ and the accomplishment of this
ideal is also possible only in relation to the influence of the 
Holy Spirit. In this sense, as Arbaugh and Arbaugh say, Christian 
"love is the invisible life of the spirit and the source of 
Christian social concern."[60] In this spirit, Kierkegaard says: 
"Christianity is not indifferent to anything secular, on the 
contrary, it is solely spiritually concerned for everything."(WL, 
p. 117) For those who think in this way, as Heinecken well 
expressed, "[the] oft repeated criticism that Kierkegaard has no 
social ethics is really without foundation, as is quite apparent 
from a study of the Works of Love. "T61]
Someone will ask whether it is possible to think in this way 
after Karl Marx. This is a vast question and it needs separate 
study. In this section, I just assume that it is possible, and by
doing so I am following Jeremy Walker and Werner Stark who assert
as follows:
There can be, I believe, no valid ’synthesis’ of the Marxian 
and the Kierkegaardian answers to the fundamental question of 
commitment. Their radical humanisms are in immediate 
opposition. Nor can there be, I believe, a third answer, 
given the exhaustiveness of their opposing humanisms. It is 
not possible to evade the question. Therefore the basic 
question for our time, as for all times, can be put: Marx or 
Kierkegaard?[62]
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Yes, Kierkegaard was in the last analysis much more of a 
realist than Karl Marx. Marx believed that human selfishness 
was not an eternal trait of human nature, but just a passing 
feature, born of the institution of private property and bound 
to fade away with it.. .Kierkegaard, on the other hand, faced 
the fundamental fact of our fallen state, namely, that we can 
only advance towards the good, alike as individuals and in 
society, if we overcome ourselves and follow the cross.[63]
The Christian social ethics which is found in the works of
Kierkegaard is Spiritual social ethics which is also based on the
principle of love.[64] I want to show this by considering several 
salient passages in Works of Love. The first passage runs as
follows:
[It] is infinitely important that it is Christ who has said it 
[Christ’s command of love], and when it is said to an 
individual, it is precisely to him that it is said, the whole 
eternal emphasis is on that him, even if in a way it is said 
to all individuals.(WL, p. 80)
This passage makes two points clear. Firstly and mainly, what is 
commanded by Jesus Christ, which provides the basis of Christian 
ethics, must be regarded as speaking to the individual person.
That is, everyone must regard the command as a personal
command.[65] However, this is not the whole of the story. With
this, this passage also intimates that this command is actually
addressed to all individuals. This point hints at the universal
applicability of the command. Even though each individual should 
accept the command as addressed to himself, the command itself is 
objective, and the validity of this command does not depend on 
each individual’s applying it to himself.[66] This universal
applicability is very important in relation to the theme under 
discussion. For, according to the logic of this discussion, one
should think that the command of love is intended to be the
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universal principle. And if this love-command is the way in which
God changes or transforms the world, then there is no other way in
which one can change the world except by applying this principle
of love.
In relation to this, let us quote the second passage:
[Everyone] who forms parties and factions, or joins such, he 
steers on his own responsibility, and all his achievement, 
even if it were the transformation of the world, is a 
delusion...for it is certainly possible that Providence might 
use of it, but, alas, it would not have used him as an 
instrument; he was a self-willed, a conceited man, and 
Providence also uses the efforts of such a man by accepting 
his difficult labor and letting him lose the reward.
However laughable, however slow, however inexpedient, 
loving one’s neighbor may seem to the world, it is still the 
highest act a man is able to accomplish. (WL, p. 71)
In this passage, Kierkegaard criticizes all other attempts to 
transform the world by human powers, and at the same time suggests 
that the way in which Christianity tries to transform the world is 
the highest act a man is able to accomplish. According to 
Kierkegaard, the principle of love is the only way in which this
world can fundamentally solve the problems of human life.
Malantschuk describes well Kierkegaard’s position:
On the basis of a rigorous Christian position Kierkegaard 
maintains that injustice cannot be removed by force, since one 
who uses coercion eventually functions on the same level as 
one who perpetrates wrong. Only suffering love can defeat 
injustice.[67]
When Kierkegaard is asserting this as social ethics, he is 
keenly aware that in the eves of the world this is laughable, too
slow, almost impossible, and inexpedient, for in this world, man 
is regarded as the measure of all things.[68] However, its
impossibility in the eyes of the world was not a hindrance for
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Kierkegaard who continues to believe and assert that this (i.e., 
to love others in this way and transform the world in this way) is 
the highest act a man is able to accomplish. Thus one can make 
the point that when Kierkegaard seems to be indifferent to social
change, the real fact is that he is not indifferent to social
change in the real sense of the word, but he is attacking all
attempts to change the world with merely human resources which
ignore the divinely commanded method of love. This point is very 
important, when we think about a common misunderstanding of 
Kierkegaard as an extreme individualist.[69]
It is true that Kierkegaard thinks that the only way to solve
human problems personally and collectively is to stand before God
alone. But this is not because Kierkegaard himself is an 
individualist, but only because this is the only way in which a 
human being can stand before God, for "[to] God, the infinite 
Spirit, all these millions who have lived and are still living do 
not form a mass - he [God] sees only the single individuals."[70] 
In his study of Kierkegaardian encounter with modernity, Plekon 
also makes a similar point:
One does not become a single individual for aesthetic or 
socio-psychological reasons. Rather, the project of the 
individualization of consciousness is grounded in 
transcendence, is required by the Eternal. We can only come 
to the Absolute, we can only stand before God as individuals. 
For Kierkegaard, the basis for singular individuality is not 
an abstract anti-sociality but the conviction that the 
fundamental human relationship is the God-relationship....[71]
Based upon this understanding, he, as a sociologist who examines
Works of Love, asserts as follows: "There is a distinctive social
orientation in the Kierkegaardian corrective: the reconstruction
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of the social world can only be accomplished by transformed, 
corrected single individuals.”[72] This is because "[in] becoming 
a ’doer’ of the Word, a ’worker of love’, the inwardly transformed 
individual becomes the most effective agent for the transformation 
of others and his society."[73]
Indeed, once one stands before God alone, then, as we have
seen in the discussion of this section, one is inevitably related 
to others who also stand before God individually.[74] This is the 
reason why God is described as the middle term of Christian love. 
This is because the standing before God is the way in which we can 
see the fundamental equality between all people, (cf. JP, I, 
236(Pap. XI A 135)) According to Kierkegaard, equality is an 
expression of humanness.(JP, I, 63(Pap. VIII 1 A 268)) However, 
according to Kierkegaard, we should try to seek equality only 
based upon this fundamental equality, and the other ways in which 
one tries to seek the equality of human beings cannot be adequate
ones, for they cannot fundamentally solve the problem of 
difference. In this sense, one may say, with Arbaugh and Arbaugh, 
that "[to] assert that S.K. leaves the individual ’hermetically’
sealed off from others is true only in the sense that the
individual is compelled to face God alone over the issue of
whether he is or is not loving towards his fellow-man."[75] A 
similar suggestion of a social view of the Christian is found in
one of Kierkegaard’s journal entries:
I should have been ashamed before God, and my soul would have 
been troubled, if I had become so self-important that I 
behaved as though 'other men’ did not exist.[76]
So we may say, with Crites, that "the Kierkegaardian individual is
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not simply a-social."[773 For, as Shraueli says, "Christian love 
aims...to form a society in which people can help each other to 
become true subjects. The individualism expressed by 
Kierkegaard’s philosophy is an attitude which can be formed only 
in the bosom of a Christian society".[78] I think that Shmueli has 
correctly understood Kierkegaard’s meaning. For basically 
Kierkegaard thinks that structural transformation of society must 
be based on each individual’s God-relationship.[793 This is the 
reason why Kierkegaard is critical of socio-political movement 
which is not based on God-relationship.[80] As Stendahl says: 
"What Kierkegaard refutes so sharply...is false belief in human
solutions, in progress and evolution, development and 
expansion."[813 Such a movement is judged by Kierkegaard as not 
solving human problems fundamentally.(WL, pp. 59f.) The reason
why Kierkegaard criticizes these social movements does not lie in 
Kierkegaard’s indifference to social problems, but in his real 
concern for solving these problems. The seeming individualism, 
therefore, is the way in which Kierkegaard seeks the fundamental 
answer to all the social problems. For, in Christian love, as 
Plekon says, "there is not only self-transformat ion, but 
transformation of the web of society, the nature of social 
relationship."[823 And as Stark says, "the stronger the 
individuals, the firmer also the social bond."[833
In this sense, the demand of the Christian love is the demand
of the fundamental revolution. Kierkegaard says:
[Christian3 love is a revolution, the most profound of all, 
but the most blessed! So then in love there is confusion; in 
this blessed confusion there is for the lovers no difference 
between ’mine’ and ’thine’....There is a 'you* and an ’I’ and
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there is no ’mine* and ’thine*!...The more profound the 
revolution is, the more completely the difference of ’mine’ 
and ’thine’ disappears, the more perfect is the love.[84]
In one of his journal entries, he says again: "[What] the God of 
Christianity wanted was a world-transformation."(JP, I, 561(Pap. 
XI 2 A 102)) This fundamental way of transforming the world 
through love is also observed by Kierkegaard as an anticipation of
that which is the case in eternity. So the true lover is one who
lives eternity even in his temporal existence. (WL, pp. 72f.) Some
sentences later Kierkegaard calls such an understanding of the
human relationship ’’this agreement with God”(WL, p. 73) and 
asserts that there must be an actualization of this agreement with
God in one’s real life. He says again:
[Might] this not seem so glorious to you that for your part 
you would decide to make this agreement with God; that you 
wish to unite with Him in order to maintain this 
understanding, that is, to express in your life that with Him 
you will maintain this understanding as the only true 
understanding, whatever may befall you because of it, even if 
it should cost you your life; that with God you will hold it 
fast as your victory over all indignities and injuries.(WL, p. 
73, emphasis given)
The hope of the final victory of love, which is quite different
from the normal concept of victory, surely presupposes that there
will be some cosmic eschatological consummation which will be 
carried out by God himself.[85] Until that time, the Christian is 
summoned to endeavour to transform the world by loving one’s
neighbour individually and collectively. This endeavour includes
the attempt to change the structure of society to the ideal form
in which the true spirit of the command of love is reflected.[86]
Hence, as Collins says, Kierkegaard asserts that ’’all social forms 
[must be] determined by a radical ’love’ or orientation, based
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upon one’s relation to God. ”[87]
Based on this observation, I agree with Croxall’s
interpretation of Kierkegaard’s social ethics:
Nevertheless, the Works of Love is not against such things 
[the efforts of social reformers]. On the contrary, it leaves 
the door wide open for them and prepares for them in the best 
possible way.... So Kierkegaard sets out his programme. He 
does not seek to overturn or even to alter the established 
order, but rather to introduce health-giving reflexions which, 
if ^Qted ppoji, KQUl-d KPrJc -t.he.ir PUCje £be -believed) more 
-s.ur.ely.,, more .silently., than pglj.tj.cal revpj-.atj.pp, lie makes 
his appeal, to the indivi-daai rather .than to the state or 
nation. [88]
In short, for Kierkegaard love in the Christian sense is the best 
possible policy even for social problems.(cf. PV, p. 120) The 
power to solve these problems, as we have observed before, is
regarded as coming from God Himself. God the Spirit is the One 
who carries out this task through calling to mind the sacrifice of
love which Jesus Christ made, and reminding the believers to love
as they are loved, and their neighbour as themselves. So 
Christian social action should be "a spiritual movement”(JP, VI, 
6671(Pap. X 3 A 415)); and as far as this love can only come from 
the Holy Spirit, Kierkegaard's social ethics is also Spiritual
ethics.
Now it must be quite clear that Kierkegaard’s ethics of love 
is profoundly based on his Christian faith. In this section, we 
have observed that Kierkegaard sees love in its true sense as the
love of God which is conclusively expressed in the Christ event, 
and as a human response to this divine love, which is possible
only in relation to God the Spirit. We have also observed that
the expression of this love always has God as its middle term, so
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"love to God" is the fundamental source of love, and "love to
one’s neighbour" is the outer expression of love, and the "love to
oneself" is the inward expression of love. We have also seen that 
there are very clear social implications of this love. Throughout
this discussion, we could see a clear difference between Christian
ethics and other forms of ethics. Kierkegaard shows us in this
book that the Christian sees the ethical aspect of human life from
a different perspective from those of the ethical person and the
person in religiousness A. There is, therefore, a fundamental 
difference between the Christian view of the ethical aspect of
life and that of the ethical perspective. In this section we have
shown this difference through a consideration of the Christian 
understanding of love. In the next section, we shall look at it 
from the perspective of Christian discipleship.
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Douglas V. Steere, in WL, p. vii; Malantschuk, Kierkegaard’s 
Thought. pp. 325f, 36lf. ; Hong and Hong, "Translator’s 
Introduction," to WLH, p. 15; Arbaugh and Arbaugh, p. 258; 
Stendahl, p. 183; John W. Elrod, Kierkegaard and Christendom 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), p. 284;
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1919(Pap. X 5 A 44); JP, II, 1285(Pap. X 3 A 200); JP, II, 1432,
1548(Pap. X 5 A 23, X 3 A 394); JP, III, 338O(Pap. II A 538),
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In this section, I want to consider Christian ethics as the ethics 
of Christian discipleship. But, as we shall see, this is only
another way of looking at the same Christian ethics which we have
considered as the ethics of Christian love.
I shall examine the meaning of Christian discipleship by 
considering the following two questions: (1) does one have to be 
a Christian in Kierkegaard’s sense of the word in order to be 
regarded as a disciple or follower of Christ? (In other words, is 
it possible to be a disciple without being a Christian?); (2) can 
this emphasis on discipleship be understood as a tendency to 
emphasize the human factor in relation to the question of 
salvation, a tendency of synergism, rather than monergism? (The 
scope of synergism is very broad. But in this section, I am 
mainly concerned with the Roman Catholic view of salvation. So
the main question is whether Kierkegaardian discipleship can be 
regarded as something similar to Roman Catholic discipleship.) 
These two questions are raised because following Christ means 
different things to different people.[1]
The first consideration [(1) above] comes from a negative 
response to those who think that to be a follower of Jesus means
only to act in the way in which Jesus did and therefore does not 
necessarily mean that one should believe in Jesus's being the
God-Man as Saviour. I shall call this view "merely ethical 
discipleship”, and I think such merely ethical discipleship is not 
able to have its place in the thought of Kierkegaard. Hence I
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shall show that for Kierkegaard, Jesus’s being the Pattern cannot
±e separated. from His. Heing the Hayiaucj. He is the pattern as the 
Sav iour. In other words, as Thomte says, "Kierkegaard’s
conception of Christ the Pattern is essentially grounded in his 
conception of Christ as the atoner for sin."[2] To put this
differently, onels following .Christ whinh is the yjjal -RgT.t o£
HissiHLeshin can only seme frea onsin faithrreiationshin with hhe 
God-Man. As I hope to show, here one is able to see the clear 
difference between the merely ethical understanding of 
discipleship and that of the Christian understanding.
And the second question [(2) above] arises from the fact that 
Kierkegaard’s understanding of being a Christian, a disciple, 
cannot be seen as a kind of semi-Pelagian understanding of being a 
Christian which emphasizes that one has one’s own power to follow
Christ and one can be justified and saved through one’s own 
efforts which are formed by God’s grace. As this cursory 
description shows, I use the term "semi-Pelagianism" or 
"semi-Pelagian understanding" in a very broad sense. (That is, by 
semi-Pelagianism I do not mean semi-Pelagianism in the restricted 
sense, e.g., that of John Cassian, Abbot of Massilia (Marseilles), 
of Faustus of Rhegium, Gennadius of Massilia of the fifth century, 
which was condemned at the Second Council of Orange (529 A.D.), or 
that of Hincmar, Archbishop of Rheims(c. 806-82)).[5]) By this 
term I cover all understanding of salvation which asserts 
synergism (the theory of cooperation of God and man in the act of 
salvation). Three characteristics of this view can be pointed out
here. Firstly, the human’s natural capacity to do good is
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approved. Secondly, though the need of God’s grace is emphasized, 
God’s grace does not break with natural human efforts.[4] Thirdly, 
therefore, even though the ultimate meritorious cause of man’s 
salvation is asserted to be Christ’s atonement, Christ’s atonement
is understood to have purchased grace by which one is now able to
merit one’s salvation for oneself.f5l I shall call this view of
discipleship "semi-Pelagian discipleship”, and I shall show that
Kierkegaard’s understanding of discipleship is also far from this
”setni-Pelagian discipleship”.
I shall show these two points through an attempt to 
understand Kierkegaard’s meaning of discipleship expressed in
.Fragment? and Training in .Chr.is-t.iani ty. My
discussion of these two books therefore is restricted to the
things which are directly related to discipleship. My point here
is that one can relate the discipleship of Philosophical Fragments
to that of Training in Christianity, even though in these two 
books different aspects of discipleship are dealt with.
Let us start with the consideration of discipleship expressed 
in Philosophical Fragments. In this book Christianity is 
suggested as a thought-experiment (scheme B) contrasted to scheme 
A which is the Socratic view, and the fact that the Teacher whom a
disciple has to follow is the God-Man is clearly expressed from 
the outset. He is called the "divine teacher”(PF, p. 19=PFS, p. 
24) in the sense that He is teacher as God.[6] That is to say, He 
became the God-Man in order to be the teacher. But, as Arbaugh 
and Arbaugh say, ”[in] incarnation God does not empty Himself or 
lay aside his glory.”[7] At the same time, His servant form is not
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just a deception, but it is real. In this sense, He is the
God-Man, very God and very man.
Climacus emphasizes both Christ's divinity and His humanity.
That he is a historical individual man is regarded as an obvious
fact; at the same time, it is also emphasized that he gives "some
sort of sign" which puts us in the difficult position of having to
choose to believe that he is God. The signs serve to attract
attention and will then lead to either faith or offence. That he
is God is never immediately apparent; there are only signs. 
However, these signs are important. For, according to 
Kierkegaard, it is important that the God-man "became noticed", so 
that "he still was recognizable by his divine authority, even 
though it demanded faith to solve its paradox."(JP, III, 3077(Pap. 
IV A 103)) Climacus says:
The god did not, however, take the form of a servant in order 
to mock human beings; his aim, therefore, cannot be to walk 
through the world in such a way that not one single person 
would come to know it [his presence and his identity],(PF, p. 
56=PFS, p. 69)
That is to say, he was not here on earth as in the way in which
some docetists think; "the servant-form is not something put on
but is actual, not a parastatic but an actual body."(PF, p.
55=PFS, p. 68) Hence we can say with Dupre7 as follows:
Kierkegaard never questioned Christ’s divinity. For him even 
the idea of a kenosis, in which Christ through an act of total 
annihilation empties Himself of His divinity, is 
unthinkable.[8]
Indeed, Kierkegaard says in one of his journal entries, for the 
Christian, "[at] every moment Christ is God just as much as he is 
man - just as the sky seems to be as deep in the sea as it is high
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above the sea.”[9] That the teacher is the God-Man implies that 
the right relationship with the teacher is only through faith; one 
cannot be his disciple without believing that this individual 
human being (Jesus) who was in this world at a certain time and
space is the God-Man. That the God-Man has been on earth - "it is
a historical fact."(PF, p. 87=PFS, p. 108) Christian truth comes 
as a shocking proclamation from an historical man, outwardly quite 
human, but who claims to be God. But precisely this is the 
possibility of offence; that this historical person is the God-Man 
is the possibility of offence to everybody. However, one cannot 
be a disciple without first having the possibility of offence and
then overccming this possibility through faith.
This is true both of the disciple (temporally) contemporary 
to Jesus and of the disciple at second hand. In this sense, 
"[immediate] contemporaneity is by no means a decisive 
advantage."(PF, p. 106=PFS, p. 133) So there is also basically 
no difference between the first generation of secondary disciples 
and the most recent generation of secondary disciples.(cf. PF, p. 
93=PFS, p. 117) In this sense, Climacus says that: "There is no 
follower at second hand. The first and the latest generation are 
essentially alike...."(PF, pp. 104f.=PFS, p. 131) For the only 
way of being a follower for both of them is to believe in the
God-Man.
But can one believe the God-Man by oneself? There are some 
people who think that Philosophical Fragments is ambiguous in this 
matter, because it says, on the one hand, that we cannot believe 
the God-Man by ourselves, and on the other hand, that believing in
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the God-Man is letting go by our will. [10] However, as I shall 
show in this paragraph, Climacus’ answer is very clear: letting
go by our will is possible only when God gives the condition to do
so. In this sense, Climacus says that "faith is not an act of
will."(PF, p. 62=PFS, p. 77) He says again:
For example, if I have the courage to will it [the 
understanding]...[then I am in the Socratic sphere] because 
from the Socratic point of view I possess the condition and 
now can will it [this understanding]. But if I do not possess 
the condition (and we assume this in order not to go back to 
the Socratic), then sLL jny Hilling is o£ no .gty^il.... (PF, p. 
63=PFS, p. 77)
According to the hypothesis [the scheme B]...he will not be 
able to set himself free. (And this is truly just the way it 
is....)(PF, p. 17=FPS, p. 21)
Only the person who personally receives the condition from the 
god (which completely corresponds to the requirement that one 
relinquish the understanding and on the other hand is the only 
authority that corresponds to faith), only that person 
believes.(PF, p. 103=PFS, p. 129)
Based on these passages, we can say that in Philosophical
Fragments one can believe in the God-Man only when God gives the
condition. Thulstrup makes this point clear, when he summarizes
the argument of this book as follows:
Faith...[is not] an act of will, since such is possible only 
if the condition is already present, if the will is capable of 
realizing what it aims at, consequently only if the condition 
is already present."[11]
Therefore, only after having been given the condition by God is 
faith "an expression of will."[12] As Dupr/ says: "The activity 
of the human will in faith becomes possible only through a choice 
by God Himself; only within the limits of the datum of grace, 
which transcends all freedom, can faith be called free."[13] That
is, we as human beings who are not in the truth cannot believe in
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the God-Man by ourselves. As David E. Roberts says, we "cannot
reach liberation by ’willing’ because it is precisely the will 
that needs to be liberated."[14] Since we are in untruth (sin), 
our mind "certainly cannot think it [the truth], cannot hit upon 
it on its own, and if it is proclaimed, the understanding cannot
understand it and merely detects that it will likely be its 
downfall. "(PF, p. 47=PFS, p. 59) So we cannot have faith and be 
disciples of the God-Man by ourselves.
Hence, as Arbaugh and Arbaugh say, "God must prepare the
human heart to receive truth...in order to be Teacher God must
enter man’s world as Saviour."[15] So He became the God-Man in 
order to be the Saviour and He did the work of redemption as the 
Saviour. And at the same time, this work must be applied by God 
Himself to the individual human being individually. This act of
application of the redemption is called in this book "giving the 
condition." Climacus says: "Only one who receives the condition 
from the God is a believer."(PFS, p. 129=PF, p. 103) This was 
true of the contemporary disciples.(PF, p. 65=PFS, p. 80) And 
this is also true of all disciples of all generations.(PF, p. 
100=PFS, p. 126) Without the God-given condition, without God’s 
opening their eyes of faith, they cannot be disciples of the 
God-Man. The disciple is one "who knows that without the 
condition he would have seen nothing, inasmuch as the first thing 
he understood was that he himself was untruth."(PF, p. 65=PFS, p. 
81)
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These two points {i.e., (1) Jesus is the God-Man, and (2) one 
can be a disciple only when God gives the condition for 
understanding the truth} show that discipleship in this book is 
not only a question of adopting a good example, nor a matter of
accepting some knowledge from the teacher. What is important is 
the relationship between the teacher and the disciple, which is 
based on the right recognition of who the teacher really is, that 
is, the God-Man. For, according to Climacus, "only the 
believer... can [know the teacher] as he was known."(PF, p. 
68=PFS, p. 84) Curious multitudes who want to hear him, ’’craving 
to be able to tell others that they have seen and heard him [the 
teacher]"(PF, p. 57=PFS, p. 71) cannot be the disciple; those 
who are only concerned about abstract knowledge which the teacher 
teaches are also not the disciple in the real sense; and those who 
are only concerned about the moral teaching of the teacher are not 
the disciple either. Only those who have a real
faith-relationship with the God-Man are disciples.
Hence, one cannot speak of merely ethical discipleship in 
relation to the view of discipleship expressed in this book. The 
God-Man is not regarded as merely a good example to imitate, or 
resemble; He is not a moral teacher who has left a good influence 
to future generations.[16] This book shows that if Christianity is 
true, the teacher is the teacher as the Saviour and the Redeemer 
and the one who "is a reconciler”.(PF, p. 17=PFS, p. 21, 
atonement) So one cannot speak of "merely ethical discipleship" in 
relation to the understanding of discipleship in this book.
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But can the same be said for semi-Pelagianism? Can one not
regard the God-given condition as something similar to the 
infusion of grace?[17] In a sense, this is a somewhat interesting 
idea, for the teacher is described as the "one who restores the 
lost condition and gives the learner the truth"(PFS, p. 21=PF, p. 
17)» and one may list similar things which show the relation 
between semi-Pelagianian discipleship and Climacus’ view of
discipleship. Indeed, Dupre says that "Kierkegaard firmly
maintains that each step preparatory to the reception of God’s 
grace must itself already be grace."[18] However, when we consider 
the character of the disciple which is expressed in the book, we 
cannot give a positive answer to this question. In particular, 
two things have to be emphasized in relation to this subject.
The first concerns with the relationship between, on the one 
hand, what we were doing independently of God before we became
disciples and what we are doing in relation to God after we became 
disciples, on the other. According to semi-Pelagianism, it is 
possible that there is a close relationship between them; that is,
provided one tried to be good by oneself before one became a 
disciple, what one will do after becoming a disciple is the same
work, but now aided and strengthened by the infused grace. For 
example, D’Arcy says:
But a being who has a mind and a spiritual will and power to 
love can submit to this Divine pressure on it without 
destruction...[A] human being can remain himself while acting 
above his natural capacity.... Now it is this mysterious 
elevation of man above himself which is described in the 
technical language of the supernatural and of grace.[19]
So for Catholicism grace fulfils nature. The same is true of the
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cognitive aspect, that is, what one knew before becoming a
disciple is now confirmed and complemented by the supernatural 
revelation. In every aspect, grace does not violate nature, but
completes.
However, Climacus sees the situation totally differently. 
According to him, before one’s becoming a disciple, he is untruth; 
moreover, he cannot even "be described as a seeker”.(PFS, p. 
16=PF, p.13) But in the moment in which one becomes a disciple,
one ”becomes a different person, not in the jesting sense - as if
he became someone else of the same quality as before - but he 
becomes a person of a different quality.”(PF, p. 18=PFS, pp. 
22f.) There is a fundamental change of the quality of one’s 
existence. Hence ”as a result of receiving the condition in the 
moment, his course [of life] took the opposite direction, or he 
was turned around.”(PF, p. 18=PFS, p. 23)
It is true that sometimes the semi-Pelagian system also has 
the language of new birth or regeneration. For example, D’Arcy 
whom we mentioned above says:
The Epistles of St. Paul abound in attempts to describe it 
[the supernatural or grace]. He calls it grace, adoption, 
regeneration, membership in Christ. St. John’s favourite 
name for it is ’sonship’.[20]
However, as we can see even in this quotation, these concepts are 
usually changed into so-called semi-Pelagian concepts. Hence, 
even though they [Climacus and semi-Pelagian thinkers] use the 
same terms, the meanings which they give to these terms are 
different from one another. In the semi-Pelagian system,
regeneration or the new birth is only a different designation for
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grace. As grace does not destroy nature but completes, so
regeneration or the new birth does not have any break with the
natural human capacity but enhances it above human capacity. 
However, for Climacus, such positive enhancement cannot be in the
scheme B. In scheme B, there is a clear discontinuity between
one’s being in error and one’s being a new creature. One must be 
turned about; the direction of one’s striving has to be changed. 
There is no positive enhancement of what one was doing. 
Therefore, there is a break between what one was doing before 
becoming a disciple and what one is doing after becoming a
disciple.
Secondly, we have to consider the different understanding of
faith between semi-Pelagianism and the disciple understood by 
Climacus. In contrast to semi-Pelagian understanding of faith as 
basically assensus (assent), Climacus regards faith basically as 
trust in the God-Man. So the God-given condition does not 
function as "grace infused” does in the semi-Pelagian system. It 
is far from human efforts, even those which are guided by God’s 
grace. Faith is absolutely passive. Even when it works actively, 
it keeps the character of passivity in relation to God. And what
is emphasized throughout the book is that one cannot be saved 
through or by one’s own merits.
As far as Philosophical Fragments is concerned, many people 
may agree that the disciple is the one who has a right 
relationship with the God-Man, and that such discipleship is far
from "merely ethical discipleship" and semi-Pelagian concept of
discipleship. Can we apply the same view to Training in
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Christianity? Firstly, can one find "merely ethical discipleship"
in this book?
It is true that in this book the act of following Jesus
Christ in His humiliation is emphasized. One should imitate Him
in His humiliation; one should resemble Him. For "Christ’s life
here upon earth is the paradigm...Every generation has to begin 
all over again with Christ and thus to present His life as the 
paradigm...."(TC, p. 109) If we do not give a full attention to 
the exact meaning with which Anti-Climacus uses these expressions, 
then it is easy to think that Anti-Climacus provides us with a
view of merely ethical discipleship. If we start to think in this
way, then it is also easy for us to think that by the "admirer" to
whom Anti-Climacus contrasts the "follower" he means the one who
takes Jesus as a special religious character (the God-Man); and 
the follower is the one who does not pay any attention to this
so-called Christological business, but tries to follow what Jesus
did.
However, if we carefully examine the meaning of 
Anti-Climacus' passages, as those who are familiar with the pages 
of this book will know, this question ("whether one can find 
"merely ethical discipleship" in this book?") has, in fact, no 
relevance here. For from beginning to end this book is quite 
clear that it is concerned with one’s relationship to the God-Man 
(TC, p. 83, et passim) who "eighteen hundred years and more" ago 
"walked here on earth...in order to seek the lost, in order to 
suffer and to die"(TC, p. 9), "who sits in glory at the right 
hand of the Father"(TC, p. 26) and will "come again in
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glory”.(TC, p. 27, of. TC, pp. 167, 180, 193) That is the 
reason why this book talks so much about the offence, and Christ's 
drawing us unto Himself (Part III).[21] In this book, we shall get 
a view of discipleship which first of all emphasizes Jesus
Christ's being the God-Man and which is far from "merely ethical 
discipleship".[22] For the "God in time" is not simply the ideal 
man in whom we find out our own humanity through imitation. The 
"God in time", to be sure, is the example fPattern! to be
flCtllPHSA, .but he Is algo the sue Hfco f-Orgiyes oiar sin. Therefore, 
one's following Christ can only come from one’s faith-relationship 
with the God-Man. Such an understanding of discipleship is what I 
would call "high-christological discipleship". In what follows, I 
want to point out three salient aspects of Anti-Climacus' view of 
discipleship, which clearly show that "merely ethical 
discipleship" has no place in his view of discipleship: (1) the
fact that Anti-Climacus' emphasis on Christ's humiliation also 
shows his belief in Christ's exaltation, (2) Anti-Climacus* 
emphasis upon the difference between Jesus Christ as the God-Man
and the ordinary individual human being, and (3) Anti-Climacus' 
differentiation between ordinary suffering and Christian 
suffering.
Let us begin with Anti-Climacus' emphasis on Christ's
humiliation. We are invited to look at Jesus Christ in his
humiliation. The historical person and his historical life are 
the most important things for Anti-Climacus. If we try to look at 
him through the eyes of later interpretation and of the later
development of history, then we are only distorting what he was
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and is in the real sense.
Why does Anti-Climacus emphasize the humiliation of Christ so
much? The answer to this question must be sought in relation to 
his view of discipleship. For he says that "what corresponds to 
humiliation is a follower."(TC, p. 231) The follower can only be 
found in relation to the concrete historical person who lived on
earth in time and space. One cannot be a follower of the one who
is only in heaven, or in imagination, or in myth, or in 
Urgeschichte. If and only if there was a historical person in a
concrete time and space is there the question of following. In
this sense, the emphasis on the humiliation of Christ cannot be an
element which supports merely ethical discipleship. On the
contrary, it is, for Anti-Climacus, an element which shows the
importance of a faith-relationship with this Jesus Christ.[23] His
Jesus is from the outset "the God-Man." That is precisely the
reason why he has such strong emphasis on the offence, that one
cannot remove this offence from this book. Anti-Climacus says:
Offence has essentially to do with the composite term God and 
man, or with the God-Man...[The] situation is inseparable from 
the God-Man, the situation that an individual man who stands 
beside you is God-Man. The God-Man is not the unity of God 
and mankind. Such terminology exhibits the profundity of 
optical illusion. The God-Man is the unity of God and an
individual man.(TC, P. 83)
The fact that the historical person (Jesus) is the God-Man is the
occasion for offence. It was an offence to the immediate
contemporaries to Jesus. So they said: "Is not this the
carpenter’s son? Is not his mother called Mary? and his
brethren...and sisters, are they not all with us? Whence hath
this man all these things?"(TC, p. 105, cf. Matt. 13:55=Mk.
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6:3) They were offended by the historical Jesus, for he intimated 
that he and God the Father are one, and demanded that they believe 
in him.(TC, p. 135) But the fact that he who quite directly said 
this was here on earth as an individual human being is the
occasion for offence. From here there are only two alternatives: 
"either to be offended or to believe."(TC, p. 83) That is to say, 
for Anti-Climacus, either one can believe that the historical 
Jesus is the God-Man, or one is offended by him.
Moreover, according to Anti-Climacus, if Jesus were not the
God-Man, there would be no exaltation which is attributed to 
him.(TC, p. 167) And in this case, even the word "humiliation" 
does not make any sense, for if Jesus were just a man, it could be 
rightly said about him that he was a man; that is not a
humiliation. Only if Jesus were the God-Man could his existence
on earth as an individual human being be called a humiliation.
This is the reason why the period of His humiliation, 
Christ’s life on earth, is regarded as the absolute which can be 
contemporary with every generation. Anti-Climacus says: "His
[Christ’s] earthly life possesses the eternal
contemporaneousness."(TC, p. 68) "For in relation to the absolute 
there is only one tense: the present."(TC, p. 67) Therefore, 
according to Anti-Climacus, everybody can be contemporary with two
ages: "the age in which he lives" and "Christ’s life on
earth".(TC, p. 68) As far as Christ’s life on earth is regarded 
as the absolute by Anti-Climacus, there is no room for "merely 
ethical discipleship" for him. For a good moral teacher and
ethical example cannot be the absolute in this sense, even at his
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best.
In relation to this, Anti-Climacus also emphasizes that the
real follower of Jesus should believe both his humiliation and his
exaltation. It has been asserted by some scholars that 
Kierkegaard did not take seriously the fact that Christ is risen 
and glorified. [24] It is, however, clear that Kierkegaard thinks 
that Christ is resurrected[25] and highly glorified.[26] Christ’s 
humiliation and exaltation are not something which we may choose 
between as we wish.(TC, p. 166) Both those who only think of the
exaltation and those who do not believe the exaltation are not
true to the truth which Jesus Christ is.(TC, pp. 154f., 166)
Now it becomes clear that Anti-Climacus’ emphasis on the
humiliation of Christ cannot be an element which supports merely 
ethical discipleship; on the contrary, it serves as an element 
which makes it clear that Christ is the God-Man, and that 
therefore if one wants to be a real follower of Jesus, one should 
believe in him as the God-Man. Hence we may say that 
Anti-Climacus’ emphasis on Christ’s humiliation supports what may 
be called ”high-christological discipleship”, rather than "merely
ethical discipleship".
What we are going to suggest as the second aspect of 
Anti-Climacus’ view of discipleship (that is, his emphasis on the 
difference between the God-Man and the ordinary human being) also
serves as an element which supports what we have called 
"high-christological discipleship". Anti-Climacus strongly
emphasizes the difference between the God-Man and the ordinary
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individual: "[The] God-Man is essentially heterogeneous from
every other individual man and from race as a whole."[27] When
Anti-Climacus emphasizes this point he does not mean that there is 
only quantitative difference between them. Rather, Anti-Climacus,
as we have seen, emphasizes the fact that even though Jesus Christ 
is true man, He is also at the same time God. "[As] God-Man, 
although truly man, He is yet so heterogeneous, so unlike the
individual man, that it is not just simply a matter of course that
with a kind of impudent forwardness one should want in a way to 
take sides with Him."[28]
First of all, Anti-Climacus makes it clear that if one begins 
with the assumption that Jesus was a man, then one cannot reach 
the conclusion that he is God or the God-Man at all.(TC, p. 30) 
So only one who begins with the presupposition that He was God 
(Anti-Climacus calls this presupposition "the assumption of 
faith") is able to perceive the God-Man rightly. So if any one 
just regards Jesus as only a good moral teacher, then he has 
nothing to do with Christianity. For Christianity’s emphasis
"falls upon the fact that God lived" on earth as an individual 
human being.(TC, p. 35)
That is why the fact that God lived in time and space as an 
individual human being (Jesus) is more important than the 
consequences of his life or his teaching. If this individual 
human being under discussion is nothing but a man, then the 
consequences of his life and his teaching are more important than 
the mere historical fact that he lived, for "in relation to a man 
it remains nevertheless true that the consequences of his life are
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more important than his life."(TC, p. 35) But, according to 
Anti-Climacus, "to apply this to Christ is a blasphemy, it is to
make Him a mere man."(TC, p. 123)
Here is one of the differences between Jesus Christ and
Socrates. For in the case of Socrates, there is no problem of
leaping to another quality, from that of man to that of God, when 
one thinks of the consequences of his life. The consequences of 
his life also remain in the realm of man. And even though 
unfortunately people ignore the fact that he lived, this does not 
detract from the impact of his teaching. For the consequence of 
his life is more important that the faot that he lived.(TC, p.
35) Anti-Climacus who speaks of the Socratic person in this way, 
emphasizes that the same cannot be applied to Jesus Christ. "Very 
different is the case with Jesus Christ!"(TC, p. 37) For he is 
the God-Man. So for him the fact that he lived is more important 
than any thing else. Hence the one who thinks of Jesus as merely 
a good moral teacher, according to Anti-Climacus, cannot have the 
right relationship to Christianity. Such a person may find in 
Jesus a very good moral example, from whom one may receive very 
good ethical teaching. But he "demolishes Jesus Christ."(TC, p.
36) He thinks of Jesus as a good person, and he may try to do 
throughout his life what he thinks Jesus exemplified. But he is, 
according to Anti-Climacus, far from what Jesus really was and is. 
"Then," he spells out the reason why he thinks in this way, 
"Christ is no more the God-Man, but only a distinguished man whose 
life is homogeneous with the development of the race."(TC, p.
218) If He were a mere man, then he could be a good moral example,
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but He cannot be the Saviour of the world. As Anti-Climacus says: 
"if He is not very God, He does not save men." (TC, p. 137) But 
for Anti-Climacus, Jesus Christ is the only Saviour: "He is the 
Saviour, there is no salvation for any but in Him."(TC, p. 81) 
Jesus Christ is also the Pattern, but that only as the
Saviour.[29]
From this perspective, Anti-Climacus also emphasizes the fact 
that following Jesus Christ therefore begins with the right 
recognition of Him as the God-Man. In another place, Kierkegaard
says:
If I want to proceed directly to be ethical about this 
[imitation], I take this prototype in vain. Here it is a 
matter of worship and adoration first and foremost - and only 
through worship and adoration can there be any question of 
wanting to imitate....[30]
Hence to follow Him does not mean being perfectly like Him; that 
would be regarded as "mockery of God", Anti-Climacus emphasizes 
the difference between the God-Man and the individual human being 
from every perspective. The God-Man knows "everything beforehand, 
his sufferings and the certainty and necessity of his destruction, 
and yet [is] able to live day after day tranquilly, with devotion 
to God, as if He understood it all as good."[31] But for 
individual human beings, the situation is different. They have to 
"be handled carefully, and hence it is only little by little [that 
their tasks are] made clear to [them]."(TC, p. 184) That is the 
reason why Jesus Christ "did not at once foretell all that they 
would suffer""[even] to the Apostles, though they were 
contemporary with Him."(TC, p. 184) Therefore, what is
recommended in this book by the term "following" or "imitating" is
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that "thy life has as great a likeness to His as it is possible
for a man’s life to have."(TC, p. 108) Only to try to be like him 
as far as possible as a human being is what is emphasized in this 
book.[32] For "[no] man, with the exception of Christ, is the 
truth; in the case of every other man the truth is something 
endlessly higher than he is...[But] Christ is the Truth."(TC, p. 
200) The difference between Christ the Pattern and human beings as 
the followers is also clearly emphasized in Kierkegaard’s journal
entries:
Even the chosen apostle, and thus every one without exception, 
is qualitatively different from the God-man in this way - the 
apostle must be constrained; the God-man is the only one who 
has pure ideality and therefore voluntarily the maximum.[33]
By becoming contemporaneous with Christ (the exemplar) you 
discover precisely that you do not resemble Him...[Then] you 
flee to the exemplar that he may take pity upon you. Thus the 
exemplar is at the same time He, who infinitely judges you 
most strictly - and, in addition, He Who has mercy upon 
you.[34]
In Kierkegaard’s other work, "Has a Man the Right to let himself
be Put to Death for the Truth?" , Kierkegaard once again makes this
point clear. In this work the ma j or stress is placed upon the
dissimilarity between Christ the Master and every man. Per
L/nning makes a good case about this work, when he says: "The
real task of the essay can thereby be said to be...the affirmation
of the boundaries of the likeness to the Master for which a
believing Christian can strive."[35] Hence Anti-Climacus’ and
Kierkegaard’s emphasis upon the difference between the God-Man and
the ordinary human being which we have considered in the last few 
paragraphs also underlines their insistence on what we have called
high-christological discipleship, rather than merely ethical
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discipleship.
Now let us turn to the third aspect of Anti-Climacus* view of
discipleship: the problem of suffering. For Anti-Climacus, a
disciple is one who suffers for being a disciple. In relation to
this, we have to mention the fact that this book, just like his
other books, makes it clear that what a disciple has to suffer for
being a disciple is not ordinary suffering, but Christian 
suffering. By "Christian suffering" Anti-Climacus refers to what
is specifically Christian - "suffering in likeness with Jesus 
Christ"(TC, p. 173), "the sufferings which a Christian must 
endure...sufferings he can well avoid merely by refraining from 
being a Christian."(TC, p. 67) In short, Christian suffering is 
"suffering for Christianity"[36], or "suffering for the 
doctrine".[37]
Therefore, for example, "illness, financial difficulties, 
anxiety for the year to come, [etc.]"(TC, p. 115) does not belong 
to Christian suffering. At the same time, what the ethical man
has to suffer for the sake of his ethical efforts is not Christian
suffering either. According to Anti-Climacus, "[such] sufferings 
are the universal human experience, in which the heathen are (or 
were) just as severely tried as the Christians."(TC, 173) 
Therefore, "to suffer in likeness with Christ does not mean to 
encounter the unavoidable with patience...."(TC, p. 173) 
Christian suffering is something one should suffer because one is 
a Christian. In Christian suffering, according to Anti-Climacus 
there are two kinds of suffering.
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The first kind is something external which comes from the
heterogeneity between the world and the Christian.[38] In this 
sense, this is "the suffering which Christ and Christianity
themselves brought into the world", that is, suffering "because of 
the word [of God, or of the Gospel]" and "for righteousness’ sake 
[in the biblical sense of the word]"(TC, p. 110), the suffering 
which there "is always when there is truth in the profession of 
being a Christian"(TC, p. 112), which comes when one truly 
asserts that "I will belong to Christ, I will be a Christian!"(TC, 
p. 117) For example, "tribulation and persecution [which] arise 
because of the word"(TC, p. 116, cf. Matt. 13:21=Mk 4:17), and 
to "suffer ill at the hands of men because as a Christian or by 
being a Christian"(TC, p. 173) belong to Christian suffering.
The second kind of suffering is more internal, but it is also
suffering which the Christian suffers because he is a Christian.
It is suffering within the Christian inwardness which results from
his sensitivity to God and His will and therefore to his own 
sinfulness.(TC, pp. 194f.) Kierkegaard says that "for the 
Christian sorrow for sin is the deepest sorrow."[39] But though 
this is suffering "with which no other human sufferings can 
compare in painfulness and anguish"(TC, p. 194), the Christian is 
willing to remain a Christian and to endure this suffering. This 
does not mean that he enjoys suffering; he is not a spiritual
masochist. He merely knows that such is the case for a man who
lives the Christian life according to what is suggested by his 
Pattern, the God-Man, even though he cannot dare to equate his own
case with the case of his Pattern. Here we can see again the
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difference between the God-Man (the Pattern) and the individual 
Christian (the follower).[40] The Christian has to follow and 
imitate and resemble his Pattern, but always in his following he 
clearly knows the ultimate difference between the God-Man and the
individual human being.
Up to this point we have observed firstly Anti-Climacus’ 
emphasis on Christ’s humiliation, and secondly, the difference 
between Jesus as the God-Man and other human beings; and thirdly, 
what is the nature of the Christian suffering which is supposed to 
inevitably follow the life of a disciple. Now we may see that 
these are closely related to one another. What becomes obvious
through these observations is the fact that the disciple in this
book is also a disciple of Jesus Christ who demands first of all
belief in His being the God-Man. This disciple cannot be
understood as a person who is only morally influenced or moved by
the good moral example of Jesus. If one follows Jesus merely in
this way, one is not yet a disciple in the sense with which this
book uses the word.[41] In short, Christ is understood as both the
Saviour and the Pattern.(TC, p. 232) And as we have seen, in
order to follow the Pattern, one should be renewed by Christ. In
one of his journal entries, Kierkegaard says:
I believe that his [Christ’s] activity [of redemption] was the 
principal thing, because that life which he enjoins (Matt 5) 
cannot blossom forth before regeneration; consequently this is 
the conditio sine qua non; and, on the other hand, this life 
must necessarily unfold in him who is truly regenerated. I 
Cor. 5:7, Eph. 5:2, Rom 3:25.[42]
Thus, according to Kierkegaard, "grace [must be] in the first 
place."(JP, II, l493(Pap. X 5 A 101)) I think what we read in
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Training in Christianity is not different from what we read in
this journal entry. Hence the faith-relationship between the
God-Man and the individual human being has to precede one’s being 
a disciple. Without faith in the God-Man, according to the logic 
of this book, there is no following in the real sense of the word. 
This is because "works apart from faith are dead."(JP, I, 976(Pap. 
X 1 A 457)) Therefore, we can conclude that discipleship in this 
book cannot be understood as "merely ethical discipleship".
Indeed, many commentators observe that Kierkegaard’s strong 
emphasis on imitation in Training in Christianity must be related 
to his emphasis on the need for grace.[423 That is to say, one of 
his most important intentions when he emphasizes the imitation is 
the fact that man by himself and of himself cannot do this; there 
is, therefore, a desperate need of grace of God. However, this 
interpretation functions in two ways. On the one hand, it makes 
it clear that there is no place of "merely ethical discipleship" 
in this book; on the other hand, it makes us ask about the 
relevance of the concept of semi-Pelagianism to this book.
So now let us turn to the problem of semi-Pelagianism. There 
have been several attempts by some scholars to detect a
semi-Pelagian tendency in Kierkegaard’s emphasis on the imitation
of Christ. For example, even though not directly mentioning
Training in Christianity, H. Roos says:
[There] are certain positive tendencies which...point in the 
direction of the Catholic position; that is especially true of 
his emphasis upon the principle of action [esp., 
Kierkegaardian concept "imitation"] in contrast to that of 
faith.[44]
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Malantschuk also says:
In his [Kierkegaard’s] later years, when he particularly 
emphasizes the significance of imitation for the Christian 
life the tendency toward Catholicism becomes more marked in 
his writings.[45]
Therefore, it is worth considering this problem of
semi-Pelagianism extensively.
I shall consider this problem through a thorough examination
of Part III of this book, for this part of the book is the most 
likely one from which one may draw out such a tendency. (But I
shall refer to other parts of the book and other materials in 
order to illuminate the points which I shall draw from this part.) 
Indeed, a superficial reading of this part may give support to 
this view, since in it Christ’s drawing us to Himself is expressed 
as being harmonious with our trying to be disciples. But careful
examination which hopefully I shall provide in what follows, will
show that, in the final analysis, one’s being a disciple cannot be 
achieved by one’s efforts, even though it is true that one should
try to be a disciple. For in spite of one’s efforts, human
efforts, even those under the spiritual influence of God, are
always found to be insufficient, and moreover one’s salvation only
depends on what the God-Man has done, and this is the conclusive 
motivation of one’s being a disciple in the real sense.
What is important in relation to this is the fact that
throughout this part, one’s being and remaining a disciple, which 
is termed here as being drawn to Christ, is regarded as the work 
of Christ. Anti-Climacus says:
[On] high He is not resting, but He works hitherto, employed
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and concerned with drawing all unto Himself...[Thou] seest not 
God's almightiness - and yet it is fully certain that He also 
works, that a single instant without Him, and the world is 
nothing. So likewise He is invisible on high, yet everywhere 
present, employed in drawing all unto Himself - while in this 
world, alas, there is worldly talk about everything else but 
Him, as though He did not exist.(TC, p. 155)
Hence the God-Man is now working on high. Yet this work is based
on His work which He has done when He was here on earth (that is, 
His redemption or atonement), and being carried out by Him from on 
high; He draws us unto Himself from on high. Hence, as we shall
see, there is a coherence or unity between what He has done on
earth and what He is doing now. This coherence or unity can be 
observed from two aspects; one is concerned with our knowing the
fact that He draws us unto Himself, and the other one is concerned
with the relation between what He has done on earth and what He is
doing on high.
The first aspect (which concerns our knowing this fact) is 
less important in comparison with the second aspect, but it also 
shows the unity between His work on earth and His work on high. 
Anti-Climacus says:
It is the exalted One who shall do this [drawing to Himself], 
but it is the humbled One who has said that he will do it. In 
case the humbled One had not lived, we should have known 
nothing about the exalted One; and in case the humbled One had 
not uttered this word, we should have known nothing about the 
premise that He from on high will draw all unto Himself.(TC, 
p. 161)
As this passage shows, if Christ in His humiliation had not said
what He would do when He would be on high, we could not know this 
fact. In this sense, what He has done on earth is related to what
He is doing on high. But, as we have said above, this aspect of
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the unity of His work is less important.
The main thing we have to bear in mind in relation to the
unity of Christ’s work is the fact that what He has done on earth 
(redemption) is the ground or basis of what He is doing now on 
high. To draw us unto Himself is Christ’s work, and His work has 
a kind of coherence; what he has done when he was here on earth 
does not break with what He is doing from on high.(TC, p. 151) 
Without having redeemed us, he cannot draw us to Himself; that is, 
without redemption we cannot be disciples.
Anti-Climacus sees this even in relation to the way in which 
Jesus puts the clause, "And I, if i be lifted up from the earth, 
will draw all unto Myself. ”(TC, p. 151, et passim. John 12:32), 
and also the way in which the evangelist interprets this clause. 
That is, Anti-Climacus sees and emphasizes that Jesus says this
clause in this form when He was in His humiliation. So the
situation of humiliation is very important, and at the same time 
His drawing us will be carried out if or when He is lifted up from 
the earth. Moreover, Anti-Climacus reminds us of the fourth
evangelist’s interpretation of these words of Jesus in the 
following verse (John 12:33): "’This He [that is, Christ] said 
signifying what death He should die.' Thus the Apostle explains 
the being lifted up from the earth as humiliation, as the deepest 
humiliation, as crucifixion. ’’(TC, p. 251, emphasis given) Hence 
what Jesus Christ means is that, after he is crucified, that is, 
after he has accomplished the redemption, He will draw us unto 
Himself. But this does not mean that it is only on the cross that
Jesus Christ does the work of redemption, even though what he has
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done on the cross is the essence of the work of redemption.
Anti-Climacus has a very strong sense of the importance of
Christ’s life on earth for the work of redemption. Following the 
writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews, Anti-Climacus says that ”He 
[Christ] Himself learned by what He suffered - He learned 
obedience.”(TC, p. 180) That is, the way in which He lived on 
earth - His absolute obedience to God the Father, His suffering 
for being the Truth, etc. - is a part of His work of redemption, 
and this work is the basis or foundation of what He is doing 
new.(TC, p. 181) What is important here is the coherence or unity
of His work. His work now is the continuation of the work he
carried out on earth. His work has two kinds of completion; one 
is the completion of the work of redemption and the other is the 
application of this completed redemption. So we can say, as 
Anti-Climacus does, that He continues to complete {the second 
completion} the work even now which He has completed when he was 
here on earth {the first completion}. His drawing us unto Himself 
is His own work as the work of the second completion. 
Anti-Climacus says again:
[He] is invisible on high, yet everywhere present, employed in 
drawing all unto Himself - while in this world, alas, there is 
worldly talk about everything else but Him, as though He did 
not exist. He employs the most various things as the way and 
the means of drawing unto Himself...But though the means He 
employs are so many, all ways come together at one point, the 
consciousness of sin - through that passes ’the way’ by which 
He draws a man, the repentant sinner, to Himself.(TC, p. 155)
This quotation highlights clearly the way in which Christ in His 
exaltation from on high draws us unto Himself. Even though He 
uses many means of drawing us unto Himself, "all ways come
together at one point, the consciousness of sin”. Here, the unity
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of His works clearly appears. By pointing out this fact,
Anti-Climacus closely relates what Christ has done when he was on
earth to what He is doing now. The death on the cross which is 
done as the means of solving the human problem of sin, is closely
related to His making us conscious of our sin. Both of them are 
His own works; rather, they are two parts of His own work. As we
have asserted above, He draws us unto Himself on the basis of what
He has done on earth.
What is emphasized in the unity of His works is the fact that 
even though He may use several different means, the One who
conclusively does this work is Jesus Christ Himself. In this
sense, on the last page of this book, Anti-Climacus says again 
that "for lhP.U Alone ACi able .drAW .untp Thyself. though Thou 
Aanat employ, ALL means And. ALL JBA& io AfAW ALL unto .Thyself. " (TC, 
p. 254, emphasis given) Jesus Christ draws us, he makes us 
conscious of our sin, and on the basis of the redemption which He 
has done on earth He forgives our sin. He "will not forget [us] 
even when, alas, [we do] sometimes forget Him, who from on high 
continues to draw [us] unto Himself, until the last blessed end 
when [we] shalt be by Him, and with Him on high."(TC, p. 156) In 
this way, the fact that all that is related to our salvation is
Christ’s own work is emphasized throughout this book.
In relation to this, we have to understand the meaning of
drawing to Himself which Jesus said that he would do. 
Anti-Climacus says that "here the meaning of truly drawing to
oneself is duplex: first to make that which is to be drawn its
own self, and then to draw it to oneself. "(TC, p. 159) In order
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to understand this properly, we have to first understand the 
Christian sense of becoming oneself (which I shall discuss and 
compare to the ethical understanding of becoming oneself in the 
next chapter).
Here I just want to point out one fact which is closely 
related to the problem of semi-Pelagianism, and which 
Anti-Climacus also emphasizes. The activity of drawing to Himself 
is described here as a two-step activity: firstly making the one 
who is to be drawn become himself, and then drawing the one to
Himself. What must be remembered is the fact that even the first
step is closely related to Christ; it is not an autonomous, or 
independent happening. "Christ would first and foremost help 
every man to become himself, would require of him first and 
foremost that by entering into himself he should become 
himself...."(TC, p. 160) In this way, Anti-Climacus emphasizes 
that even the first step of the drawing is possible only in 
relation to Christ. As we shall see in the next chapter, in the 
Christian consciousness one cannot be oneself by oneself; it is 
only in relation to God, who has conclusively revealed Himself in 
the Christ event, that one can be oneself in the full sense.
Hence even the first step of being drawn by Christ is closely 
related to Christ Himself who first makes one to be oneself, "so 
as then to draw [one] unto Himself."(TC, p. 160) Hence even in 
the first step of the drawing, one is in relation to Christ.
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In this sense, I wonder whether it is more accurate not to
regard this two-step activity as something which is happening 
through two different stages. Anti-Climacus himself describes
this as a possible alternative, when he says:
[When] that which is to be drawn is in itself a self, the real 
meaning of truly drawing to oneself is, first to help it to 
become truly its own self, so as then to draw it to oneself, 
on it ffleans, ±o jreip it Jbeqeiae its. o&n .self with and M the 
■drawing jsi it jo .oneself., (TC, p. 159, emphasis given)
In this sense, this two-step activity looks like an analytic 
expression of what is happening at the very same time. Whatever
that may be, what is emphasized in this context is the fact that
it is possible to choose Christ or to choose to follow (or be 
drawn by) Jesus Christ only when one becomes oneself. This 
intimates that we cannot choose Christ by ourselves before we are 
really related to Christ. Our relation to Christ comes before our
choice to follow Christ. If there is the slightest possibility 
for us to choose by ourselves to follow Christ in the context of 
this discussion of Anti-Climacus, then we have to say that 
Anti-Climacus has a semi-Pelagian tendency. If one can be oneself
by oneself and if only after that can one be related to God and 
Christ, then we cannot help speaking of his semi-Pelagian 
tendency. But what we find is the emphasis upon Christ's 
initiative in our becoming ourselves.(TC, pp. 156f.)
This point can be confirmed by the observation that in this 
book, one's consciousness of arriving at a certain standard or
one's sense of conquering in relation to one's efforts to follow
Christ, is scathingly criticized.[46] In fact, one's imagination 
that one had conquered is regarded as being caught by Satan’s
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tactics.(Cf. TC, pp. 224ff.) It is true that Anti-Climacus 
speaks of these things in relation to the Church as a whole, 
rather than to individual human beings. But if this is the case 
for the Church as a whole, then this can also apply to individual
human beings who belong to that Church. Hence if the Church, 
which imagines that it has arrived at a certain standard by itself 
or even by God's grace, is not the true Church, but one which "has 
taken the Church of Christ in vain"(TC, p. 205), then the 
individual human being who thinks that he can be saved or
justified by what he has done with the help of God's grace is also
not the true Christian, but one who has taken Christ in vain.
That one cannot reach perfection is one of the reasons why
Anti-Climacus, who is Christian to an extraordinary degree, says:
[I] am convinced in my inmost heart that what I say is
Christian; but I dare not say of myself that I am so perfect a
Christian that I might venture to give the impression that at 
every instant I feel equally vividly what I have here said,
not that I would assume responsibility for every deduction
from it.(TC, p. 249)
Even though he himself cannot be such a person in its full sense, 
he cannot help pointing out what is the ideal form of being a 
Christian. This attitude is in keeping with his view of 
discipleship. According to him, a disciple tries to do all things 
he can do in order to be a disciple and suffers for being such a 
disciple, but he will never attribute any merit to his own efforts 
of being a disciple and to his own suffering for being a follower 
in the true sense. He even thinks that such thought of 
meritoriousness is one which defiles one's being a true
disciple.[47] For a true disciple does not start from himself (if
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this is the case, he cannot find any way in which he can be a 
disciple in the sense with which this book uses this term); rather 
he begins to strive to be a true disciple, a true Christian with 
the redemptive understanding of the death of the God-Man.(Cf. JP, 
III, 2483(Pap« X 1 A 197)) For such a person, if there were no 
redemptive event of the cross, then there would be no point in
being a disciple, and then the term "Christian" would not make any
sense at all. That is to say, without redemption there is no 
starting point for him. For such a person, "His [Christ’s] death 
becomes the infinite guarantee with which [he as] the striver
starts out, the assurance that infinite satisfaction has been
made...."(TC, p. 270) In this spirit, Kierkegaard says:
The fellow-worker with Christ in relation to the atonement 
thou canst not be, not in the remotest way. Thou art wholly 
in debt, He wholly makes satisfaction, [viz., The guilt is 
entirely yours: the making satisfaction is entirely
his.](Chr. D, p. 308)
This is the conclusive reason why such a disciple does not put any 
merits on his efforts or works.(Cf. Journals. No. 1069(Pap. X 2 
A 511)) What is given to him by God is the starting point and the 
ending point for him.
A quotation from Kierkegaard’s journal entry will clearly 
elucidate this point.
No, the Atonement and grace are and remain definite. All 
striving toward imitation, when the moment of death brings it 
to an end and one stands before God, will be sheer paltriness 
- therefore Atonement and grace are needed, Furthermore, as 
long as there is striving, the Atonement will constantly be 
needed to prevent this striving from being transformed into 
agonizing anxiety in which a man is burned up, so to speak, 
and less than ever begins to strive. Finally, while there is 
striving, every other second a mistake is made, something is 
neglected, there is sin - therefore Atonement is 
unconditionally needed. Although it is the utmost
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strenuousness, imitation should be like a jest, a childlike 
act - if it is to mean something in earnest, that is, be of 
any value before God - the Atonement is the earnestness.[48]
This passage clearly shows us Kierkegaard's understanding of the 
relation between atonement and our striving to imitate Christ in 
His humiliation (discipleship).
Firstly, the only basis or foundation of one’s salvation is
the atonement which Christ has accomplished when He was here on 
earth. Human striving is only paltriness and "like a jest, a 
childlike act" before God; that is, it, whatever that may be, has 
no value at all before God. What is more, "good works in the 
sense of meritoriousness are naturally an abomination to God."(JP, 
II, 1121(Pap. VIII 1 A 19))
Secondly, Christ’s atonement is also the basis of one’s 
striving to imitate Christ in His humiliation(cf. JP, II, 
l8T5(Pap. X 3 A 378), 1910(Pap. X 4 A 492)); only such striving 
which is based on atonement is able not to be transformed into
"agonizing anxiety in which a man is burned up".[49] That is, as 
Marie Thulstrup says, "God’s grace awakens thankfulness in a
person, and it is precisely thankfulness which eo ipso leads to
the imitation of Christ. It comes about because of joy [of 
redemption]. Therefore, this kind of imitation has nothing in 
common with a legalistic demand for imitation binding upon 
everyone."[50]
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In short, imitation for the Christian is "the fruit of 
faith."[513 So Kierkegaard says that "infinite humiliation and 
grace and then a striving born of gratitude - this is 
Christianity."[52] He says again: "Your striving is to be as
rigorous as possible, and then it is nevertheless by 'grace* that 
you are saved."[533 These points illuminate the view of 
discipleship of Training in Christianity,
Now it must become clear that even in relation to Training in
Christianity which emphasizes the act of following Christ, it is
difficult to find a semi-Pelagian tendency. On the contrary, in 
this book, it is emphasized that one’s following Christ, which is
the vital part of discipleship, can only come from one’s
faith-relationship with the God-Man.
So far we have observed that the view of discipleship in
Philosophical Fragments and in Tr aining in Christianity cannot be
understood as "merely ethical discipleship" which sees the Pattern 
(Christ) as only a good moral teacher and example; and it cannot 
be understood as providing synergism which sees the problem of
salvation as a cooperative work of God and man. These two
observations make it clear that Christian understanding of the
ethical aspect of life, which is basically treated as a problem of
discipleship in these two books, is fundamentally different from
the rationalistic understanding of ethics. For Christian 
understanding is suggested to be something which is different to
the view of the ethical person; moreover, it is seen as something
which cannot be compromised even with a religious view which does
not make a clear distinction between the Christian view and the
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merely ethical view. In short, the Christian does not think that
the ethical aspect of life is autonomous, or independent of God.
Rather, the ethical aspect of human life is also understood to be
closely related to God and faith in God, for "the Christian
ethical norm" is being a "disciple"(cf. JP, II, 1901(Pap. X 4 A
340)), as described in this section.
*****
On the basis of the discussion so far advanced, we can conclude
this chapter by saying that the Christian understanding of the
ethical aspect of life is not the same as that of the ethical
person; rather there is a clear distinction and break between
them. For the ethical person, what is important is human ,
practical reason which makes ethical universality possible. But 
for the Christian, what is important is not self-sufficient 
reason, but God and the God-relationship. Here our long quest for
an understanding of Christian ethics reaches its end. What is
suggested as the antithesis between ethics and faith in Fear and
Trembling can be conclusively understood as the antithesis between
the rationalistic understanding of the ethical aspect of human
life and the Christian understanding. This Christian
understanding of ethics which comes from Christian faith, shows us
that there can be something which could be called Christian
ethics. Christian ethics is suggested as the ethics of love in
Works of Love and is also seen as the ethics of discipleship in ;
Philosophical Fragments and especially in Training in -
Christianity. Our comparison between rationalistic ethics and J
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Christian ethics shows one aspect of the clear discontinuity 
between the ethical sphere and the Christian sphere. Our next 
task is to try to see whether such discontinuity can also be 
observed in their understanding of becoming a self. This is what
we shall consider in the next chapter
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CHAPTER 1W0
THE SELF
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the relationship between
the ethical person’s understanding of the self and the Christian’s
understanding. That is, in this chapter, the ontological aspect 
of the difference between the ethical sphere and the Christian
sphere is dealt with. I hope to show that there is also a
distinction and definite break between the ethical person’s 
understanding of the self and the Christian understanding, as 
there is a clear-cut distinction between the ethical understanding 
of ethics and the Christian understanding (as we have,seen in the 
last chapter).
By the terms ’’ontology” and "ontological” I do not mean that 
there is ontology in the traditional sense of the word (”the 
inquiry into beings as beings”, ”the inquiry into the being of 
beings”, or ’’the inquiry into being as such”[1]) in the thought of 
Kierkegaard. For it would be futile to try to find such a
traditional ontology in the thought of Kierkegaard. In fact, he 
is very critical of traditional ontology, especially Hegelian 
metaphysics. One may even say that "Kierkegaard has no 
ontology”.[2] Hence when I speak of "ontology”, I use this term in 
a very special way. On the one hand, the meaning which I give to
this term is very broad in the sense that it includes all kinds of
matters which are related to the problem of human beings and 
existence, even though these are not systematically arranged as
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ontology in se nsu strictu. So ontology here is a 
"pre-ontological" ontology (to use Heidegger’s terminology[3]), or 
an "implicit ontology" (to use Calvin Schrag’s terminology[l|]). 
That is, it is an existential-ontic (or pre-theoretical) 
understanding of one’s existence. Kierkegaardian ontology is what
is implied in his understanding of the human being which he 
defines as an existing individual. What I want to do is to draw 
out frc«n his various writings this implied understanding of the
human being as an existing individual. But on the other hand, the 
term is also very restricted in the sense that it deals only with
what is related to human existence and one’s being oneself.
Kierkegaardian ontology does not include theology proper, or 
cosmology. It is only concerned with the concrete human being and 
his existence. But this does not mean that Kierkegaard does not 
mention God or the world when he is speaking of human problems. 
But these references are made mainly in relation to the problem of 
one’s becoming oneself. In this sense, one may speak of 
Kierkegaardian ontology as a restricted ontology, or, as John 
Elrod does, a "regional ontology"[5].
In relation to the term "ontology", another point must also 
be made here. In spite of the general trend among scholars, who 
use this term to cover all "Kierke^ard’s spheres of existence", I 
cannot help pointing out the clear difference between the ethical 
person’s understanding of becoming oneself and the Christian’s 
understanding. Hence I do not believe that the ontology of the
ethical person is the same as that of the Christian. I do not 
think that there is one ontology which is the basis for the
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doctrine of spheres of existence. In this sense, my position is 
the opposite of that of Elrod, who thinks that Kierkegaard 
’’developed an ontology in the pseudonyms in his writings on the 
self"[63 and that ’’this ontology makes possible and unifies the 
aesthetic, moral, and religious modes of existence. "[73 As I have 
mentioned above, Elrod is not the only one who thinks in this way. 
It is a general trend among scholars to find an ontology behind 
Kierkegaard’s spheres of existence. In particular, those who try 
to compare Kierkegaard’s thought to that of other existential 
thinkers assert an ontological basis to Kierkegaard's works.[8] 
However, in my opinion, there are two possibilities of speaking of 
an ontology which covers and unites several spheres of life. One
of them is excluding the Christian sphere from the discussion, 
because after excluding the Christian sphere, it is possible to 
construct an ontology which covers and unites the aesthetic sphere 
and the ethical sphere and religiousness A. For the fundamental 
thought of these spheres are basically the same, that is, 
immanentism. But it is very difficult to include Christianity and 
the Christian mode of existence within this same structure. For, 
as Malantschuk says, Christian ontology is the ontology which 
"cannot be contained within human ’immanental thought[93
The second possibility of speaking of an ontology of 
Kierkegaard is of identifying the Christian ontology which is the 
self-understanding of the Christian existence, and then looking at 
other spheres from this perspective. In fact, I think, the 
discussion in The Sickness unto Death follows this line of
thought, and in section 2 of the chapter, I shall examine this
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book and develop such an ontology. We have to differentiate the 
ethical understanding of the self and the Christian understanding. 
This is the thesis which I hope to maintain in this chapter.
In this chapter, I shall first consider the ethical person’s 
understanding of the problem of the self and of one’s being 
oneself. I shall do this through a thematic reading of the second
volume of Either/Qr, and I shall refer to the second part of 
Stages on th_e Life’s Kay. and other material in order to shed light 
on the points which I shall make in relation to Either/Or. In the 
course of this discussion, the close relationship between the 
ethical person’s understanding of the self and Heidegger’s idea of 
authentic self will be identified. (But as space is limited, I 
will merely point out several similarities. For extensive 
discussion of the comparison of the ethical person’s view of 
becoming a self and Heidegger’s view of becoming an authentic 
existence, a separate study would be needed. )
I shall then, in section 2, consider the Christian 
understanding of becoming oneself through a thorough examination 
of The Sickn-ess unto Death. In the course of this examination, 
one can clearly see that even though there is what one may call a 
structural similarity between the ethical understanding of the 
problem of becoming oneself and the Christian understanding, they 
are basically different. By "structural similarity" I mean that 
the structure of the self of the ethical person and that of the 
Christian are similar in that both of them have two opposite, or 
contradictory elements (i.e., body and soul, temporality and 
eternity, or finitude and infinitude) which must be integrated by
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the third element. The structure of the self of the ethical
person is similar to the Christian’s. However, the differences 
lie in their understanding of the way in which the integration of 
these elements is accomplished, and the characteristics of the 
resulting integrated self in each person (the ethical and the 
Christian person).
After finishing this discussion, in section 3, we shall 
consider another closely related problem: how can we understand 
the person who is in religiousness A? He appears to have exactly 
the same structure of the self as that of the Christian, for he 
also affirms that one can be oneself only in relation to God. For 
him too the relation to God is the necessary and sufficient 
element of the integration of oneself. However, we hope to show 
the fundamental difference between the ways in which one believes 
to accomplish this integration of each sphere. So this section on 
the problem of religiousness A is also helpful for our conclusion 
that even in the problem of becoming a self there is a clear 
distinction and definite break between the ethical person and the
Christian.
I
Let us start with a consideration of the ethical person’s 
understanding of the problem of becoming oneself. Our 
consideration of this problem will proceed in the following way. 
First, we shall see one of the most characteristic emphases of the
ethical person: choice. In considering this, we shall find that
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this choice, emphasized so much by the ethical person, is nothing 
other than the choice of oneself. Then we shall examine the way 
of choosing oneself suggested by the ethical person. And then 
lastly, we shall consider the characteristics of the resultant 
ethically integrated self. Through this examination we shall be 
able to see that the ethical person understands that one can be 
oneself by one’s own efforts, if only one wishes and tries to do 
so. For the ethical person, to be oneself is a possibility which
is latent in his structure of the self itself.
First, what is the most characteristic emphasis of the 
ethical person? When we examine the letters of Judge William, the 
pseudonymous representative of the ethical viewpoint, in 
Either/Dr, it is easy to see that one of the most dominant themes 
is that of choice.[10] In many places Judge William emphasizes the 
importance of choice. To put it in the context of the book, he 
recommends the young man (who is designated "A" by the editor of 
the book, Victor Eremita) to choose. This implies that according 
to Judge William, "A" as an aesthetic person has not yet made the 
choice of life. From this we can see that by the term "choice” or 
"to choose" Judge William means a very special choice.
When we closely examine the passages in which Judge William 
mentions this choice, we can find that the choice to which he
refers is that in which one .chooses oneself.Mil So his
recommendation to the aesthete "A" can be summarized in the
following command: "[Win] yourself, acquire your own self"(E/0L, 
II, p. 167=E/O, II, p. 163), or "choose [yourself]".(SOLWL, p.
124) Indeed, "choose yourself" is the repeated refrain throughout
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the whole of Judge William’s writings to "A". This presupposes 
that the ethical person does not think that every human being, 
given his biological and psychological reality, is a ’’self”. Here 
appears the special meaning of the term "self". Every living
being is not yet a "self”. To be a ’’self” is understood as a 
task. And that task is accomplished through one’s choice.[12]
What then does Judge William mean by the terms ”to be 
oneself”, or ”to choose oneself”? There are three expressions
which are used in relation to the term ”to choose oneself”.
Sometimes Judge William says that ”one should choose the ethical”. 
From time to time he says that ’’one must choose oneself in one’s 
eternal validity.” And in some places he says that ’’one should
choose the absolute” or ”one should choose absolutely”. These 
expressions are clues to the exact understanding of choice of 
oneself. In the next few paragraphs, I shall discuss the meaning 
of these three expressions one by one in relation to the problem 
of be can ing oneself. But such a separate discussion is only for 
convenience's sake; in fact, they cannot be separated. They 
contribute in their own ways to clarifying the meaning of ”one’s 
becoming oneself”.
The choice of oneself is, first of all, regarded as the 
choice of the ethical. For the ethicist, choice itself is the 
ethical concept. So Judge William says that ’’the ethical 
constitutes the choice”(E/0, II, p. 169=E/OL, II, p. 173); and 
in another place he says again: ”The act of choosing is a proper
and stringent expression of the ethical.”[13]
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According to the ethicist, therefore, the aesthetic choice is 
either entirely immediate, or does not know a decisive either/or, 
so it is no choice at all.[14] Thus in the eyes of the ethicist 
the aesthetic person is only in the world of possibilities; 
"everything is possible for you [the aesthete, "A"]..., but it is 
unheal thy"(E/0, II, p. 16); "you are the epitome of any and every 
possibility."(E/0, II, p. 17) The aesthete thus seeks to exist as 
pure possibility, and refuses to take on concrete determinants.
The aesthete, as Stack says, "loses his sense of his own
actuality, his own temporal reality."[15] The aesthetic existence
is a "poet-existence" which does not know the concrete world, but
only lives in the world which he himself composes according to his
own imagination.(E/0, II, p. 210=E/OL, II, pp. 2l4f.) In this
sense, the aesthete is only an observer in the game of life. As
Judge William speaks of "A": "[You] stick your hands in your
pocket and contemplate life."(E/0, II, p. 195=E/OL, p. 200) In
the same spirit, he also describes "A" as follows:
You are a hater of activity in life - quite appropriately, 
because if there is to be meaning in it life must have 
continuity, and this your life does not have.(E/0, II, p. 
195=E/OL, II, p. 200)
Hence, according to the ethicist, the aesthete is not yet 
himself.[16] For, according to the ethicist, only with the choice 
of the ethical does one become oneself. Conversely, we may say, 
as Ronald J. Manheimer says, that "one becomes ethical by 
deciding to actualize one’s possibilities in such a way that the 
individual defines himself."[17] For, according to the ethical 
person, the choice of the ethical is not the choice between good
and evil, but the choice between choosing good sud evil and not
Page 163
choosing at all.(E/0, XI, p. 169=E/OL, II, p. 173) Hence at 
first, the self’s choice of itself must be the choice to choose. 
At this stage, "the point is still not that of choosing something; 
the point is not the reality of that which is chosen but the 
reality of choosing."(E/0, II, p. 176=E/OL, II, p. 180)
Accordingly, in the opinion of the ethicist, the aesthete
does not have a proper conception of gpod and evil. As Mackey
says, "[the] distinction between good and evil does not exist for
the aesthete."[18] The aesthete is not yet good or evil. And yet
without choice personality deteriorates.(cf. E/0, II, p.
163=E/OL, II, p. 167) For the ethicist thinks that the choice of
evil is not the choice, for choice itself, as we have seen,
implies the ethical choice. Judge William says:
[It] actually is a matter of only one choice. Through this 
choice, I actually do not choose between good and evil, but I 
choose the good, but when I choose the good, I choose ao. ipso 
the choice between good and evil. The original choice is 
forever present in every succeeding choice.(E/0, II, p. 
219=E/OL, II, 223)
Hence the ethicist thinks that anyone who is capable of choosing 
between good and evil will choose the good.(E/0, II, p. 168=E/OL, 
II, p. 172) Therefore, according to the ethicist, only with one’s 
becoming oneself is there a differentiation between good and evil, 
so only then is one either good or evil. (E/0, II, p. 223=E/OL, 
II, 227) Hence to fail to choose is to fail to be either good or 
evil. But this is to lose oneself. Thus, according to the 
ethicist, to choose oneself means to choose the ethical, or to
choose oneself as the ethical self.
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Yet the ethical implies freedom. As Judge William expresses 
it: "[In] the ethical I am raised above the moment, I am in
freedom."(E/0, II, p. 179=E/OL, II, p. 184) The ethical choice, 
or choice understood by the ethicist, is an act of freedom. "The 
act of resolution," says Judge William, "is the ethical act, it is 
freedom."(SOLWL, p. 115) Thus, for the ethicist, there is an 
irrevocable relationship between freedom and choice; if there is 
no choice there is no freedom, and vice versa. This is the very 
reason why Judge William can assert: "It is for freedom,
therefore, that I am fighting (partly in this letter, partly and 
chiefly in myself), for the time to come, for Either/Or [i.e., 
choice]."(E/0, II, p. 1?6=E/OL, II, p. 180) So one may say with 
Elrod that "it [to choose oneself] is the acceptance of oneself as 
radically free and responsible for oneself".[19] In this sense, to 
choose oneself is to accept responsibility for oneself.[20] To
choose oneself in freedom does not mean to abandon all
circumstances in which one is placed. One aspect of choosing 
oneself in freedom is to accept what was given with one’s birth, 
the "particular given that the self has not determined but that 
cannot be escaped."[21]
Such activity of accepting what was given is described by 
Judge William as to accept one’s facticity as a possibility.(cf. 
E/0, II, p. 251=E/OL, II, p. 256) Another aspect of choosing 
oneself in freedom is to take that possibility as one’s task.(E/0, 
II, p. 251=E/OL, II, p. 256) This is the only way in which one 
can actualize oneself. The actualization of the possibility is 
the becoming of the self. Hence one can say that in the activity
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of choosing, one’s personality is determined as ethical. As 
Thomte expresses it: "The ethical breaks forth from the very 
depth of his personality.”[22]
Here in relation to freedom and to the ethical a novel idea
of essence and accidence appears. Judge William says:
Everything that is posited in his freedom belongs to him 
essentially, however accidental it may seem to be; everything 
that is not posited in his freedom is accidental, however 
essential it may seem to be.(E/0, II, p. 260)
For "[the experience of choosing] gives a person’s being a 
solemnity, a quiet dignity, that is never entirely lost.”(E/0, II, 
p. 176=E/OL, II, p. 181) Hence only what is posited by one’s 
freedom constitutes one’s essence. But, as we have seen, one’s 
freedom is expressed in one’s acceptance of what was given and in 
one’s choice of being an ethical self. That is to say, through 
one’s use of freedom (understood by the ethicist) only the ethical 
becomes to belong to the ethical self essentially, and everything
else is for him accidental.
Moreover, by being ethical "in freedom he himself chooses his 
place [in the world] - that is, he chooses his place".[23] In this 
sense, the ethical person is very concrete.(E/0, II, p. 215=E/0L, 
II, p. 219) Thus to be oneself in the ethical sense is to be 
concrete, even to the extent that it must be a "social and civic 
self". (E/0, II, p. 263=E/0L, II, p. 267) For, according to Judge 
William, only through the civic life can one be oneself. (E/0, II, 
p. 216=E/OL, II, pp. 219f«) So he who chooses to be himself can 
be described as follows: "He is a specific individual; in the
choice he makes himself into a specific individual: namely, into
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the same one, because he chooses himself”. (E/0, II, p. 251=E/OL,
II, p. 256) This is why Judge William criticizes all kinds of
attempts not to be concrete. One of the representative examples
is that of the mystic who escapes from this concrete world to the
world of spirit. Of such a mystic Judge William says:
The mystic’s error, then, is not that he chooses himself..., 
but his error is that he does not choose himself properly;
...he -dnes not choose ethically.... The mystic’s error is 
that in the choice he .da&g not .becQffl.e £gjacr.je&fi either In 
himself nc. Qod.; he chooses himself abstractly and therefore 
lacks transparency. (E/0, II, pp. 247f.=E/OL, II, pp. 252f., 
emphasis given)
The matter under concern here is the fact that it is unethical not
to be concrete in the world. This applies to everybody who tries 
not to be concrete, however free he looks. So the mystic who, in 
some sense, may be considered as choosing with freedom, does not 
choose with freedom in the real sense of the word. For, according 
to the ethicist, ”a person can choose himself according to his 
freedom only when he chooses himself ethically.”(E/0, II, p. 
247=E/OL, II, p. 252) Only one who chooses to be concrete chooses 
according to one’s freedom, and ”only as a concrete individual is 
[one] a free individual.”(E/0, II, p. 247=E/OL, II, p. 252)
Yet, for the ethicist, this being concrete is, ironically, 
the only way in which he becomes the universal man.(E/0, II, pp. 
255f.=E/OL, II, pp. 260f.) The ethical is the universal, as we 
have seen in the first chapter of this study. Judge William also 
says that the one who lives ethically expresses the universal in 
his life(E/0, II, p. 256=E/OL, II, p. 260), and that "[not] 
until the individual himself is the universal, not until then can 
the ethical be actualized."(E/0, II, p. 255=E/OL, II, p. 260) To
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be universal, therefore, is to be ethical, and to be ethical is to 
choose to be ethical. So the ethical person thinks that in the 
act of choosing the ethical, one becomes oneself.
Let us turn to our second expression, "one must choose
oneself in one’s eternal validity". (cf. E/0, II, pp. 211, 213»
214=E/OL, II, pp. 215, 217, 218) Here the self which the ethicist
chooses appears as his task; the self which he has to realize in
time and history. But one’s self in one’s eternal validity, which
one should try to realize in one’s concrete life, is not something
which transcends oneself. Judge William says:
[I] know where a treasure is buried that can make you richer 
than the whole world, and this treasure belongs to you, and 
you must not even thank me for it, lest you damage your soul 
by owing everything to a human being. This treasure is stored 
in your own inner being. There is an Either/Or there that 
makes a human being greater than the angels.(E/0, II, p. 
176=E/OL, II, p. 180)
The human being, as he is, has the possibility of being himself in 
his inner self. As Judge William expresses it, there is an
either/or of becoming oneself or of not doing so in one’s own 
■inner self. In this sense, one can say that ’’the ethical 
individual...does not have duty outside himself but within 
himself. "(E/0, II, p. 256=E/OL, II, p. 261) And one can also 
make the following paradoxical statement: the self, which comes 
into existence with the act of choosing, has already existed, "for 
it was [in fact] ’himself’."(E/0, II, p. 215=E/OL, II, p. 219) 
One cannot choose the self which one is in one’s eternal validity, 
if such a self does not already exist as a possibility within 
oneself. The ethical person seeks and finds his ultimate goal
within himself, for his goal is really his own self in its
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absolute concreteness. [2*1] But this self, which was there only as 
a possibility, now comes into existence as one chooses oneself.
Judge William expresses this idea in the following way:
What I choose, I do not posit, for if it were not [already] 
posited I could not choose it, and yet if I did not posit it 
by choosing it then I would not choose it. It is, for if it 
were not I could not choose it; it is not, for it first comes 
into existence through my choosing it, and otherwise my choice 
would be an illusion.[25]
Hence it is not true to say, in the absolute sense, that one 
creates oneself. For there is already something within oneself 
from which one can produce oneself. Therefore, Judge William uses 
not the term "creator", but "editor".(E/0, II, p. 260=E/OL, II, 
p. 264) The ethical self is his own editor.
From this it follows that after the choice of oneself one is
the same self one was before, but at the same time, one can be 
said to become another in the sense that one has changed (that is, 
one has become oneself) through the choice. "It [the ethical]
does not want to make the individual into someone else but into
the individual himself...."(E/0, II, p. 253=E/OL, II, p. 257) So
Judge William speaks of such a person as follows:
He remains himself, exactly the same that he was before, down 
to the most insignificant feature, and yet he becomes another, 
for the choice penetrates everything and changes it. Thus his 
finite personality is now made infinite in the choice, in 
which he infinitely chooses himself.(E/0, II, p. 223=E/OL, 
II, p. 227)
Now the self is infinitized through one’s choice of oneself, 
infinitized in the absolute sense. Hence the ethical self is
ne.garded ±y ±h_£ eihxoaL .p.er.s.o.n as "-the absolute". Judge William
maintains:
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Not until I absolutely choose myself do I absolutely 
infinitize myself, because I myself .am the absolute, because 
only I myself can choose absolutely.... (E/0, II, pp. 
223f.=E/OL, II, p. 228)
I choose the absolute, and what is the absolute? It is myself 
in my eternal validity. Something other than myself* J .can 
never cho-ose as the absol .uta.... (E/0, II, p. 214=E/OL, II, p. 
218, emphasis given)
As these quotations show, the ethicist regards "oneself in one’s 
eternal validity" (i.e., "the ethical self") as the absolute.f261 
Accordingly, becoming conscious of oneself as such a being is the 
most important thing in the world.(E/0, II, p. 206=E/OL, II, p. 
210) This is one of the reasons why "this choice to be oneself" is 
also described as "the absolute choice".
Hence, this term "the absolute choice" has a double meaning; 
it modifies the object of the choice and at the same time relates 
to the way in which one chooses that object. As far as I know, 
Collins is the only person who discusses this double meaning of 
the absolute choice. But he thinks that this is a matter of
either/or, saying that "’an absolute choice’ may refer either to 
the object chosen or to the way of making one’s choice"; and he 
chooses the latter, as we can see in the following passage: "It 
refers to the manner in which I will or refuse to will, rather 
than to a thing which I seek to obtain."[27] I wonder how he does 
not see the obvious fact that the object of choice (the ethical 
self, in this case) is designated the absolute. For the ethicist, 
the only object which can be chosen absolutely is oneself. To 
repeat, oneself is the absolute for the ethicist. It must be 
chosen as the absolute, not a relative thing. Accordingly, one 
should also choose oneself absolutely; one should not choose
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oneself only in part or relative to other things. This is why 
mediation, which tries to mediate two different things (oneself 
and the other, in this case) and enhance both of them into the 
third other, has no place here. For, as Judge William says, "if 
one admits mediation, then there is no absolute choice, and if 
there is no such thing, then there is no absolute Either/Or."(E/0, 
II, p. 173=E/OL, II, p. 177) This is because basically mediation 
works with the logic of both-and, whereas what is important for
the ethical person is either/or. As far as we are existing 
individuals, we cannot resort to mediation, for "absolute 
mediation is not possible until history is finished. " (E/0, II, p. 
173=E/OL, II, p. 177) Hence insofar as we are existing 
individuals we choose to be ourselves as ethical selves or we 
choose not to be ourselves as ethical selves. In this spirit, 
Judge William also says that "only by choosing absolutely can one 
choose the ethical. Consequently, the ethical is posited by the 
absolute choice."(E/0, II, p. 177=E/OL, II, p. 181) Only through 
an absolute choice can a person be the ethical self, or oneself in
the ethical sense.
Now we have the full picture of the ethical conception of 
becoming oneself. To be oneself in the ethical sense is to be 
ethical, the universal, by accepting what is given and at the same 
time accepting oneself as "the absolute". As we have mentioned, 
"to be ethical", "to be oneself in one’s eternal validity" and "to 
choose the absolute" - these three expressions cannot be separated 
from one another. The exact meaning of one’s becoming oneself can 
be understood only when we combine the meanings of these
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expressions.
Here we shall pause for a moment in order to draw out the 
implications of our discussion so far. The main question which we 
have asked in this section is what ’’one’s becoming oneself” means 
in the ethical sphere. Prom the discussion which we have engaged 
in until now we can draw out the following ideas. There is 
potentiality for ethical existence within one’s inner self. That 
is, one can be the "ideal self”(E/O, II, p. 259=E/OL, II, pp. 
263, 264), the "eternal self" (or "oneself in one’s eternal
validity") (E/0, II, pp. 206, 213, 214=E/OL, II, pp. 210, 217,
218), or the "absolute self"(E/0, II, p. 219=E/OL, II, p. 223); 
this is one’s ethical possibility. This "ideal (or eternal, or 
absolute) self" can also be designated the ethical self or 
ethically possible self. This ideal self has a dialectical 
relationship with the finite self which is conditioned by one’s 
facticity or necessity that "is the limiting factor of the 
self". [28] What is demanded of oneself in order to be oneself is 
to actualize the ideal (eternal, absolute, or possible) self in 
the concrete life-situation. This actualization involves, as we 
have seen, the acceptance of one’s concrete circumstances in which 
one is placed, the acceptance of one’s facticity or necessity. 
Only after one accepts one’s concrete facticity and sees one’s 
ethical possibility as one’s task, and then synthesizes these two 
factors within one’s existence, does one become an actual ethical 
self. Now, for such an ethical self, temporality becomes the 
medium of his self-revelation and self-actualization; now "time 
seems to him to be a true blessing."(E/0, II, p. 3O5=E/OL, II, p.
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310) In this sense, the ethical person asserts that "man in fact 
is at once temporal and eternal."(SOLWL, p. 116) Here is the 
actualization of one’s potentiality for becoming a self.
Here we may ask a question: how then can one accomplish the 
synthesis of one’s facticity and one’s possibility? In other 
words, how can one become oneself? What does the ethicist 
suggest? With these questions we have turned to the next stage of 
our discussion of the ethical understanding of becoming oneself. 
That is, how is it possible to actualize this ethical self?
Judge William as the ethicist suggests what seems to be a 
very negative way of becoming oneself; he recommends that we
should despair. He says:
Choose despair, then, because despair itself is a choice, 
because one can doubt without choosing it, but one cannot 
despair without choosing it. And in despairing a person 
chooses again, and what then does he choose? He chooses 
himself ... in his eternal validity.(E/0, II, p. 211=E/0L, 
II, p. 215)
The main thought in this quotation so rich in meaning is: despair 
is the only way in which one can choose oneself. [29] Judge William 
does not say that despair is a prelude to choosing oneself, but 
despair is the way to be oneself. For, according to William, as 
we shall see, true despair itself involves the choice of oneself. 
Here we can see Judge William uses the term ’’despair” in a special 
way. Hence it is worth considering the meaning which Judge 
William gives to this term.
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When we discuss despair as used by the ethicist, we have to 
bear in mind the fact that there are two kinds of despair 
understood by Judge William; one is what may be called phenomenal 
despair, and another is what is recommended by Judge William. 
McCarthy also gives his attention to these two kinds of despair 
which Judge William speaks of. McCarthy calls them "despair as a 
state" and "despair as an act", respectively.[30] Mackey also 
makes a similar distinction between these two meanings of despair. 
He says: "[The] despair which Judge Wilhelm recanmends is not the 
despair which the aesthete nurtures as the last end of a life of
enjoyment. It is a despair oL ike life ef enioyment. aa suck, and 
thus the gateway .inio a, .new, way ef life... .By despairing of 
himself qua aesthetic he will at once have chosen himself qua 
ethical in his eternal validity. "[31]
Indeed, in some places, Judge William says of the aesthete
that he is in despair. This is phenomenal despair, or despair as
a state. We may quote two passages in relation to this:
Consequently, it is manifest that every esthetic view of life 
is despair, and that everyone who lives esthetically is in 
despair, whether he knows it or not."(E/0, II, p. 192=E/OL, 
II, p. 197)[32]
[Every] life view that has a condition outside itself is 
despair. Thus, wanting to sorrow is despair in exactly the 
same sense as wanting to seek happiness, since it is always 
despair to have one’s life in something whose nature is that 
it can pass away. (E/0, II, pp. 235f.=E/OL, II, p. 240)
The main thought in these passages is that according to the 
ethical view of life, the life and existence of the aesthete Is 
one of despair. This is despair which the ethical person finds in 
the aesthete’s mode of existence. This kind of despair is
Page 174
sometimes called "finite despair".(E/0, II, p. 221=E/OL, II, pp. 
225f.) The result of "finite despair" is to damage one’s 
soul.(E/0, II, p. 221=E/0L, II, p. 225)
To such a person who is in finite despair, Judge William, 
ironically, recanmends that he should despair.(E/0, II, p. 
211=E/0L, II, p. 215) How can we understand this? Does it mean 
that the despair in which the aesthete is at the moment is not 
enough, and therefore the aesthete must go deeper into despair?
Does it mean that the aesthete himself must be aware of the fact
that he is in despair? Or can this be understood in some other 
way? I think it is the best possible way of looking at this 
recommendation to differentiate the two different meanings of 
despair: "despair as phenomenon" and "despair as the precondition 
or negative element of the ethical repentance". It is true that 
when Judge William speaks of repentance, he does not add the 
adjective "ethical" before the term "repentance". But, as we 
shall see, the characteristics of repentance of which Judge 
William speaks are different from those of Christian repentance, 
which we shall closely examine in the next section.[32] So in this 
section, I shall put the adjective "ethical" before "repentance". 
The following quotation shows what I mean by despair as the
precondition or negative element of ethical repentance.
Generally speaking, a person cannot despair at all without 
willing it, but in order truly to despair, a person must truly 
will it; but when he truly wills it, he is truly beyond 
despair. When a person has truly chosen despair, he has truly 
chosen what despair chooses: himself in his eternal
validity.(E/0, II, p. 213=E/OL, II, p. 217)
Here Judge William distinguishes two kinds of despair: to despair
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in the ordinary sense and to truly despair. Only through truly
despairing is one truly in and beyond despair, and does one choose
oneself in one’s eternal validity. What is such true despair?
Judga William does not give us a direct answer to this question.
But when we closely examine several passages, we can get an
indirect intimation of the equation of this true despair with
ethical repentance. Let us look at the following quotation:
[It] certainly is true that when I despair, I despair over 
myself just as over everything else. But this self over which 
I despair is something finite like everything else finite, 
whereas the self I choose is the absolute self or myself 
according to its absolute validity.(E/0, II, pp. 2l8f.=E/OL, 
II, p. 223)
This passage makes it clear that in true despair two things are 
involved: despair of the finite self and the choice of the
absolute self. If these two things happen in the process of one’s 
true despair, the meaning of true despair is no different from the 
meaning of the ethical repentance, for only by repentance does one 
choose oneself in the real sense. True despair through which one 
can be oneself in one’s eternal validity is nothing other than the 
ethical repentance. So Judge William says that "such a willing 
[willing one’s despair] is identical with the absolute 
resignation. "[34] Only repentance can fulfil the role of such a 
true despair. In this sense, Judge William says that he 
emphasizes "that choosing oneself is identical with repenting
oneself, because repentance places the individual in the closest
connection and the most intimate relation with an outside
world."[35] Without repentance, one cannot be the ethical self. 
The ethical repentance is also very concrete repentance,
repentance which is closely related to existence. Hence, as the
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ethical person, Judge William can say that "I repent myself out 
■ttie Mhols &L .existence. "(E/0, II, p. 224=E/OL, 11, p. 229, 
emphasis given) The ethical person thus shows that true despair as 
ethical repentance must be concrete, and it is, actually, a way in 
which one can be oneself.
Now let us turn to the result of such a true repentance (or 
true despair). What are the characteristics of the resulting
self? One can point out three characteristics of this ethical
self from the writings of Judge William: harmoniousness,
universality, and autonomy. Let us consider these characteristics
in turn.
First of all, the ethical person believes that he can be a 
harmonious self. By "harmonious" I mean that there is no conflict 
between several aspects of his life; that is, the ethical self 
looks upon the aesthetic aspect of life, and the ethical aspect of 
life, and the religious aspect of life as allies.(E/0, II, p. 
147=E/OL, II, p. 150) But it must be borne in mind that this is 
the view of Judge William, the ethicist, not that of Kierkegaard 
or the Christian. [36] There are some scholars who are rightly very 
careful to make this distinction. For example, Collins says: 
"Indeed, this ethical pseudonym [Judge William] supposes that 
there is a much greater degree of harmony between the three 
spheres of existence than Kierkegaard himself is willing to
allow."[37]
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Hence after the choice of oneself, which implies the choice 
of the ethical, all of the the aesthetic returns again. "If only 
the choice [of oneself] is posited," says Judge William, "all the 
esthetic returns, and you will see that only thereby does 
existence become beautiful, and that this is the only way a person 
can save his soul and win the whole world, can use the world 
without misusing it."[38] So now, as the ethical self one can have 
a right relation to the world around oneself. Now the world
becomes beautiful to one and joyful; one has overcome the 
pessimistic view of the world, which is one of the characteristics
of the aesthetic view of life. This does not mean that the world
around oneself has changed, but one sees it with different eyes,
the eyes of a harmonious ethical self. Judge William says:
[Despair] and your spirit will never sigh in despondency, for 
the world will once again become beautiful and happy for you, 
even if you look at it with other eyes than before, and your 
liberated spirit will vault up into the world of freedom.(E/0, 
II, p. 219=E/OL, II, p. 223)
For "[in] despair nothing perishes."(E/0, II, p. 229=E/OL, II, p. 
233) Now the aesthetic serves the ethical; what is present by way 
of hope and natural tendency in romantic love is transformed and 
realized more fully in the ethical love, (cf. E/0, II, p.
229=E/0L, II, p. 233) Thus, for the ethical person, there is a 
harmonious relationship between the aesthetic and the ethical.
Similarly, the ethical person does not know any break with 
religiousness. His religiousness (i.e., the ethical 
religiousness) is quite compatible with his ethical view of life. 
So Judge William, as an ethical person, quite comfortably speaks 
of himself as a Christian, and of his view of life as a Christian
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view. Sometimes he sounds very religious. For example, he says:
A religiously developed person makes a practice of referring 
everything to God, of permeating and saturating every finite 
relation with the thought of God and thereby consecrating and 
ennobling it.(E/0, II, p. 43=E/OL, II, p. 44)
But, as we shall see in the next section, his religiousness is not 
Christian in the proper sense. However, what is important here is 
the fact that for the ethical person even the religious is quite 
comfortably placed within the ethical view of life.[39] For, as 
Collins says, "[even] service to God must ultimately minister to 
ethical existence."[40] In the final analysis, we can see that the 
God of the ethical self is different from the God of Christianity. 
"Judge William’s God, like the God of Unmanuel Kant," says Mackey, 
"is a supersensible guarantor of the validity of his moral 
position and its invisible harmony with the seeming independent 
domain of natural desire."[41] Hence, for the ethical person there 
is no conflict between love for God and love for man. (cf. E/0, 
II, p. 245=E/OL, II, p. 249) In this sense, the ethical self is 
a quite harmonious self. This harmony comes from the ethical 
integration of one’s self[42], and therefore, among the aesthetic, 
the ethical and the religious, the ethical is the supreme, for the 
ethical is the one which integrates the aesthetic and the 
religious. The following quotation clearly shows the profile of
such a self:
I love my wife, and am happy in my home...M(y work has meaning 
for me...I love my native country...I love my mother 
tongue.... So I love life because it is beautiful and hope 
for one even more beautiful.(E/0, II, p. 324=E/OL, II, p. 
329)
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As this passage intimates, as well as being harmonious, the 
ethical self has the characteristic of universality. That is, the 
ethical self tries to be the universal man.(E/0, II, p. 256=E/0L, 
II, p. 260) He sees the universal, and expresses the universal in 
his life, and he makes himself the universal man. In this sense, 
for the ethical person, to be the universal man is the task of his 
life. Judge William says: "The task the ethical individual sets 
for himself is to transform himself into the universal 
individual.”(E/0, II, p. 261=E/OL, II, p. 265) What is required 
is to submit oneself to universal requirements that can be 
accepted by other individuals as well.(E/0L, II, p. 335=E/O, II, 
P. 330) For, as we have seen, the ethical principle is understood 
to be universal or universalizable. Hence one must appropriate 
the ethical ’’universal” in one’s own existence. This is
important, for the universal, to be actual, must be realized in 
and through the actuality of an existing individual. In this 
sense, Judge William says that ’’the universal can very well 
continue in and with the specific without consuming it.”(E/0, II, 
p. 261=E/OL, II, p. 266) So, in a sense, to be the universal man 
is very difficult to achieve. But it is a task which is possible 
for everybody, for everybody has the possibility of being the
universal man. ”[To] transform himself into the universal human 
being,” maintains Judge William, ”is possible only if I already 
have it within myself -kata dunamin [potentially(E/0, II, p. 
261=E/OL, II, p. 265f.) And Judge William asserts that to be the 
universal man in one’s particularity is to be ordinary, not to be 
extraordinary. But sometimes he uses a special expression which 
reveals the reversal of the concepts of ordinary and extraordinary
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in the ethical view of life.(E/0, II, p. 328=E/OL, II, p. 333) 
As concrete exemplary ways in which one can be extraordinary in 
the sense of the ethical view (i.e., universal in one’s 
particularity, or ordinary in the ordinary sense) Judge William 
suggests three relationships: marriage[43], friendship[44], and 
relationship to one’s works.[45] Everybody has the possibility of 
being the universal man through these relationships.
This idea that everybody has already the possibility of being 
the universal man can be a bridge which connects the second 
characteristic of the ethical self (i.e., universality) and the 
third characteristic, that is, autonomy. For this possibility to 
be the universal man (i.e., the ethical self) is a possibility 
which one can actualize if one wills, whoever one may be. Judge 
William says this in several places. For example, he says: 
"[The] greatness is not to be this or that but to be oneself, and 
every human being can be this if. he. aa wills it. "(E/0, II, p. 
177=E/OL, II, p. 181, emphasis given) And in another place he 
says again:
In the act of despair, the universal human being came 
forth.... Kv-g.cy if he will., eau .become a
.P^.rad,.i.gm&-t.i.c human being, not by brushing off his accidental 
qualities, but by remaining in them and ennobling them. (E/0, 
II, pp. 26lf.=E/0L, II, p. 266, emphasis given)
Thus to become oneself in the ethical sense (i.e., to be the
ethical self) is a situation which one must strive to achieve on 
one’s own as an autonomous person; one can accomplish it by 
oneself, especially by one’s will. In this spirit, Judge William 
asserts that "the crucial thing is not deliberation but the 
baptism of the will which lifts up the choice into the
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ethical."(E/OL, II, p. 173=E/O, II, p. 169) For one can, as 
Collins says, "integrate" one’s imagination and intellect "with 
[one’s] will."[46] It is a task which one has to do in and by 
oneself. For, as Judgs William says, "[only] within himself can 
the individual become enlightened about himself."(E/0, II, p. 
259=E/OL, II, p. 263) As far as one’s becoming of oneself is 
concerned, one has sovereignty over oneself, (cf. E/0, II, p. 
251=E/OL, II, p. 256) In this sense, the ethical person "has his 
teleology within himself, has inner teleology, is himself his 
teleology". Therefore, "his self is. ..the goal toward which he 
strives."(E/0, II, p. 274=E/OL, II, p. 279)
Now we can describe the ethical self which comes out of true
despair. He is the one who tries to accomplish the integration of 
his self; the aesthetic aspect and the ethical aspect and even the 
religious aspect of his life are viewed under his ethical view of 
life. At the same time, he thinks that he accomplishes the 
synthesis of necessity (facticity) and possibility (ideality). He 
believes that he becomes an actual ethical self.[47] He relies on 
himself and does not need God in the true sense, even though he
may mention the name God. The ethical self is the self-sufficient
self. This is the ethical understanding of the self and the 
problem of one’s becoming oneself. This ethical self is very 
different from, and even antithetical to the Christian self. For 
as we shall see in the next section, the Christian is one who 
thinks that one can be oneself only in relation to the God-Man. 
This Christian self is understood by the ethical self as
heteronomous, one-dimensional, and particularistic. Hence there
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is a basic difference of opinion between the ethical person and 
the Christian. In order to see this difference more clearly, let 
us turn to a closer examination of the Christian understanding of 
the self. This is the task of the next section of the chapter.
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II
In this section I shall look at the Christian understanding of the
self and compare it with the ethical understanding which I have
examined in the last section. Through this examination I shall 
argue that the Christian’s understanding of becoming oneself Is 
fundamentally different from the ethical person’s understanding. 
This assertion does not disregard the fact that at first glance, 
the Christian understanding and the ethical understanding look 
similar. However, as I shall show in this section, when we 
closely look at these two understandings of becoming oneself, we 
cannot help noticing obvious differences between them. In 
particular, there is a clear-cut distinction between the ways in 
which the Christian and the person in the ethical sphere think one
becomes oneself. And therefore there is also a difference between
the resulting selves, the ethical self and the Christian self. In 
short, the autonomous self of the ethical person is clearly
contrasted with the Christian who becomes himself in his relation
to the God-Man. This difference of the self-consciousness of the
Christian and of the ethical person, as I shall also argue in this 
section, makes it impossible to assert that there Is any positive 
continuity between the ethical person’s understanding of the
’’self” and that of the Christian.
The main text, which we shall examine here to show this
difference and discontinuity, is The Sickness unto Death published 
under the pseudonym ”Anti-Climacus”. When we discuss the content
of the book, we have to bear in mind the fact that the book as a
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whole is written from the perspective of Christianity. It would 
be difficult to think that the first part of the book is somewhat 
neutral and only in the second part the Christian view is 
explicitly expressed.[1] I think that the book as a whole must be 
interpreted from the Christian perspective.[2]
The first task of this section is to show that Anti-Climacus
thinks that there are three situations in each of which the
problem of becoming oneself is differently positeds the situation 
in which one has the possibility of becoming oneself, the 
situation in which one has lost the possibility of becoming 
oneself, and the situation in which one has once more been given 
the possibility of becoming oneself. In the first situation, each 
person is given the task of, and responsibility for, becoming
himself, and it is in relation to God that he can be himself. In 
the second situation, man lost the relationship to God, so that he 
is in despair. In this situation one tries either not to be
oneself, or tries wrongly to be oneself. In the third situation, 
one can be oneself as one who has experienced despair, and 
therefore here the problem of forgiveness of one’s sin (one's 
despair) emerges as a decisive matter, so that Christ, who brings 
the forgiveness of sin, has to be involved as the vital factor for 
one's becoming oneself. In this situation, one can be oneself 
through one's relationship to Christ.
The second task of this section is to examine the question of 
whether there is any continuity between the ethical self and the 
Christian self. Through this examination I shall argue that it is
difficult to assert the continuity between these two selves, even
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though there are some similarities between these two persons* 
understanding of the problem of the self. In the course of this 
discussion, the Christian’s evaluation of the ethical person’s 
understanding of, and attempt at becoming, himself will be closely- 
examined. Actually, this is a part of the above mentioned second 
situation. But the separate consideration of this problem is 
necessary for the purpose of this chapter,’ for through this 
consideration, it becomes clearer that there is a definite break 
between the Christian understanding of the problem of the self and
the ethical understanding.
Let us then start with the discussion of the three situations
through which Anti-Climacus, as a Christian, thinks of the problem 
of becoming oneself. Firstly, there is the situation in which one 
can be oneself through a direct relationship to God. This 
assertion comes from my reading of the first part (especially, I, 
II) of this book. According to Anti-Climacus, "[the] self is a
relation that relates itself to itself or is the relation’s
relating itself to itself in the relation; the self is not the 
relation but the relation's relating itself to itself." (SUD, p, 
13=SUDL, p. 146) But the self which the individual himself tries 
to think up is regarded as a false self. For Anti-Climacus, a
self must have been constituted by another. This is also the
point of view of Kierkegaard himself. In one of his journal 
entries he says: "Real self-reduplication without a third factor, 
which is outside and compels one, is an impossibility and makes 
any such existence into an illusion or an exparimant. »C Journal a,. 
No. 1041 (Pap. X 2 A 396)) So the self is "a relation and relates
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itself to that which established the entire relation.’’[3] Hence if
one attempts to relate to oneself without the relationship to 
another, one cannot be oneself. If and only if one relates to 
another as one relates to oneself, can one become oneself In the
real sense.
Here a question may be raised: what (or who) is the 
’’another" of which Anti-Climacus speaks? It is true that in the 
first part, this term "another" is described very ambiguously. 
Sometimes Anti-Climacus uses the expression "the power that 
established the entire relation" or "the Power which posited 
it".(SUD, p. 14=SUDL, p. 147) Since Anti-Climacus uses a very 
ambiguous term "power", there is a possibility of different 
interpretations of this term. I shall consider two different
interpretations in turn.
J.P. Cole interprets this as the power of being, or the
power of selfhood. After quoting The. Sickness Death,
(Lowrie*s translation) p. 147, Cole goes on to say:
This Power, then, is the Power of selfhood, or the Power of 
being, for the self is contingent upon it. Insofar as the 
self is grounded in this Power, it exists; and insofar as it 
is not, it does not exist. Hence this Power is truly the 
Power of being for the self, and the relationship to this 
Power is a matter of being and not being for the self.
Kierkegaard called this Power Spirit. It constitutes the 
third essential element of selfhood.... Now, Spirit, as the 
Power of human being, is given with human existence.[4]
By this bold statement Cole emphasizes the importance of the Power 
of being which is given with human existence. Hence, according to 
him, only Spirit as the Power of selfhood (or the Power of being) 
can integrate two different elements of one’s self. This Power
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”is present in man from the beginning as a possibility to be 
actualized."[5] That means: ’’Latent within this body-soul 
unity...is Spirit, the possibility of self-determination. Spirit 
continually projects itself as a possible mode of being, 
disturbing the passive unity of the psychosomatic entity, and 
tempting it to become responsible for itself."[6] Therefore, when 
Spirit actualizes its possibility, Cole asserts, one has become a 
self. Moreover, he even goes on to assert that "[it] would be 
more accurate to say that Spirit is Kierkegaard’s God-concept.”[7] 
By this he does not mean that our projected images of the self are 
identical to God. He agrees that such images are ”in fact idols, 
graven images, counterfeit gods.”[8] But he also maintains that 
there is a possibility of the imaged self functioning as a god.
Furthermore, what he thinks of as the final assertion of The
Sickness Unto Death is to exist in Christ’s mode of being. "So,
when one exists in Christ’s mode of being," says Cole, "his
reality is infinitely potentiated, for he has become a self."[9]
The importance of Christ, for Cole, lies only in his being the
exemplar of the one who has become a self. Cole says:
In the religion of the Son, Christ is not a new image of God 
but ^n image. Pf the Selfv Chcisf is. the paradigm of selfhood, 
the dialectical incarnation of God....In short, he is the 
paradigm pf the relationship. tetasen man and Gpd, A& g.uch,_ 
Kierkegaard calls him the God-Man.[10]
Hence the reason why Christ is called the God-Man is not because 
He is uniquely very man and at the same time very God. But it is 
merely because he is "the paradigm of the relationship between man
and God". Cole calls this also "the paradigm of selfhood"
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By interpreting Kierkegaard in this way, Cole, in the final
chapter of his study, can make the following statements:
Infinite, eternal possibility is what Kierkegaard means by 
Spirit. Hence Spirit is the fundamental category in an 
historical theology. Spirit is the power of human being, 
because without it the dialectic of selfhood would collapse. 
It exercises a god-function In the dialectic of the self? it 
is the absolute tel os of human existence - the always 
transcendent, utterly inexhaustible horizon of the self. It 
is the creative source of human being, the Godhead.[11]
We should also note that such an understanding of the 
historical process whereby the Absolute Spirit becomes a 
relative god, is the basis of the notion of a living God. 
While the Holy Spirit is absolute - i.e., infinite, eternal 
possibility - God the Father is relative. He is subject to 
the relativities of history and culture it produces. The 
God-concept, then, is itself historical. It is itself subject 
to the dialectic of Spirit and to the corrective of 
history.[12]
As we can clearly see in these passages, Cole by interpreting 
Kierkegaard in his own way, makes a kind of theology frcm which we 
may sense traces of Hegelian theology. By an idiosyncratic 
interpretation of Kierkegaard, Cole makes Kierkegaard a Hegel, the 
one whom Kierkegaard scathingly criticizes throughout his life.
John Douglas Mullen’s interpretation of ”a positive third 
term”, though rather naive, is similar to that of Cole in that he 
also tries to think of it immanently. He thinks that by the 
"positive third term" Kierkegaard means human will. He says: 
"The self Is constituted as a synthesis of opposing tendencies 
which remain always in opposition, but are ’held together’ by 
spirit (will)."[13]
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But most scholars do not think in the way in which Cole and 
Mullen think, for the context of Anti-Climacus’ discussion of
one’s becoming oneself and the overall intention of writing this 
book make such an interpretation of ’’another” as the power of 
selfhood almost impossible. Most interpreters think that by "the 
power that established the self” Anti-Climacus means God[14], 
hcwever not the God who is idiosyncratically interpreted as Pcwer 
of selfhood (as we have seen in Cole’s interpretation of 
Kierkegaard's "spirit”). I also think that this is the right 
interpretation, for, besides the above-mentioned two reasons for 
interpreting this in this way (viz., the context of 
Anti-Climacus’s discussion of one’s becoming oneself and the 
overall intention of writing this book), one can mention the fact 
that in the near context Anti-Climacus actually mentions God. For 
example, he says: "[He could not] despair if the synthesis in its 
original state from the hand of God were not in the proper 
relationship."(SUD, p. 16=SUDL, p. 149) Moreover, as 
Anti-Climacus’ discussion of this subject progresses, there are 
more obvious assertions that one can be oneself only in relation 
to God.[15] Hence, even though Anti-Climacus uses ambiguous terms 
such as "another" or "power", what he wants to say from the outset
is that one can be oneself in one’s relation to God which 
inevitably involves one’s relation to oneself. That is, one can 
relate to oneself as one relates to God who has constituted the
relation,
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What is important in the context of our study is the fact 
that one’s becoming oneself is posited as a possibility at first. 
This possibility, however, is at the same time the possibility of 
despair, that is, the possibility of one’s not being oneself. One 
faces the possibility either of becoming oneself, or of not 
becoming oneself. The possibility of becoming oneself becomes an 
actuality only when one is in the right relationship to oneself 
and to God in one’s relationship to oneself. This possibility was 
a given condition for man. God made man as one who could be a 
self which relates itself to itself. That is, God gave man the 
possibility to be spirit, the self. And yet to be spirit (or the 
self) means that one integrates one’s freedom and necessity, the 
eternal and the temporal, the infinite and the finite, that is, 
one’s soul and body in one’s relation to oneself, a relation which 
again relates to God. Thus man is given the possibility to be 
such a self, spirit. This is "the highest claim upon him."(SUD, 
p. 22=SUDL, p. 155) It gives man both advantage and 
responsibility.
But in reality, there is no one who has become oneself, 
spirit. Of course, every person, insofar as he is a human being, 
is a soul-body entity, a synthesis of the infinite and finite, of 
the eternal and the temporal, of freedom (or possibility) and 
necessity. But, as Anti-Climacus says, so regarded "a human being 
is still not a self."(SUD, p. 13=SUDL, p. 146) There is not yet 
the integration of the self. Even those who assert that they have 
the right relationship to themselves are found to be in despair. 
The phenomenon of despair is universal; there is nobody who is not
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in despair.(SUD, p. 22=SUDL, p. 155) Anti-Climacus asserts that 
this is neither exaggeration nor overstatement, but ”a 
consistently developed basic view.”(SUD, p. 22=SUDL, p. 155)
This universality of despair does not mean that despair is 
’’something that lies in human nature as such.’’(SUD, p. 16=SUDL, 
p. 148) If this were the case, God who made man in this way would 
be the author of man’s despair. But according to Anti-Climacus, 
what God did was to give man the great advantage of the 
possibility of becoming spirit, not to make man be in despair. 
Only man himself makes the disrelationship. Despair is not
something which happens to man or some deficiency in which he just 
happens passively to find himself, such as ’’weakness, 
sensuousness, finitude, ignorance, etc.” These problems come frcm 
without, but despair originates in himself. In this sense, 
Anti-Climacus calls this disrelationship (i.e., despair) ”a 
sickness of the spirit”, or "a phenomenon of the spirit”(SUDL, p. 
157), or* ”a qualification of spirit."(SUD, p. 24) Hence "to be 
unaware of being defined as spirit is [also] precisely what 
despair is."(SUD, p. 25=SUDL p. 158) So according to
Anti-Climacus, everybody in despair suffers frcm the sickness unto 
death. This is the Christian understanding of the situation of 
human beings.(SUD, p. 8=SUDL, p. 145) In another place, 
Kierkegaard also says:
If a man in relating himself to himself relates himself 
absolutely to God, there is no despair at all; but at every 
moment when this is not the case, there is also some despair. 
Consequently when a man in relating himself to himself 
absolutely relates himself to God, then all despair is 
annihilated.(JP, I, 749=Pap. VIII 2 B 168:6)
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According to Anti-Climacus, such a disrelationship basically 
takes two forms: the despair of not willing to be oneself and the
despair of willing despairingly to be oneself. Of course, there 
are some people who are even unconscious of their having selves. 
They are called “the despairing [individuals] who [are] ignorant 
of [their] despair."(SUD, p. 44=SUDL, p. 177) And the forms of 
despair can also be observed by reflecting upon the factors which 
compose the self as a synthesis (i.e., the factors of finitude and 
infinitude, of necessity and possibility, of the temporal and the
eternal).
Here an interesting question can be raised: is there a kind
of sequential order between Anti-Climacus* discussion of despair 
viewed under the aspects of Finitude/Infinitude (part 1, III, A, 
a), of despair viewed under the aspects of Possibility/Necessity 
(part 1, III, A, b), and of despair viewed under the aspect of 
consciousness (part 1, III, B)? There are some scholars who 
answer this question affirmatively. But I do not think that it is 
necessarily the case that one should read this part as having a 
sequential order. In the following few paragraphs, I shall
discuss the view of the scholars who think that one should read
this part as having a sequential order, and shew that it is better 
to think that Anti-Climacus* discussion of “despair viewed under
the aspects of the composing elements", and the discussion of 
"despair viewed under the aspect of consciousness" as discussions 
of different aspects of despair, rather than a series of 
developmental forms of despair.
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Let us start with a discussion of the view that there is a
sequential order. Dunning seems to think that there is a kind of 
dialectical relationship between these despairs. He suggests that 
there is an obvious development between (1) "despair without 
regard to consciousness" (part 1, III. A), (2) "conscious 
despair" (part 1, III, B), and (3) "the self-consciousness of the 
sinner before God" (part 2, I). And he designates each despair 
"despair in-itself", "despair for-itself", and "despair 
in-and-for-itself".[16] Let us quote his own summary of this 
argument:
In the first movement, despair in-itself is posited without 
regard to consciousness; the second presents despair 
for-itself as externalized consciousness; and despair 
in-and-for-itself is the self-consciousness of the sinner 
before God. Perhaps owing to its level of abstraction, the 
development here is quite obvious. In despair without regard 
to consciousness there is as yet no awareness of a distinction 
between inner and outer or self and other. That awareness 
first emerges in despair as consciousness. Here the self as 
mere elements (namely, the binary oppositions of despair 
in-self) is negated by the concept of despair as a form of 
consciousness. However, in this movement consciousness is 
still of the autonomous human self over against the eternal. 
As consciousness develops through the phases - spiritlessness, 
weakness (not willing to be oneself), and defiance (willing to 
be oneself) - the self in despair for-itself remains alienated 
from Its true nature, which is to rest transparently in the 
power that established it.... The fact that the birth of 
self-consciousness represents a new awareness of alienation 
from God determines self-consciousness as sin-consciousness. 
It is as this sin-consciousness that despair develops through 
the demonic and is transformed or transfigured by the 
redeeming practice of Christianity, that is, the acceptance of 
Christ’s invitation to follow him as pattern, which completes 
the dialectic of despair and the development of 
consciousness.[17]
The structure of Sickness Unin Death with that of Training in 
Christianity, we are told, shows the dialectical structure (and 
therefore, developmental structure) of consciousness, from (1) 
implicit consciousness (despair in-itself) through (2)
Page 199
consciousness as alienation (despair for-itself) to (3) the 
self-consciousness before God (despair in-and-for-itself). 
Dunning’s argument here clearly shows the ’’systematic nature of
the structure” of the book.
John D. Glenn also suggests that there is a sequential order
in various forms of despair. He says:
[Kierkegaard] proceeds to dissect various forms of despair (a) 
insofar as they involve misrelation among the components of 
the self as synthesis, and (b) insofar as they are 
characterized by varying degrees of self-consciousness and 
self-assertion; finally, he analyzes (c) despair as sin. 
These three sections of The Sickness unto Death correspond to 
the three dimensions of selfhood, so that the definition of 
the self provides the structure of the rest of the work, while 
the latter’s details make concrete the meaning of the 
definition.... [A] similar relation holds between these 
dimensions and the three ’stages’ of existence...depicted in 
Kierkegaard’s early pseudonymous works.[18]
In this spirit, he says that ’’[the] existence of the reflective
aesthete...is lived in terms of the first dimension of the
definition of the self [i.e., ’’synthesis of the infinite and the 
finite, of the temporal and the eternal, and of freedom and 
necessity”].[ 19] So he speaks of ’’the self as synthesis” as "the 
psychological-aesthetic dimension of selfhood[20]; of "the self as 
self-relating” as "the ethical dimension of selfhood"[21]; and of 
"the self as dependent on God" as "the religious dimension of 
selfhood."[22] What Glenn tries to show is that the three sections
of The Sickness unto Death, in which Anti-Climacus discusses 
several forms of despair, has a kind of sequential order which is 
similar to that of three stages of existence.[23]
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It is true that there are some parts of the book in which
Anti-Climacus discusses the subject of despair in a developmental 
scheme. For example, when he discusses the unconsciousness of 
self, the despair of not willing to be oneself (the despair of 
weakness), and the despair of willing despairingly to be oneself 
(defiance), we can see a kind of developmental or progressive 
scheme. In relation to this part, Dunning himself rightly speaks 
of the progression from "self-ignorance”, through "self-rejection"
and to "self-assertion (as self-alienation)".[24]
But, in relation to Anti-dimacus* discussion of "the forms 
of despair" as a whole, I wonder whether it is better to view the 
discussion of "despair viewed under the aspects of the composing 
elements", and the discussion of "despair viewed under the aspect
of consciousness" as discussions of two different aspects of 
despair, rather than as a discussion of a series of developmental 
or progressive forms of despair. For the discussion of the forms
of despair from the reflection upon the factors of the synthesis 
is regarded by Anti-Climacus as "abstract" discussion.(Cf. SUD, 
p. 29=SUDL, p. 162) It is not clear why Anti-Climacus thinks 
this is "abstract"; perhaps, he thinks that what is discussed here 
is merely the logical possibilities which resuLt from the fact 
that man is a synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of 
possibility and necessity. And this discussion cannot be of prime 
importance, whereas the discussion of despair viewed under the 
category of consciousness is regarded as the "primary" or
"principal" one. Hence, the .despair oL n .concrete. individual, can
be obeerved “abstractly", by reflecting npcn the factors which.
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compose the. self? and. at the same time, it must "principally" be 
viewed under the category ££_ consciousness* Miller also intimates 
this view when he says that Kierkegaard offers "us at least two
ways in which the forms of despair may be viewed."[25] The closer
examination of Anti-Climacus* discussion of forms of despair 
clearly shows this point - that is, "the discussion of despair
frcm the reflection upon the factors of the synthesis" and "the
discussion of despair under the category of consciousness" are two 
different discussions from different perspectives. Let us 
consider Anti-Climacus* discussion of various forms of despair.
Anti-Climacus first discusses despair in the light of the 
factors involved in the relationship of body and soul, but he 
discusses this only under two categories, the category of 
finitude/infinitude and the category of possibility/necessity. 
(We do not know why he does not consider despair viewed under the 
aspects of temporality/eternity). So here what he calls "the 
despair of infinitude", "the despair of finitude", "the despair of 
possibility", and "the despair of necessity" are discussed. These 
despairs are characterized by an over-emphasis on one aspect of 
the synthesis, with a corresponding lack of its opposite aspect.
The "despair of infinitude", for example, where one becomes 
carried away into the fantastical and the limitless, is understood 
to come from the lack of finitude. In this despair one becomes "a 
fantasized existence in abstract infinitizing or in abstract 
isolation, continually lacking its self, from which it only moves 
further and further away."(SUD, p. 32=SUDL, p. 165) For "the 
fantastic is generally that which leads a person out into the
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infinite in such a way that it only leads him away from himself 
and thereby prevents him from coming back to himself. "(SUD, p. 
31=SUDL, p. 164) So in some cases one's feeling becomes 
fantastic, and the final result of this is one becoming "a sort of 
abstract sentimentality". Such an abstract sentimentality is an 
inhuman one which "inhumanly combines sentimentally, as it were, 
with some abstract fate - for example, humanity in 
abstracto."(SUD. p. 31=SUDL, p. 164) In other cases, one may 
become fantastic with knowledge. For such people, "the more 
knowledge increases, the more it becomes a kind of inhuman
knowledge, in the obtaining of which a person's self is 
squandered."(SUD, p. 31=SUDL, p. 164) Perhaps, Kierkegaard is 
thinking of Hegel's system building, but this can also be applied
to any other inhuman systematization. For, as we can see from one 
of Kierkegaard's journal entries, not only Hegel's reasoning, but
also "pure reason is something fantastical, and the limitless
fantastical belongs at home where there are no negative concepts,
and one understands everything like the sorcerer who ended by
eating his own stomach."(JP, I, 7=Pap. X2 A 354) Or, in yet
another case, the will becomes fantastic. Such a fantastic will,
as is the case with fantastic feeling, is only concerned with the
abstract or with infinite things, disregarding "the infinitely
small part of the work that can be accomplished this very day,
this very hour, this very moment."(SUD, p. 32=SUDL, 165) Arbaugh
and Arbaugh take the following cases as examples of one who Is
fantastic with knowledge and of one who has fantastic wills
Thus a scientist who is so intent on understanding microbes 
that he forgets to grow in self-awareness is sick. Similarly, 
a dreamy utopian may will infinite good for all mankind but be
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blind to the daily duties for which he ought to be
responsible.[26]
There may also be ”a fantasized religious person”. (SUD, p. 
32=SUDL, p. 165) Such a person infinitizes his God-relationship, 
so that he cannot become himself. As Dunning summarizes well:
"In each case the self loses itself in uncontrolled imagination, 
so that eventually all senses of the finite factor in the 
synthesis is lost."[27] So everybody who "presumably has become or 
simply wants to be infinite" is in the despair of infinitude.(SUD, 
p. 30=SUDL, p. 163)
The despair of finitude, by contrast, is characterized by 
"the lack of infinitude". So worldliness, blind social 
conformism, complacency, ethical meanness and narrowness, and
self-sufficiency can be listed as the characteristics of those who
are in this despair. Anti-Climacus speaks of such a person in the
following way: .
Surrounded by hordes of men, absorbed in all sorts of secular 
matters, more and more shrewd about the ways of the world - 
such a person forgets himself, forgets his name divinely 
understood, does not dare to believe in himself, finds it too 
hazardous to be himself and far easier and safer to be like 
the others, to become a copy, a number, a mass man.(SUD, pp. 
33f.=SUDL, pp. 166f., emphasis given)
So those who are in the despair of finitude are also not 
themselves; "spiritually speaking, they have no self, no self for 
whose sake they could venture everything, no self before 
God..,."(SUD, p. 35=SUDL, p. 168) Those who are in "the despair 
of infinitude", as we have seen, lost themselves in the process of 
infinitizing the self; whereas those who are in "the despair of 
finitude" lose their true selves through finitizing the self.
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Let us turn to the second category, that of possibility and
necessity. Anti-Climacus’ point is simple: ”A self that has no
possibility is in despair, and likewise a self that has no 
necessity.”(SUD, p. 35=SUDL, p. 168)
He who is in "the despair of possibility" is the one who is 
like a wave on the surface of a sea of possibilities, but does not 
actualize any of them. Such a person "becomes an abstract 
possibility", or "becomes for himself a mirage."(SUD, p. 36=SUDL, 
p. 169) For, "[instead] of taking the possibility back into 
necessity, [either] he chases after possibility - and at last 
cannot find his way back to himself", or "the individual pursues 
[with melancholy love] one of anxiety’s possibilities, which 
finally leads him away from himself so that he is a victim of
anxiety or a victim of that about which he was anxious lest he be 
overcome."(SUD, p. 37=SUDL, p. 170) Dunning speaks of them as 
"types that respectively adumbrate the manic and the depressive in 
contemporary psychiatric terminology."[28]
The despair of necessity, on the other hand, involves a lack 
of possibility, so that to the one who is in this despair, either 
"everything has become necessary" [fatalism], or "everything has 
become trivial [philistinism]."(SUD, p. 40=SUDL, p. 173) For the 
fatalist, according to Anti-Climacus, there is no God; he "has 
lost God"(SUD, p. 40=SUDL, p. 173), so he lost possibility and 
himself as well. For, according to Anti-Climacus’ Christian point 
of view, possibility only belongs conclusively to God and only he 
who has God, has a self. While fatalism is "spiritual despair",
philistinism is despair of spiritlessness.(SUD, p. 41=SUDL, p
Page 205
174) The philistine ’’has lost his self and God."(SUD, p. 41=SUDL, 
p. 174)
The above are forms of despair observed without taking 
consciousness into account. As Martin Heinecken says: "They 
represent merely the logical possibilities which result from the 
fact that man is a synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of 
possibility and necessity."[291
Anti-Climacus next discusses despair from the point of view 
of consciousness. This discussion is regarded by Anti-Climacus as 
the principal or primary one. Considered from this point of view, 
despair has basically two formsj the despair of weakness and the 
despair of defiance. Of course, there are some people who are not 
yet aware of their being called to be themselves. They may be 
said to be in despair unconsciously; they are in unconscious 
despair. But these three despairs (viz., unconscious despair, the 
despair of weakness, and the despair of defiance) are not 
different in the absolute sense; the contrast here is "only 
relative."(SUD, p. 49=SUDL, p. 182) It is because, for example, 
"[no] despair is entirely free of defiance"(SUD, p. 182) and at 
the same time, "even despair’s most extreme defiance is never 
really free of some weakness."(SUD, p. 49=SUDL, pp. I82f.) Hence 
one may say with Nordentoft, that "defiance is a ’profound’ 
weakness and weakness is a ’profound’ defiance.’’[30] Moreover, 
even though the despair of weakness and of defiance are "the 
despair that is conscious of being despair"(SUD, p. 47=SUDL, p. 
180), in the final analysis, it can be questioned whether those 
who are in despair of these sorts have "the true conception of
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despair” which is understood by the Christian as the sickness unto 
death. It is true that those who are in the despair of weakness 
have more consciousness (and therefore more self-consciousness)
than those who have the despairing unconsciousness of having an 
eternal self. Likewise, those who are in the despair of defiance
in turn have more consciousness than those who are in the despair
of weakness. It is also true that the despair of defiance is more 
intense than any of the other forms of despair. But it is not 
necessarily the case that those who are in the despair of 
defiance, who have a greater consciousness of being in despair 
than any other, have a more correct conception of despair. In 
this sense, we may say that, frctn the perspective of the 
Christian, even those who are in the despair of defiance are not
aware that they are in despair as understood by the Christian. 
Especially, when we remind ourselves of Anti-Climacus* following 
assertion, this point that even the most conscious person does not 
have the exact observation of his situation as suffering from the 
sickness unto death: "[To] be [sharply] aware of this sickness is 
the Christian’s superiority over the natural man."(SUD, p. 
15=SUDL, p. 148) So when we look at the details of the difference 
between these despairs, we have to bear in mind the fact that
these differences are only relative.
Those who are in unconscious despair "have no conception of 
being spirit".(SUD, p. 43=SUDL, p. 176) Hence "it makes no 
difference whether the person in despair is ignorant that his 
condition is [one of] despair - he is in despair just the
same."(SUD, p. 44=SUDL, p. 177) Anti-Climacus compares this
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man’s case with the sufferer from consumptions ’’when the illness 
is most critical, he feels well, considers himself to be in 
excellent health, and perhaps seems to others to radiate 
health."(SUD, p. 45=SUDL, p. 178) Anti-Climacus regards this 
form of despair (i.e., unconsciousness of it) as being the most 
common in the world.(SUD, p. 45=SUDL, p. 178)
However, as we have just asserted (in the previous 
paragraph), this condition does not only apply to those who are in 
unconscious despair. All people, in so far as they are in 
despair, also have this characteristic of being unconscious of 
being in despair (in the true sense). As we shall see, those who 
are in the despair of weakness and that of defiance are aware of
being in despair, but their awareness cannot be said to be true to 
the exact situation of their being in despair. In this sense, 
Anti-Climacus says that "to be unaware of being defined as spirit 
is precisely what despair is."(SUD, p. 25=SUDL, p. 158) Let us 
examine this by closely considering the despair of weakness and 
the despair of defiance.
Anti-Climacus divides the despair of weakness (the despair of 
womanliness) into two kinds: (1) "despair over the earthly" and 
(2) "despair over the eternal or over oneself". Despair over the 
earthly is also divided into the case of "pure immediacy"(SUD, pp. 
50-54=SUDL, pp. 184-87) and the case "when immediacy is assumed 
to have self-reflection."(SUD, pp. 54-67=SUDL, pp. 187-194) In 
the first kind (i.e., the case of "pure immediacy"), one’s inner 
self is also determined by some external things. When some 
disaster occurs, then despair occurs. So one’s conception of
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despair is wrong. “Here there is no infinite consciousness of the
self, of what despair is, or of the condition as one of 
despair."(SUD, p. 50f.=SUDL, p. 184) The fact that he can become 
lively again through the change of his outward circumstances
clearly shows that he is not aware of true despair. Such a man is 
satirised by Anti-Climacus as a man who "quite literally 
identifies himself only by the clothes he wears...."(SUD, p. 
53=SUDL, p. 187)
When immediacy is assumed to have a certain degree of 
self-reflection, despair is somewhat modified; there is somewhat
more ’’consciousness of the self” and there is some sense in it
when such a man talks of being in despair.(SUD, p. 54=SUDL, p. 
187) But he has only "a dim idea [or an obscure conception] that 
there may even be something eternal in the self. "(SUD, p. 
55=SUDL, p. 188) In the final analysis, he has no consciousness 
of the infinite self either. So in his case, "[as] long as the 
difficulty lasts, he does not dare...’to come to himself’, he does 
not will to be himself."(SUD, p. 55=SUDL, p. 189) This despair 
is therefore "despair in weakness, a [passive] suffering of the 
self".(SUD, p. 54=SUDL, p. 188) Anti-Climacus says satirically 
that in the real sense this person does not have the true 
conception of despairs
It is comical that he wants to talk about having been in 
despair; it is appalling that after the conquering of despair, 
according to his view, his condition is in fact despair.(SUD, 
p. 56=SUDL, p. 190)
Here two conceptions of despair appears the despair of which this 
man speaks and the despair of which Anti-Climacus as a Christian
Page 209
thinks. According to this man’s conception of despair, he has 
overcome despair, so he is (according to his own view) no longer 
in despair. But according to the Christian conception, he is 
still in despair. So the despair of which this man speaks of 
having overcome is not the despair of which the Christian thinks.
Whereas "despair over the earthly" is called "the despair in
weakness", "despair about the eternal or over oneself" is called
the "despair oyer his weakness".(SUD, p. 61=SUDL, p. 195) But,
as is always the case, "there is only a relative difference."(SUD,
p. 61=SUDL, p. 195) Anti-Climacus describes the one who is in
"the despair about the eternal or over oneself"(or "the despair
over one’s weakness") as follows:
The person in despair understands that it is weakness to make 
the earthly so important, that it is weakness to despair. But 
now, instead of definitely turning away from despair to faith 
and humbling himself under his weakness, he entrenches himself 
in despair and despairs over his weakness."(SUD, p. 61=SUDL, 
p. 195)
So in the end, he either plunges into life, "perhaps into the 
distractions of great undertakings" (so that he becomes "a 
restless spirit who wants to forget"), or he seeks "oblivion in 
sensuality, perhaps in dissolute living; in despair he wants to go 
back to immediacy, but always with the consciousness of the self 
he does not want to be."(SUD, p. 66=SUDL, p. 199) So this man 
does not allow the possibility that with God, overcoming his 
weakness is possible. In this sense, he may be compared with the 
one who is in despair of necessity who does not accept the fact 
that for God everything is possible.
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In contrast, the one who is in despair of defiance (the 
despair of manliness) asserts himself; he tries to be himself by 
himself. He defiantly and despairingly wills to be himself in 
defiance of the power which posited him. In his proud and 
conscious defiance he denies being grounded in God. So even 
though "there is a rise in the consciousness of the self", his 
consciousness of the infinite self is regarded by the Christian as 
"really only the most abstract form, the most abstract possibility 
of the self."(SUD, pp. 67f.=SUDL, p. 201) That is, the defiant
man’s consciousness of himself is not the consciousness of the
true self, even though he has an Increasing awareness of the 
self.[31] For, as Kierkegaard says in one of his journal entries, 
"no true self-knowledge without God-knowledge or [without 
standing] before God."(JP, IV, 3902(Pap. X 4 A 412)). Likewise, 
even though there is "a greater consciousness of what despair is", 
his conception of despair is not the right one, insofar as he
thinks that he can overcome despair by his own power.
Until now we have discussed various forms of despair. 
Despair can be discussed from two different perspectives: (1) It 
can be discussed from the perspective of the components of the 
synthesis of human being. (2) And at the same time, despair can 
also be discussed from the perspective of consciousness. They (1 
and 2 above) are two different discussions of despair from two 
different perspectives, one from the perspective of the components 
of the synthesis of human being and the other from the perspective
of consciousness
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What is important in the context of this study, is the fact 
that everybody is in despair, of one form or another. And from 
the Christian viewpoint, despair is sin and those who are in 
despair are sinners. And ’’the state of [remaining in] sin” is 
regarded by the Christian as being "greater sin than the new 
sin."(SUD, p. 106=SUDL, p. 237) Insofar as man is in sin, he is 
not himself in the true sense. In this sense, Anti-Climacus says 
that "[to] despair over oneself, in despair to will to be rid of 
oneself - this is the formula for all despair."(SUD, p. 20=SUDL, 
p. 153) It is true that, as we have seen, there are some people 
who try to be themselves by themselves. Such people will not want 
to get rid of thaaselves. However, Anti-Climacus goes on to
qualify this:
Well, so it seems, but upon closer examination it is clear 
that [after all] the contradiction is the same. The self that 
he despairingly wants to be is a self that he is not..., that 
is, he wants to tear his self away from the power [i.e., God] 
that established it.(SUD, p. 20=SUDL, p. 153, emphasis 
given)
So everybody in despair tries not to be himself as defined by God. 
And, as Miller says, "losing the self-before-God is despair, 
...more strictly...sin."[32]
When all men are in despair, hew ever, a possibility of 
becoming oneself through being forgiven one’s sin is provided.
This constitutes the third situation of Christian understanding of 
one’s becoming oneself. This third situation is closely related 
to Jesus Christ, for the existence of Jesus as the God-Man who
came to this world in order to save human beings who are in sin,
is that possibility which was given to men who are not able to be
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themselves. The despairing individual is confronted with the 
God-Man.(SUD, p. 113=SUDL, pp. 244f.) What is required of him is 
an act of faith in which he submits to his own powerlessness on
the one hand, and to the power of God, on the other. Here there
is the possibility either of being forgiven, or of offence. If 
one relates in a proper way to the message of the forgiveness of
sins, then one is forgiven one’s sins, and one becomes oneself.
Now such a person has faith. Yet faith is defined by 
Anti-Climacus as follows: "Faith is: that the self in being
itself and in willing to be itself rests transparently in 
God."(SUD, p. 82=SUDL, p. 213) Here we should remember that for 
Kierkegaard, as Colette puts it, "to be before God is to be before 
Christ".[331 And here we may recall "the formula that describes 
the state of the self when despair is completely rooted out": "in 
relating itself to itself and in willing to be itself, the self 
rests transparently in the power that established it."(SUD, p. 
14=SUDL, p. 147) When we compare these two passages, we can see a 
striking similarity. In fact, we have to say that the contents 
are exactly the same; "[grounding] one's self transparently in God 
is an equivalent expression for faith."[34] This means that one 
can accomplish the task of becoming oneself in the real sense
through one’s faith in Christ. This is the last situation of 
Anti-Climacus' three situations in which the problem of becoming 
oneself is differently posited. Now what was at first only a 
possibility (i.e., to become oneself in one's relation to God) 
becomes an actuality. So according to the Christian, one is
totally dependent upon God in Christ in one's becoming oneself
Page 213
Here would be the best place in which to consider the 
Christian’s self-consciousness as a Christian, In fact, we have 
already mentioned all the salient factors in the Christian’s 
self-consciousness. They are: sin-consciousness, the
consciousness of the forgiveness of sin, and faith. Since these 
factors have already been touched on, here they will just be drawn 
together. Before going into a separate discussion, however, we 
have to bear in mind one important point in relation to these 
factors. That is, these three major factors of Christian 
consciousness cannot, for Kierkegaard, be separated from one 
another. They always exist together, side by side. They form, to 
use Robert C. Roberts’ term, ’’a logically integrated 
package.’’[351 It is therefore purely an arbitrary division for the 
sake of a dear understanding of each factor or component in the
Christian’s consciousness that we shall discuss these factors one
by one.
Let us start with the consciousness of sin. The
consciousness of sin, writes Kierkegaard, is and continues to be 
the conditio sine qua non for all Christian!ty[36], and 
’’Christianity.. .begins with the doctrine of sin. ”[37] Accordingly, 
the one and only entrance into Christianity is through the
consciousness of sin. And it is this consciousness which binds a
man to Christianity.[38] Hence if one could somehow be released 
from this, he could not be a Christian. It is this
sin-consciousness which paganism (both ancient and modern) lacks
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What then is "sin"? According to the Christian conception, 
sin is not merely a matter of several misdeeds; one cannot think 
that one does some bad things as well as some good things. For in
the presence of God one is measured by God’s absolute standards. 
In this sense, sin is not the opposite of virtue but of faith. 
"Sin is not to believe”(JP, IV, 4020(Pap. X 12 A 348)), and faith 
is the way of being before God. Hence the natural man’s
subjectivity, which is the highest truth of the natural man, must 
be recognized as untruth ’’before God”. [39] For, as Bruce H. 
Kirmmse says, sin is ”an existential state, a willed condition, a 
position, as Kierkegaard calls it”; it is ”a misuse of a capacity, 
an ongoing misrelationship or posture.”[40] And as Verdenius 
quotes from Steinbuchel, "Christian sin is more than a
transgression of the divine law, it is the hardening of the self’s 
I against God’s Thou".[41] Therefore, whatever he is doing is 
sin.[42] As Schrag expresses it, "[every] particular sin is simply 
an expression of...[the] state of being sinful.’’[43] The depth and 
power of sin are such that human goodness and human effort cannot
prevail against them. The power of sin is far greater than can be 
overcome by human merits and moral efforts. The sinner is so 
thoroughly in the power of sin that he is blinded by its power. 
As Pojman makes it clear, "sin’s corruption is total, affecting 
not only man’s will and Intuition but even his reason.’’[44]
Here we have to bear in mind one important thing in the 
interpretation of Kierkegaard’s concept of "sin-consciousness".
This is the fact that the "God" before whom one stands is not 
deity in general. For instance, Judge William (or Kant, Hegel)
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has in mind a kind of deity. But the deity to whom the ethical 
person relates does not make him aware of his sinfulness, as we 
have seen in the last chapter. The person in religiousness A can 
have guilt-consciousness. But Kierkegaard carefully 
differentiates guilt-consciousness and sin-consciousness.[45] In 
guilt-consciousness the self asserts itself as strongly as it can 
in existence. But he who has the consciousness of sin, is outside 
of ’’immanentism”. Immanentism means, for Kierkegaard, a point of 
view which does not know anything transcendent which can enter
into time and space. So in relation to self-consciousness,
immanentism is expressed in the very fact that self-reflection Is
constitutive of existence. Within immanentism one thinks of the
process of inward self-reflection as the means of understanding 
and becoming oneself. However, the Christian thinks, as 
Kierkegaard says, "no human being [by himself] can come to know 
hew great a sinner he is.’*[46] And yet in the consciousness of 
sin, one is conscious of oneself as not being in possession of the 
power of becoming oneself. That is to say, in the consciousness 
of sin, one recognizes that the existing individual is completely
incapable of overcoming the division within oneself and the 
separation from God. Only when God forgives one’s sin and makes 
one a new creature can one have the right relationship to God. In 
this sense, Kierkegaard, through the mouth of Climacus, says that 
’’the relation to that historical fact (the Deity in time) is the 
condition for sin-consciousness....”(CUP, p. 517) Hence, as Elrod 
points out, for Kierkegaard, “sin-consciousness...depends upon the 
historical revelation of the deity in time, *’ and ’’the
consciousness of sin is mediated by a divine revelation.’’[47] That
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is, only in relation to Christ can one have the consciousness of 
sin,[48] Thus one needs a radical change in self-consciousness, 
and therefore, there is “the breach with immanence". Sin is thus
a transcendent category. As Kirmmse says: "Sin itself is a
revealed, dogmatic, Christian category."[49]
Therefore, the Christian no longer thinks that through the
process of inward self-reflection one can understand and become 
oneself[50]; the Christian asserts that one can be oneself only in 
relation to Christ. But this does not mean that one, who has not 
been a sinner, becomes a sinner only when one has the conception
of God. On the contrary, now, in one’s confrontation with the 
God-Man, one real ize.s that, sue. haa bean, a ainner. beffire. Gfii. [51] 
For, in Kierkegaard’s conception of sin-consciousness, sin is 
basically a misrelation to God, and sin is characterized as 
disobedience.[52] One cannot adjust this misrelationship by 
oneself. So long as one thinks that by one's own power one can 
have right relationship with God, one is in sin. For in fact this
means that one does not know how serious one's sinfulness is and
that one is not yet conscious of one’s sin in all its 
seriousness.[53] Hence we may say with Shmueli that "[the] sinner 
is the person who shuts himself into his own immanence and 
defiantly considers it his actuality. "[54] One who has the 
consciousness of sin in the real sense, is one who thinks that one 
cannot be removed from the state of sin but for God's forgiveness 
of sin. In this spirit, Anti-Climacus says that the requirement 
of Christianity is too high for man: the real reason why man is 
offended at Christianity is "because it Is too high for him",
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because its goal is not man’s goal, because it would make of a man 
something so extraordinary that ”his mind cannot grasp it.”[55]
Hence sin-consciousness is always found together with one’s 
belief in God’s forgiveness of sins.[56] One’s realization that 
one is so extremely sinful that one cannot solve by oneself the 
problem of sinfulness, makes one utterly dependent upon God. In 
this sense, Kierkegaard says: ’’The forgiveness of sin is a 
totality-qualification based on my being in relationship to 
God.”(JP, II, 12l8(Pap. IX A 482)) Hence when God in Christ 
offers the forgiveness of sin, such a person does not, and cannot 
say that this forgiveness is impossible.[57] Moreover, he should 
not suggest the way in which God should offer the forgiveness of 
sin, that, e.g., God should give us a perfect moral example, so 
that we can follow the example and in so following be forgiven our 
sins, or that it is proper for God to forgive everybody.[58] Those 
who believe in the forgiveness of sin just accept what God himself
has offered, the way in which God forgives us, the extent of this 
forgiveness, and the character of this forgiveness. Therefore, he 
who has the consciousness of the forgiveness of sin is related to
God through the mediation of the God-Man. In this spirit, in one
of his journal entries, Kierkegaard says:
[The] consciousness of the forgiveness of sins Is linked to an 
external event, the appearance of Christ in his fullness, 
which is, indeed, not external in the sense of being foreign 
to us, of no concern to us, but external as being 
historical.(JP. II, 1100(Pap. Ill A 39))
And according to Kierkegaard, only one who believes in the 
forgiveness of one's sin is one who becomes spirit.(JP, I, 67(Pap. 
VIII 1 A 673)) Hence those who do not believe in the forgiveness
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of sin are regarded as not being themselves in the proper sense. 
Only those who believe in Christ’s forgiveness of sin are regarded 
as spirits and therefore themselves.(of. JP, IV, 4333(Pap. X 2 A 
445))
Thirdly, as we have suggested before, sin-consciousness and 
the consciousness of the forgiveness of sin are always found 
together with faith.(cf. JP, IV, 4036(Pap. X 2 A 477)) Those who 
have sin-consciousness and the consciousness of the forgiveness of 
sin, are those who must live by faith.[593 He who lives by faith 
asserts that if there is an integration of the self, this 
integration of the self is given only by God. For to become 
oneself in relation to God requires the negation of the thinking 
that one can be oneself through one’s own power.(cf. JP, I, 
53=Pap. V B 196) The life of faith is therefore that of total 
dependence upon God. But this dependence is a willing 
dependence.[60] New one realizes that as long as one is trying to 
be independent of God, one cannot be oneself in the real sense. 
One no longer believes that one can existentially integrate 
oneself by one’s own power. One relies upon God in one’s becoming 
oneself. Now one can be called "spirit” in the sense 
Anti-Climacus uses this term. One is a self.[61] Accordingly, 
Anti-Climacus says: ’’[The Christian motto is]: according to your 
faith, be it unto you, or as you believe, so you are, to believe 
is to be."(SUD, p. 93=SUDL, p. 224) For faith is the belief that 
the self’s lost integration is restored in existence through the
atoning significance of the existence of "the God in time". In 
this sense, we can agree with Elrod, when he says: "To become
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one’s self in existence and to believe in the paradox [of the
God-Man] are not two different and unrelated tasks. The two
tasks, in fact, are inseparably linked. It is impossible for the 
individual to become himself apart frcm belief in the 
paradox....”[62] For, as we have discussed, one can be oneself in 
the real sense, only in relation to Christ, and yet Christ is the 
God-Man (the absolute paradox). Here again we can see the fact 
that we cannot separate the consciousness of sin, and of the 
forgiveness of sin and faith in the Christian’s consciousness. 
These are the constituting factors of Christian consciousness.
This discussion of the Christian’s self-consciousness leads us to
draw a comparison between the Christian’s understanding of himself 
and the ethical person’s understanding.
Let us then turn to this comparison. As we have seen in the
last section, the ethical person thinks that the task of becoming 
oneself is a task which has a characteristic of total autonomy. 
Yet the Christian, as understood by Anti-Climacus, thinks that as 
long as one tries to be oneself by oneself, one is in despair. 
For, from the Christian understanding of the problem of becoming
oneself, everyone is in despair, as long as one has no real 
relationship to Christ. Hence the ethical person, who tries to be 
himself by himself, is regarded by Anti-Climacus to be in the 
despair of willing despairingly to be oneself.(SUD, p. 67=SUDL, 
p. 200) So it is quite obvious that there are differences and 
discontinuity between the ethical understanding of the self and
the Christian understanding. When we look at Kierkegaard’s
writings, these differences and discontinuity are too obvious to
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be disregarded.
Some critics, hcwever, while noticing the differences and
discontinuity, try to find a kind of continuity between the
ethical understanding of the self and the Christian understanding.
For example, Elrod says as follows:
Faith presupposes a definition of the self and the notion that 
the task of existence is an ethical one in which the 
individual actualizes and understands himself in existence....
[Faith] is an act which is explicitly and understandably 
continuous with the preceding development of Spirit. Faith 
accepts the already established fact that the individual’s 
self is a synthesis and that he has the ethical task of 
actualizing that synthesis as a relation (unity) in 
existence.•..
Faith is explicitly continuous with the preceding levels 
of the ethico-religious stage of Spirit’s development.[63]
Hence, according to Elrod, the definition of the self and the 
notion of the task of one’s actualization and understanding of 
oneself in existence are basically those of the ethical person. 
Even the Christian self, we are told, accepts the ethical
definition of the self and the task of ethical realization of
oneself. The Christian accepts, says Elrod, "the already 
■established. fast .that the. Individual ’ s self, is a synthesis and. 
that he. has the ethical task. ef. actualizing that, synthesis as a 
relation in existence." And in another place, Elrod says: "Grace
for Kierkegaard is never received without a prior and 
corresponding human effort, namely, the ethical act of willing the 
others as end. Such an act, when honestly made, becomes the 
vessel that will be filled with grace."[64] Therefore, according 
to Elrod, the previous process of self-development makes a 
positive contribution to the Christian self’s becoming itself? 
one’s spiritual development is vital for one’s becoming oneself.
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It is true that there are some similarities between the
ethical understanding of the self and the Christian understanding. 
At first glance, therefore, the Christian understanding and the
ethical understanding look similar. Both the Christian and the 
ethical person see that man is In a sense already himself, but at 
the same time not yet himself; he has to become himself. In order 
to be himself, both the Christian and the ethical person assert, 
he has to integrate two different factors which compose the self 
as a synthesis, soul (the eternal, the infinitude, possibility) 
and body (the temporal, the finitude, necessity). Moreover, both 
maintain that the self is both the product of the integration of 
these two factors and the agent which integrates these factors.
However, when we look closely at Kierkegaard’s texts, we 
cannot help questioning Elrod’s assertion of the continuity 
(between the ethical understanding of the self and the Christian 
understanding). In particular, it seems to me very difficult to
think that the definition of the self of the Christian is
basically that of the ethical. In what follows, I shall argue 
against this assertion of continuity through a consideration of 
the following three questions: (1) Whether the infinitude (the 
eternal, possibility) of the self is understood in the same way in 
the ethical understanding of the self and in the Christian 
understanding? (2) Whether the way in which one becomes oneself 
is understood in the same way, or in a similar way, at the very 
least? And (3) whether the resulting selves (i.e., the ethical 
self and the Christian self) are similar, or whether there is any
continuity between the two selves? Let us consider these in turn,
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Firstly, the understanding of infinitude. Do the ethical 
person and the Christian have the same understanding of infinitude 
(the eternal, possibility) of the human being? When we look at 
Kierkegaard’s texts, we cannot equate the infinitude of the 
Christian self with that of the ethical self, for the
characteristics of the infinitude of each self are different from
one another. So we have to say that their understandings of the 
infinitude are different. For the Christian, this possibility (or 
infinitude), though it is a given element, so that it is one 
factor which constitutes human self, is still a possibility only 
in relation to God.[65] For the Christian, ’’humanly speaking, 
there is no possibility.’’(SUD, p. 38=SUDL, p. 171) What does 
this mean? Does this mean that we human beings do not have soul, 
the infinitude, the eternal, within us? Anti-Climacus would 
answer this question negatively. What then does he mean when he 
says that "humanly speaking no possibility exists"? Perhaps he 
means that the infinitude (the eternal, possibility, soul) in man 
is possible only in relation to God.[66] Without the relation to 
God, man would be as if man did not have soul; his soul is a dead 
soul, even though he is living. His soul does not function as it 
should do. The eternal, the infinitude, possibility of the 
ethical person is "immanent", for, as we have seen in the last 
section, this possibility is latent in human beings; it is merely 
a human possibility. But what Christianity asserts is that the
infinitude must be something transcendent
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The ethical infinitude is therefore regarded by the Christian 
as only abstract infinitude and, in the final analysis, as the 
immanent infinitude; the ethical infinitude is something which “is 
with [the ethical person] in time. "(SLOWL, p. 116) Duprez also 
says that the ethical person’s "relation to the infinite lies only 
within the finite."[67] Anti-Climacus’ thinking develops in the 
following way. (1) An ethical self is one who is conscious of the 
infinite self.(SUD, pp. 67f.=SUDL, p. 201) (2) But since he 
cannot be himself in the real sense, Anti-Climacus thinks that 
this infinite self "is really only the most abstract form, the 
most abstract possibility of the self." He continues to say: "And 
this is the self that a person in despair wills to be, severing 
the self from any relation to a power that has established it, or 
severing it from the idea that there is such a power [God]."(SUD, 
p. 68=SUDL, p. 201)
The self which the ethical person thinks to be the actual
real self is regarded by Anti-Climacus as "the abstract 
possibility of the self.’’[68] As the ethical person criticized the 
aesthetic person, the ethical person is judged by the Christian as 
thinking that he became himself abstractly, or only in
possibility. It is true that the aesthete and the ethical person
are different. What the aesthete lacks is his awareness of
necessity and limitations; in this sense, the aesthete only lives 
in the world of possibility. The ethical person, on the other 
hand, is clearly aware of his concretion,(Cf. SUD, p. 68=SUDL, 
pp. 201-2) The trouble with the ethical self is that, by the aid 
of being the infinite, he wills to construct [himself] by
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himself.(SUD, p. 68=SUDL, p. 202) In this sense, the ethical 
view of life is called by Anti-Climacus ’'stoicism".(SUD, p. 
68=SUDL, p. 202) But he warns us not to think only of "this 
philosophical sect." By "stoicism" Anti-Climacus means that the
ethical view of life is one of self-construction. Yet In the view
of Anti-Climacus, as long as one thinks that one can construct 
oneself by oneself, one is thinking in an abstract way, for one is
thinking what is impossible. The infinitude of the ethical person
makes him think in this impossible way.
In contrast to the ethical person's understanding of 
infinitude, the Christian's understanding of infinitude is the 
basis of the acceptance of the concrete fact that he cannot be 
himself by himself. Hence we can say that the Christian's
understanding of infinitude is very different from the ethical 
understanding.[69]
This discussion on infinitude has already touched the second 
point of our discussion. As this examination intimates, the
difference between the ethical self and the Christian self not
only lies in their understanding of infinitude, but also in their 
understanding of the way in which one becomes oneself. The 
ethical person Is basically the one who tries to be himself by 
himself. He can either be "active" or "passive". (But in both 
situations, he is the one who controls himself.) So according to 
the Christian, the ethical person is in despair through trying to 
be himself by himself$ he is defiant. Hence there is a difference 
between the ways in which the two persons think one becomes 
oneself. The Christian thinks that it is possible only In
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relation to God; whereas the ethical person thinks that he can 
autonomously be himself. Therefore, it is difficult to agree 
without reservations with Mackey when he asserts: "The effect of
Kierkegaard’s position is to infini.tizg iha freedom of iho 
individual and. thereby to absolutize human subjectivity. "[70] As 
far as Kierkegaard’s ethical person is concerned this statement is
quite correct. But it is quite certain that for Kierkegaard’s 
Christian this assertion cannot be valid, as our discussion in 
this context shows. Here, we may see a difference between the 
ethical person and the Christian.
Thirdly, as the result of these differences, there is also a
difference in the resultant selves. The Christian self which
integrates itself in relation to God is a willingly dependent 
self, or theonomous self. As Kierkegaard says, ”what I am I am 
simply and solely by believing in and obeying God.”(JP, V, 
5125(Pap. VIII 1 A 602)) In contrast, the ethical self which 
attempts to integrate itself by itself is a totally independent 
self, or autonomous self. From the perspective of the Christian 
self, the autonomous self of the ethical person is defiant.
One of the most obvious examples of one’s being defiant can 
be found, according to Anti-Climacus, in one’s response to the 
existence of the God-Man. According to Anti-Climacus, the 
doctrine of the God-Man is not something which man imagined; "it 
is God who devised the teaching about the God-man."(SUD, p. 
118=SUDL, p. 249) The importance of this doctrine of the God-Man 
lies in the fact that It makes the qualitative distinction between
God and man clear on the one hand, and at the same time, it shows
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what God did in order to save human beings who are in sin, on the 
other hand. But the ethical person does not accept this doctrine 
of the God-Man as it is; he can and may accept this doctrine when
he interprets it in the way in which he can take away and abolish 
the possibility of offence. For example, he can accept this
doctrine as it is interpreted by Kant, in which Jesus is only the
perfect moral example[71], or the "ideal of humanity"[72], or the
"archetype" of human being[73], or the "godly-minded teacher."[74]
And he can accept this doctrine as it is interpreted by Hegel, in
which the God-Man is only the symbol of human deification, or of
the union of divinity and humanity in general. In his "Lectures
on the Philosophy of Religion" in 1824, Hegel says: "What is
posited [in the Incarnation] is that divine and human nature are
not intrinsically different - God [is] in human shape. The truth
is that there is only one reason, only one spirit."[75] Thus Hegel
sees the unity of human spirit and the Absolute Spirit, the unity
of human reason and the Absolute Reason. In the same spirit, in
his lectures (on the same subject) in 1827, he says again: "The
substantial unity [of God and humanity] is what humanity
implicitly is."[76] Hence, for Hegel, there is the necessity of
the Incarnation, as we can see in the following quotation:
The necessity that God [has] appeared in the world in the 
flesh is an essential character - a necessary deduction from 
what has been said previously, demonstrated by it - for only 
in this way can it become a certainty for humanity; only in 
this way it is truth in the form of certainty.[77]
From this observation we can agree with Charles Taylor:
[Although] Hegel probably continued to see in Jesus an 
exceptional individual who lived in harmony with God in a way 
quite without precedent or equal in his time, it could not be 
said of him that he was God in any sense other than in which
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we are identical with God. An. we are all the same in
this regard.[78]
Here there is no need to list all kinds of attempts which 
understand the doctrine of the God-Man in a different way frcm 
what it was in classical theology. Anti-Climacus himself only 
mentions two heretical tendencies in the interpretation of the 
existence of the God-Man: to make the God-Man only a man, and to 
make the God-Man God who only appears to be a man. Perhaps these 
are enough for us as well. What is important here is the fact 
that the ethical person cannot accept the existence of Jesus as 
the God-Man as he is. He either rejects this idea all together,
or tries to interpret it in his cwn way which abolishes the 
possibility of offence. Thus, according to Anti-Climacus, the 
ethical self is in despair of defiance. The ethical person 
himself thinks that he can become himself, whereas the Christian 
thinks that the ethicist is in despair of defiance.
To summarize the discussion which we have developed up to 
new: (1) There is a difference between the ethical person’s
understanding of the infinitude (the eternal, possibility) and the 
Christian’s. (2) There is also a clear difference between the
ethical way of becoming oneself and the Christian way; the ethical 
self tries to be himself by himself, whereas the Christian self 
becomes himself only in relation to God. And therefore (3) there 
is a difference between the resulting selves; the ethical self is 
the independent and autonomous self, whereas the Christian self is 
the willingly dependent self, or theonomous self. Accordingly,
there is also a difference between their understanding of the
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power of the self? the ethical self is the lord for itself,
whereas the Christian self has God as the Lord.
Here one may raise an interesting questions does Kierkegaard 
suggest that the ethical person thinks that he had become a self,
and only looking back from the Christian sphere realises that he
was not a self at all? Or does he, while within the ethical
sphere, begin to see his failure to be a self? until finally he 
falls down before his own eyes and realises he is getting nowhere? 
It Is true that Kierkegaard speaks of the consciousness of 
limitation which the ethical person has to have, and that he, in
relation to this, mentions repentance even within the ethical 
sphere. Hcwever, as we have seen, ethical repentance as the 
choice of the ethical self is the starting point of the ethical
sphere; it is not at the end of the ethical sphere. Moreover, the 
absolute consciousness that he cannot be a self by himself can be 
attained only within the Christian sphere. This means that the 
person in the ethical sphere does not have the real sense of 
failure as understood by the Christian. Hence there is a 
difference between repentance within the ethical sphere and in the 
Christian sphere.
By this observation, we may also answer the following 
questions can we not say that the ethical person is at least on 
the way to becoming a self? At least, can we not say that he is 
closer to becoming a self than the person in the aesthetic 
sphere?[79l This is a very subtle question, and it is very 
difficult to find an adequate answer. In some places, Kierkegaard 
suggests the possibility of a positive answer to this question;
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yes, he is nearer the tel os (i.e., becoming a self) than the 
aesthetic person in that the ethical person at least tries to be a 
self. For the ethical person it may be said that he at least
knows what he is aiming at: becoming a self. However, 
Kierkegaard immediately subjoins that this seeming nearness is the
very reason why he is in a far more dangerous situation than is 
the aesthetic person.(cf. JP, IV, 4024(Pap. X 2 A 29)) Such 
seeming nearness is the basis of his arrogance, his defiance in 
asserting that he can be himself by himself. Both the aesthete 
and the ethicist are equally far from the Christian God and in 
need of becoming a self in relation to God. Hence Kierkegaard’s 
answer to the aforementioned question is as follows: In one
sense, the ethical person is near to becoming a self, but in 
another, and deeper, sense, he is further from becoming a self in 
the real sense of the word. I think we should emphasize the 
second point. For, as Kirmmse says, "it JLa. the most dangerous
jaisknasfi. when. ore. refuses ia allow, oneself ta ba healed. from 
it."[80] Hence, in the final analysis, there is also a difference 
between the ethical self's understanding of its state and the 
Christian's understanding of the ethical self's statej the ethical 
self thinks that it becomes itself, whereas the Christian thinks 
that the ethical person is in despair and has not yet become the 
self.[81] Hence being in the ethical does not give any help for 
being a Christian.
Based on this discussion we can now conclude (1) that the
Christian self cannot be understood as one handed-over from the
ethical spherej and (2) that the ethical person cannot realize his
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failure in the genuine sense so long as he is in the ethical
sphere. So if an ethical person becomes a Christian, there is a 
fundamental change in his seLf-consciousness; his
self-consciousness can be no longer the ethical person’s 
self-consciousness. Becoming the Christian self, therefore, 
cannot be understood as the development or enhancement of the
ethical self. As we have seen in this chapter, to be the
Christian self means that the characteristic traits of the ethical
person have to be abandoned
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Ill
In this section we shall consider the understanding of becoming
oneself of the person in religiousness A. In the last two
sections we have examined the ethical understanding of becoming a 
self and the Christian understanding. As a result of the
examination we have seen that the Christian’s understanding of
becoming a self has certain characteristics which are different
from the ethical person’s understanding. The fundamental 
difference comes from their relation to God in regard to their
becoming themselves. Whereas the ethical person does not need God
in this matter, the Christian thinks that without God there is no 
self. In relation to this, one interesting question may be
raised: how should we think about the understanding of becoming a
self of the person who is in religiousness A? This is interesting 
because religiousness A is, on the one hand, quite compatible with 
the ethical sphere, but, on the other, in relation to the problem
of becoming a self the person in religiousness A thinks that one
can be oneself only in relation to God. Does this mean that in
relation to the problem of becoming a self, the person in
religiousness A has the same view as the Christian has? Or does
the person in religiousness A have a different understanding of 
the expression "one can be oneself only in relation to God”? If
the latter is the case, exactly what constitutes the difference 
between the Christian’s understanding of the phrase ”only in 
relation to God” and the way it is understood by the person in
religiousness A?
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I wish to show in this section that the basic difference
between the Christian's understanding of becoming a self and that
of the person in religiousness A lies in the characteristics of
God to whom each relates in his relation to himself. In other
words, the God of the Christian (or the Christian conception of 
God) is different from the God of religiousness A (or the 
conception of God in religiousness A), and this difference plays 
the major role in defining the difference between the Christian's
understanding of becoming a self and that of the person in
religiousness A. We shall also see the difference between their
views of one's relationship to God, and the difference between
guilt-consciousness which the person in religiousness A has and
sin-consciousness which the Christian has. In the end, we shall 
see that as long as one keeps the characteristics of the ethical
sphere, one's understanding of becoming a self is far from the
Christian understanding. For, as we have seen, the Christian's 
relation to God, which is vital for his becoming himself, is
regarded by the ethical person and the person in religiousness A
as being particularistic, anti-rationalistic, and heteronomous. 
(But, as we have seen, this does not mean that the Christian
himself also thinks that his relation to God has these
characteristics. According to the Christian himself, one's
relation to God is the most important thing which is demanded by 
God from everybody, and which allows one's real freedom.)
Before proceeding to the main argument of this section, it
will be useful to make it clear here what I mean by religiousness 
A. This explanation is necessary, because there are some
ambiguities in Kierkegaard’s use of this term.[1] I think that 
Kierkegaard applies this term to two somewhat different types of 
religiousness. (When I say "somewhat different types of
religiousness" I do not disregard the fact that in the mind of 
Kierkegaard, in the final analysis, both of them have the same 
characteristic of immanentism, or of paganism.) He sometimes calls 
the religiousness of the subjective thinkers who are not
Christians, religiousness A. For example, if there is a
religiousness which is compatible with and suitable to Socrates,
that religiousness is religiousness A. For, as Taylor says, 
"Kierkegaard most frequently uses Socrates as an example of a 
person who represents religion A. ..."[2] Thus, Dupre even calls 
religiousness A "Socratic religion"[3], and Roberts speaks of the 
Socratic position as a "paradigm of religious teaching" which is 
contrasted with Christianity.[4] Perhaps, as some people think, 
the religiousness of Schleiermacher is regarded ty Kierkegaard as 
religiousness A.[5] On the other hand, Kierkegaard at times calls 
the religiousness of the person who lives in Christendom but does 
not have the Christian mode of existence, religiousness A. In 
other words, in some places Kierkegaard regards nominal Christians 
as people in religiousness A.[6]
When I refer to religiousness A in this section, I mainly
mean the religiousness A in its former sense. Hence the main task
of this section is to examine the understanding of becoming a self
of the person in religiousness A in this sense. This examination
naturally leads us to compare it to that of the merely ethical
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person and that of the Christian. Based upon this examination, we
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shall conclude that the understanding of becoming a self of the
person in religiousness A may be regarded as a continuation or
enhancement of the understanding of becoming a self of the ethical
person, and that in this respect, his understanding is also very
different from the Christian’s understanding.
I think we can reach this conclusion by showing that, for
religiousness A, God is understood as an immanent God, who is only
immanently in the natural world, whereas Christianity is dependent
on revelation which is given by the transcendent God. To
demonstrate the understanding of God of the person in 
religiousness A, (1) we shall consider the view that it is 
possible to think of the God of the first part of The Sickness
Unto Death as God in general, not necessarily the God of 
Christianity. (2) Then we shall relate this kind of religiousness 
to the wSocratic” in the works of Climacus. (3) We may then look 
at Schleiermacher in order to understand better what religiousness
A may be and why it is so different from what Kierkegaard
understands by Christianity. That is, Schleiermacher may help us
to understand better what a fully fledged religiousness A might
look like.
Let us start with the discussion of The Sickness unto Death.
Some interpreters of Kierkegaard think that as far as the first 
part of The Sickness unto Death is concerned, it can provide us 
with a good example of the thinking of the person in religiousness 
A in the matter of becoming a self. Although I wonder whether it
is really possible to separate this part from the rest of the
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book, and whether the God of this part is also the God of 
Christianity, I think it is interesting to reflect on this
possibility. Let us suppose for a moment that this is possible,
and try to draw out the understanding of becoming a self from this
perspective.[7]
For those who think in the way which I have described in the
above paragraph, the description of becoming a self and of despair
does not include any Christological consideration; it has, if we 
may say so, only a Unitarian (in the broad sense) picture of God.
And in this part, God must always be understood as one who has
nothing to do with the Incarnation in the traditional sense of the 
word.[8] Rather, one may say that the God of this picture does not 
need any incarnation, and actually cannot become incarnate. In
this part, according to this view, one is understood to be oneself
only in relation to this kind of God. Hampson says: "The self
comes to itself essentially for the first time in relationship to
God...Apart from God the self would not be itself. God 
’constitutes’ the self.”[9] For, says she again: "[A] human was 
intended to become himself or herself in relationship to God.”[10] 
In this respect, the person in religiousness A is different from
the merely ethical person who thinks that one can be oneself by
oneself without any relation to God. In contrast to the ethical
person’s independence, the person in religiousness A is dependent
on some deity. But at the same time, in contrast to the
Christian, the person in religiousness A cannot relate to the
Christian God who has become incarnate himself as an individual
human being without ceasing to be God.
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Now let us turn to "the Socratic" in the writings of
Climacus. Socrates* religiousness, if there is any religiousness
in Socrates, has this very characteristic of religiousness A.
That is, the type of religion which would be compatible with the
Socratic thought, as explained in Philosophical Fragments, could
only be religiousness A. Socrates is at the very least the 
subjective thinker (outside of Christianity) who emphasizes the 
task of existing as an individual.[11] He has his 
"God-relationship**. [12] But, as Climacus say, "[in] religiousness 
A there is no historical starting-point. The individual merely
discovers in time that he must assume he is eternal..,. In time
the individual recollects that he is eternal."(CUP, p. 508)
Here, in relation to this, one may make two major points: 
one is concerned with the character of God in religiousness A, and
the other is concerned with the nature of one’s relation to God in
religiousness A. But these two points are closely related to one
another. The first point concerned with the character of God is 
that in religiousness A, "God is neither a something..., nor is He 
outside the individual...."(CUP, p. 498) For in religiousness A 
God is "all and infinitely all" (so He is not something), and He 
is also in the individual. The God of religiousness A cannot be 
thought of outside one’s relation to Him. And therefore, the 
second point is that in religiousness A, the individual finds the 
God-relationship within himself.[13] Thus, "every individual is in 
essence equally adapted for eternity and essentially related to
the eternal."(CUP, p. 508)
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Because of these characteristics of religiousness A, for the
person in religiousness A, there is no need of the divine teacher,
for the teacher is merely an occasion for discovering one’s own
eternity. Kierkegaard draws out this conclusion from the Socratic
doctrine of recollection which is expressed in Meno, and says:
[According to this doctrine of recollection] the Truth is not 
introduced into [the individual from without], but was within 
him. [This thought receives further development at the hands 
of Socrates...].(PF, p. 9=PFS, pp. 11f.)
In the thought of Socrates, the idea that one has the truth within
oneself is based on the belief that one has an essential infinite
within oneself. So according to the person in religiousness A, 
the self is made up of an infinite aspect and constantly changing 
temporal experiences.[14] This infinite within us is the agent 
which makes the relationship between God and man possible. As far
as man has this infinity, he himself can establish the
relationship to God. The connection with the Eternal is "part of 
the self’s constitution. ”[15] So one may even say, with Manheimer,
that ’’Socrates orients the individual to his own inward
divinity."[16]
Hence there is a sort of continuity between God and the
infinite within human being. The infinite within us, as Taylor
says, is the "point of contact" between the self and...God."[17] 
As far as the infinite within us is concerned, there is no problem 
at all for the human being. But the trouble is that one is in the
temporal realm. So there is a tension between one’s essential
eternity and one’s staying in the temporal realm. Coming to be in 
the temporal world gives the human being this trouble and tension.
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By coming to be temporal, one has forgotten one’s eternal 
essential nature and the essential relationship between God and
man. However, though hindered by the fact of temporal existence, 
one has, within oneself, the possibility of remembering one’s 
eternal nature (to use the mythical word), or of establishing 
one’s relationship to God. To put it otherwise, in spite of the
obstacle of the temporal element, the bond between the human being
and the Eternal, or God, is still there to be discovered.
Therefore, for those who continue in the Socratic
religiousness, it is nonsensical that God, the Eternal, should
become incarnate as an individual human being. First of all,
there is no need at all for God to become incarnate. There is no
need for a mediator; one can be related to God "without passing 
through a mediator."[18] For, as we have seen, one can, by 
oneself, make the relationship to God. Or, it would be better to 
say that one has already this God-relationship within oneself.[19] 
So there is no need of God becoming incarnate in order to be the 
Saviour and Teacher of man.(cf. PF, p. 47=PFS, p. 58) Secondly, 
therefore, the idea that God has become incarnate becomes the
object of mockery for the person in religiousness A. According to
him, this idea of the Incarnation is a distortion of the idea of
eternal God. For, according to him, if God has become incarnate 
as an individual human being, then God is no longer eternal; from
now on God must be temporal in sensu strictu. So the idea of the
Incarnation, for the person in religiousness A, is the mockery of
the Godhead and blasphemy. God cannot be a human being, and
cannot be anthropomorphic
Page 244
Therefore, we can see that although they assert that one can
be oneself only in relation to God, they themselves have already
defined who God must be. Those who hold to the Socratic
religiousness have a relation to God, but their God is the one who
is defined by their conception of God. For the God of
religiousness A, as Shestov says, "not everything is possible,
and...the possible and the impossible are determined, not by God, 
but by eternal laws to which God and man are equally subject.” 
’’For this reason,” continues Shestov, ”[this kind of] God has no 
power over history, i.e., over reality.”[20] Or, in a sense, one 
may say that in religiousness A what is important is the
relationship itself, not the exact object to which one relates.
Religiousness A, ” says Climacus, ”is not conditioned by anything
but is the dialectic inward appropriation of the 
relationship....”(CUP, p. 494) This religiousness has led to 
greater inwardness and passionate subjectivity.
In order to see these points more clearly, I want to draw out 
several characteristics of religiousness A from Part Two, chapter 
IV (”The Problem of the Fragments”), section II, A (”Existential 
Pathos”) of the Postscript, in the following few paragraphs. The 
examination of this part needs a very critical reading, for even
though this part is mainly concerned with religiousness A,
Climacus, in the course of his discussion of religiousness A, 
sometimes talks about the paradoxical religiousness (i.e., 
Christianity) as well.[21] Hence we need some means by which we 
can sever religiousness A from religiousness B and make the
difference clear. In this part Climacus discusses the three
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expressions for existential pathos: (1) absolute relation to the 
absolute tel os as the initial expression, (2) suffering as the 
essential expression, and (3) guilt as the decisive expression. 
In the following discussion, I shall examine the aspects that are
solely valid for religiousness A. From this perspective, I shall
discuss these expressions in turn.
In regard to the first of these (i.e., one’s absolute 
relation to the absolute telos), we can say that in religiousness 
A, one’s relation to the absolute telos is expressed in one’s
resignation. So the first characteristic of religiousness A is 
resignation. Climacus emphasizes that one’s resignation must be 
total; one should relinquish all rights to everything external and 
immediate. Here a "total renunciation" is the expression of the
enthusiastic reconciliation to the infinite. As we have seen in
our discussion of Fear and Trembling, this infinite resignation, 
as opposed to faith, is a movement that everybody is able to make
in his own strength of will, i.e., an immanent movement.[22] The 
monastic movement of the Middle Ages is provided by Climacus as a
classic example of this. But what he says of the monastic 
movement applies not only to that of the Middle Ages, but also to 
general religious monasticism.[23] Compared with Hegelian 
mediation, the monastic movement has passion, at the very 
least.[24] It tries to resign the relative and the immediate and 
in this resignation one expresses one’s sincere devotion to the
Absolute. But the trouble with the monastic movement lies in the
fact that it makes one’s relationship to the Absolute something 
outwardly and externally special and peculiar.(cf. CUP, pp. 366,
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370)
So what is finally suggested as a true form of resignation is 
not even something like the monastic movement. What Climacus
demands as the first characteristic of religiousness A is what may 
be called "religiousness as incognito ”, the hidden inwardness
which does not express itself at all. Reacting against the
suspicious inwardness of the monastic movement, Climacus is
therefore taking the opposite extreme view of hidden inwardness. 
It is clear that this "religiousness...as incognito is...not yet
Christian religiousness. ...it cautiously keeps itself within 
immanence...."(CUP, p. 473n) Anti-Climacus, the pseudonymous 
author of Training into Christianity regards such "hidden
inwardness" as one of the symptoms of established Christendom and 
scathingly criticizes it.[25] Thus hidden inwardness is only the 
willingness to sacrifice any and every finite thing for the sake 
of the Absolute.(JP, IV, 3837(Pap. XI 3 B 45)) According to 
Kierkegaard, Mynster is the representative of those who emphasize 
this hidden inwardness.[26]
This hidden God-relationship is clearly contrasted to
Kierkegaard’s Christian understanding of God-relationship (which
is summarized in his assertion that "an authentic God-relationship
cannot avoid leaving its visible mark upon a man."[27]) From this
perspective, Kierkegaard criticizes the hidden inwardness:
The mistake of the religiousness of our time is that faith has 
been made into ’inwardness’ in such a degree that in reality 
it has completely gone out. Directly or indirectly, life has 
been permitted to take on a purely worldly character....[28]
So he says: "Hidden inwardness. That is what must be
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rejected...And nothing is more contrary to Christianity,
Christianity which, above all, wishes everything to be made
manifest."(Journals. No. 1226(Pap. X 4 A 327)) He says again:
If I transform my Christianity into merely hidden inwardness 
and outwardly conform completely to the world, if I give 
absolutely no indication that in my inmost being I acknowledge 
a completely different criterion (the God-relationship), but 
am an upright man just like most people etc., then it is 
obviously a betrayal. (JP, II, 2119(Pap. VIII 1 A 511))
Hence we can agree with Pabro when, after examining Kierkegaard’s
various writings, he says: "It would be impossible to enumerate
the sections and the pages of his works and the innumerable
passages of the Journals in which Kierkegaard denounces the
hypocrisy of ’secret inwardness*....”[29]
In contrast to this, from the perspective of religiousness A,
what is expressed outwardly, whatever it may be, is despised as
something inferior to a completely hidden inwardness. This hidden
inwardness is the first characteristic of the pathos of
religiousness A. [30] In religiousness A, what is religious must be 
only in the realm of inwardness; it must not be expressed in the
outward way. Outwardly he must be just like a person in the
ethical sphere. His religion does not affect his outward life,
his ethics etc. Insofar as one has this inwardness which cannot
be expressed in the outward way, one is in religiousness A.
Let us turn to the second characteristic of religiousness A.
The essential expression for the existential pathos is suggested 
by Climacus to be buffering”. (CUP, p, 388) In religiousness A, 
suffering must be absolutely inward suffering. Religious
suffering is not to be identified with the suffering that comes
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about through misfortune. So from this perspective, it is wrong
to think of external suffering as religious suffering. Climacus,
from this perspective, criticizes the New Testament notion of 
suffering, for someone like Paul suffered externally and Peter 
speaks of external suffering which comes to the Christians because
of their faith. As far as they think of external suffering, their
suffering cannot be religious, even though they suffer because of 
their faith. "No," says Climacus, "when the individual is secure
in his God-relationship and suffers only outwardly, then this is 
not religious suffering. "(CUP, p. 405) What then is the religious 
suffering of which Climacus speaks? Only when one is not sure of
his God-relationship, is there inner suffering, religious
suffering. From this perspective, the Christian who is sure of
his God-relationship and abandons everything and suffers from all
kinds of persecution and even martyrdom is still not religious
enough. The person in religiousness A would say that the
Christian is too secure and he is too sure of his
God-relationship, For, according to Kierkegaard, the Christian
should have "an unshakable sureness, an unshakable certainty about 
one’s relationship to God. "[31]
Therefore, religiousness A’s understanding of religious
suffering as completely inner suffering is different from the
Christian understanding of suffering which we have discussed in 
the first chapter. As we have seen, the characteristic Christian
suffering is suffering for the sake of one’s Christian faith and
its expression as love and discipleship. Kierkegaard says:
[Every] person is required to witness to the truth with his 
life, and please note, not in an illusory way, such as by
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becoming a pastor (office, paid occupation) but by supporting 
the truth. If one does this, then genuine Christian suffering 
will also come.(JP, II, 1385(Pap. X 1 A 64))
In short, Christian suffering is suffering "for the [Christian] 
doctrine."[32] And the Christian understanding of suffering is
that not all religious suffering is inner suffering. In
Christianity, some external suffering can also be regarded as
religious suffering. What is important in the Christian
understanding of suffering is whether that suffering comes from
the conflict between faith and the world.[33] For, according to 
the Christian, as Marie Thulstrup rightly observes, "[the] real 
’dying unto the world’ [which is regarded by Climacus as the 
fundamental expression of religious suffering] occurs only by 
virtue of faith and grace."[34] Absolutely inner suffering is thus 
the second characteristic of the pathos of religiousness A.
The third characteristic of religiousness A is guilt, which
is the decisive expression for existential pathos.(CUP, pp. 
468ff.) "The eternal conservation of the recollection of guilt,"
says Climacus, "is the expression for existential pathos, the
highest expression for it, higher than the most enthusiastic 
penance which would make up for the guilt."(CUP, p. 479) As this 
quotation shows, guilt-consciousness is "the eternal recollection 
of guilt."(CUP, p. 475) And in this eternal recollection of 
guilt, the person in religiousness A "comprehends guilt as a 
totality."(CUP, p. 491) That is, he does not think of guilt as 
something comparative and momentary. In this way, for the person
in religiousness A, guilt is something which is inescapably
related to his "being" itself. Guilt-consciousness is an
expression of his limitations, finiteness, or his consciousness of 
the discrepancy between the finite and the infinite within 
himself.(of. CUP, p. 239) Provided that one has some sense of 
religiousness, one can discover one is guilty; one can have
guilt-consciousness by oneself. In brief, guilt-consciousness is 
decidedly within immanence.(CUP, p. 474) In contrast, "the 
consciousness of sin [in Christianity] is the paradoxical, and in 
turn, quite consistently with this, the paradoxical thing is that
the exister does not discover this by himself, but comes to know 
it from without. Thereby the identity is broken. "(CUP, p. 475n.) 
Hence, from the perspective of religiousness A, it is a strange
idea that one is totally sinful, as the Christian asserts. What
the person in religiousness A can accept is that he is limited and
finite, so he needs to be dependent. This is expressed as
guilt-consciousness.
Up to now, we have examined the characteristics of the pathos
of religiousness A. According to our examination, the person in
religiousness A is the one who totally resigns every external and
immediate thing, and shows religiousness as incognito. He suffers
from the insecurity of his God-relationship. And he very 
definitely feels that he is limited and finite. As we anticipated
when we started this discussion, we can now clearly see that what
is important in religiousness A is only the religious relation
itself, not the object of this relationship. Perhaps, this is
because for those who are in religiousness A, God is no longer an
object to which they should relate, but is immediately related to
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themselves
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In this sense, Schleiermacher's religious person may be
indicated as the case in point. Let us, therefore, turn to
Schleiermacher in order to understand better what religiousness A
may be and why it is so different from what Kierkegaard
understands by Christianity.
According to Schleiermacher, as is well-known, the religious
person is the one who has the consciousness of being absolutely
dependent. And this "feeling of absolute dependence becomes a 
clear self-consciousness."[35] To make this discussion of
Schleiermacher comprehensible, I shall make some general comment
on Schleiermacher’s use of these expressions, before going deeply
into the main discussion of Schleiermacher’s conception of one’s
relation to God.
Firstly, when I use the term "the feeling of absolute
dependence" as the translation of the German phrase "das
^tLLe^iithjJinlge or "^§s gefjjefrl j&er
schlechthinnigen Abhaengigkeit", I am aware that there are other
suggestions of the translation of this German phrase, e.g., "the 
feeling of unconditional dependence"[36], or "the feeling of utter 
(or simple) dependence"[37]. However, I think it is allowable to 
use the traditional translation of this German phrase, insofar as 
one clearly bears in mind the different nuances of these
translations.
Secondly, in relation to this phrase, I am also aware that
here "feeling" should not be understood in a merely subjective, 
psychological sense[38]; Schleiermacher’s "feeling" may be
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understood as "cognitive feeling”.[39] Here it will be worthwhile 
to quote a sentence from Richard R. Niebuhr: "When, in The
Christian Faith, Schleiermacher says that feeling is an
abiding-in-self, in distinction from knowing and doing, he does
not mean that feeling is an empty passivity of the self: rather
it ’is the universal form of having the self’. "[40] So 
Schleiermacher’s term "feeling" must be understood positively and 
broadly, not negatively nor psychologically in the restricted
sense of the word.
Thirdly, for Schleiermacher, the consciousness of absolute
dependence has in itself the consciousness of freedom as well. 
For, in his thought, "without any feeling of freedom a feeling of 
absolute dependence would not be possible."[41] In our discussion 
of Schleiermacher’s conception of one’s relation to God (which we 
are going to deal with now), we should bear in mind these three
points.
For Schleiermacher, this consciousness of being absolutely 
dependent is equated with the consciousness of being in relation 
to God.[42] For, according to Schleiermacher, "God is given to us 
in feeling in an original way"[43], and therefore, as Avis says, 
"the consciousness of God is given in and with the sense of 
absolute dependence."[44] Or, as Moltmann expresses: "God is 
indirectly experienced in the experience of the absolute
dependency of our own existence."[45]
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The self-consciousness of the religious person is the 
consciousness of being absolutely dependent, and this
self-consciousness includes God-consciousness "in such a way
that...the two cannot be separated from each other." So his
God-consciousness is exactly this feeling of absolute dependence. 
As long as one has this feeling of absolute dependence, one has 
God-consciousness. "So that in the first instance," says
Schleiermacher, "God signifies for us simply that which is the
co-determinant in this feeling and to which we trace our being in 
such a state...."[46] Shmueli makes a similar point when he 
explains religiousness A: "He [the God of religiousness A] is the 
expression of the religious feelings man acquires as soon as he
comes to realize the finiteness of the human condition and opens 
himself toward what lies beyond it."[47]
The God-consciousness is sometimes called by Schleiermacher 
piety. According to Schleiermacher, "piety appears as a
surrender, a submission to be moved by the Whole that stands over
against man....So everybody who very definitely feels that he is
finite and limited can have guilt-consciousness. Piety does, 
indeed, linger with satisfaction on every action that is from God, 
and every activity that reveals the Infinite in the finite, and 
yet it is not itself this activity."[48] Based upon this 
understanding of piety, Schleiermacher can describe the
contemplation of the pious, and religion in the following way:
The contemplation of the pious is the immediate consciousness 
of the universal existence of all finite things, in and 
through the Infinite, and of all temporal things in and 
through the Eternal. Religion is to seek this and find it in 
all that lives and moves, in all growth and change, in all 
doing and suffering. It is to have life and to know life in
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immediate feeling, only as such an existence in the Infinite 
and the Eternal.... Wherefore it is a life in the infinite 
nature of the Whole, in the One and in the All, in God, having 
and possessing all things in God, and God in all.[49]
Yet this piety, or God-consciousness is neither knowledge nor 
morality. "Piety," says Schleiermaoher, "cannot be an instant 
craving for a mess of metaphysical and ethical crumbs."[50] But 
this does not mean that for Schleiermaoher, piety (or religion) 
lacks cognitive and moral implications. However, referring to 
this state, one may say that God has not yet been definitely 
conceptualized in the God-consciousness at first. As Barth says: 
"Piety as a determination of the self-consciousness precedes pious 
ideas."[51] (But afterwards, this religious person draws out the 
concept of God from his God-consciousness. This analysing and 
interpreting the God-consciousness is suggested as the task of 
theology. So Christian doctrines are defined as "accounts of the 
Christian religious affections set forth in speech"[52], and 
Dogmatics as "the knowledge of doctrine now current in the 
[evangelical] church."[53] In this sense, for Schleiermaoher, 
theology is a descriptive, empirical, and even 
"phenomenological"[54] discipline; and one’s statements about God 
are only statements about the manner in which the feeling of
absolute dependence is to be related to God.
statements are only implications of
self-consciousness. In this sense, H. Richard Niebuhr says that 
for Schleiermaoher, "God and faith belong together."[55] In short, 
for Schleiermaoher, all the statements we make about God are
Theological
the religious
expressions of our immediate consciousness of absolute
dependence. [56])
Therefore, what is important in religion is God-consciousness
itself which has not yet been conceptualized. To put this in the
language of Climacus, as long as one is related to deity (whoever 
he may be), one has the God-relationship, and therefore, in this 
relation to deity, one becomes oneself. However, strangely
enough, Schleiermacher*s God appears as One who cannot allow us
think of Him in the way in which the one who is in the traditional
Christianity thinks about God. For, when we closely look at
Schleiermacher's God, we have to say, with Robert C. Roberts,
that "the God of the Bible and traditional Christianity...cannot 
be the [God] for this feeling of [absolute dependence]."[57]
In relation to this God, there is guilt-consciousness, the
consciousness of the difference between God and man. But there is
no need of sin-consciousness as understood in Kierkegaard’s 
Christianity. Such sin-consciousness is regarded as a terrible 
distortion of man’s image. It is true that Schleiermacher, unlike 
the person who is described by Kierkegaard as being in 
religiousness A, uses the terra sin-consciousness. But the meaning
which Schleiermacher gives to this term is similar to the
guilt-consciousness in Kierkegaard’s writings. For example, 
Schleiermacher says: "We are conscious of sin as the power and
work of a time when the disposition to the God-consciousness had 
not yet actively emerged in us."[58] In this way, sin is discussed 
by Schleiermacher in terms of a weakness of the God-consciousness, 
or lower level of receptivity to divine influence.[593 And this
weakening and defilement of the God-consciousness is understood to
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be due to our lower nature, the flesh. So, for Schleiermacher, as
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for the person in religiousness A of Kierkegaard’s writings, sin 
is a problem innate in the very self-structure of man. On the 
basis of this understanding, we can agree with Tillich when he 
says that in Schleiermacher’s doctrine of sin, Schleiermacher 
follows the general trend of German idealism and certainly of the 
Enlightenment. He continues:
According to this trend, sin is a shortcoming. It is not a 
"no" but a "not yet”. Sin arises because of the discrepancy 
between the great speed of the evolutionary process in the 
biological development of mankind and the slower pace of moral 
and spiritual development of man....Sin is the "not yet” of 
man’s spiritual development within an already fully developed 
bodily organism. The distance or the gap between these two 
processes is what we call sin. This condition is universal. 
It is the state of mankind universally.... This makes sin in 
some way necessary and unavoidable.[60]
Hence Schleiermacher says that sin "does not invalidate the idea 
of the original perfection of man."[61] Schleiermacher says again 
that "sin is so little an essential part of being of man that we
can never regard it as anything else than a disturbance of
nature.”[62] As Barth says, Schleiermacher’s "dogmatics knows 
nothing of any sickness unto death."[63]
Consequently, Schleiermacher’s conception of redemption and
salvation is also different from that of Kierkegaard’s
Christianity. According to Schleiermacher, as Tillich quite
clearly summarizes him, salvation is "the transformation of a
limited, inhibited, or distorted religious consciousness into a 
fully developed religious consciousness", [or] "the liberation of 
our consciousness from inhibition, limitation and distortion"[64], 
or shortly "the presence of God in man, in man’s
consciousness...."[65] Hence he who has this fully developed
religious consciousness is one who has been saved. In this sense, 
we can agree with Barth when he says: "The antithesis of his
second part [the antithesis of sin and grace] is a psychological
one and therefore it falls short of the Christian antithesis at
least in the New Testament and Reformation sense."[66] For, 
according to Schleiermacher, there is no need of vicarious
sacrifice of Christ, no redemption in the classic and Reformation
$
sense of these words.[67] In fact, in the thought-system of 
Schleiermacher, this traditional understanding of redemption is
not necessary, or is even regarded as a misunderstanding or
distortion of religious consciousness. Likewise, for
Schleiermacher, there is no need of repentance and conversion in
the traditional sense of these words.[68]
For, in the final analysis, for Schleiermacher, there is a 
kind of continuity between man and God[69]> and therefore, it is 
natural for man to have God-consciousness. In this sense,
Schleiermacher says that "as certainly as Christ was a man, there
must reside in human nature the possibility of taking up the 
divine into itself, just as did happen in Christ."[70] In the same 
spirit, he says again:
Inasmuch...as the reason is completely one with the divine 
Spirit, the divine Spirit can itself be conceived as the 
highest enhancement of the human reason, so that the 
difference between the two is made to disappear.[713
But this does not mean that Schleiermacher equated God with every
individual man. In the thought of Schleiermacher, God is regarded 
as the one who encompasses all human beings and all creatures. In
this sense, Schleiermacher asserts that we cannot attribute a
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nature to God. That is, there is no such thing as the nature of 
God; God is "the unconditioned and the absolutely simple."[72] God 
is the reality that corresponds to the religious person's feeling 
of absolute dependence. He is regarded as the universal Source 
{"the Whence"} of all creatures and as the absolute causality.[73] 
So, according to him, God is in them (i.e., human beings and all 
creatures), among them, with them, behind them, and above them. 
God is the depth of everything, and the power of the divine is
present in everything so that God is the ground and unity of 
everything. But He is always in relation to them and He works
only through them.
Prom this understanding, Schleiermacher can say that "[your] 
feeling is piety in so far as it is the result of the operation of 
God in you by means of the operation of the world upon you.[7^3 
So, for the early Schleiermacher, God is equated with the
Universe, the Whole.[75] A surrender to God is thus the surrender 
to the Universe. But this does not mean that the early
Schleiermacher equates God and the world. In relation to this
subject, we can agree with Richard B. Brandt, when he says:
The situation is roughly as follows: Schleiermacher clearly 
did not believe that God is an individual self-conscious 
being, capable of distinguishing Himself from the world. On 
the other hand, he continually insists upon a distinction 
between God and the world.[76]
For Schleiermacher himself says: "The world does not allow of
being completely conceived [as totality and unity] except in and 
with God, and there is no other revelation of God than the 
world."[77] There is a clear continuity between God and the world;
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but both particular things in the world and the totality of
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particular things are not God. God is not the sum of all 
particulars, for, as Welch says, "the totality of finite things 
must also be viewed as utterly [absolutely] dependent."[78] God is 
opposite in kind and equal in scope to the world.[79] And yet, at 
the same time, for Schleiermacher, God is not an object beside 
other objects.[80] For Schleiermacher, to ascribe personality to
God understood as the universal Source and the absolute Causality,
"would be to reduce Him...to the level of finite," as Mackintosh
says.[81] From this understanding of the relationship between God 
and the world, we may term Schleiermacher*s thought 
"panentheism".[82] For Schleiermacher, the religious persons 
"refer everything to the Unchangeable and in all things alike 
perceive the Deity."[83] Yet, for the human being, "[humanity] 
itself is...the true universe, and the rest is only added in so 
far as it is related to it or forms its surroundings."[84] Thus,
in the final analysis, God is equated with the Eternal Humanity
which "is unweariedly active, seeking to step forth from its
inward, mysterious existence into the light, and to present itself 
in the most varied way, in the fleeting manifestation of the 
endless life."[85] From this understanding Schleiermacher can 
assert: "All that is human is holy, for all is divine."[86]
Moreover, there is a continuity between one’s humanity and God as
the eternal Humanity. Everybody lies "directly on the bosom of
the infinite world. In that moment, [one is] its soul. Through
one part of [one’s] nature [one feels], as [one’s] own, all its
powers and its endless life."[87] Therefore,
[the more] everyone approaches the Universe and the more they 
communicate to one another, the more perfectly they all become 
one.... They are no longer men, but mankind also. Going out
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of themselves and triumphing over themselves, they are on the 
way to true immortality and eternity.[88]
In short, there is no transcendent God, for Schleiermacher. To 
think of God, says Schleiermacher, "as if apart from His operation 
upon us through the world, the existence of God before the world,
and outside the world, though for the world, were...vain 
mythology."[893 Schleiermacher’s God is immanent (in the 
world).[90]
This conception of God as a completely immanent deity also
influences Schleiermacher’s understanding of Christ.[91J In the 
next few paragraphs I shall consider this. For Schleiermacher,
Christ’s role is quite compatible with the progressive improvement
of human nature. For Christ is regarded merely as the supreme
example of the one who is filled with God-consciousness. As is
well-known, Christ is suggested only as the ideal of the
"religious person” in his sense of the word.
According to Schleiermacher, in the life of Christ "the
perfect form of God-consciousness lies in front of the human race"
and this is the conclusive significance of Christ. Christ is
suggested as having perfect ideality in relation to the 
God-consciousness; "we must conclude that ideality is the only 
appropriate expression for the exclusive personal dignity of
Christ." In this sense, he can criticize the view which attributes 
only an exemplary (vorbildliche) dignity to Christ, but not 
"ideality (Urbildlichkeit) (which, properly, asserts the existence 
of the ooncept itself), that is, absolute perfection".[92] But 
when Schleiermacher says that Christ is ideal, he does not mean
that what Christ taught His disciples is the final ideality which 
does not have imperfection. Nor does he mean that Christ’s 
actions are always perfect.[933 Especially at the earlier stage of 
Christ’s life, sin was "certainly actually present" in Him, "even 
if only in the faintest degree".[94] Yet Schleiermacher thinks
that in spite of sin in His life one can assert the sinlessness of
Christ.[953 So here we can ask whether he shows that he uses this 
concept "sinlessness" in his own way, rather than in the
traditional sense of the word; or whether he is inconsistent. In
relation to this question, we should remember that
Schleiermacher’s conception of sin is different from the
traditional sense of the word. Accordingly, his conception of
"sinlessness" is also far removed from the traditional sense of
the word. Barth notices this point and says that for
Schleiermacher, "sinlessness is no more than human nature
completely permeated by the divine."[963 Moreover, according to 
Schleiermacher, Christ must not be omniscient, for "this...would 
mean the loss of true humanity."[973 Only in Christ’s inner being 
is there absolute ideality, and "inner being may always transcend 
its manifestation."[98] And this ideality in Christ’s inner being
can be explained "only by the universal source of spiritual life
in virtue of a creative divine act in which, as an absolute
maximum, the conception of man as the subject of the
God-consciousness comes to completion. "[993
Therefore, the reason why Christ can have the absolute 
ideality lies in the fact that human nature itself has the
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possibility of arriving at the peak of God-consciousness. So
”what is peculiar in the Redeemer’s kind of activity belongs to a
general aspect of human nature”.[100] In another place, he says:
[If] personal immortality did not belong to human nature, no 
union of the Divine Essence with human nature to form such a 
personality as that of the Redeemer would have been possible; 
and conversely,...since God had determined to perfect and 
redeem human nature through such union, human individuals must 
all along have possessed the same immortality as the Redeemer 
was conscious of.[101]
Hence Christ’s being the Redeemer partly ewes to the peculiarity
of human nature and its possibility of receiving the divine. 
Human nature is thus understood as having the capability of
receiving divinity. So Schleiermacher says that ”in so far as
Christ none the less was also a perfectly human person, the
formation of this person also must have been an act of the human
nature”[102], even though there was also ’’the creative divine 
activity”. [103]
In this sense, Schleiermacher can say that Christ ”is like
all men in virtue of the identity of human nature, but
distinguished from them all by the constant potency of His 
God-consciousness, which was a veritable existence of God in 
Him.”[104] So, for Schleiermacher, to ascribe to Christ an
absolutely powerful God-consciousness, and to attribute to Him ”an
existence of God in Him” are exactly the same thing. It is true
that he admits that as far as we remain passive in our
God-consciousness, there is no existence of God in any individual, 
but only an existence of God in the world.[105] Only when 
God-consciousness is in one’s self-consciousness ”as continually
and exclusively determining every moment” and consequently also
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this perfect indwelling of the Supreme Being is one’s peculiar
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being and one’s inmost self, is one’s God-consciousness "an
existence of God in one”. And Schleiermacher thinks that this
applies only to the case of Christ. So he says:
[The] existence of God in the Redeemer is posited as the 
innermost fundamental power within Him, from which every 
activity proceeds and which holds every element together; 
everything human (in Him) forms only the organism for this 
fundamental power, and is related to it as the system which 
both receives and represents it, just as in us all other 
powers are related to the intelligence.[106]
But according to Schleiermacher, one should not think that 
the divine in Christ is "something special existing from eternity,
its descent to earth takes on the appearance of a 
humiliation."[107] That is, as Avis suggests, the deity of Christ 
cannot be stated in ontological terms, for that would have no 
meaning for Christian consciousness of God.[108] For as we have 
seen, the existence of God in Christ is only another expression of 
his absolutely powerful God-consciousness. We may thus agree with
Barth when he says:
He [Schleiermacher] renounced the idea of a purely speculative 
christology, but precisely in so doing, according to the 
premises of his conception of religion, he was bound to 
renounce the idea of the Deity of Christ or, to put it 
differently, to understand the Deity of Christ as the 
incomparable climax and decisive stimulator within the 
composite life of humanity.[109]
So in relation to Christ, the being of God in his life "cannot be
explained by its origin from a virgin without sexual 
intercourse."[110] "Therefore,” says Schleiermacher again, "all 
ingenious explanations as to why this activity [virgin birth] is 
attributed specially to the Holy Spirit are out of place."[111] 
Schleiermacher understands Christmas, as Barth describes, in the
following way:
It is the true existence of man himself as this is most purely 
and beautifully depicted in the relation of mother and child; 
it is the feeling for life which is kindled by seeing this 
relation, which is elevated by the feast, and which lovingly 
seeks and finds fellowship.[112]
For him, not only the miracle of the incarnation, but also miracle 
in general "cannot but be altogether superfluous. "[112] Therefore, 
according to him, the virgin birth, the resurrection and 
ascension, and the prediction of his return in Judgment cannot be 
proper parts of Christianity.[114] Hence Schleiermacher tried to 
"offer, or better, point out a few alternatives" through his 
dogmatics.[115]
Although he denies all "supernatural" elements (in the 
traditional sense of the word) in relation to "the existence of
God in Christ", there is a very fundamental question as to why
Schleiermacher thinks that only in Christ is there special
existence of God. For, if one thinks with the perspective and
presupposition of Schleiermacher’s thought, then it seems that
there would be no basis on which one could assert that only in the
case of Christ is His God-consciousness the same as "an existence
of God in Him". In spite of this, Schleiermacher asserts that
only in Christ was there the existence of God and in this sense
Christ is different from us all. In our case "Christ in us is the
centre of our life"[1l6], and "we see God in Christ, and envisage 
Christ as the most immediate partaker in the eternal love which
sent Him forth and fitted for His task."[117] So there are some 
people who see this aspect of Schleiermacher’s thought (i.e., his 
Christological emphasis) as being inconsistent with other aspects 
of his thought. For example, Barth says that "it
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[Schleiermacher’s Christology] is the point where the system 
involuntarily breaks up.”[118] Erail Brunner, in his book on 
Schleiermacher, also says that Schleiermacher*s Christological 
thinking is an interlude in his dogmatics; it does not fit the 
whole system.[119] B.A. Gerrish summarizes Brunner’s argument in 
the following way:
In Truth, so it is claimed, his dogmatics really falls apart 
[into] two systems; and Brunner knows which belongs to the 
real Schleiermacher (the mystical) and which is only an 
intrusion (the Christian). The word about Christ, which 
certainly requires a conceptual awareness of him, is a mere 
disturbance.[120]
Even though there are some problems with their interpretations of
Schleiermacher, I basically agree with them in their suspicion of
Schleiermacher’s inconsistence in relation to his Christological
emphasis.
But even in Schleiermacher, the difference between us and
Christ is only a difference of degree, not of kind.[121] 
Schleiermacher says that ’’the distinction between the Redeemer and
us others is established in such a way that, instead of being
obscured and powerless as in us, the God-consciousness in Him was
absolutely clear and determined each moment, to the exclusion of 
all else....”[ 122] So although Schleiermacher uses the expression, 
”in the Redeemer God became man”, and the Johannine phrase ’’the 
Word became flesh”, he uses these expressions in his own way. For
example, with regard to the Johannine phrase, he says that ”’Word’
is the activity of God expressed in the form of consciousness, and 
’flesh’ is a general expression for the organic. ”[123] In this 
sense, as Niels Thulstrup says, according to Schleiermacher, ”[in]
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Christ the God-consciousness conquered completely, but this 
indicates a change in quantity, not in quality."[124] To say that 
"in the Redeemer God became man", for Schleiermacher, is to say
that we have in Christ a human nature saturated with the perfect
consciousness of God. Therefore, for Schleiermacher, there is no
essential difference between Christ and other human beings. In
this sense, Schleiermacher, in the Christmas Eve, can make Ernst 
say: "[Every] mother is another Mary. Every mother has an 
eternal divine child and devoutly seeks the stirrings of the 
higher spirit within."[125] Similarly, according to 
Schleiermacher, not only Christ’s suffering, but "all suffering,
even on the part of one who is only relatively innocent, always
has a vicarious character."[126]
Hence, in the thought of Schleiermacher, there is no
Incarnation in the traditional sense of the word.[127] Barth makes
a similar point when he says: "Schleiermacher’s Christology has
as its summit the indication of a quantitative superiority,
dignity and significance in Christ as opposed to our own 
Christianity."[128] It is not only critical scholars like Barth 
who hold this view, but also sympathetic admirers (of 
Schleiermacher) like Heinrich Scholz. Scholz says: "The basis of 
his picture of Christ is... the evolutionary view of history given 
an idealistic sign, and therefore the best scholarship of his 
age. "[129] For Schleiermacher, "[the] beginning of His [Christ’s] 
life was...a new implanting of the God-consciousness which creates 
receptivity in human nature"[130], or more precisely, "the
perfecting of human nature."[131] However, for Schleiermacher,
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this receptivity and God-consciousness was already present in 
humanity itself. For, without this receptivity there cannot be
any exertion even of Christ’s influence and one cannot experience
any change through Christ. "For there can be no change,” says
Schieiermacher, "in a living being without his own activity;
hence, without such activity - that is, in a purely passive way - 
no influence exerted by another can really be received.”[132] Thus 
there are two factors in relation to the work of Christ which may
be termed a new implanting of the God-consciousness: the
influence of Christ’s consciousness of God and man’s innate
receptivity.[133] Only when there is the working of these two 
factors, is there any positive result.[134] Schleiermacher thus 
always presupposes that there is man’s receptivity which plays its 
own role in the process of having relationship with God. So he 
says that "the indwelling being of God in Him [Christ] must be 
related to the whole human nature in the same way as that which 
previously was innermost was related to the whole human
organism”.[135] Only on the basis of this understanding can he
speak of ”the beginning of the life of Jesus as the completed
creation of human nature”, or ”its second creation” or ”the
regeneration of the human race.”[136] Hence, as Thulstrup says,
according to Schleiermacher, "[Christ’s] appearance in history
signifies nothing supernatural, no break with the continuity of
nature.”[137] Indeed, Schleiermacher writes:
The appearance of the first man constituted at the same time 
the physical life of the human race; the appearance of the 
Second Adam constituted for this nature a new spiritual life, 
which communicates and develops itself by spiritual 
fecundation. And as in the former its originality (which is 
the condition of the appearance of human nature) and its 
having emerged from creative divine activity are the same
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thing, so also in the Redeemer both are the same - His 
spiritual originality, set free from every prejudicial 
influence of natural descent, and that existence of God in Him 
which also proves itself creative.[138]
Hence, for Schleiermacher, it is not that there is an independent 
God who is outside of this process, and that this God constitutes
firstly the physical nature of man, and secondly, the spiritual
nature of man. God is understood by Schleiermacher to be in this
process itself, and therefore the originality of these
constitutions is understood as their having emerged from creative
divine activity. So he says:
[Christ] has part in our blessedness or salvation only through 
His influence upon this progressive improvement, which means 
that a specific difference between Him and other men is of 
little importance.[139]
Therefore, what happens in Christ conditioned humanity in
general.[140] So we may agree with Barth when he says:
They [Christ and other people] are mediated by means of their 
belonging together in the comprehensive composite phenomenon 
of the higher life. At some point or other they must 
coincide. And it is only with the prospect of this final 
coincidence and from this point of no distinction that they 
are distinguished at all.[l4l]
Therefore, it is natural for Barth to conclude: "To be sure, one
cannot seriously speak of an absoluteness of Christ in 
Schleiermacher, but one can certainly speak of a supreme
relativity which was most incisively maintained and which was
tirelessly established [throughout his life] with both brilliance 
and warmth".[142]
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Schleiermacher's understanding of the Church and the Holy
Spirit is presented in a similar way. That is, the Church is the
realm in which the power of Christ's God-consciousness is
communicated immanently in history. The Holy Spirit is even said 
to mean "the [living] unity of the Christian [community] as a 
moral personality" or the "common spirit" of the Church, which is 
at the same time "the being of God in it."[l43] And, according to 
Schleiermacher, there is no such thing as eternal damnation of
some people, and "there will one day be a universal restoration of
all souls."[144]
Based on the discussion developed so far, we may say that 
Schleiermacher has nothing to do with transcendence in the 
traditional sense of the word.[145] To conclude, Schleiermacher’s
God is immanent and his Christ's role is quite compatible with the
progressive improvement of human nature.
So far we have seen the general characteristic of
religiousness A. We started with the possibility of a
non-Christian interpretation of The Sickness unto Death. We then
related this non-Christian theistic religiousness to the
"Socratic" of Climacus. Then, we have considered Schleiermacher*s
theology and Christology in order to see a clear example of this
kind of religiousness. What we have seen is that for
religiousness A God is immanent in the world. Of course, there
are some people in religiousness A who speak of a kind of
transcendence. However, that transcendence either has no real
relation to this realm of time and space or that transcendence is
only immanent transcendence. In the case of the absolutely
transcendent God being unable to enter into this realm of time and
space, God has nothing to do with this realm of time and space.
So in the realm of time and space, man himself is sovereign. Yet
this sovereign man may have something of the feeling of total
dependence, but this feeling does not affect the realm of reason
in which he is still sovereign. He is dependent on God in the
realm beyond that of reason. His God does not touch the realm of
reason at all. In this sense, this man's transcendence becomes
the immanent transcendence.
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So there is, in religiousness A, no room for the God who is
both transcendent and can enter into the realm of time and space.
God becomes either the God of absolute transcendence, who cannot
enter into the realm of time and space and the realm of reason, or
the God of immanence, of panentheism. The God to whom the person
in religiousness A relates is such a God. So for this person, the
God-Man has nothing to do with his becoming himself. Without the 
God-Man, he can well relate himself to his God, and therefore
become himself. This is very clear in the case of Schleiermacher.
As Barth says: "Schleiermacher turns the Christian relationship 
of man with God into an apparent human possibility."[146] In 
contrast to religiousness A, Kierkegaard's Christian thinks as
follows:
[A] Mediator is necessary for [him], among other reasons, 
simply to make [him] aware that it is God with whom, as we 
say, [he has] the honor of speaking; otherwise a man can 
easily live on in the indolent conceit that he is talking with 
God, whereas he is only talking with himself. (JP, II, 
l424(Pap. X 4 A 252))
Hence, says Kierkegaard again, "one's wanting to be related to God
without a mediator” shows one’s untruth.(JP, IV, 4517(Pap. X 4 A
577))
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From this (consideration) we can draw out the conclusion that
the difference between the Christian’s understanding of becoming a
self and that of the person in religiousness A conclusively lies
in the difference between their Gods, or their conception of God.
If one is known by the Christian God, and believes by this God’s
revelation that the Christian God is transcendent but yet He can
enter into the realm of time and space and the realm of reason,
one inevitably thinks that one can be oneself only in relation to
this God who reveals Himself through the God-Man. But, on the
other hand, if one thinks that God is so absolutely transcendent
that He cannot enter into the realm of time and space and of
reason, one naturally thinks that one can be oneself only in
relation to God, a relation which is neither in the realm of time
and space. In a similar way, if one thinks that God is only
immanent, one naturally thinks that one can be oneself only in
relation to this immanent God, a relation which must be expressed
in an immanent way, e.g., one’s relation to another person and 
other creatures.[147] Hence, in the theology of Schleiermacher, 
the religious community is strongly emphasized. We can thus see a
clear correlation between one’s conception of God and one’s
understanding of becoming a self.
Let us here ask one more question: what makes the difference
between the Christian’s conception of God and the conception of
God of the person in religiousness A? Fundamentally, the reason
why the Christian thinks of God in the way described above lies in
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the revelation of God through the God-Man. Face to face with the 
phenomenon of the God-Man, the Christian accepts this phenomenon
as that of revelation, and in accepting this he abandons the
presuppositions of the natural man, which he had in common with
the ethical person and the person in religiousness A. However,
the person in religiousness A does not want to abandon such
presuppositions, so he develops his own conception of God which is
compatible with his presuppositions as a natural man. So the
fundamental difference between the Christian and the person in
religiousness A lies in the question of whether or not one has 
abandoned the presuppositions of the natural man. (We shall
consider the point more carefully in the next chapter of this 
study.) Here is the very reason why religiousness A is quite 
compatible with the ethical sphere, whereas Christianity is quite
incompatible with the ethical sphere.
The discussion which we have developed in this section, 
therefore, can be a partial contribution to the thesis of this
chapter, that of the difference and discontinuity between the
ethical understanding of becoming a self and the Christian
understanding. For, based on the discussion of this section, we
may say that if there is any religious understanding of becoming a
self, which is somewhat different from the ethical understanding
of becoming a self but has a kind of continuity with it, then that 
is the understanding of religiousness A.[148]
*««*
Hence we can conclude this chapter by stating that the Christian's
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understanding of becoming a self has presuppositions and elements 
which are fundamentally different from those of the ethical 
person, and that it is very difficult to say that there is any 
continuity between the ethical understanding and the Christian
understanding of becoming a self.
In the last chapter, we have seen that there is a great
difference and discontinuity between the ethical view of ethics
and the Christian view of ethics. And in this chapter we have
seen the discontinuity between the ethical person’s understanding
of becoming oneself and the Christian’s understanding. On the
basis of these examinations we have said that to be a Christian
means overcoming ethical ethics and the ethical understanding of
becoming oneself and adopting new ethics and a new understanding
of the problem of becoming oneself which are based on Christian
faith. Becoming a Christian involves changes in one’s ethics and
one’s understanding of oneself. In a sense, it is agreed
generally among Kierkegaard scholars that there is a change in 
one’s mode of existence when one becomes a Christian.[149] When 
people say this, they generally mean that one who becomes a
Christian has a different way of life from that of the aesthete or
that of the ethical person, or even that of the person in
religiousness A. But does this also involve a change in one’s
epistemological standpoint? Does Kierkegaard indicate that what
the Christian thinks to be true is different from what the natural
man believes to be true? Or is there no change at all in one’s
epistemology when one becomes a Christian? Or is the change in
one’s epistemological standpoint confined to so-called ’’religious
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matters”? These are the questions which we want to consider in
the next chapter
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CHAPTER THREE
PERSPECTIVE OH TRUTH
In this chapter I shall consider the question whether the
Christian has the same perspective on truth as the person in the 
ethical sphere and the person in religiousness A. This chapter 
concerns the cognitive aspect of one’s Weltanschauung. What I
want to show is that the basic presuppositions and the general 
orientation of one’s epistemology change when one changes one’s 
way of viewing the world (Weltanschauung) from that of the ethical 
sphere to that of the Christian sphere.
The basic task in this chapter is to compare the natural 
man’s epistemological standpoint with that of the Christian. The
fundamental question is whether what the Christian thinks to be
true is different from what the natural man thinks to be true. I
shall show that whereas the natural man thinks from his autonomous
rationalistic standpoint, the Christian thinks from his Christian
standpoint. What is most important for the natural man’s
standpoint is autonomous human reason: what is most important for
the Christian standpoint is what the Christian God has done. That
is, the Christian thinks with the presuppositions of Christian 
faith. Hence, as we shall see, the clearest difference between 
them appears when considering what Kierkegaard thinks Christianity 
to be characterized by: the Christ event (described as the
absolute paradox), and Christian faith (the paradoxical 
relationship to this Christ event). But this does not mean that
the Christian and the natural man think differently only
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concerning Christ and faith. Their different views concerning 
Christ and faith can be seen either as determining their
standpoints on the other subjects as well, or only as reflecting 
the basic difference between their epistemological standpoints in
m their basicgeneral. They fundamentally differ 
presuppositions, and in the general orientation of their 
epistemological standpoints.
Therefore, in this chapter, I shall firstly describe the
natural man’s epistemological standpoint, especially in relation
to Christianity by examining some parts of Philosophical
Fragments, of the Postscript and of other pseudonymous writings.
I shall then, in section 2, examine Kierkegaard’s writings 
published under his own name and under the Christian pseudonym
"Anti-Climacus", in order to show how the Christian depicted in
these writings thinks of the Christ event and Christian faith. 
Through this examination, we can see how the Christian thinks
differently from the natural man. That is, when we look at
Kierkegaard’s writings published under his own name and under the
Christian pseudonym "Anti-Climacus", we can see very clear
indications that what the Christian thinks to be true is different
from what the natural man believes to be true. This change in
one’s epistemological standpoint is very obvious in relation to 
so-called "religious matters", but is not confined to these
matters.
Page 288
I shall then, in section 3, examine Kierkegaard’s Journals 
with respect to this problem of epistemological standpoint. In
this section, I shall show that even Kierkegaard himself did not 
always think in the way in which he said the Christian should 
think. However, at the very least, Kierkegaard admitted that
anyone who does not always think as a Christian is not a Christian
in the real sense of the word. By this admission he showed that
the Christian is one who should always think from the Christian
point of view.
I shall then, in section 4, come back to one of Kierkegaard’s 
early pseudonymous writings fPhilosophical Fragments) to show that 
it is possible to interpret these early pseudonymous writings
consistently with his other writings, even though in his early 
pseudonymous writings the change in one’s epistemological 
standpoint is expressed less clearly. That is to say, it is
possible to look at these pseudonymous writings as having some
indications that what the Christian thinks to be true is different
from what the natural man believes to be true.
Based on this examination, I shall conclude this chapter by 
saying that there is also a great difference and clear-cut
distinction between the natural man’s epistemological standpoint
and the Christian’s.
I
The purpose of this section is to draw out the natural man’s
epistemological standpoint from Kierkegaard’s various pseudonymous 
writings before 1846. The term "the natural man” is very broad.
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What we are actually interested in here is the epistemological 
standpoint either of the person in the ethical sphere or of the 
person in religiousness A. Hence what I want to do in this 
section is to draw out the ethical person’s and the non-Christian 
religious person’s epistemological standpoint from Kierkegaard’s 
early pseudonymous writings. We have already seen in the last two 
chapters that religiousness A is quite compatible with the ethical
sphere. Therefore, it is not necessary to differentiate in detail
between the epistemological standpoint of the ethical person and 
that of the person in religiousness A. What can be done here is 
to describe the general tendency of the way in which the natural
man thinks. So what we are trying to do in this section is
firstly to draw out the basic presuppositions and the general
orientation of the natural man; and secondly, to describe his
response to Christ and Christian faith.
Fortunately, we have a very clear model of the natural man’s
epistemological standpoint. In Philosophical Fragments, the
Socratic standpoint is described, which is not only the standpoint
of Socrates, but is the archetype of the natural man’s
epistemological standpoint. As Arbaugh and Arbaugh say,
"Socrates...appears here [in WJpsg.pbi.Qal fcagfflgjxta]...as a 
representative of the best of human insight and teaching."[1] In 
Socrates Climaous finds the supreme example of the natural man’s
epistemological standpoint. Niels Thulstrup also speaks of
"Socrates as representative of the purely human at its 
highest.’’[2] Through Socrates, Climacus tries to show what would
be the case if there were no God and revelation in the Christian
sense of these words. [3] This is the background for the term ’’the 
Socratic standpoint”. Hence it is not necessary to give
references to all thinkers we have in mind, because in this book 
Socrates is the prototype of the natural man’s thinking.[4] In 
what follows I shall describe the general orientation and
presuppositions of this Socratic standpoint as the archetype of
the natural man’s epistemological standpoint.
When I say this, I do not disregard the fact that there are
some differences between the profile of Socrates in Philosophical
Fragments and that of the Postscript. Climacus says in the
Postscript that in Philosophical Fragments when he was speaking of 
Socrates he was actually presenting the outlook of Plato on the
scope of the maieutic system.(CUP, p. 184) Hence one may say that 
what is presented in .Eh.llPJSP.pM.C.al as the Socratic
theory is in reality the Platonic theory of recollection. But we
may say that, as far as the basic idea is concerned, the Socratic
standpoint even in Philosophical Fragments is the ideal form of
the natural man’s epistemological standpoint. Climacus says:
In order if possible clearly to exhibit the difference between 
the Socratic position (which was supposed to be the 
jMlaapj&hipalx. the .rp.p1-U.qji) and the
experimentally evoked thought-determination..., I carried the 
Socratic back to the principle that all knowledge is 
recollection.(CUP, p. I84n., emphasis given)
That ”all knowledge is recollection” is a Socratic proposition. 
Socrates and Plato share this principle; ”This is, in a way, 
commonly assumed.” But ”[this] proposition is not for Socrates a 
cue to the speculative enterprise...Socrates concentrates
essentially upon accentuating existence, while Plato forgets this
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and loses himself in speculation.”(CUP, p. 184) Here Plato is 
regarded as a precursor of Hegel, the speculative thinker.
Climacus says again:
The proposition [i.e., all knowledge is recollection] does 
indeed belong to both, only that Socrates is always departing 
from it, in order to exist...To accentuate existence, which 
also involves the qualification of inwardness, is the Socratic 
position; the Platonic tendency, on the other hand, is to 
pursue the lure of recollection and immanence.(CUP, pp. 
I84f., note)
Hence the figure of Socrates criticizes the less existential 
standpoint of the natural man (the clearest example of which is 
the Hegelian). In doing so, Socrates at the same time presents 
the ideal form of the natural man’s epistemological standpoint. 
"I had recourse to paganism [in Philosophical Fragments].” says 
Climacus, "and to Greece as the representative of the 
intellectual, and to Socrates as its greatest hero.”(CUP, p. 329) 
In this sense, the Socratic standpoint appears as the archetype of
the natural man’s.
What then are the general orientation and presuppositions of 
the Socratic standpoint? In the Socratic standpoint, there is
basic continuity between the rational aspect of humanity and what
may be called the ultimate truth. In mythical terms, this was 
described by the Greeks as the human soul existing in the realm of
Eternity before coming into existence in the temporal realm. Thus
the human soul can recollect every idea. This is the famous
doctrine of recollection. That is, the eternal Forms are always
immanent in man. However, when Socrates and Climacus use these
Greek mythical terms, they do not mean that we have to believe
that the human soul actually has existed in the realm of Eternity
before coming into existence in the temporal realm. They only 
mean that we should think that human beings have the possibility
and capability of thinking about what is eternally true. They
make explicit concepts implicit in the Greek mythical terms such
as the pre-existence of the human soul and the doctrine of
recollection. The meaning behind these mythical terms is that
human beings can find the eternal truth by themselves. They can 
find the truth merely by using their innate ability, for the truth
was already within them. As Crites says: "all intelligible truth 
is latent in [human] consciousness."[5] In this sense, Climacus 
says that "the truth is not introduced into him [from without] but 
was in him."(PF, p. 9=PFS, p. 11) And he says again: "[At]
bottom every human being is in possession of the truth. This was 
Socrates’ explanation"(PFS, p. 16=PF, p, 13); "[therefore], the 
learner himself is the truth"(PF, p. 52=PFS, p. 64), for he had 
the truth from the beginning without knowing it.(of. PF, pp. 
12f.=PFS, p. 15) Therefore, as Thulstrup puts it, "the problem is 
at most one of making it actual."[6]
Hence, from this Socratic standpoint, even though one comes
to know particular knowledge at a particular time, that knowledge
has already been in one, and it has just been awakened. 
Therefore, "[viewed] Sooratically, any point of departure in time 
is eo ipso something accidental, a vanishing point, an 
occasion."(PF, p. 11=PFS, p. 13) There is no such thing as the 
decisive moment in which everything is decided.(PF, pp. 51f.=PFS, 
p. 64) The moment of being taught or the moment of discovery is 
accidental, and opportunities are always available. So in this
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standpoint, ’’the moment of occasion is merely a jest, like an 
end-sheet half-title that does not essentially belong to a 
book."(PF, p. 52=PFS, p. 64) The moment of discovery is only an 
occasion for making explicit what was already implicit.
Likewise, if there is a teacher in this situation, he is also 
merely an occasion for others to awaken to this particular 
knowledge. He helps others become conscious of themselves and 
bring to birth what they already bore within themselves. The 
teacher cannot assert that he has taught or teaches something
which has not been in his students’ mind before. Hence "in death
the teacher leaves [behind him] no claim upon the pupil’s soul, no 
more than the pupil can claim that the teacher owes him 
something."(PF, p. 24=PFS, p. 29) In this way, the teacher and 
the disciple are on the same plain, and they stand in a reciprocal 
relationship to one another.(cf. PF, p. 14=PFS, p. 17) The 
teacher is only a midwife for begetting self-knowledge and
therefore, conclusively, achieving noble humanity. As is obvious, 
the supreme example of this kind of teacher is Socrates who "was
and continued to be a midwife,... because he perceived that this
relation is the highest relation a human being can have to
another."(PF, p. 10=PFS, p. 12) Climacus says again:
[The] essence of the Socratic is that the learner, because he 
himself is the truth and has the condition, can thrust the 
teacher away. Indeed, assisting the people to be able to do 
this constituted the Socratic art and heroism.(PF, p. 62=PFS, 
p. 77)[7]
Indeed, this relation "is the highest relation a human being can 
have to another."(PF, p. 10=PFS, p. 12, of. PF, p. 24=PFS, p. 
29) Thus, in the Socratic standpoint, the persons involved in the
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teaching-learning process help each other to discover themselves
in order to find in themselves the truth. The teacher becomes
unimportant, as a matter of principle, because all people can and
must find the truth within themselves. It is not only the teacher 
who is the occasion for the learner, but ’’the pupil is [also] the 
occasion for the teacher to understand himself."(PF, p. 24=PFS, 
p. 29) As Croxall says, "[they work] both autopathetically, i.e., 
each affecting himself, and sympathetically, i.e., affecting each 
other.”[8] Hence, Climacus says, ’’the truth in which I rest was in 
me and emerged from me. Not even Socrates would have been capable 
of giving it to me.”(PF, p. 12=PFS, 15) And even though God 
becomes a teacher, He is also an occasion for one’s 
self-knowledge.(PF, p. 14=PFS, p. 17) This is because human 
beings themselves have the possibility and capability of knowing 
the truth.[9] In other words, they have the truth within
themselves.
Therefore, ”[in] the Socratic view, every human being is 
himself the midpoint, and the whole world focuses only on him 
because his self-knowledge is God-knowledge.”[10] But this does 
not mean that in this standpoint the teachings of the Sophists, 
which make everything relative, are regarded as the true 
expression of truth.[11] There can be a nobler understanding of 
human being than making man the measure of everything. Here is 
the greatness of Socrates, and the reason why Climacus uses
Socrates as the archetype of the natural man. Unlike the 
Sophists, Socrates does not pretend to know everything (here there
is an indirect criticism of Hegel’s system-building)
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Socrates avowedly asserts that he himself does not know, and
always asks after the truth. In this continually asking after the
truth, lies his greatness. This means that the Socratic position
is not that from which one asserts that one knows everything, in
the way God knows. Prom the Socratic standpoint an individual man
cannot assert this omniscience. However, from this standpoint,
insofar as man can ask after the truth, man has the truth in 
himself[12], "for the ultimate idea in all questioning is that the 
person asked must himself possess the truth and acquire it by 
himself."(PF, p. 13=PFS, p. 15) This is "the underlying 
principle of all questioning". And insofar as an individual man
is aware of this, he is aware of the true situation in which he 
is, and therefore he has self-knowledge. He is not in a state of 
error. He is in a state of knowledge and truth. Hence the
learner is himself the truth and in possession of the condition 
for understanding the truth.(cf. PF, pp. 62f.=PFS, p. 77)
The description which I have given in the last few paragraphs
is a depiction of the general orientation and presuppositions of
the natural man’s standpoint in its ideal form. I emphasize the
word ideal. for in reality, we usually see something like the 
standpoint of the Sophists and that of Hegel. In these cases, we
hear the assertion that man knows virtually everything, like God. 
At the very least, Climaous understands Hegel in this way.(CUP, p. 
108) According to the Hegelian standpoint, it is possible for a 
man who is in the temporal realm to think sub specie aeternitatis.
This is the basis on which one can build a system of thought which 
includes everything in the world, including human existence
itself.[13] Hence even though Hegel mentions the subjective, this 
is only one element which must be subsumed under the objective and
the absolute. Everything is absorbed in his great objective 
system. For this speculative philosopher, objectivity is truth;
that is, only what can be thought of by one’s reason is truth.
Therefore, he is criticized to the extent that "he has absolutely 
nothing in common with Socrates. ” (CUP, p. 66n.)
In fact, this criticism on Hegel is not concerned with Hegel
alone. The Socratic standpoint is contrasted with traditional
abstract thinking and modern epistemological thought since 
Descartes. (Cf. JP, I, 774(Pap. IV A 72)) By ’’traditional 
abstract thinking” I mean the thought of the philosophers who give 
us analyses of human nature in general, the universal essence of 
man, abstracted from the act of existing. From the perspective of 
the existential Socratic standpoint, such a discussion of human 
essence, which divides it into its component characteristics and, 
in so doing, separates each faculty from the rest, is something 
like chopping a thing into its formal parts and examining them one 
by one. Such a procedure is not faithful to the existing human 
being who, as a living whole, cannot be divided into several 
compartments. The abstract thinking is not right, and therefore 
cannot represent the ideal epistemological standpoint of the
natural man.
The Socratic standpoint is also contrasted with the modern
epistemological isolation of the human mind from the concrete
existential situation. For example, Descartes’ ”oogito ergo sum”
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is judged as wrong from the Socratic standpoint in that it tries
to divide the thinking subject and the existing subject, which 
properly cannot be divided. Descartes is wrong when he thinks 
that cogito does not involve sum already in itself.[14] Descartes’ 
basic mistake is to presuppose thinking as something separate from 
the act of existing, even though he comes to that conclusion. So 
Descartes, as the initiator of modern epistemology, opens the door 
for the isolation of thinking from the act of concrete existing. 
Hegel just pushes this line of thinking to its logical 
conclusion.(of. JP 1, 37(Pap. Ill A3)) In the philosophy of 
Hegel, thinking itself is the whole and nothing is left; 
everything is absorbed into pure thought. Contrasted with these
various somewhat distorted views, Climacus provides us with the 
ideal form of the natural man’s epistemological standpoint, the
Socratic standpoint.
Now let us present some religious corollaries of this
Socratic standpoint. This will be a good preparation for seeing
the natural man’s view of Christ and Christian faith.
Firstly, God, if there is any God[15], does not intervene in 
the chain of causes. Accordingly, miracles lose their status as
historical events. To take an anachronistic (to a study about
Kierkegaard) example, we may quote from Adolf von Harnack:
[We] are firmly convinced that what happens in space and time 
is subject to the general laws of motion, and that in this 
sense, as an interruption of the order of Nature, there can be 
no such things as ’’miracles”... .Miracles, it is true, do not 
happen;...That the earth in its course stood still; that a 
she-ass spoke; that a storm was quieted by a word, we do not 
believe, and we shall never again believe....[16]
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The world is a self-contained system of cause and effect, and
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history is assumed to be a closed continuum[ 17], even though some 
natural men are more receptive to the idea of the possibility of
something strange appearing in this process and of
non-predictability.(Cf. JP, III, 3809(Pap. I A 217))
Therefore, secondly, there is no such thing as divine 
revelation (as understood in traditional Christianity) in time and 
space. There is no actual encounter with God in time and 
space.[18] The idea that God does particular things in history, in 
mighty works of redemption and judgment, is excluded. Moreover,
there is no need of a Divine Teacher. If there were any
revelation, it might take one of the following two forms.
The first form may be summarized in the following way: 
revelation would be the process of human understanding, and the
advancement of human knowledge and possibility could be seen as 
the education of humanity. One of the good examples of this way 
of viewing the relationship between human history and revelation
would be that of G. E. Lessing (1729-1782).[19] He regards 
history as a continuous revelation of God, and at the same time, 
as the record of man’s moral and intellectual growth.[20] Lessing
thus compares the divine education of the human race in the
process of history to the growth of an individual man. The Old
Testament time is the time of the child who has a direct
relationship to God. The New Testament time is that of the youth
who is still under the idea of future reward. But humanity should 
overcome this idea and become an adult who no longer needs any
future reward, who can do his duty without hope of future reward.
This is the highest stage of human development which began to
appear during the time of the Enlightenment. In this highest 
stage, humanity will dwell together, having come to see beyond 
their errors and oppositions. For Lessing, there is no absolute 
religion. As Randall says: "The only true and ‘absolute’
religion is the whole religious development of mankind, which has
absorbed the lessons of the past and passed beyond them without 
rejecting them."[21] Lessing’s thought on this is well expressed 
in the famous fable of the three rings in Nathan the Wise. In
another place, he puts the same idea in the following way:
All revealed religion is nothing but a reconfirmation of the 
religion of reason. Either it has no mysteries, or, if it 
does, it is indifferent whether the Christian combines them 
with one idea or another, or with none at all.[22]
Hence, for Lessing, every higher religion is an expression of the 
truth. The process of history in which religions reach the high
stage is the process of the divine education of the human race. 
For him the idea of the gradual unfolding of the religious concept
in a progressive order of development is very important. For
Lessing, history as a whole is revelation. In this sense, Randall
is quite right when he closely relates Lessing’s thought to that 
of Hegel; "Lessing begins that long enterprise of reinterpreting
the rational meaning of the Christian symbols that was to reach 
its culmination but not its end in Hegel."[23]
Indeed, Hegel’s view of history is only one of the extremes 
of this way of thinking. As Thulstrup says, "[for] Hegel the 
relationship between revelation and history is contradiction-free
and is not a problem, inasmuch as revelation occurs as a necessary
historical event, and not only the particular event itself but the
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entire sequence of historical events is determined, as well as the 
conception of it."[24] According to this view, there is only one 
universal history. Therefore, whatever claims are made for
knowledge concerning the past must be confirmed by detailed 
historical observation. For historical process is a unity in the
sense of a closed continuum which "cannot be rent by the 
interference of supernatural, transcendent powers...."[25]
The second form of natural man’s understanding of revelation 
is somewhat different, even though those who adopt the second form 
(of understanding revelation) fully accept the presuppositions of 
the first. According to natural man’s second form of 
understanding revelation, revelation must be in the realm beyond 
the arena of history. According to these people, what is in 
history cannot be directly identified with divine revelation. God 
is only to be found in the realm beyond time and space. What is 
in history must be subjected to historical research, but 
revelation, which is beyond history, is not influenced by 
historical research. In a sense, this second form is very similar 
to Kierkegaard’s understanding of the relation between history and 
revelation. But for Kierkegaard, what is historical in
Christianity must have existed in time and space. That is the
reason why there is the absolute paradox. If Christ were the
God-Man only in the realm which was beyond time and space, there
would not be the "Absolute Paradox" of the God-Man. The God-Man
is regarded as the "Absolute Paradox", because Jesus, who was an 
individual human being in time and space, was simultaneously God
Page 300
in time and space. Kierkegaard asserts that even though the
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God-Man is in time and history, one should relate to the God-Man 
in faith. However, according to those who accept the view that
there is revelation but it is outside the realm of time and space, 
if the object of faith were something historical, then this object 
would be grasped by reason and faith would no longer be faith. 
For these people (who think that what is in the realm of time and 
space is not revelation), the object of faith completely 
transcends the realm of nature and of history.
Hence, for the natural man, (1) either there is no 
revelation, or (2) human development itself is revelation, or (3) 
revelation is something which is completely transcendent, so that
there is no revelation in time and space.
Thirdly, for the natural man, there is no need for redemption
in the traditional sense of the word. There is no need for a
fundamental and qualitative change in human nature; there is no 
need of new birth in the traditional sense of the phrase. What is
needed is only man’s clear awareness of himself, of his
possibility and of the need to overcome the influence of the lower
nature. Kierkegaard speaks of this as follows:
Naturally, it does not occur to any man and to any society of 
men that they are deeply corrupted. It is quite simply, an 
impossibility; for men cannot be deeply corrupted if they 
simultaneously all by themselves, without outside help, can 
see that they are deeply corrupted. But a higher conception 
(Christianity) takes upon itself to proclaim to man that he is
deeply corrupted and lays down the standard for him. But
Christianity is not proclaimed in this manner these days. One
assumes the natural man’s natural conceptions about life; his
hankering to enjoy life is regarded as the truth. Thus some 
of the promises are deleted from Christianity, and it is 
adulterated so that it fits in with this view of enjoying 
life.[26]
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That is, in the natural man’s consciousness, there is no sin
consciousness as found in the Christian’s consciousness. And in
Christendom, there is adulteration of the true characteristics of
Christianity, which comes from thinking from the perspective of 
the natural man. This is disaster to Christianity. Thus
Kierkegaard says again:
Yet what nonsense Christianity becomes when they take away the 
foreground or the background of Christianity. Christ says: 
”1 am come to save the lost” - see this is the background; on 
this Christianity can be placed.(JP, I, 544(Pap. XI 1 A 39))
However, in the natural man’s epistemological standpoint, there is 
no need to have this kind of consciousness that one is so totally
lost that one needs the divine redeemer.
Fourthly, accordingly, there is in this standpoint no eternal
punishment. Kierkegaard, in one of his journal entries, describes
how this view was prevalent in his time:
Once upon a time people tried to escape the thought of eternal 
punishment in thoughtlessness and defiance, - now even comedy 
lies in between; the whole educated world bears witness that 
it is nonsense, and one makes oneself ridiculous by 
entertaining such ideas.(Journals. No. 1076(Pap. X 2 A 
552)=JP, III, 3640))
However, Kierkegaard - pace Charles Lewis[27] - thinks that even 
in this matter the Christian standpoint is opposed to this point
of view. To take just one example, Kierkegaard says: ”The New
Testament clearly rests in the opinion that there is eternal 
perdition....”[28] In contrast to this, the Socratic religious 
thinking is universalistic; there is no such thing as eternal 
damnation. If there is a God, He must save all human beings. If 
He does not or cannot do so, then He cannot be God. God is thus
being thought of quite differently from the God of Christianity by
the natural man. For some, God is thought of as present within us
and part of our self-realization.
Lastly, for the existential subjective thinker outside of 
Christianity, everything is either eternal truth, or historical 
fact. They emphasize that .there Is nothing besides them. Thus 
there are two ways of knowing truth: in relation to eternal 
truth, one can know it by one’s reasoning; and in relation to 
historical fact, one can know it by believing its "coming into 
existence". Apart from this, there is no way to the truth.
The representatives of those who make this idea clear are 
Leibniz and Lessing.[29] According to them, (1) one can know the 
eternal truth through one’s reason[30] (the result of this is 
knowledge); and (2) one can approximate the truth of the 
historical fact by believing its "coming into existence". This is
because whereas one can develop a system of necessary truths about 
the logical relations of concepts, one cannot have such a
certainty in relation to historical facts. The result of this is 
sometimes called historical knowledge: knowledge of the present 
and knowledge of the past.(PF, pp. 80, 81=PFS, pp. 99, 100, CUP, 
p. 75, et passim) But the term "knowledge" here is used only in 
the sense of apprehension. In this sense, Climacus sometimes 
intimates that historical knowledge is "not a [form of] knowledge, 
but an act of freedom, an expression of will."(PF, p. 83=PFS, p. 
103) In this sense, historical knowledge is sometimes called by 
Climacus approximation knowledge.(CUP, p. 75) For Climacus, as 
for classical empiricists, "[immediate] sensation and immediate
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cognition cannot deceive."(PF, p. 81=PFS, p. 100) However, in 
order to have historical knowledge, one should believe that the
object of this immediate sensation "has come into existence".
Climacus takes the example of observing a star:
For example, when the perceiver sees a star, the star becomes 
dubious for him the moment he.seeks to become aware that it 
has come into existence. It is just as if reflection removed 
the star from the senses. It is clear, then, that the organ 
for the historical must be formed in likeness to this, must 
have within itself the corresponding something by which in its 
certitude it continually annuls the incertitude that 
corresponds to the uncertainty of coming into existence - a 
double uncertainty.(PF, p. 81=PFS, 100f.)
Hence, as far as the immediate sensation of something historical
is concerned, one can be sure that it is immediate and certain. 
But in relation to the question of whether one can know for 
certain that this historical fact has come into existence, we have 
to say that when one believes that it does, only then can he have
historical knowledge.
In relation to the historical, therefore, there are two 
faculties involved: sensation and giving assent (an act of will). 
One "does not believe that the star [is there], for that [one] 
sees, but [one should believe] that the star has come into 
existence."(PF, p. 81=PFS, p. 101) In this way, the "what" of a 
happening may be known immediately, but one should believe that it 
has happened, if one wants to have historical knowledge about this
fact, "even though it is taking place, as they say, right in front 
of one’s nose."(PF, p. 82=PFS, p. 101) Some people call this 
faculty relating to the historical, "historical reason". It is
somewhat different from pure reason. So in relation to the
historical, we may speak of Climacus* epistemology as volitional
epistemology. For Climaous, among the mental faculties related to 
the historical is the wil1. For example, according to him, the 
Greek sceptic did not "deny the [validity] of sensation and of 
immediate cognition...."(PF, p. 82=PFS, p. 102) But "the sceptic 
keeps himself continually in susDenso, and this state [frame of 
mind] was what he willed [to maintain]."(PF, p, 83=PFS, p. 102) 
According to Climacus, the sceptic is a sceptic because of his
willing not to give assent. As far as the contents of the
sensation are concerned, the sceptic also accepts them as they
are, but the sceptic suspends his judgment to the end. The Greek
sceptic "doubted not by virtue of knowledge but by virtue of will 
([refusal to give] assent - metroipathein)."(PF, p. 82=PFS, p. 
102)
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Thus there are two ways of knowing truth: in relation to
eternal truth, one can know it by one's reasoning; and in relation 
to historical fact, one can know it by believing its "coming into 
existence". However, to say that something historical (e.g., 
Jesus existed in time and history) is the eternal truth and to 
assert that this historical fact is the "absolute fact", are 
things which the natural man cannot accept. For the natural man, 
there is no such thing as the absolute fact which is a historical 
fact and which at the same time is applicable in every age.
In short, for the natural man, what may be believed is what
is plausible to the human mind. One can believe in what is 
possible according to one’s rational judgment, even though one 
cannot know for certain that it is absolutely true. In relation
to the things which are fit for human reason, one can have
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knowledge; in relation to the things which are not quite fit for
human reason but can be judged as plausible, one can think that 
these are possible. However, in relation to the things which are 
judged by human reason as being implausible and impossible, one
should not believe them, even though it is asserted that God has
done them. The natural man "remains outside the paradox and 
retains probability."(PF, p. 52=PFS, p. 65) Either rationality 
or high probability, according to the judgement of the natural 
man, is necessary to justify belief in a proposition. In short, 
in the mind of the natural man, there is, as Gardiner says, "an 
unquestioned belief in human reason as the sole source of ultimate 
or essential truth."[31] However, Kierkegaard as a Christian 
thinks that "[this] faith in probability...is...a prodigious 
superstition"(JP, VI, 4741(Pap. X 3 A 727)), and therefore 
"dangerous".(JP, VI, 4884(XI 1 A 146)) Hence we may say that the 
Christian standpoint is also against the natural man’s belief in 
probability.[32]
So far we have drawn from the Socratic standpoint some 
religious corollaries. These corollaries are the basic religious 
standpoint of the natural man. In short, reason in the broad 
sense of the word (meaning the wisdom born of practical 
experience) is the criterion of religious truth.
I turn now to a consideration of the natural man’s
understanding of Christ and of Christian faith. His standpoint is
the most in evidence when he is faced with Christian faith in the
God-Man. (In this examination, I shall apply the Socratic
standpoint mentioned above to the Christian assertion of the
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God-Man and faith, so in some places the examination may seem to 
go too far, but I shall try to fully draw out the Socratic 
standpoint to its the logical conclusion.)
How does the natural man think of Jesus? For the natural man
Jesus was merely a human being, a Jew of the first century. The
Leben Jesu Forschung. which started sometime just before 
Kierkegaard[33], provides us with good examples which show us how
the natural man thinks of Jesus. Miller summarizes well the
naturalistic motive behind this quest for the so-called historical
Jesus:
Biographies of Jesus were attempted, in which Paul’s writings 
were devalued in an effort to get at "the religion of Jesus” 
as against ”the religion about Jesus”. There were two motives 
behind such biographies and such historical and critical 
research. For the sceptical and the emancipated there was the 
intention of showing how scanty indeed were the verifiable 
historical evidences on which the entire Christian religion 
rested; ergo, the inference ran, one did not have to believe 
it. On the other hand, for those who wanted to believe the 
Christian religion but could not square the Gospel accounts 
with what their reason told them, the intention was to distil 
from these accounts a kind of minimal, de-theologized, 
believable picture of the real Jesus as he must have appeared 
to his contemporaries.[34]
Hence, for both kinds of biographers what is important is what
reason tells us. According to the former, one should not believe 
in Christianity on account of human reason; and according to the
latter, we should change Christianity into something which is
plausible to human reason. That is, the Scriptures are acceptable
only insofar as autonomous human reason admits that they are in 
agreement with those truths that it requires itself, or that draws 
from itself. Hence, as Shmueli says, ”what the philosopher [as a
natural man] knows is Jesus as a man.”[35] In one of his journal
entries, Kierkegaard says: "It is clear that modern philosophy
makes the historical Christ a kind of natural son, at most an
adopted son."(JP, 1, 291(Pap. II A 765))
What is certain for the natural man is that Jesus cannot be
thought of as the person who is described in the New Testament, 
even though there may be a thread linking the historica1 Jesus and
the one who is described as Jesus Christ in the New Testament,
What is described in the New Testament is nonsense.[36] The New
Testament documents may reflect some historical facts which are
related to this particular human being, Jesus. He may have lived
as a rabbi (when this term is used in the broad sense of the 
word), and he may have appeared to the eyes of the first century 
to do some miraculous things, though their historical basis may be 
very slight. If there were "miracles", only those for which a 
reasonable explanation could be given should be granted historical
status.[37]
Basically, Jesus seemed to attack the religious practice and
religious leaders of his time, and was crucified. And the natural 
man thinks that some time later the conviction appeared in the
mind of some of Jesus’s disciples that Jesus was alive again. 
These disciples thought of the cross on which Jesus had died as
the event of God’s redemption, from the perspective of 
resurrection faith. Thus Jesus became Christ; the one who had
proclaimed God’s rule became the one who was proclaimed as the
Messiah of God. But this was only a reflection of their mind. 
They thought that God acted through, or even in, this particular 
human being, Jesus. That is to say, in the concrete history,
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there was no "God-Man". For the natural man, as Karl Jaspers 
says, "JegRs ±§t AL& ghnistua^ ajs gotj^mengcju ©in Mthus. "[38] 
Hence, according to the natural man, "Die Mvthisierung des
gP-t tmejLspheji.^ 1st ALe .VerJU.ghtPDE Kahrhej.t,." [ 39 3 If he
actually lived in time and space, he may have been a good moral
teacher. However, the assertion that Jesus is the God-Man is
absurd. The God-Man in history is an absurdity. He cannot be the 
God-Man in this concrete time and space, as the Christian
believes. From the natural man’s point of view, the matter must
be judged as absurd.
But for some natural persons, Jesus may be the God-Man above
the realm of time and space. These people may believe that Jesus 
was the God-Man in the sense that he was such a person {"Christ”} 
in the realm beyond time and space. Nonetheless, for all natural
men, Jesus cannot be the God-Man in the time and space in which we
live. The reaction of the natural man is to assert that "the
paradox [of the God-Man] is foolishness", and that "the paradox is 
the absurd."(PF, p. 52=PFS, p. 65) Kierkegaard makes this point 
clear in one of his journal entries: "[If] faith is discarded and 
this whole sphere [of faith] ignored, reason will become 
presumptuous and will perhaps conclude: ergo, the paradox is
nonsense."[40] Thus, from the natural man’s view-point, it is not 
possible that God became an individual human being without ceasing 
to be God; the God-Man is a contradiction in terms. The natural 
man, as Alan P.F. Sell puts it, "[has] the presupposition that 
empirical humanity is normal humanity, and consequently, that 
there cannot really be a God-man." He continues to say: "This,
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presumably, will be the conclusion of supposedly autonomous 
’Enlightenment’ men of every age.”[41] Indeed, from the 
perspective of the natural man, the assertion that the Eternal 
[God] is the historical [Jesus] is an absurdity. This is the 
verdict of the natural man from his Socratic standpoint.
What then does the natural man think of the Christian act of
faith which believes in Jesus as the God-Man in time and space?
As naturally follows from his premises, the Christian act of faith 
is regarded by the natural man as madness in the genuine 
sense[42], and "foolishness.”[43] Kierkegaard says that in this 
world the genuine Christians, "the witnesses to the truth, etc." 
are treated as "fanatics".(JP, VI, 6466(Pap. X 1 A 617)) For, 
according to the natural man, it is absurd to believe that a human
being is at the same time God. He may be God, either if all human
beings are God, or if "each man is potentially ’God
incarnate’".[44] As Hastings Rashdall says:
If ’divine’ and 'human’ are mutually exclusive terms, then 
belief in the God-Man is absurd. But all men are 
reproductions of the divine mind, and in all true human 
thinking there is a production of divine thought...In the 
conditions of the highest human life, we have access as 
nowhere else, to the inmost nature of the divine. Thus it is 
impossible to maintain that God is fully incarnate in Christ, 
and not incarnate at all in any one else.[45]
But if there is a clear difference, in any sense, between God and 
human beings, Jesus (insofar as he was a human being) is not the 
God-Man. Christians who believe that Jesus is the God-Man may
behave morally and be good persons, but they are not honest to
their reason. They are making an epistemological mistake, and are 
intellectually irresponsible, and somehow noetically deficient, if
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they really think that it is true that Jesus is the God-Man in 
time and space. They are in error, not using their reason in the
way they should.
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If Jesus is presented in a way in which they can accept him
with their reason, some natural men may accept him. But insofar 
as Jesus is presented as the God-Man in time and space, the
Christian message about Christ is an absurdity, and Christian
faith is madness. Jesus’s immediate contemporaries asked: "Is
not this the carpenter’s son? Is not his mother called Mary, and
his brethren.. .and his sisters, are they not all with us? Whence 
hath this man all these things?"(TC, p. 105) As anti-Climacus 
says, they were offended that he, "this lowly man, should be the 
extraordinary one, should be God... [They were] offended that God 
should be the son of a carpenter, and this [was] His family."(TC, 
p. 105) This is the human verdict on Christ and Christian faith.
Hence, according to the natural man’s standpoint it would be
wrong for a person to accept Christianity unless it was rational
for him to do so. For the natural man, Christianity is
unreasonable, so it cannot be accepted. On the basis of such an
understanding of the natural man, Kierkegaard says:
To dispute with men about what Christianity is is a 
misunderstanding, because with rare exceptions their tactic is 
specifically directed to defending themselves against 
understanding or getting to know what Christianity is....(JP, 
I, 523(Pap. X 3 A 285))
Here we can see a clear sense of what is dominant in the natural
man’s standpoint - autonomous human reason. There may be broadly 
two kinds of natural men. One kind is the person who asserts that
one can accept only things that which are fit for reason. Hegel 
is the most obvious example of this standpoint. The other kind is
the person who asserts that there are some things which are not
quite fit for reason, but which he nonetheless can accept. This
second kind of natural man is more faithful to the Socratic
standpoint. He at the very least admits the limitation of human
reason. Therefore, he is different from the Sophists or the
Hegelians. Yet even to the second kind of natural man, what he
can accept must not be against autonomous reason. They may accept
something which is beyond reason, but it must not be against
self-sufficient reason.[46] The realm of autonomous reason must
not be broken. They think that what is religious and the totality
of everything rational cannot contradict each other even though
the content of religious consciousness is in no way produced by
reason. According to these people, to require anyone today to
believe in the God-Man would sacrifice the intellect and change
faith from its character of a free decision into an arbitrary
commitment. For them, religious things are not things to which we
can relate through reason, for they are things beyond reason. 
However, something like the God-Man cannot be accepted by even
this kind of natural man. Thus, for the natural man, either 
self-sufficient reason is sovereign, or at the very least the
realm in which reason is sovereign must be secured in any event.
Therefore, both kinds of natural man share the following
common conviction; we have to be guided by autonomous reason.
This autonomous reason is something that each of us has
intrinsically. Thus following the guide of the autonomous reason
Page 312
Page 313
is to submit to that which is of the very essence of human being
as understood by the natural man. Therefore, it guarantees that
we can know the universal through the use of our reason. And in
relation to the historical realm, we should follow what is most
probable according to our autonomous reason. In short, according
to the natural man, one must seek the truth only in one’s own
reason, and only that which reason recognizes as truth is truth.
Hence the natural man puts the self-sufficient reason in a
position to judge even God. This is the general orientation of
the natural man’s epistemological standpoint. Is this
epistemological standpoint continued in the Christian sphere or
not? In order to answer this question we have to look at the
Christian standpoint. This is the task to which we now turn to
consider in the next section,
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II
The purpose of this section is to describe the Christian’s
epistemological standpoint and compare it with the natural man’s
standpoint which we have examined in the last section. From the 
present examination, we shall be able to answer the question of
whether or not the epistemological standpoint of the natural man
is in any way continued in the Christian sphere. In this section,
I want to show that there are differences, indeed that there is a 
clear-cut distinction between the natural man’s standpoint and the
Christian’s standpoint. The fundamental difference between them
lies in the fact that the Christian is thinking from the stance of
faith which is the core of his/her total stance toward God, for 
Christ ’’[turns the Christian’s] mind to. ..God, so that [God] may 
rule there. "(JP, III, 3383(Pap. Ill C 9)) (The meaning of 
"thinking from the stance of faith" will be clear in the main 
discussion of this section.) For the Christian, God is the ruler 
even in the realm of facts and of thinking. Therefore, the 
Christian should think "with the assumption of faith"(TC, p. 29), 
and "in the thoughts and conceptions of Christianity."(FSE, p. 
36) Hence, as we shall show in this section, the Christian’s
conception of "what is reasonable" is different from the natural
man’s conception, and the general orientation and presuppositions
of the Christian’s epistemological standpoint are different from
those of the natural man’s
This difference can be clearly expressed when we think of 
typically Christian themes, e.g., the God-Man and the Christian
act of faith. So here we start with the Christian’s understanding 
of Jesus Christ (the most important object of faith (fides quae
oreditur)) and of the Christian act of faith (fides qua creditur).
and from this understanding, we shall try to draw out the general
orientation of the Christian standpoint.
Let us then start with the Christian’s understanding of Jesus
Christ. For the Christian as described in the writings which
Kierkegaard published under his own name and under the Christian
pseudonym, Anti-Climaous, Jesus is the God-Man; and to accept this
is the starting point of Christian thinking. The absolute
historical fact that God has become an individual human being 
without ceasing to be God is decisive.[1] Everything else comes
from this. In this sense, for Kierkegaard’s Christian, the belief
in the Incarnation is the basic belief: it is the fundamental
presupposition of the Christian standpoint. Louis P. Pojman
makes a similar point when he says: "Kierkegaard advocates
putting the idea of the Incarnation in the foundation of one’s 
noetic [i.e., cognitive] structure....”[2] Hence whether one is 
thinking as a Christian or as a natural man depends on whether or 
not one accepts Jesus as the God-Man.[3] As Kierkegaard says: 
"[Because] all Christianity is rooted in the paradox [of the 
God-Man], one must accept it (i.e., become a believer) or reject 
it."(JP, III, 3083(Pap. VI B 35:36))
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Thus one who accepts Christ as the God-Man in time and space, 
is thinking as a Christian; this person’s standpoint is Christian.
However, here one must be aware of the paradoxical character of 
the fact of the God-Man. For Kierkegaard, if someone thinks of
Jesus as a half-man and half-God, a "divine Uncle George” who is a
good protector for the right-minded person and is something which
is neither God nor man, then he is not yet aware of the full 
meaning of the God-Man.[4] That Jesus is the God-Man implies that 
he is fully man and at the same time fully God. Jesus is indeed a 
human being, "and yet he is not merely without sin, but is the 
Savior."(JP, III, 2472(Pap. IX A 377)) And as Saviour the 
historical Jesus is also "very God"(TC, p. 135), ’’the only 
begotten of the Father".[5] Hence God the Son who was incarnate is 
eternal (TC, p. 195, GS, p. 52), pre-existent with the Father 
(GS, p. 47), and omniscient (Chr. D, p. 78). Kierkegaard says 
again: "Here is Christianity. God decided to become man in order 
really to be able to have compassion for men."[63 This assertion 
is understood by the natural man as nonsense. But the Christian
does not think that this is nonsense. For him, the God-Man is not 
a logical contradiction(JP, III, 2803(Pap. X 2 A 529)), nor 
absurd.[73 Rather, the fact of the God-Man is regarded as the 
truth.[8] "The paradox in Christian truth," says Kierkegaard, "is 
invariably due to the fact that it is truth as it exists for God. 
The standard of measure and the end is superhuman...."(Journals, 
No. 106l(Pap. X 2 A 481), emphasis given) Hence becoming the 
God-Man is regarded as what is needed.[93 If this is Kierkegaard’s 
personal belief, then we may say, with Richard H. Popkin, that 
Kierkegaard is "[a] man who devoted his whole agonized life to a
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crusade to awaken mankind to the cosmic importance of the truth 
that Jesus is God....”[10] In this sense, Kierkegaard asserts that 
"Christianity is God's invention”(Journals, No. 1200(Pap. X 4 A 
212)=JP, I, 532), and that "Christianity is God’s 
thought. "(Journals. No. 1391) ’’For truth, from the Christian 
point of view, does not lie in the subject (as Socrates understood 
it), but in a revelation which must be proclaimed."(Journals. No. 
809(Pap. IX A 221))
Yet we have to bear in mind that the reason why the Christian
believes in Jesus Christ in this way does not lie in his argument
by which he proves that this historical fact of the God-Man is
rational enough to believe. If there is someone who tries to
believe in the God-Man in this way, he is regarded by Kierkegaard 
as one who tries to be above God himself, for in that case it is 
he who judges what must be true. Such a thought, even though it
says "yes" to the content of faith, is regarded as
disobedience[11], for it makes the human reason the final judge.
For a true Christian, the fact that Jesus is the God-Man is simply
accepted as true. As we have said, this is the starting point of
Christian standpoint.(cf. Journals. No. 752=JP, V, 6l34(Pap.
VIII 1 A 648)) Hence, as N.H. S?Je rightly observes:
Christianity is...a message coming from outside which brings 
salvation. Since it comes from outside, this message does not 
originate in the heart of any man. It is, moreover, the 
opposite of what ratio [reason] would expect and therefore of 
what the pagan world imagined it to be.[12]
So the Christian starts from belief in the God-Man rather than
from the premises of some argument whose conclusion is that God
has become an individual human being. For, in the thought of the
Christian, one knows God only in that one is seized by God’s 
reality in Jesus Christ.[13]
On the other hand, the one who does not accept Jesus as the
God-Man in the real sense of the word, is still thinking as a
natural man. Such a person either completely abandons the idea of
the God-Man, thinking of it as nonsense, or tries to interpret the
idea of the God-Man in some other terras which can be rationally 
understood by the natural man. Yet, according to the Christian as
understood by Kierkegaard, the attempt to change the fact of the
God-Man into the idea of the eternal unity of Godhead and manhood
is a total denial of Christianity itself; it is an apostasy. For
in this case, "Christianity becomes a phase of speculative 
thought, and the latter obtains a preponderance.... "(CUP, p. 335) 
But "Christianity is no doctrine concerning the unity of the 
divine and the human...but the fact that God has existed [i.e., 
the fact that God has become an individual human being]."[14] In 
this spirit, Kierkegaard says:
The danger in Hegel was that he altered Christianity - and 
thereby achieved agreement with his philosophy. In general, 
it is characteristic of an age of reason not to let the task 
remain intact and say: No - but to alter the task and then 
say: Yes, of course, we are agreed. The hypocrisy of reason 
is infinitely treacherous.(JP, II, l6l8(Pap. X 4 A 429))
Anti-Climacus, the Christian pseudonym, even uses the term the 
"sin against the Holy Spirit" in order to describe the attempts
which remove the actual historicity of the God-Man by interpreting
it as myth or symbol of the eternal unity of Godhood and 
manhood.(SUD, p. 131=SUDL, p. 262) According to Kierkegaard’s
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Christian, while in the fact that Jesus was God "there is no
contradiction”, in the Hegelian idea that Jesus is the symbol of 
the union of humanity in general and divinity ’’there is a 
self-contradiction.”(JP, III, 2803(Pap. X 2 A 529)) Kierkegaard 
describes this Hegelian interpretation as ”a monstrous falsehood,
a falsification of the doctrine of the God-Man.”(Journals. No.
712(Pap. VIII A 414)) According to him, if somebody thinks that 
the assertion that Jesus is the God-Man is impossible and
nonsense, he is at the very least faithful to the presuppositions
of his standpoint as a natural man.[15] He is better than those 
who try to change the fact of the God-Man into the idea of the 
eternal unity of God and mankind[l6], in that he honestly exposes 
his epistemological standpoint. At the very least, he does not 
change the meaning of the Christian terms into something else. 
(But this does not mean that the Christian thinks that the natural
man’s faithfulness to his standpoint is right. Rather this is 
regarded as wrong and error.[17]) Therefore, there is an absolute 
either/or: either the acceptance of Jesus as the God-Man or the 
offence against the assertion about the God-Man.(of. JP, IV, 
4463(Pap. X 3 A 396))
Kierkegaard knows well that to assert this demands much, but
he also knows well that ”in the relationship between the God-Man
and a human being the situation cannot be other than this -
blessed is he who is not offended!”(JFY, p. 213, Kierkegaard’s
emphasis). Thus there is a clear difference between the Christian
standpoint and the natural man’s standpoint. Kierkegaard says:
For Christianity is not merely related to the human in such a 
way that it is that which does not issue from the heart of any 
man (I Cor. 2:9), in other words, that which is strange. But 
its terrible divine sharp-sightedness is as though intended to
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exasperate and embitter man in the most frightful manner - 
unless he oan humble himself. For Christianity is the 
sovereignty of God.(LY, p. 114(Pap. XI 1 A 293))
In this sense, whether one accepts Jesus as the God-Man or not is 
the criterion of the Christian standpoint. Perhaps, as Sjzte puts 
it, "[Kierkegaard] would really maintain that from the 
Incarnation, correctly understood, the whole of Christian 
’dogmatics’ can be derived."[18]
The point - that the acceptance of the God-Man is the
criterion of the Christian standpoint - makes it clear that the
reason why some accept Jesus as the God-Man and some do not does
not lie in their peculiarities, that is, their superiority or
inferiority either in their cognitive power, or in their emotive
power, or in their volitional power. In this matter, there is no
distinction between man and man; there is no one for whom It is
easier than others to become a Christian. Kierkegaard says:
[God] has carefully organized Christianity in such a way that 
it revolts equally the man who from the human standpoint may 
be called the most good-natured man, and the most defiant man. 
For God does not desire any direct transition from something 
human to being a Christian.(LY, p. 123(Pap. XI, 1 A 324=JP, 
I, 554))
Thus everybody is in the same situation; everybody by himself
unaided by God thinks as a natural man, whether he is in the 
aesthetic sphere, or in the ethical sphere, or in religiousness A.
Until one accepts Jesus as the God-Man, one has been thinking as a 
natural man. There is nothing within man which contributes to the 
change in one’s standpoint except God’s grace itself.[19], As 
Kierkegaard says, "this is Christianity’s major premise."[20]
In one place, Kierkegaard relates this change in one’s 
standpoint to the life-giving work of the Holy Spirit.(FSE, pp. 
93-106) As we shall see in the next few paragraphs, the
life-giving work of the Holy Spirit is the same as what Climacus 
calls the work of God of giving the condition for understanding
the truth. According to Climacus in Philosophical Fragments, 
’’[the] person who through the condition becomes a follower 
receives the condition from the god himself.”[21] In Philosophical 
Fragments, the work of God of giving the condition for 
understanding the truth is also called new birth, becoming a new 
creature.[22] Only when God gives us the condition (i.e., only 
when we become a new creature), can we have a proper relationship
to the truth.
Similarly, as we look at the For Self-Examination, we find 
that Kierkegaard asserts that only when the Holy Spirit gives us
new life can we think as a Christian.[23] In relation to the work 
of the Holy Spirit, Kierkegaard uses the imagery of death and new 
life. The meaning which he gives to these words is not physical,
nor psychical, but spiritual. That is, he is speaking here of 
spiritual death and spiritual life. If somebody does not
consciously live in relation to God who conclusively reveals
Himself in the Christ event, he is regarded as spiritually dead. 
In contrast, if somebody lives in relation to this God at every 
moment of his life, he is regarded as spiritually alive. These 
are the meanings of spiritual death and of spiritual life in the 
writings of Kierkegaard.[24] In relation to this, we may recollect
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Kierkegaard’s concept of ”the sickness unto death The sickness
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unto death is understood as a sickness worse than any physical 
ailment and involves a death worse than physical death.(cf, JP, 
IV 4329(Pap. X 2 A 103)) It is a sickness of the spirit, and it 
leads ultimately to the death of the spirit. And according to 
Kierkegaard, everybody, except for the genuine Christian, is in
this state.
Then comes the Spirit which makes alive.(FSE, p. 97) Here is 
a new life, "literally a new life, a life on the other side of 
death."[25] This new life is not the culmination or direct 
continuation of one’s natural existence.[26] So this process is 
sometimes called rebirth (New Birth) or regeneration.[27] The 
Christian is thus regarded as one who has once been spiritually
dead, but now leads a new life. Kierkegaard says:
The view of Christianity is that everything turns on a 
qualitative change, a change of the whole character in time 
(as qualitative as the change from not being to being which is 
birth). Everything that is only a development of what man is 
originally is not Christian existence.(LY, p. 223(Pap. XI, 2 
A 81)=JP, III, 3101)
From now on, the Christian consciously thinks and lives in
relation to God at every moment of his life. Kierkegaard speaks
of this state: "The true Christian is always under the Spirit in
a special sense, not in the general sense that everything is under 
the Spirit."(JP, III, 3065(Pap. XI 1 A 195)) In this sense, the 
Christian is called "’the spiritual man’(I Cor. 2:15)”.[28] If 
one is still thinking as the natural man thinks, one cannot be
regarded as being on the other side of spiritual death. But the
Christian no longer thinks that the autonomous reason is the final
judge.[29]
Does this mean that the Christian’s faith has no cognitive
element? Does this mean that Christian faith does not have a
”propositional content”?[30] In order to answer these questions, 
one needs to carefully define the meaning of ’’cognitive element”
and of ”propositional content”. For different people understand
different things by "proposition”. But suppose, as Wolterstorff 
suggests[31], we mean fcy a proposition simply whatever is demanded 
to be believed in order to be a Christian, what is supposed to be
believed as truth if one is a Christian. In this case, we have to
say, as we shall show, that Christian faith involves some 
propositional content.[32] For the Christian faith always has a 
”what of the faith”, a quae creditur, a propositional content. 
Hence Kierkegaard says that ”a knowledge about Christianity must 
certainly be communicated in advance.”[33]
The most basic proposition in Christian faith is that Jesus
is the God-Man. In order to be a Christian one should know that
what is demanded is to believe in Jesus as the God-Man. Of
course, belief in the God-Man is more than knowing the proposition 
that God once became an individual human being without ceasing to
be God. In other words, Christian faith is not a mere
intellectual assent to a set of propositions. But if Christian
faith is more than that, it does at least involve the acceptance
of these propositions. Kierkegaard says: ”To believe is not an
indifferent relation to something which is true, but an infinitely 
decisive relation to something [which is true].”(JP, IV, 4537(Pap. 
VI B 19:8), emphasis given)
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What Kierkegaard wants to say is not there are no correct 
doctrines, but the Christian has to "interiorize the doctrine"(JP, 
IV, 4544(Pap. VIII 1 A 535)), or "live according to this doctrine 
personally"(JP, IV, 4568(Pap. X 5 A 84)). In short, "all the 
objectivity is to be realized existentially in the individual’s 
life."(JP, IV, 4553(Pap. X 2 A 336)) Hence we have to say with 
Thomas, that "the subjective problem itself is the relation of the 
individual to the objectively given truth."f?41 Therefore, with 
Valter Lindstroem, we can say that "he [Kierkegaard] tries to do 
justice to the objective element of Christianity whenever 
possible."[35] Especially, his book on Adler (parts of which are 
translated in English by W. Lowrie under the title On Authority 
and Revelation) is a very obvious case in point. For, in this 
book, as Utterback says, Kierkegaard "emphasizes that one must be
in control of the conceptual definitions of Christianity in order
to distinguish and express Christian inwardness. [He] also 
underscores the fact that Christian subjectivity is not a form of
subjectivism, which lacks any transcendent reference, objective 
determinants, or concern for objective truth."[36] So one should 
say that the Christian has cognitive content of his faith.(cf. 
Journals, No. 1021(Pap. X 2 A 299))
And this content has the form of a historical fact that God
has "come into existence" without ceasing to be God.[37] This 
content is a constitutive element in genuine faith. So, then, 
that historical fact remains.(PF, p. 87) Therefore, Levine is 
quite wrong when he says: "The absolute paradox, [according to 
Kierkegaard], is something of which we can be objectively certain
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that it did not happen.”[38] Kierkegaard says:
Christianity is an historical truth; it appears at a certain 
time and a certain place and consequently it is relevant to a 
certain time and space...in Christianity it is precisely the 
historical which is the essential.(JP, II, l635(Pap. IV C 
35))
According to the Christian, even though this is against the
natural man’s standpoint, if God has become an individual human
being, it must be right and true.[39] The Christian emphasizes 
that "the other must regard it as the absurd - and then still
believes it.” "At the same time,” continues Kierkegaard, "it
naturally follows that for the believer it is not the absurd."[40]
Hence it is not the case that for the Christian, everything
which is against the natural man’s standpoint is acceptable as 
true and right. For example, Don Quixote’s thinking is regarded 
as nonsense by the Christian.(cf. CUP, p. 175) Kierkegaard even 
has Climacus warn us that believing in the God-Man is not the same 
as believing in nonsense.(CUP, p. 504) Not every absurdity is the 
paradox to which one should relate with faith. (cf. Journals. 
No. 1O33=JP, I, 7(Pap. X 2 A 354)) In short, as S/e says, "the 
thought-content of Christianity is not nonsense but is clear and
understandable within the sphere of faith. "T411 So what is
important for Kierkegaard’s Christian is not, pace Ussher[42], 
absurdity itself in relation to which one can have the maximum of 
subjectivity, but the fact of the God-Man. Therefore, a criticism 
which we can see in the following passage of Pojman is out of the 
question:
[It] would seem that there is no reason to choose Christianity 
rather than some other contradiction. Believing that God 
became a rat or a rotten apple or Adolf Hitler would seem
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equally contradictory and be even more absurd.[43]
Only what God has done and what God demands are accepted by the 
Christian as true and right, even though they are against human
understanding. In one place, Malantschuk makes a very significant
comment which is suitable for quoting here:
[Kierkegaard’s] subjectivity is a blend of truth and what is 
individual (whereas...subjectivism is a blend of what is 
arbitrary and what is individual). For Kierkegaard it is 
truth which determines and transforms the individual; for [the 
subjectivist] it is the individual who determines what truth 
shall be.[44]
Therefore, we can conclude that for the Christian faith there are
definite cognitive contents and Christians accept these contents
as truth.
So far we have discussed what the starting point of the
Christian thinking is: the belief in the God-Man; it is that in 
and through the Incarnate God that God conclusively reveals
Himself and is believed and acknowledged in accordance with His
nature; thus by letting our thinking obediently follow the way God 
Himself has taken in Jesus Christ, we can think as Christians. We
also discussed the necessary condition in which it is possible to
think as a Christian: only as the Holy Spirit makes us think in
this way, only as God Himself gives the condition to understand
the truth. It is the miraculous nature of the Spirit’s work that
He creates in us the ability to understand the Truth which God has
taught in the God-Man beyond all human capacities. Through the 
Spirit, we are converted from ourselves to thinking from the
perspective of Christian faith. In one place, Thomas F. Torrance 
makes a very interesting comment which can be closely related to
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the idea which we have discussed so far:
[Theological] thinking is essentially a spiritual activity in 
which we are engaged in a movement that corresponds to the 
movement of the Spirit and indeed participates in it. It is a 
form of kinetic thinking in which the reason does not 
apprehend the truth by sitting back and thinking ideas, but in 
an act or movement in which it participates in what it seeks 
to know. Thus in order to know Jesus Christ, the eternal Word 
became flesh, the Truth of God in historical happening, we 
must know Him in a way apposite to that divine becoming and 
happening in space and time, and therefore kata pneuma. as St. 
Paul said. This is what Kierkegaard used to call ’the leap of 
faith’, but it would be a grave misunderstanding to think of 
this as a blind or irrational movement....[45]
Thus only in relation to the work of the Holy Spirit can one 
accept Jesus as the God-Man, and here is the fundamental meaning 
of "the leap of faith". Based upon this understanding, let us 
consider what else is involved in one’s acceptance of Jesus as the
God-Man.
If one has accepted Jesus as the God-Man, first of all, there
is a change in one’s conception of God (JP, III, 3102(Pap. XI 2 A
212)). Apart from God’s revelation, according to Kierkegaard’s
Christian, man cannot have the right conception of God.(PFS, p.
79=PF, PP. 63f.) In this spirit, Kierkegaard says that "only the
Christian has God’s idea of how infinitely sublime God is; we men
make God rather trivial."[46] In another place, he asserts that
every conception of God which does not have the right relation to
the Christ event "ends in superstition."(JP, III, 1332(Pap. IV A
157)) So in relation to the Christ event, the Christian has a
conception of God who is the Creator and the Redeemer.(Chr. D, p.
297) The Christian believes that
there is a God in heaven with whom there is no respect of 
persons...[and that] it is he who in order to live has need 
every instant, yea, every second, of this God, without whose
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will doubtless no sparrow falls to the ground, but without 
whom also no sparrow comes into existence and is.(Chr. D, pp. 
53f.)C47]
And this God is "omnipresent, though never seen by any 
mortal.”[48] "In each moment every actuality is a possibility in 
His almighty hand."(PSE and JFY, p. 231)
The Christian also believes that he is a sinner before God, 
whom God the Son came into the world to save.(Chr. D, p. 55)
That is, now he has sin-consciousness and at the same time the 
consciousness of the forgiveness of sin by God. He now thinks of 
sin very seriously (Chr. D, p. 385), and following the 
Scriptures, he thinks that "there is nothing so deceitful and
cunning as the human heart, so inventive in seeking evasions and
in finding excuses; nothing is so difficult and so rare as true
sincerity before God."[49] Moreover, the Christian also thinks 
that because of sin "the whole creation [groans] under the 
corruption to which it was subjected against its will".[50]
From this realization of the seriousness of sin, the
Christian understands and affirms the redemption of Christ. He 
asserts that "[Jesus Christ came to bear] the burden of sin, that 
heavy burden which not mankind itself could bear, the sin of the 
race."[51] And he also thinks: "Originally the individual, the 
single person [the Christian] understood that his salvation had 
cost the life and death of Jesus."[52] So we can say, with 
Kierkegaard, that "[the] consciousness of sin silences [the 
sinner] so that in spite of the possibility of scandal [he 
chooses] faith."(Journals. No. 820(Pap. IX A 310)) Such a person
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thinks that "He [Jesus Christ] died once for...[his] sins; His 
death is not repeated."[53] In short, Jesus’s death is an "atoning 
death"[54], or "sacrificial death".[55] Accordingly, the Christian 
has the following conviction:
So when retribute justice, either here on earth or hereafter 
at the Day of Judgement, seeks the place where I a sinner 
stand with all my guilt - it does not find me, I no longer 
stand in that place, I have left it, Another stands in my 
place, Another who entirely puts Himself In my place. For 
this I thank Thee, Lord Jesus Christ.[56]
So the Christian thinks that "the soul finds rest in God through 
the consciousness of the forgiveness of sins."(Chr. D, p. 273) 
Thus, for the Christian, "Christ’s Atonement is infinitely 
everything."[57] This Atonement is the basis upon which the 
Christian stands in relation to the God-Man.[58]
Now if one has accepted Jesus as the God-Man, then one also
thinks that for the God-Man it is possible to do some miraculous
acts which are described in the New Testament, in order indirectly
to reveal that this individual human being is at the same time
God. The Christian no longer thinks that miracle is a priori 
impossible[59], rather he believes that for God everything is 
possible(Chr. D, p. 176), and that "Christ performs a miracle 
and can perform a miracle at any moment. "[60] As a matter of fact,
the existence of the God-Man is itself "the wonder [Miracle]. "T611
As Miller says, "since it [the Incarnation] did happen..., it 
ceases to be mere poetry and becomes The Miracle. "[62] Hence 
Kierkegaard thinks that the Christian has no problem with the 
virgin birth of Christ[63], and that the God-Man should give some 
sort of sign which shows that he is the God-Man.(PF, p. 56=PFS,
p. 69) But the miracles which the God-Man performed serve only as 
signs (semeia) which show who Jesus really is (i.e., the God-Man). 
Those, who follow Christ believing in Him as the God-Man, believe 
that He can do everything He wishes.(FSE, p. 90)
In this sense, Anti-Climacus even says that for the one who 
believes in the God-Man, the resurrection of Jesus and his
ascension are also true. And In other writings Kierkegaard
expresses his belief in the resurrection and the ascension of 
Jesus Christ.[643 In one place, he says that doubt about the
ascension cannot arise in the mind of the real follower of
Christ(FSE, p. 87); "Ascension was a sure thing to them"(FSE, p. 
88); "it was a certainty to them."(FSE, p. 89) In a similar way, 
Kierkegaard speaks of those who do not believe in the literal 
second coming of Jesus Christ as non-Christians. [65]
Another example expressing the Christian standpoint is found
in the Christian’s attitude towards the Scriptures. He no longer 
tries to apply the natural man’s standpoint (which he has had 
before he became a Christian) to the Scriptures. Before he became 
a Christian, he thought either that what is in the Scriptures is 
rubbish, or that they have some relative value just like those 
which are in any other books.(Chr. D., pp. 22f.) But for the 
Christian as understood by Kierkegaard, "every iota [in the 
Scriptures] will be of infinite value."[66] In Christian 
Discourses Kierkegaard says that "the Gospel itself is the real 
teacher"(Chr. D, p. 13). And in one of his journal entries, 
Kierkegaard says: "The New Testament contains the divine
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truth....It is always right, even if the opposite appears to be
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the case."[67]
Likewise, according to Kierkegaard, the apostle, in contrast 
to the religious genius, has paradoxically something new to 
contribute; his message is not like that of the genius, an
anticipation of what may eventually be developed in the race, but
"the qualification an ’apostle1... belongs in the sphere of
transcendence”, the paradoxical religious sphere.[68] The apostle 
is ”a man sent by God on a specific mission. Through the
paradoxical fact the apostle is made paradoxically different from 
all other men for all eternity.”(PA, p. 144) Hence what is 
written by the apostle has a special characteristic, for what is 
written by the apostle is ”the revelation and the revealed
teaching [which] cannot be assimilated to the qualifications of 
his personality.”[69] So Pojman is right when he interprets 
Kierkegaard’s Christian in the following way: ”If a person has
faith, he has the inner certainty about inspiration [of the 
Scriptures].”[70]
From this perspective, Kierkegaard asks us: ”My hearer, how 
highly dost thou esteem God’s Word?"[71] And he asserts that ”he 
who is not alone with God’s Word is not reading God’s Word.”[72] 
And, according to Kierkegaard, the Christian should think
according to what the Scriptures say. But Kierkegaard also knows
well how difficult it is to approach the Scriptures in this way
for the natural man, and says that "flesh and blood are reluctant 
to understand and be obliged to do accordingly.”(FSE, p. 59) 
Considering the confusion in Christendom {i.e., a continual
reduction of the price, from generation and generation, of calling
oneself a Christian}, Kierkegaard says: "If the New Testament had 
been taken literally, this confusion would have been 
impossible."(LY, p. 252(Pap. XI, 1 A 128)=JP, III, 2334) In one 
place, Kierkegaard says again: "[The] New Testament... [is one] 
with which every generation has to begin. "(JP, III, 2910(Pap. XI1 
A 392)) Here, in relation to one’s attitude towards the 
Scriptures, the difference between the natural man’s standpoint 
and the Christian standpoint is expressed clearly. For example,
Kierkegaard says:
I do not listen to Paul because he is brilliant or 
incomparably brilliant, but I submit to him beoause he has 
divine authority.(JP, III, 3088(Pap. VII 2 B 256:10))
That is, the Christian believes in what is written in the 
Scriptures not because it is rational according to the judgement 
of the natural man, but because it has divine authority. Hence, 
as S0e says, "the highest authority for Kierkegaard is quite 
simply the teaching of the Bible....”[73]
The Christian thus thinks that Christianity is the truth,
which is true independent of his accepting it as truth, and at the
same time, Christianity is the truth which must be applied to his
concrete existential life. [7*1] The Christian thus regards the 
content of Christianity as "eternal truth’’[75], or "unconditional 
truth"[76], or "concerned truth".[773 That is, Christianity is 
understood by the Christian as something objective to which one
must subjectively relate. In this sense, Kierkegaard says that 
the Christian must personally suffer for the truth(JP, IV, 
4881(Pap. X 4 A 609)); and that "this is the only way in which 
one can relate oneself to the unconditioned."[78] Hence, in spite
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of the demand of truth that one’s subjectivity should correspond 
to the truth, the truth of Christianity is there, even though 
there were nobody who accepted Christianity.(JP, IV, 4964(Pap. X 
1 A 209)) In this sense, Christianity is the "militant truth”.(JP, 
IV, 4852(Pap. IX A 4)). And we can agree with Malantschuk when 
he says:
According to [Kierkegaard’s] conviction that Christianity was 
the only and the supreme truth, Christianity must be 
intolerant; it cannot watch with indifference when men go 
astray in unbelief or in false forms of religion.[79]
Therefore, for the Christian, there are two criteria for being in 
the truth: (1) whether one’s conception of truth corresponds to
what God thinks and revealed, and (2) whether one’s mode of 
existence is at one with the Christian conception of truth. Here
we can see a clear difference between the Christian perspective on
truth and the natural man’s perspective. As Deyton says, "what is 
irrational in the world’s understanding is presented [by 
Kierkegaard as leading] to a fresh perception of the wisdom of 
God."[80] Hence, from the Christian perspective, the Christian
truth is not regarded as irrational, but the expression of God’s
wisdom.
How then does the Christian think of the Christian act of
faith (fides qua creditur) which believes in Jesus as the God-Man? 
Before he becomes a Christian, as we have seen, he thought that 
the Christian act of faith was madness and foolishness.[81] Does
he still think that Christian faith is madness? Strangely, the
Christian has a different view of this subject. Once he asserted
that Christian faith is genuine madness. But he now as a
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Christian asserts that it is not absurd[82], nor madness, but that 
"it is meet and proper that a man have faith."(GS, p. 33) And to 
be a Christian is "right and reasonable, [and] it is a plain duty 
to do so"(Chr. D, p. 184); "the fact of the matter is that 
Christianity must be accepted."(JP, I, l86(Pap. X 1 A 188)).
But here we have to bear in mind that his conception of "what
is reasonable" is not the same as the natural man’s. His
conception of the reasonable has changed.(JP, I, 824(Pap. X 4 A 
633)) Moreover, what he thinks as reasonable cannot be "rational" 
in the Hegelian sense and in the Enlightenment sense in general.
The reason wby he thinks that to believe in Jesus as the God-Man
is proper and reasonable is not because he thinks that this fact
is fit for his reason, as the natural man thinks of what is
reasonable. Kierkegaard is very critical of all attempts to make
Christianity plausible or reasonable to the natural man’s 
thinking.[83] According to the natural man’s standpoint, as we 
have seen, the God-Man is the most impossible, the most 
unreasonable thing in the world.(cf. PP, p. 52=PFS, p. 65) But 
for the Christian, as we have also seen, what is important is God
and what God has done. So if God has become an individual human
being and commanded that "you should believe", then for the
Christian to believe this is proper and reasonable and not to
believe is unreasonable. So for the Christian who has a different
conception of "reasonable" from the natural man, as Pojman says,
"Christianity is not irrational, nor merely a rational option, but
the only way to knowledge of the highest truth and enjoyment of 
eternal happiness."[84] To repeat, the Christian’s conception of
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the "reasonable” has changed.
There are many places in which Kierkegaard indicates this
fact. For example, in one place, Kierkegaard says that "the world 
and Christianity have the most opposite conceptions."(JFY, p. 
113) Therefore, according to Kierkegaard, the natural man "regards 
Christianity as drunkenness", and Christianity regards the natural
man’s mind as drunkenness. So they say to each other "only be 
reasonable, come to thy senses, try to be sober".[85] Kierkegaard
says:
[The difference between the natural man’s mind and the 
Christian’s mind] is not that the first holds one opinion and 
the second another; no, the difference always is that they 
.hold opinions which fine di.amo.tr.i.c^l ly _opj)g,sj.t.eJ„ .that what. the 
fine nails. ygofi the fithen nails eyjj3 yfe.t g££ fifills. Ifiye the 
fi.th.er nfilln selfishness, whfit fine nails godliness the other 
nallfi ungodliness, .what the gne nails drunkenness the other 
■call.s _9ohr.ie.ty., [86]
And yet, according to Christianity, "[to] become sober is to come
ifi oneself in .sej.f.-hn.QKl.e^e, and heffire god., as nothing before 
■Hijn., yei infinitely^ absolutely, .under obligation, "(jfy, p. 120, 
Kierkegaard’s emphasis). When we look at this sentence, we have 
to interpret it in the way in which Kierkegaard does. According
to him, "to come to oneself in self-knowledge" does not mean to be 
oneself "according to the opinion of the merely human view."(JFY, 
p. 121) For Christianity calls drunkenness "what the merely human 
view calls sobriety."(JFY, p. 121) And according to Christianity, 
"[only] by being before God can a man entirely come to himself in 
the transparency of sobriety."[87] Moreover, while "[the] merely 
human view holds...that being sober is recognizable precisely in 
the fact that one is moderate in all things, that one observes the
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sober maxim, ’to a certain degree’”, "Christianity thinks that it
is precisely the absolute, and this alone...is capable of making a
man entirely sober, when he (for otherwise he has not received the 
impression of the absolute) absolutely surrenders himself to its 
sway."(JFY, p. 123) And according to Kierkegaard, "Christianity 
is the absolute."(JFY, p. 125) "Christianity says; ’The absolute 
reveals that thou art drunk, and there is only one thing that can 
make a man entirely sober: the absolute.'"(JFY, p. 130) So even
though the Christian and the natural man use the same words the 
meanings which they give them are different.[88] One needs, then, 
to be "torn out of [the natural man’s] conceptual setting and his 
world of ideas" in order to think as a Christian.(JP, II, 
l409(Pap. X 3 A 359))
And from the Christian perspective, not to believe in God and 
His way of redemption is regarded as presumption.(of. Chr. D, p. 
66) "Presumption is essentially against God...Presumption 
therefore is either, in a forbidden, in a rebellious, in an 
ungodly way, to want to have God’s help, or in a forbidden, in a
rebellious, in an ungodly way, to want to dispense with God’s 
help."(Chr. D, p. 66, Kierkegaard’s emphasis). Hence, from the 
Christian perspective, those who do not have a right relationship
with God through Christ are "without God in the world.”[89] In a 
sense, this is a result of God’s abandonment.(LY, p. 277(Pap. XI 
2 A 175)) So "the god-forsaken world seems free in a quite 
different way from the Christian - for the god-forsaken world has 
been given up by God, it is free from God.’’(LY, p. 299=JP, IV, 
5038(Pap. XI, 2 A 239))
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So far we have discussed how the Christian thinks of the
God-Man and the Christian act of faith. For the Christian the
God-Man is not absurd, and the Christian act of faith is not
madness. His standpoint concerning Christ and the Christian act
of faith is different from that of the natural man. And the
Christian thinks that one should not change Christianity into
something which can be easily accepted by the natural man.[90]
Those who try to change Christianity are regarded as ’’natural men
disguised as Christians."(JP, III, 2921(Pap. XI 2 A 403)) Hence 
if there is something which cannot be understood by the natural 
man’s epistemological standpoint, it must nevertheless be 
presented as it is. In this way, Christianity is absolute.[91]
But is the Christian epistemological standpoint confined to 
the realm of so-called religious matters? Is it only concerning
Christ and Christian faith that there is a difference between what
the Christian and the natural man believe to be true? This is an
interesting question which we shall want to consider in what 
follows. I think and shall show that the Christian depicted by 
Kierkegaard is one who always and in relation to everything, 
thinks as a Christian, i.e., thinks from the Christian 
standpoint.[92] If we are totally committed to the truth of 
Christianity, then its truth is taken as basic assumption for
every idea inferred and action taken.
Kierkegaard is very clear on this point. For Kierkegaard, 
Jesus, as an individual man in time and space, was the God-Man.
So according to him, God can enter into the realm of time and
space, since there really was the Incarnation and therefore there
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was the God-Man in time and space. God became an individual human
being in order to save human beings who are in their sin. There
was no necessity for God to become incarnate; God did this out of
love. So for Kierkegaard, the idea that God cannot enter into the
realm of time and space, or that God cannot break the natural law,
is destroyed in the face of the existence of the God-Man. So
according to Kierkegaard’s Christian, God is sovereign even in the 
realm of time and space. God can intervene in the world.[93] From
this perspective, Kierkegaard interprets one Old Testament
passage, "keep thy foot when thou goest to the house of the
Lord”(Eccl. iv. 17) in the following way:
Keep thy foot when thou goest to the house of the Lord, for 
thou dost assume an immense responsibility. Remember that 
here is One who is in heaven - and thou art on earth. But do 
nat imagine that in His exaltation He is far .aw.ay.,; -h_er.ej.ji 
±i£s the ngEifiiisngss and j^nnansitiiitx of the ajtna-tjpjv that 
He,. the .infinitely azaliesk. is fl.uA.te niase to thee, nlpner 
than the men kho ana afeant thaa iailyx eJ-oser than thy most 
tra.st.ed friend tafaca Hhaa than de.st feel fr.ee to nhasi thyself 
for what thou art.(Chr. D. p. 174)
As we can see in this quotation, for Kierkegaard, God is 
transcendent, but at the same time is close to everyone who is 
among His people.[94] Here God is not represented as the 
completely transcendent God of the early Barth who quotes this 
passage from Kierkegaard to suggest that God cannot enter into the 
realm of time and space.[95] According to Kierkegaard, God is 
transcendent, but He can enter into the realm of time and space of
which He is the Creator. The most clear expression of this fact
is the historical existence of the God-Man. Because of the
God-Man, the Christian clearly thinks that God is sovereign even
in the realm of time and space.[96] So the Christian must think of
everything in time and space in relation to God.
Moreover, according to Kierkegaard, only he who thinks and
lives as a Christian at every moment of his life, is a Christian.
The Christian is the one who "is occupied only with his own 
relation to God."(GS, p. 144) This does not mean that he only 
thinks of his God-relationship which is isolated from the rest of
his concrete life. Rather, this means that he thinks and lives 
his life in relation to God; in this sense, everything in the 
world is related to God in the Christian’s thinking and 
living.(cf. Journals, No. 48?(Pap. V A 42)) Only in this sense 
is his relation to God everything to him. If someone thinks as a 
Christian (i.e., in relation to God) in some aspect of life, but, 
in relation to other aspects of life, does not think in relation 
to God, then his standpoint is not Christian at all.(cf. JP, IV, 
4937(Pap. X 4 A 290)) Similarly, if someone at one time thinks as 
a Christian, but ceases to think as a Christian the next moment, 
then he is not a Christian either, and neither is his standpoint 
Christian. Likewise, those who think as Christians but do not
live Christianly are not Christians either.(cf. Journals. No. 
625(Pap. VII A 216)) According to Kierkegaard, the Christian is 
one who thinks and lives his life in its totality in relation to 
God. For, according to Kierkegaard, "[spiritually] speaking, a 
man’s thought must be the building in which he lives - otherwise 
everything is topsy-turvy."(Journals, 583(Pap. VII 1 A 82)=JP, 
III, 3308) So the Christian "ought to live in the thoughts and 
conceptions of Christianity; this should be his daily life."(FSE, 
p. 36) In one of his journal entries, Kierkegaard describes the
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same idea in this way: "To be a Christian is almost the same as
saying: to talk and act like a Christian."[97] Here we should
bear in mind the close connection between thought (which can be
expressed in speech) and life. Based upon this understanding we
can say that Collins is quite right when he says:
Christian religious faith is distinguished precisely by the 
authority of Christ, who alone can rightfully place an 
unconditional demand upon the personal freedom of man. The 
special inwardness of the Christian man of faith consists in 
the practical commitment to the actuality of the Incarnation, 
with which he is constantly striving to conform his thoughts 
ansi -dee-ds. [98]
Hence the Christian as understood by Kierkegaard is one who 
constantly strives to conform both in thought and deed with the
actuality of the Incarnation.
From this perspective, Kierkegaard is always very critical of
those who proclaim themselves to be Christians, but think as the
natural man thinks. This is something abominable for Kierkegaard;
this is blasphemy. One of Kierkegaard's main attacks upon
Christendom is that, in Christendom, people who have the title
"Christians" think and live as the natural man does. They do not 
think of everything in relation to God.[99] Only in relation to
so-called religious matters, do they think as Christians. In one
place, Kierkegaard satirizes this situation in the following way:
In sermons we constantly hear that everyone must relate 
himself to God in everything: that everything must be referred 
back to God.... [And] nowadays nothing further is done; at 
the most it is the subject of a sermon.(Journals. No. 864, 
Kierkegaard's emphasis.)[100]
That is, only in so-called religious situation and in relation to 
something that they define as religious (the sermon, in this
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case), they think Christianly (i.e., "one should relate to God in 
everything"). But that is all. They do not really relate 
everything in the world to God. For these people, God has become 
one who is sovereign only in religious matters, or in the
religious situation; He has nothing to do with one’s academic work 
and one’s concrete life.[101] In short, their standpoint regarding 
what they define as religious and their standpoint regarding the 
other things in the world are different. They are double-minded; 
they have two different standards which they apply to two
different things.
In doing so, they, as a matter of fact, distort the Christian 
standpoint. For they do not regard Christianity as the absolute.
Hence they are Christians "in a way by which it is impossible to 
be a Christian."(JP, II, 2068(Pap. XI 1 A 421)) And they make 
Christianity, as Gates says, "a Sunday religion". [102] But this is
not permissible for the genuine Christian; this is a distortion of 
the Christian epistemological standpoint. Thus the Christian 
asserts that nominal Christians (in Christendom) "[change] the 
whole point of view of Christianity."(JFY, p. 204) For they 
revise Christianity "according to the natural notions of the 
natural man."[103] In this sense, Kierkegaard says: "Christendom
is apostasy from Christianity."[104] So Kierkegaard asserts that 
if you cannot think as a Christian, then honestly admit that you 
are not a Christian.[105] In this spirit, he also asserts that 
"[it] is the thought of faith we need, the honest, confident, 
frequent expressing of this thought to ourselves."(GS, p. 32) For 
"all the working of faith tends to do away with self-will and
selfishness, so that God mav truly be admitted, and then allowed 
to rule in all things."(GS, p. 59» emphasis given) And according 
to Kierkegaard, here, in this complete submission to God in one’s 
thinking, there is "true knowledge of the only true God.”[106] In 
order to live as an existing Christian, to think as a Christian 
(i.e., to think of everything in relation to God) is a necessary 
condition, even though not a sufficient condition of being a 
Christian. So it is crucial for a Christian to think always and
in everything in relation to God.
Here we have to consider one of Kierkegaard’s special terms,
reduplication. According to Lowrie, "reduplication is a matter of
the transformation of one’s life and way of living in accordance 
with truth one objectively knows."ri07l So in order to 
reduplicate, first of all one should have something which one 
regards as truth, for "to reduplicate is to ’exist’ in what one 
understands".T1081 The idea of reduplication means that to the
extent that I become what I know, to that extent do I come to know 
the truth. In this sense, the change in one’s epistemological
standpoint is either presupposed in the change of one’s way of
life, or happens at the same time as the change in one’s way of 
life. At any rate, the change in one’s way of life necessarily
involves the change in one’s perspective on truth. Kierkegaard
even says: "If a man does not become what he understands, then he 
does not understand it either."(JP, IV, 4540(Pap. VII 1 A 72)) 
Hence the Christian consciously thinks and lives before God (coram 
deo) at every moment of his life. It would be strange for a man, 
who asserts that he lives before God, not to think of everything
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in relation to God. It is a contradiction that a Christian thinks
as a natural man in everything except for the things which are 
peculiarly religious.[1093
Kierkegaard is critical of non-Christian thinking as well as
non-Christian living. Hence it is important to criticize both the
non-Christian living of the so-called Christian, and the 
non-Christian thinking (which follows the natural man’s 
standpoint) of the so-called Christian. (And non-Christian 
thinking has become more prevalent nowadays.[110] For nowadays it 
is rare to find even one who thinks of everything in a Christian 
way, not to mention, one who lives in a Christian way. At best,
we find an admixture of Christian thinking and the natural man’s 
thinking.) In several places, Kierkegaard himself clearly warns us 
of the danger of mixing Christian thinking and merely human 
thinking.[1113 For Christianity is not something which "appeals to 
the taste of the natural man,"(JP, III, 2330(Pap. XI 1 A 205)) 
Therefore, both he who thinks as a natural man but tries to do
what he believes to be commanded in the Scriptures, and he who 
thinks as a Christian but acts as the natural man acts, are 
regarded as those who try to serve two masters. According to the 
logic of Kierkegaard’s Christian, one should think as a Christian
and live accordingly, i.e., as a Christian, who "seeks God’s 
Kingdom first".[112]
The Christian thus sees everything with the eyes of faith.
And in the eyes of faith "there is only one exaltation, that of
being a Christian, everything else is lowly, both lowliness and 
exaltation. "(Chr. D, p. 49) The Christians are sure that they do
"remain in the truth only by remaining in Him [Jesus Christ]" and 
that "only by remaining in Him" have they life.[113] For, in their 
thinking,
there is in the end but one name in heaven and upon earth, one
only name, and hence but one way to choose - if a man is to
choose seriously and to choose aright!...There is but one name 
in heaven and earth, but one way and but one pattern...This
name is the name of our Lord, Jesus Christ.(GS, pp. 21f.)
From this understanding, they also say that "Socrates did not 
possess the true ideal...."(Journals. No. 1122=JP, IV, 4279(Pap. 
X 3 A 253)) These assertions are regarded by the natural man as 
fanatical assertions. But Kierkegaard thinks that the reason why 
the natural man responds in this way lies in his rebellion against 
God: "it is because of a rebellious spirit, that will not
believe."(GS, p. 44)
So we may conclude this section by stating that the Christian
as understood by Kierkegaard is one who consciously thinks of 
everything in relation to God, and lives accordingly. For the
Christian, even his thinking is related to his faith. Faith is
not something which is isolated from the rest of life. It is the 
vital factor which is involved in every aspect of life. So even
in relation to the realm of time and space the Christian thinks of
everything in relation to God. What Kierkegaard demands is that 
if one is a Christian, then Christian thinking should dominate the
entire breadth of one's life.
Here we may see discontinuity between the natural man’s
epistemological standpoint and the Christian’s standpoint. For 
the Christian, reason is not sovereign. According to the
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Christian, as Shestov says,
the power and the sovereign rights of reason are maintained 
only by sin. If man could, for a moment, become an embodiment 
of the truth of Holy Scripture, reason would immediately be 
deprived of its sovereign rights: it would cease to be an 
independent giver of laws and would assume the modest role of 
dutiful executor.[114]
So if someone who has been in the ethical sphere or in
religiousness A, becomes a Christian, then there must be a 
substantial change in his standpoint. For, as we have seen and as
Cornel io Fabro summarizes well, faith differs "from the Socratic
existence and its dialectic of inwardness which was not successful
in overcaning either doubt or immanence (truth as 
♦anamnesis1)."T1153 So, insofar as one thinks as a natural man,
one is not a Christian.
Thus, according to Kierkegaard, there are basically two kinds
of people: the natural man and the Christian. Accordingly, there
are two perspectives on truth. This does not mean that everything
that Christians and the natural man know is different. There is a
very broad realm of investigation in which the difference between
these two groups exerts no influence. For example, "plants, 
animals, and stars may be handled in that way [scientific 
method)."(Journals. No. 6l7(Pap. VII A 186)) But even in 
relation to this so-called common realm, the difference of
approach is apparent. The Christian approaches even this realm in
relation to God. For him, all truth must be God’s truth. Hence 
if one does not relate everything to God, all one^s achievement is
only half-finished work and "all man’s knowledge is but a chopped
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fragment."(JP, III, 3399(Pap. VI B 154)) But the natural man
Page 350
tries to keep this realm as a realm in which autonomous reason is 
sovereign. The clearer difference between these two perspectives 
on truth, as we have seen in this section, appears in relation to 
so-called religious matters, e.g., the God-Man. Ultimately, the
goal and direction of these two standpoints are at odds with each 
other, even though in some respects they are alike (e.g., both the 
Christian and the natural man thinks that 5+7=12, that A=A, and 
that A^6s= -A.) Underneath there are warring principles at some
fundamental level; they are struggling against each other.[116]
What is required by Kierkegaard is that Christians should be
free frankly to state their presuppositions and starting points 
and introduce these into their concrete thinking in all areas of
human inquiry, especially in their understanding of human
existence, and live accordingly. In short, Christianity requires
a total surrender of the person to God and His revelation. This
revelation, accepted by faith, becomes, then, the arena within
which and on the basis of which one thinks and lives. So there is
one absolute either/or: either reason is autonomous and it
establishes autonomously its own criteria for rationality in
matters of both faith and life or revelation and faith are
conclusive and one must obey God in all aspects of one’s thought
and life. As Kierkegaard says: "If God is the source of truth, 
then we have the essentially Christian position.... If man is the
source, well, then, the truth is where the majority is and is what 
the majority believes."(JP, IV, 4962(Pap. IX A 124J Here we have 
a clear Either/Or. For, according to Kierkegaard, "[two] wills in 
the world cannot be tolerated. God is the one and only."(JP,
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5038(Pap. XI 2 A 239)) In conclusion, I would like to quote a
passage which makes this contrast between the Christian
epistemological standpoint and the natural man’s standpoint clear
and scathingly criticizes the attempt to mix these two:
Christianity came into the world on the basis of authority, 
its divine authority; therefore the authority is superior.
But for a long time now the situation has been quite 
changed around: one seeks to prove and establish authority on 
grounds of reason....
When Christianity came into the world mankind had long 
despaired of making sense of this existence, they had 
despaired of finding the truth - then Christianity came with 
divine authority...
But now the matter has been turned around. A so-called 
philosophical Christianity has discovered authority is 
imperfect, at best something for the plebs, and that 
perfection consists in getting rid of it - in order to restore 
the situation to what it was before Christianity came into the 
world.
And theology seeks to establish the authority of 
Christianity by reasons, which is worse than any attack, since 
it confesses indirectly that there is no authority...
What is [nowadays] called Christianity is really nothing 
but making a fool of God.[117]
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In the last section we have seen that what the Christian thinks to
be true is different from what the natural man believes to be
true. When we look at the character of the Christian standpoint,
which is almost antithetical to the natural man’s standpoint, we 
cannot help asking, "who on earth can always think in this way?" 
Does Kierkegaard himself always think in this way? Or does 
Kierkegaard merely point out that the Christian should think in 
this way, yet he sometimes finds himself thinking differently? 
These are the questions which we want to consider in this section. 
Therefore, in a sense, this section may seem like a digression 
from the main argument of this chapter: that there is a clear-cut
distinction between the Christian standpoint and the natural man’s
standpoint. Nonetheless, the discussion in this section will 
indirectly support the main argument of this chapter. For this
section will make it clear that the Christian standpoint (which we 
have seen in the last section) is the ideal form of Christian 
thinking, so that Kierkegaard admits that even he himself does not 
always think in this way; he is aware of his tendency to mix this 
Christian standpoint (which he knows and believes is what the 
Christian should have) and the natural man’s standpoint. This is 
one of the reasons why Kierkegaard never tires of saying that "I 
hardly dare call myself a Christian."[1] Sometimes, this statement 
is interpreted only as part of his indirect communication; that 
is, by showing that the so-called Christian is not a Christian in
the true sense of the word, he tries to lead his readers towards 
Christianity.[2] There is some truth in the view that his
statement that he is not a Christian is part of his indirect
communication, especially, when we consider the following passage: 
"Such is the distance of Christendom (of Protestantism, especially 
in Denmark) from New Testament Christianity that I must 
continually emphasize that I do not call myself a Christian."[3J 
But, as I want to show in this section, his statement is more than
just part of his indirect communication.
What I want to show in this section is that one of the most
important reasons why he asserts that he does not call himself a
genuine Christian lies in the absolute character of Christianity.
He is the one who knows what Christianity and the Christian
standpoint should be. Thus within his mind there was a continuous
conflict between the absolute, ideal Christian standpoint and the 
tendency to mix this Christian standpoint with the natural man’s.
Hence Kierkegaard’s criticism of the so-called ’’Christian” in
Christendom is also his criticism of himself. He himself finds
that he is not absolutely faithful to the Christian standpoint
which he regards as what every Christian should have.
In order to show this, I shall examine Kierkegaard’s journal 
entries, supposing that these entries reflect relatively correctly 
what Kierkegaard himself thinks of his situation in relation to
Christianity. Of course I am aware that there are some scholars 
who regard Kierkegaard’s journal entries as another literary 
tactic, concealing his exact situation and his own thinking.[4] It 
is true that even in his journal entries it is not easy to find a
clue which solves, with absolute certainty, the ambiguous problems
innate in Kierkegaard’s thought; his journal entries are also
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cryptic. As is well-known, sometimes he crossed some passages 
out[5], tore some pages out[6], and he wanted the journals to be 
published after his death.[7] The public nature of his journals 
caused him to be intentionally ambiguous even in these entries. 
Hence it is difficult to know for certain how seriously to take, 
or how to interpret, his journal entries. However, we can at the 
very least get a kind of direct communication of his thought from 
them.[8]
I shall divide Kierkegaard’s adult life into four periods: 
the period of wondering ( —1838), the period of his first 
authorship (1838-1846), the period of the second authorship 
(1846-1852), and the last period (1853-1855). Let us consider 
these four periods in turn.
In the first period, Kierkegaard was officially a candidate 
for ’’theology”, but tried to be a kind of free man of letters. 
Officially, he studied under C.E. Scharling (who preoccupied 
himself with A. Neander’s Geschichte der Pflanzung und Lei-tung 
der Christlichen Kircfre _te.Qh <jie A&o£t_el. [History of the 
Foundation and Guidance of the Christian Church by the Apostles] 
(I, Hamburg, 1832)[9])» and H.N. Clausen (1793—1877, who thought 
that Christianity should presuppose that its substance and 
premises should be subject to human understanding.)[10] 
Kierkegaard also, during 1834, read Schleiermacher’s The Christian 
Faith with his tutor H.L. Martensen (1808-84). He also read 
Clausen’s and M. H. Hohlenberg’s Journal of ForeignTheologiQal 
Literature (2nd vol., 1834), through which he became acquainted
with Johann Adam Moehler’s and J.H. Fichte’s thought.[11] So he
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also read J.A. Moehler’s Athanasius der grosse _und -die Kirohe 
seiner Zeit, besonders in jfegjpfe ail ArJ^Iiisaus. (Mainz, 1827)[12], 
and Zeitsohrift fugr. Philosophie jici ffjffXulajjy.e Ifallosfiphie 
edited by J.H. Fichte, [13] and ieitsshriit. £agr Spekalg tJLye 
Theologie (I-III, 1836-38) edited by Bruno Bauer.[14] And in 1837 
Kierkegaard read Johann Eduard Erdman’s Vorlesungen Ueber Glauben 
und Wissen (Berlin, 1837).[15] From his reading and from the 
courses which Kierkegaard attended[16], we can know that through 
these Kierkegaard was exposed to a rationalist (i.e., 
post-Enlightenment) approach to Biblical and theological 
studies.[17]
As a result, during this period, his attitude to Christianity
is a kind of mixture of his early Christian faith and
post-Enlightenment thoughts, so this is a period of wondering and 
of doubt. "With me”, says Kierkegaard, "everything is 
’wandering*...."(JP, V, 5306(Pap. II A 222)) His own attitude to 
Christianity is reflected well in the following passage (in his 
letter to his brother-in-law, Peter Wilhelm Lund): ”As you know, 
I grew up, so to speak, in orthodoxy[18]; but as soon as I began 
to think for myself the tremendous colossus began to 
totter."(Journals. No. 16=JP, V, 5092(Pap. I A 72, June 1st, 
1835)) He was in doubt about traditional orthodox Christianity. 
However, on the other hand, he found that the theology which was 
in fashion at that time, was only a form of rationalism. He said
of theologians of his times that "when they find themselves in
agreement with Holy Writ they base their argument upon it, but not
otherwise, and as a result rest upon two different points of
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view."(Journals. No. 16) Here we see what we have called, in the 
last section, the mixture of the Christian standpoint and the 
natural man's standpoint. Kierkegaard also thought that the 
theologies of his time were such mixtures. Such a theology, says 
Kierkegaard, "is without faith, without open confidence before 
God, without a good conscience in the presence of Holy 
Scripture.»(JP, III, 2823(Pap. X 5 A 73), 1853) Sometimes he
criticized his teachers from the perspective of traditional 
Christianity.[193 Thus he, who was looking for something for which 
to live and die, did not want to enter into the theological world
of his time, but he could not find anything else for which he 
could live and die either.(Journals, No. 22=JP, V, 5100(Pap. I A
75))
In his wandering and searching, Kierkegaard found that
Christianity was opposed to the merely human thinking which is
exemplified in philosophy. "Christianity," said Kierkegaard,
"posits man’s cognition as defective on account of sin, which is
rectified in Christianity; the philosopher qua man tries to 
expound the relationship of God and the world [without raising any 
question of sin3".(JP, III, 3245(Pap. I A 94), 1835) In this
period, he based his views of the world and God on the natural
man’s standpoint. So he thought that if one thought as a rational
being, one should conclude that Christianity was something which 
should be opposed. (Journals. No. 32=JP, III, 3247(Pap. I A 99), 
1835) According to Kierkegaard at this stage, the merely human 
standpoint is better than the Christian standpoint. So it is
generally agreed that during the years 1834-35 Kierkegaard was
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strongly tempted to doubt Christianity.[20] Christianity appeared 
to him "the most inhuman cruelty"(PV, p. 76), and Christians 
seemed to him to be too dogmatic since they asserted that they had
the truth. Moreover, sometimes he tried to interpret Christianity 
from the merely human perspective. He thus tries to interpret 
Christianity along the lines of Hegel and Schleiermacher.[21]
Yet at the very least he thought that this mixture of 
Christianity and the merely human standpoint should not be called
Christianity. This mixture produced a change in the meaning of 
Christian concepts. Through the hands of these modern 
theologians, he wrote, "inspiration has become nothing more than 
God’s breathing of the life-spirit into man, and incarnation no
more than the presence of one or another in one or more
individuals."[22] Thus he believed that even though he himself
could not accept what Christianity taught, at the very least
Christianity itself should be kept as it was.[23] From this
standpoint, he made many statements which can be judged as
Christian statements.[24] For example:
The birth of Christ is not only an event but also in heaven; 
but our justification is also not merely an event on earth but 
also in heaven.(Journals, No. 104(Pap. II A 594), 1837)
It is so impossible for the world to exist without God that if 
God could forget it it would instantly cease to be.(Journals. 
No. 129(Pap. II A 622), 1937)
However, at this stage, Kierkegaard knew the above statements only
in an objective way. He had not yet definitely related them to
his life. They have real meaning only in the kind of life Christ
enjoins man to lead, yet this kind of life "cannot come to 
existence till after the rebirth...."[25] In this context,
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Kierkegaard refuted the Kantian idea that Christ is only the good 
ethical teacher, and the Catholic idea that "one would be able to 
satisfy the requirements of the law".[26] But he himself did not 
yet feel that he had experienced rebirth. In this sense, he said, 
"I want to believe, but I cannot.”[27] Kierkegaard himself was 
aware that he by himself could not accept Christ, so he said: ”If
Christ is to come and take up his abode in me, it must happen 
according to the title of to-day’s Gospel [John 20:19] in the 
Almanac: Christ came in through locked doors."(Journals. No.
196=JP, V, 5313(Pap. II A 730), April 22, 1838)
Then in 1838 Kierkegaard underwent a conversion experience.
Kierkegaard described this experience in the following way:
Bay. 12^. >IJ-J3ast, ten in the jascningx. There is an 
indescribable joy which enkindles us as inexplicably as the 
apostle’s outburst comes gratuitously: ’Rejoice I say unto 
you, and again I say unto you rejoice.’ - Not a joy over this 
or that but the soul’s mighty song ’with tongue and mouth, 
from the bottom of the heart’: ’I rejoice through my joy, in, 
at, with, over, by, and with my joy’ - a heavenly refrain, as 
it were, suddenly breaks off our other song; a joy which cools 
and refreshes us like a breath of wind, a wave of air, from 
the trade wind which blows from the plains of Mamre to the 
everlasting habitations. (Journals. No. 207=JP, V, SSSMPap. 
II A 228), 1838)
This experience made Kierkegaard assert that ”God creates out of 
nothing, wonderful, you say: yes, to be sure, but he does what is 
still more wonderful: he makes saints out of sinners.”(Journals, 
No. 209(Pap. II A 758), July 7, 1838) From now on, his relation 
to Christianity is different from that which he had before this 
conversion experience.[28] He no longer stands on the side of 
merely human thinking, but on the side of Christianity. As
before, he thinks that Christianity is the opposite of mere human
thinking, philosophy[293; but now he thinks that Christianity is 
right and true. Now he thinks that "the mystery of God is 
revealed in Christ"(Journal3. No. 2l8(Pap. II A 767)» 1838), and 
that "Christ is both our Saviour and our Judge...the Saviour and 
the Judge are one."(Journals. No. 222(Pap. II A 261), Sep. 12, 
1838). He has the consciousness of sin, and thinks of divine 
fatherly love as "the one single unshakable thing in life, the 
true Archimedean point."(JP, V, 5468(Pap. Ill A 78), 1840)
But he cannot continually think in this way. At times he
remarks: "I feel so dull and so completely without joy, my soul
is so empty and void, that I cannot even conceive what could 
satisfy it - oh, not even the blessedness of heaven."[30] Yet in 
the next entry he says: "To thee, 0 God, we turn for peace...but 
grant us too the blessed assurance that nothing shall deprive us 
of that peace, neither ourselves, nor our foolish, earthly
desires, nor my wild longings, nor the anxious cravings of my 
heart."[31] So he has mixed feelings about Christianity, but in a 
different sense from what he had before 1838. Sometimes he has 
deep doubt, just like before: "^y doubt is terrible."[32] Yet he
knows that this is not the normal state of the Christian’s
consciousness. Even in this doubting situation, he does not want
to mix his tendency to think as a natural man thinks with the way
in which the Christian should think. In a sense, his criticism of
any mixing of these two standpoints is a form of his criticism of
his own doubt. Not only Hegel and Hegelian theologians, but
Kierkegaard himself with his non-Christian thinking is the object
of criticism.[333
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He found within himself all sorts of different trends which
could not be compatible with Christianity, so he depicted every 
different views of life through various pseudonyms.[34] That is, 
Kierkegaard found within himself the tendency to be an aesthete, 
the tendency to be an ethical person, the tendency to be a person 
in religiousness A, and tendency to be a Christian in the genuine
sense. As Josiah Thompson says,
Kierkegaard was emptying out his thoughts and feelings through 
his pseudonyms...[He] felt he must write, must drain the 
watershed of ideas and fancies that had built upon over the 
years.[35]
Hence the spheres of life developed in his pseudonymous writings
are a kind of idealization of the tendencies which he found within
himself.[36] Yet the more Kierkegaard thought of these tendencies,
the more he felt that to be a Christian should be different from
being an aesthete, from being an ethical person, and from being a 
person in religiousness A.[37] His pseudonyms show what are the 
possible ways to live in the world. These ways of life are
differentiated from one another. As Gardiner says, they are 
"designed to exhibit - from the inside - what it is like to 
envisage life within the perspectives identified."[38] In this 
sense, these pseudonyms are, as Martin Thust says, "Soren 
Kierkegaard’s marionette theatre."[39] Kierkegaard thus maintains 
his distance from the pseudonyms. So according to Kierkegaard 
himself, each pseudonym must be treated as a pseudonym.[40] 
Kierkegaard says that "the voice of the one speaking comes from me 
but it is not my voice, the hand writing is mine, but it is not my 
handwriting."[41] The views of life of the pseudonymous authors
must not be mixed with Kierkegaard’s own conclusive view. For, as
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Crites says, in Kierkegaard’s “pseudonymous writings he preserved 
a sharp distinction between his own person and the point of view 
of each particular work."[42] As we have indicated, these 
pseudonymous works provide us with the description of different 
views of life which Kierkegaard himself found within himself as
tendencies within him. This explains the fact that sometimes he
used some material from his own journal in the writings of his 
pseudonymous works.[43]
Each pseudonymous work treats a different problem, so each 
work is written from a different point of view.[44] We may say 
with Crites that “each [work] is a distinct work of art."[45] But, 
as Crites admits, there is also a kind of superstructure which 
combines these works[46], even though that superstructure is one 
which can be revealed and perceived only at the end of his 
authorship, not at the beginning.[47]
What I have described in the last few paragraphs was about
the content of his first authorship which is continued to 1846.
He said of this authorship: "My merit in literature is that X
have set forth the decisive qualifications of the whole of the
compass of existence with such dialectical clarity and so 
originally as has not, as far as I know, been done in any other 
literature...."(Journals. No. 601=JP, V, 5914(Pap. VII A 127), 
1846)
After finishing the first authorship, he felt that he had 
finished his literary activity.[48] He felt that his purpose had
been achieved with his first authorship in which he did maieutic
work of introducing his reader into Christianity.[49] However, 
gradually he realized that what was needed was direct witnessing 
to Christian truth.[50] Hence from this time on, Kierkegaard wrote 
books in which he more directly asserted the Christian 
message.[51] In this sense, the Postscript is the turning point of 
his entire authorship. In this situation (i.e., 1846-1848),
£di.f.yj-ng Hisfiaunses in ladiaia Moods (1847), Works of L ove (1847), 
Two Minor Ethico-Religjous Essays(1847. but published in 1849)» 
The Book on Adierf 1847. part of which is published in English
under the title, On Authority and Revelation) and parts of
Christian Discourses (but published in 1848) and of Sickness unto
Death[521 (but published in 1849) and of Training in
ChristianitvTS^I (but published in 1850) were written. In these 
works, as we have seen, he attempted to assert directly the demand
of Christianity. He directly bore witness to what Christianity
really is, and he thought from the Christian standpoint.
Then there was the Easter experience of 1848. He described
this in the following way:
NB NB Wednesday April 19, 1848.
My whole being is changed. My reserve and self-isolation
is broken - I must speak.
Lord give thy grace.(Journals. No. 747=JP, V, 6131(Pap. 
VIII A 640), 1848)
On the basis of this experience, he said: "Now, with God's help, 
I shall be myself, I believe that Christ will help me to be
victorious over my melancholy, and so I shall become a 
priest."(Journals, No. 748=JP, V, 6132(Pap. VIII A 641), 1848)
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He finally fully accepted the divine forgiveness of his sin.[54] 
This experience was a kind of confirmation of his desire to become
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a country parson. Even though he could not accomplish this wish, 
he, at the very least, realized that Christianity is something
that must be directly proclaimed. He no longer had to make use of
indirect communication by means of pseudonyms. Instead, he took 
up the more direct communication of Christianity and used the
Christian pseudonym "Anti-Climacus". Thus he said: "From now on
I shall have to take over clearly and directly everything which up 
till now has been indirect, and come forward personally,
definitely, and directly as one who wished to serve the cause of 
Christianity."(Journals. No. 808(Pap. IX A 218), 1848) For 
"[the] communication of Christianity must ultimately end in 
’bearing witness’, the maieutic form can never be final. For
truth, from the Christian point of view, does not lie in the 
subject (as Socrates understood it) but in a revelation which must 
be proclaimed."[55] During this time, he sometimes preached: on 
Sep. 1, 1848 in Vor Frue Church[56], and on May 1851 in Citadel
Church.[57]
The experience of 1848 was thus not one which caused 
Kierkegaard to understand Christianity differently from how he had
previously. Nor did he come to have a different attitude to
Christianity in the way in which this was the case in relation to 
his 1838 experience. Rather, this experience was a culmination of 
his thinking since 1846, after finishing the Postscript.f581 For 
we can see a clear line of continuity in the way in which he 
thinks of Christianity.[59] Now, as one who had finished the 
maieutic education of Christendom, he went on to direct
communication; "In Christendom the maieutic form can certainly be
used, simply because the majority in fact live under the 
impression that they are Christians. But since Christianity is 
Christianity the maieuticer must become the witness.”[60] There is 
therefore a sense of continuity between his maieutic communication
and the direct communication. As Crites says, during these years, 
Kierkegaard "kept interpreting the pseudonymous works, lest the 
reader miss the Christian point of the whole."[61] Indeed, 
Kierkegaard said that "Anti-Climaous repeats what is said in the 
pseudonymous writings."[623 In this way, the second period 
(1838-46) and the third period (1846-52) of Kierkegaard's life are 
closely related. There is an obvious connection and continuation 
of his understanding of Christianity.
Accordingly, even in this third period (1846-1852), he had 
exactly the same understanding of Christianity as he had had in 
the second period (1838-1846). He still thinks that the content 
of Christianity is something which is the opposite of what human 
beings as themselves can naturally think and accept.[63] 
Christianity is too much for human beings. Yet Kierkegaard, as he
saw things from a Christian standpoint in the second period 
(1838-1846), thought as a Christian. From this standpoint, he 
seemed to think in the following way. Even though Christianity is
something which goes against the natural man’s standpoint, we 
should accept this as truth, since God himself has affirmed the 
content of Christianity,[64] He confirmed that Christianity is 
against self-sufficient reasoning: "It has constantly been
maintained that reflection inevitably destroys Christianity and is 
its natural enemy."(Journals, No. 813(Pap. IX A 240), 1848)
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However, this does not mean that the Christian does not think; as
we have seen in the last section, there is definitely a "Christian
epistemological standpoint",[65] Here Kierkegaard called Christian
thinking a "godfearing reflection":
I hope, now, that with God’s help it will be shown that a 
godfearing reflection can once again tie the knot at which a 
superficial reflection has been tugging for so long. The 
divine Authority of the Bible and all that belongs to it has 
been done away with; it looks as though one had only to wait 
for the last stage of reflection in order to have done with 
the whole thing. But behold, reflection performs the opposite 
service by once more bringing the springs of Christianity into 
play, and in such a way that it can stand up - against 
reflection. Christianity naturally remains completely 
unaltered, not one iota is changed. But the struggle is a 
different one; up to the present it has been between 
reflection and simple, immediate Christianity; now it will be 
between reflection and simplicity armed with 
reflection.(Ibid.)
Thus, in this period (1846-1852), Kierkegaard was clearly aware of 
the difference between the Christian standpoint and the natural
man’s.
In relation to the theme of the difference between the
Christian standpoint and the natural man’s, we have to trace the
trend of thought in Kierkegaard’s time. Kierkegaard made it clear
that in his time there was a strong tendency to emphasize the
natural man’s standpoint. In one place, he satirized the fact
that this emphasis on the natural man’s standpoint had even
influenced Christianity:
[Nowadays the] fact that Pascal was a famous mathematician is 
almost to the credit of Christianity; in consideration of the 
fact one can listen to, and consider what he has to 
sav. (Journals. No. 1157=JP, HI, 31l8(Pap. X3A 641), 1850)
That is, in his time, people thought that Christianity was
something which was worthy to accept, because a famous
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mathematician like Pascal spoken well of Christianity. What 
Kierkegaard wanted to say was that these people tried to believe 
in Christianity not because it was what God had revealed, but 
because some rational man thought that Christianity was something 
which might be regarded as good. In another place he more
directly said:
I have often said that Christianity can be presented in two 
ways: either in the interest of man (an extenuating
adjustment) or in the interest of God (true Christianity). I 
have also said that if I do not succeed or dare to present 
Christianity in the latter form I shall admit it and keep the 
place free.
Hardly any of the early fathers present Christianity in 
God’s interest with the same emphasis as Tertullian.
Here Christianity is n&t a little. jaonalisiHE & £ew
articles. o£ faith; Christianity is the repigiijig .between 
and. the worii,. ihat is W Tertalilan fixei his .gaze so 
determinedly .u.por its ppjg-sltjej idglat.ry.
And now, long after Christianity has, as it is expressed, 
conquered and deposited a culture, Christianity and the world 
are so mixed up that the question must be expressed once again 
in a new potency: is Christianity of God or of man?
That is what filled people with enthusiasm in the early 
days of the Church, they felt quite literally that it was 
God’s matter which was being fought over, not just a few 
dogmas, but whether God was to be God.(Journals. No. 
1192(Pap. X 4 A 137), 1851)
Hence, according to Kierkegaard, only a presentation of 
Christianity which allows God to be God (a presentation of 
Christianity in which God is sovereign in every realm) is a true 
presentation of true Christianity, and the standpoint involved in
this presentation is the Christian standpoint. True Christianity
and the Christian standpoint should not be mixed with the natural 
man’s standpoint. Those who try to make Christianity acceptable 
to the natural man’s standpoint (and this inevitably Involves a 
change in the character of Christianity) do not realize ’’that
Christianity is God’s invention and, in a good sense, in God’s
interest."(Journals. No. 1200(Pap. X 4 A 212), 1851) In this
sense, we can see the clear emphasis on the difference between the 
pure Christian standpoint and one modified by the natural man’s 
standpoint, in this third period (1846-1952).
The most characteristic emphasis of this period, however, is
that one should live as a Christian, one who follows the example
of Christ. "It is the ’imitation of Christ’ that must now be
introduced," said Kierkegaard.[66] In contrast to the second 
period when this aspect had been less emphasized, he began to 
strongly emphasize the importance of imitating Christ. Hence, 
after making it clear that the Christian standpoint was 
fundamentally different from the natural man’s standpoint,
Kierkegaard through his second authorship, tried to emphasize the
importance of the peculiarity of the Christian way of living,
concentrating upon martyrdom.
We have to bear in mind that this emphasis on discipleship is
based on the belief in the God-Man as the Saviour. Even in this
period, Kierkegaard did not forget to mention Christ as the
God-Man and the Saviour.[67] He asserted that those who believe in
Jesus as the God-Man should follow him, imitate him as they could.
As we have seen several times, from the Christian point of view, 
it is a contradiction only to believe in the God-Man and not to
imitate the way Jesus lived in the world. For the Christian
belief in atonement does not allow a man to be indolent. Rather,
it makes a man endeavour to do what God has commanded him to do
from heartfelt thanks and in fear and trembling.[68] To repeat,
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according to Kierkegaard, the Christian should live as a
Christian; he should have a Christian mode of existence which is 
one with Christian thought. True "Christian knowledge" produces 
true "Christian life".(of. JP, II, 2303 (Pap. XI 2 A 191)» 
1854))
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Kierkegaard knew all this and even thought in this way. Yet, 
in a sense, he felt that this was not yet a description of his own
life. His own life did not meet the demands of Christianity as he
conceived that of a Christian should be. In this sense, he said
that "I am only a poet. "[69] He also added that he merely
described Christianity.[70] Here "poet" is used in the sense of
one who only describes the ideality, but he himself in his
concrete existence does not fulfil the ideality itself.[71] He
felt himself to have a "poet-existence".[72] This is, as we have
seen, the characteristic mode of existence of the aesthetic
sphere.[73] Thus Kierkegaard felt himself as an aesthete in
relation to Christianity.[74] He found himself as being someone
whom he satirized in the following passage:
If it were not in one sense madness it would be a good example 
of humour if a man were to say to God: although I was 
strictly brought up as a Christian I was, as you know, born in 
the 19th century and so have my share of the universal 
superstitious belief in reason etc. The humour lies in the 
’as you know *.(Journals, No. 1118=JP, II, 1764(Pap. X 3 A 
228), 1850)
Kierkegaard had within himself a kind of tension between the 
purely Christian standpoint and the tendency to think and live as 
a natural man who removed himself from God as far as possible.(cf. 
JP, VI, 6426(X 1 A 494))
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This gap between his Christian standpoint and his way of life 
was the reason why he published The Sickness unto Death and 
Training of Christianity under the pseudonym ”Anti-Climacus” who 
is "a Christian in an extraordinary degree”.[753 He had a kind of 
distance from what he described in these Christian books.[76] In
this sense, he could not dare to call himself a Christian. He
says: "Christianity is so infinitely elevated that I am no 
Christian.”[773 Even though he ”[presents3 Christianity in the 
glory of its ideality”[78], ”as a person [he does] not correspond 
to it.”[793 From this position he says that if he were left by God 
as he was, then he would not be a Christian at all and would have 
forgotten Christianity entirely.(Journals. No. 970=JP, VI, 
6500(Pap. X 2 A 61))
Kierkegaard knew that there should be continuity between what 
he thought of Christianity and his way of existence. The 
Christian way of living (which is bringing Christianity and the 
Christian standpoint into reality) is a scandal in this world, 
just as the Christian’s epistemological standpoint is an offence
to the natural man’s standpoint. The genuine form of Christianity
is regarded as something which is too much for human beings.
Kierkegaard, who knew that this was the case, found that he did
not reach his ideal.
What is interesting is that even though he himself had this
tendency to be a natural man, he nevertheless did not try to 
justify this tendency. He always regarded this tendency as 
temptation, a kind of attempt to distort true Christianity.(JP, 
VI, 6834(Pap. X 5 A 46)) He tried to keep the ideal of
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Christianity as it is, even at the risk of being forced to define 
himself as not being a Christian.[80]
The fourth and last period of his life (1853-1855) is 
characterized by the most direct attack upon Christendom, which he 
regarded as distorted Christianity.[81 ] In a sense, he wanted 
changes in the established Church. At the very least, he wanted
an official admission that there was something wrong with the 
established Church.[82] Therefore, he said that "we should at 
least be so honest towards Christianity as to admit openly what 
the state of affairs is."(LY, p. 45(Pap. XI, 1 A 63))
His main idea was to apply New Testament Christianity to the 
19th century Danish Church. According to his reading of the New
Testament, the New Testament did not recognize "any kind of 
Christian other than the 'disciple'."(Journals. No. 1287=JP, VI, 
6837(Pap. X 5 A 72), 1853) Even in his own days, all Christians 
had to be Christ's disciples who followed Jesus Christ in their
concrete life. Becoming disciples of Christ is only an act of
obedience to God. This obedience is something which must be here 
and now.(LY, p. 53(Pap. XI 1 A 91)) Yet in the problem of being 
disciples of Christ, "grace [is] in the first place".(Journals. 
No. 1289(Pap. X 5 A 101), 1853) Without grace, there is no
disciple in the New Testament sense of the word, there is no
possibility of obedience.
When we look at his later writings from the perspective which
I have described in the last paragraph, there is hardly anything
new in his demand to Christians and to the Christian Church to be
genuine. Almost everything had been already mentioned before, or 
was the logical conclusion of his previous assertions.[83] His 
sole demand was for genuine Christians and for a genuine 
Church.(LY, p. 6?(Pap. XI 1 A 136)) If, as we have seen, to be a 
Christian is a very decisive demand, then the logical conclusion
of this would be something like this:
Every effort to bring about a Christian state and a Christian 
nation is eo ipso unchristian, anti-Christian; for every such 
effort is only possible in virtue of a reduction of the 
definition of a Christian, and is therefore against 
Christianity, and tending to establish the false claim that we 
are all Christians, and that it is therefore very easy to be 
Christian.(LY, p. 334(Pap. XI, 2 A 374))
Accordingly, Kierkegaard — pace Pojman who asserts that "the
logical conclusion of Kierkegaard's scheme of the divine comedy is 
universal salvation"[84] — was very critical of the doctrine of 
universal salvation. "Christianity begins with one being saved," 
said Kierkegaard, "perhaps only one among millions, one in the
whole world. And now we are all saved, all of us, perhaps
including our cats and dogs - and this is...[Christendom’s]
Christianity."[85] In general, Kierkegaard’s later thought was not 
substantially different from his previous thought.[86]
However, during his later years, there were some emphases
which seemed to be too extreme. These were his emphases on 
asceticism, on being spiritual (which may even imply a kind of 
dualism between the spiritual and the physical), and on inwardness 
which resulted in a severe criticism of the system of infant
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baptism. We shall look at these points in turn.
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Let us first consider his emphasis on asceticism. In
relation to this theme, Luther and Lutheran Protestantism became
one of the main objects of the later Kierkegaard’s criticism. For
example, he says:
Luther really did incalculable harm by not becoming a martyr. 
Partly because it is a very awkward thing for a man who is 
marked out to be God’s man, as Luther was, to end his days in 
ordinary comfortable converse with devoted admirers and 
followers...If it is true that for a few years of his life he 
was salt, the last part of his life is not free from 
insipidity, and the Table Talk is an example: a man of God 
sitting comfortably installed, surrounded by admiring devotees 
who believe that if he simply lets fly...it is a revelation or 
the result of an inspiration.... By the last part of his life 
Luther accredited mediocrity. One does not normally realise 
that it requires a hero to accredit mediocrity for the first 
time. This hero was Luther. But the instant it is accredited 
nothing more is required but mediocrity - and in that we are 
blest above measure in Protestantism.[87]
We do not know exactly what made Kierkegaard think that the later
Luther did harm to Christianity. Probably, Luther became an
object of criticism mainly because of the worldliness of 
Protestant Christianity. By worldliness Kierkegaard meant that
the tendency to seek security and welfare in this world even using 
God and Christianity for this purpose. Kierkegaard thought that
the dominance of worldliness came mainly from a distortion and 
forgetting what Luther meant and asserted.[88] Hence Kierkegaard
says: "The place where we really have to begin again is with
Luther. It went a little too fast with this lumping together of 
secularity and religiousness."(JP, III, 25l8(Pap. X 3 A 153))
However, Kierkegaard in some places attributed partly to
Luther the dominance of worldliness in Protestant Christendom.
(Therefore, Kierkegaard’s relationship to Luther is
dialectical.[89]) So in the end, as we have seen in the quotation
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above, the later life of Luther, who was no longer persecuted by 
the world and the worldly Church, was described as being wrong. 
But Kierkegaard agreed with Luther that in the situation in which 
Luther was (i.e., the later Middle Ages in which the Church was 
corrupt), it was necessary to emphasize the Gospel in order to 
make people free from various human-made religious laws.[90] 
Kierkegaard said that "surely Protestantism, Lutheranism is really 
a corrective."[91] But when people begin to hear the good news of 
the Gospel without understanding its full meaning, then there is a 
danger that the message of the Gospel becomes a version of cheap 
grace: you can be a Christian without altering your ways of 
thinking and living. In this situation, "people [have] forgotten 
the point in Christianity: self-denial, while worldly well-being 
and soft-hearted mediocrity are idolised."[92] In this sense, he 
said again: "[The] result of having made Protestantism into the 
regulative has been to produce great confusion."[93] This did not 
imply that after doing the work of correction we should go back to 
Roman Catholicism or other human-made laws.[94] He simply was 
emphasizing that we should not change Christianity into a cause of
worldliness. In the Protestantism of Kierkegaard’s time there was
a danger that the Church had only the name "Christian Church", but 
in reality it was not the Churoh at all.(Cf. JP, II, 1762(Pap. X 
2 A 32), 1849) In this situation, "one is a Christian in [such a 
way that] it is impossible to be a Christian"(JP, II, 2068(Pap. 
XI 1 A 421), 1855))» "which incidentally is just as strange as 
someone’s being a violinist by virtue of not being able to play 
the violin."(JP, VI, 6850(Pap. XI 2 A 321))
Kierkegaard's criticism looks to be too extreme. Here is 
Kierkegaard’s point. He knew that he demanded too much, but he
also knew that this was what is demanded in the New Testament.
What he was asserting is: let us admit that we are not 
Christians; we have used the name "the Christian Church” in vain; 
and let us start again from this point. Then, try to imitate 
Christ abandoning our worldly well-being and soft-hearted 
mediocrity.[95] For Kierkegaard, there must be only one standard 
by which the Christian can live and be measured - that of the New
Testament. According to that standard, one should live as the 
Scripture demands; one should try to imitate Christ in his own
concrete life as far as one can do as an existential human being,
without having any consciousness of merits. In this standpoint,
asceticism is understood as "existing in order to hold the flesh
and the passions in check."(Journals. No. 1357(Pap. XI 1 A 551),
1854) Moreover, Kierkegaard's asceticism does not show any sign of
being morbid. Referring to Schopenhauer's edition of Indian (or
Buddhist) asceticism, Kierkegaard said:
Christian asceticism rests in the thought that to exist is not 
identical with suffering - and then there is meaning in the 
asceticism. If to exist were to suffer, then asceticism would 
easily become , which is precisely what Schopenhauer urges 
against the Stoics.[96]
Therefore, Kierkegaard’s emphasis upon asceticism appears
something which is somewhat different from what is normally taught 
in Catholicism, especially in the Middle Ages, and any other forms
of asceticism. Kierkegaard's asceticism does not attribute
anything meritorious to sacrificial actions. In this respect,
there is a continuity of his thinking between the third period
(1846-1852), in which Kierkegaard emphasizes Christian 
discipleship, and the final period (1853-1855), even though in the 
final period he emphasized the life of poverty more.
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Let us turn to the second emphasis: the emphasis on the
spiritual to the exclusion of the physical. In relation to this
aspect, we can see some negative phenomena. Until the third
period, he had a sense of balance between the spiritual and the 
physical.[97] He tended to think, according to the thought of the 
New Testament, that the spiritual should be regarded not as
something which excluded the physical; a human being as a whole
can be "spirit" in relation to God. However, in the final period 
(1853-1855), we see somewhat different element involved. For 
example, he writes:
By nature man makes the propagation of the species the central 
thing in existence, therein lies his whole egoism qua 
animal-creation, or it culminates there. Christianity would 
like to decentralise that attitude - and what struggles it has 
co st...
And then along comes Protestantism and introduces 
Christianity - in relation to marriage, marriage becomes what 
is pleasing to God. How disgusting, this lying Christianity 
which lies to mankind, partly because it is more comfortable 
to repeat the nonsense men talk, partly because the ’parson’ 
in his capacity of master of the stud and breeder is 
egoistically interested in increasing the herd, in seeing that 
procreation continues on a grand scale.(Journals, No. 
1385=E.P. IX, p. 305, 1854)
And in another place, he also said: "Creation is reserved to God; 
it is, if one may talk of such things, the highest autopathetic 
satisfaction. To give life is but a weak analogy thereto, and is
granted to man - and is the culminating point in human 
egoism."[98] This perspective results in a very negative view of 
woman.[99] In one place He said: "Perhaps she does save a man
Page 385
here and there from excesses, and make a decent man of him, but 
she corrupts all men who marry by reducing them to finitude and 
mediocrity.”[100]
If we compare these passages with some passages in the Attack 
upon Christendom, we can get some idea that in this period 
Kierkegaard looked very negatively on the physical aspect of human 
life. When we only look at these passages, it is understandable 
that some scholars think that Kierkegaard has a kind of dualism 
between the spiritual and the physical which is similar to what
the Manichaeans or the Platonists had.[101] Indeed, in one place 
Kierkegaard clearly expressed his negative view of the physical: 
"Man is a fallen spirit...[The] fallen spirit is punished by being 
put into a slave*s dress, which is the body, and sent to this 
penitentiary, which is the world, because of his sin."[102] It is 
very clear that what is expressed in this passage cannot be 
regarded as what Christianity teaches. The content of this 
passage is closer to Platonism or Manichaeism than Christianity. 
Thus, during his final period, Kierkegaard seemed to depart from 
his previous view that creation cannot be identical with the 
fall.(of. JP, II, 13O9(Pap. II, A 237), July 26, 1838) 
Therefore, in relation to his emphasis on the spiritual at the
expense of the physical, we see some discontinuity with his 
previous thinking.[103]
In relation to the Attack upon Christendom, we can point out
another example which is not altogether in keeping with his
Lutheran background: his attack upon infant baptism.[104] 
However, as some people saw[105], Kierkegaard did not have any
intention of abolishing the system of infant baptism. What he was 
attacking was the prevailing assumption that if a baby was 
baptized, then it was a Christian. Kierkegaard was emphasizing 
that if Christians wished to have infant baptism, they had to
emphasize the doctrine of regeneration as well. According to 
Kierkegaard, without regeneration, there is no Christian; one is
not a Christian in the proper sense of the word if one is not
regenerated, even though one was baptized when one was a 
baby.[106] His attack upon infant baptism was not an attack upon 
the system itself, but upon the non-Christian standpoint involved
in the misuse of this system.
It is generally true that Kierkegaard in these final years
takes some extreme positions. He wants to suggest extreme cases
in order to make people be aware of the seriousness of the problem 
of the worldliness of Christendom. As far as I can see, only in
relation to his emphasis on the spiritual at the expense of the
physical is there something which is outside the Christian
standpoint.
In this section, we have examined Kierkegaard’s journal
entries dividing his adult life into four periods. What we have
seen is that throughout these four stages, he always emphasizes
the difference between Christianity and the merely human
standpoint. In the first period, he emphasized this from the
perspective of the human standpoint. Thus in this stage 
Christianity appeared as something which must be attacked from the
purely human standpoint. In the rest of his life, he emphasized 
the difference between Christianity as God's thought (or God’s
Page 386
Page 387
invention) and the human standpoint from the perspective of 
Christian faith. In the second period (1838-46), he tried to show 
this difference through providing several different views of life. 
That was the main purpose of his first authorship. In the third 
period (1846-52), he was more direct, and tried to be a direct 
witness of Christian truth. However, throughout the second and 
third periods, he occasionally still had doubts about 
Christianity. Even he himself was not always faithful to the 
Christian standpoint which he had described, not to mention the 
Christian way of living. However, in spite of this, he did not 
compromise his understanding of Christianity. In spite of his own 
existential weakness, he tried, as far as he could, to keep 
Christianity and the Christian standpoint as they are.[1073 He 
thought that mixing the Christian perspective and the natural 
man's perspective in order to make many people enter into 
Christianity is "winning men over to Christianity by doing away 
with Christianity."(JP, VI, 6237(Pap. IX A 226)) In the final 
period there are many extreme assertions, but except for his
emphasis upon the spiritual at the expense of the physical, we can
say that even in this period he tried to keep the Christian
standpoint pure. In conclusion, therefore, we may say that
throughout Kierkegaard's life, he very clearly differentiated the 
Christian standpoint and the natural man’s standpoint, even though
he himself sometimes is not faithful to the Christian standpoint.
His attack upon the mixture of these two standpoints can be
understood as his criticism upon such a tendency - a tendency
which is also found within himself. As Fenger puts it,
"Kierkegaard is often his own worst enemy."[108]
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IV
In the previous sections, we have seen that Kierkegaard asserts
that what the Christian thinks to be true must be different from,
and antithetical to what the natural man believes to be true, even
though he himself sometimes has a strong tendency to mix these two 
different perspectives on truth. Especially, in his later works 
(which we examined closely in the second section) Kierkegaard 
clearly shows that the Christian standpoint must be very different
from the natural man’s standpoint. How about his early works? In
his early works, does he also show that the Christian must have
the Christian view of the world which is separated from the
natural man’s standpoint, or can the Christian standpoint stand
side by side with the natural man’s standpoint within the
Christian’s mind? This is a very interesting question which we
wish to consider in this section.
In this section, I want to consider one of Kierkegaard’s
early works: Philosophical Fragments. I select this text because
it is the text in which Kierkegaard most clearly considers the 
relationship between the natural man’s standpoint (the Socratic 
standpoint) and the Christian standpoint (even though he does not 
clearly say that he is considering "the Christian standpoint”, 
which appears only as a thought-experiment). This section 
explores the exact relationship between the Socratic standpoint
and the Christian standpoint.
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It is generally agreed by Kierkegaard scholars that the 
Socratic standpoint and the Christian standpoint are mutually 
exclusive. There are many commentators who emphasize this mutual 
exclusivity. Among them, we shall briefly discuss the 
interpretation of Per Lanning, Niels Thulstrup, Robert Perkins, 
and Gregor Malantschuk. To begin with, Per L/nning says as
follows:
The difference between a Christian and a Socratic (humanistic) 
conception of truth becomes nearly boundless. For Socrates - 
and all his successors - truth is, in principle, the secure 
possession of man; it is only a matter of ’’the teacher" 
helping "the disciple" to develop the knowledge which already 
lies latent in him. For Christ, on the other hand, it is a 
matter of communicating a truth from without to a person who 
is completely cut off from contact with the truth - something 
which can only happen when "the God’, in disguise, enters into 
man’s existence, and makes himself one with it, there it 
exists.[1]
Niels Thulstrup also makes a similar point in his "Introduction"
to Philosophical Fragments. After making it clear that the main
theme of this book is the relationship between the Socratic
standpoint and Christianity[2], he asserts that what we can learn
from this book ["what is new in this book"] is "the absolute
difference" which Kierkegaard points out actually lies between the
Socratic view and Christianity.[3] Let us hear his own words:
[What] is the relationship between [the Socratic view] and 
Christianity - are they identical, partially different, or 
entirely different; Can they be joined or are they essentially 
irreconcilable? The answer is that they are entirely 
different and are not reconcilable.[4]
He says again:
The originality [of this book] does not consist in the 
comparison of Platonism and Christianity, although this was 
and is exceptionally well done; it rather consists in pointing 
out the deep essential difference between Platonism and 
Christianity because of the fact of the Incarnation.[5]
Both Lanning and Thulstrup thus find the fundamental reason for 
the difference between the Socratic view and Christianity in the
fact of the Incarnation. But they do not say that the Socratic
view and Christianity differ only as regards to the fact of the 
Incarnation. Rather, what they say is that because of the 
Incarnation, there is a radical difference between the Socratic
and the Christian standpoints.
Perkins also observes that the Socratic view as a humanistic
view contrasts with the Christian view: "As opposed to the
Socratic or humanistic view that man is in possession of
sufficient powers, Kierkegaard suggests as an intellectual 
experiment that man is destitute of the truth, that he is in 
error.wC6j From this understanding, he draws out Kierkegaard’s 
motive for writing this book in this way: "Kierkegaard has
proposed as a project of thought that one examine an alternative
to humanism, and he differentiates the Christian from the
Socratic.... The result is that Kierkegaard’s reader is 
dialectically compelled to take one or the other alternative."[7]
Malantschuk also thinks that throughout his early
pseudonymous writings Kierkegaard has laid the groundwork for an
understanding of the difference between the human view of life and
the life-view which points toward the transcendent, and "he
completes the sharpest possible demarcation between the human and 
the Christian” in Ph il o so phi cal Fragment s.T 81 So according to him, 
this book may be properly regarded as an elaboration and full
explanation of the antithesis which Kierkegaard posed in the first
of the theses in The Concept of Irony, namely, that "the
Page 400
Page 401
similarity between Christ and Socrates consists essentially in 
their dissimilarity."(CI, p. 349)[9] Hence, there is a general 
agreement among Kierkegaard scholars that the Socratic and the 
Christian are mutually exclusive standpoints. [10]
Indeed, in the text itself, there is very clear sense of the 
antithesis between the Socratic and Christian epistemological
standpoints. The Christian standpoint is suggested as the case
when the situation is different from the Socratic. So
Christianity represented in the form of thought-experiment is 
valid only if things are to be different from what is supposed in 
the Socratic standpoint. Let us quote the paragraph by which the
scheme B starts:
If the situation is to be different, then the moment in time 
must have such decisive significance that for no moment will I 
be able to forget it, neither in time nor in eternity, because 
the eternal, previously nonexistent, came into existence in 
that moment. With this presupposition, let us now examine the 
relations involved in the question: Can the Truth be
learned?(PF, p. 13=PFS, p. 16)
So from now on Climacus describes the situation which is different
from that of the Socratic position. In this situation, the 
learner, in the antecedent state, is outside the truth(PF, p. 
13), or in Sin.(PF, p. 15=PFS, p. 19) Hence, "[now], if the 
learner is to obtain the truth, [then] the teacher must bring It 
to him, but not only that. Along with it, he must provide him 
with the condition for understanding it."(PF, p. 14=PFS, p. 17) 
So the teacher must be the saviour who "[restores the lost 
condition] and along with it the truth."(PF, p. 17=PFS, p. 21) 
This Teacher is the God-Man. And in this situation, "[the] truth, 
then, is that the learner owes him [the teacher] everything."(PF,
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p. 30=PFS, 38) As we have briefly observed, everything in this
thought-experiment is different from the Socratio standpoint. 
This description is that of the situation "if things are to be 
otherwise". Harry A. Nielsen is one of those who make this point 
clear. He says: "With the phrase ’if things are to be
otherwise’, Climacus breaks with the Socratic assumption and 
instead assumes that no man has the Truth."[11] Not only this 
phrase, but also the context makes it clear that it is almost
impossible to think otherwise. Hence, it is certain that the
Socratic and the Christian are mutually exclusive.
Some people, however, try to see this relationship from the
Socratic standpoint. For them, the Socratic is the normal
standpoint. So, in their view, everyone should adopt this 
standpoint, for in this world reason is sovereign. If there were 
something which intervenes into the process of the world (e.g., 
the God-Man who does not quite fit into the structure and process 
of the world), it must be regarded as something which does not fit 
at all. According to this view, the Socratic standpoint is what
is unqualifiedly valid for the realm of facts. According to them,
the Christian is one who normally takes the Socratic stance, but
occasionally believes something which does not quite fit into it.
To repeat, this world is the one in which one should live
according to the Socratic standpoint. But if there is something 
which does not quite fit into this standpoint, one may relate to
that object with faith. Except for that special relationship, he
should think and live according to the Socratic standpoint.
Hence, the Christian according to this view thinks that the
God-Man is essentially absurd.[12] In this view, one must relate 
to such a thing in a way which defies one’s understanding. This 
view thus sees the relation of Christianity and the Socratic from
the Socratic standpoint.
Here I want to ask an important question: how about
approaching the relationship between the Socratic and Christianity 
from the perspective of the Christian? In this section I shall 
attempt to describe the relationship from the perspective of the 
Christian. I shall make two points. First of all, from the
Christian standpoint, the Socratic view in religion is regarded as 
wrong. Secondly, if one becomes a Christian, then one sees the 
world anew, one’s whole view of things changes. Here the main 
question is: how much does his Christian standpoint affect his
view of the world? Let us consider these in turn.
Firstly, from the Christian standpoint, the Socratic view of 
religion is regarded as wrong. That is, there is a realm (i.e., 
religion) which one cannot approach with the Socratic 
presuppositions. Actually, many commentators think that in the 
context of Philosophical Fragments, the Christian standpoint
appears as true when one supposes that the Socratic is wrong. Let
us take some examples. Robert Bretall, in his introductory
remarks on Philosophical Fragments, says:
Now, says Kierkegaard, let us assume for a moment, merely as 
an ’experiment of thought’, that this immanent point of view 
(i.e., the truth as within ourselves) is not correct. Truth 
would then have to be brought to us from the outside; for 
mankind (on this second assumption) is not in the truth or the 
truth in him. He is rather in error...actively in error.[13]
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After describing the Socratic standpoint, Croxall also says: "But
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suppose Socrates is wrong? asks Johannes Climacus... Then. ..he 
[the learner] is untruth. How, then, can the learner acquire 
truth? Only if the teacher brings it to him."[14] So he presents 
Christianity as "an alternative view" to the Socratic view.[15] 
Dunning also speaks of Christianity in this book as "an 
alternative possibility", and continues: "In contrast to the
reasonableness of recollection, this notion [Christianity] 
involves a paradox... [The] Moment occurs when the eternal breaks 
in upon time."[16] These two standpoints (i.e., the Socratic and 
the Christian) are thus two contrasting attempts to see the realm 
of religion. There is no possibility of compromise. Nielsen
again makes an insightful comment: "Repeatedly, Climacus warns us 
that even the mildest sounding compromise with his severe
conclusion will tip us back into the Socratic position. ’If
things are to be otherwise’, and the Moment decisive, our break 
with Socrates must be clear and total."[17] So Nielsen also speaks 
of "two incompatible and fundamental positions".[18]
I agree with these commentators that in this book the
Socratic standpoint is the opposite of the Christian standpoint.
Especially, when we read closely the following passages, we cannot
help noticing the clear difference between them:
[If] the god did not come himself, then everything would 
remain Socratic, we would not have the moment, and we would 
fail to obtain the paradox [the God-Man].(PF, p. 55=PFS, p. 
68)
But if the whole structure is not Socratic - and this in what 
we are assuming - then the follower owes that teacher 
everything (which one cannot possibly owe to Socrates....)(PP, 
p. 61=PFS, p. 76)
These passages suggest that the relationship between the Socratic
view and Christianity must be that of either/or. If the Socratic
principle is correct, then Christianity is wrong. Likewise, if
Christianity is correct, then the Socratic is wrong. Malantschuk
says that ”if ’the God’ is truth, then Socrates* search and all
human searching for truth must be declared to be untruth. Here an 
either/or applies.”[19] And this either/or is the absolute 
either/or. ”If this [what Christianity is supposing] is not the 
structure, then we are left with Socratic recollection. ”(PF, p. 
62=PFS, p. 77) On the other hand, ”[if] the moment is to have 
decisive significance, ...then the break has occurred, and the 
person can no longer come back.”(PF, p. 19=PFS, p. 24) Based on 
this passage, Croxall asserts: ”If the Instant means anything, 
the new-born man cannot return to his previous stage [the 
Socratic], and unlike Socrates’ pupil, he will take no pleasure in 
remembering the past. ”[20] There is thus no possibility of 
both-and. So we may say that in this book the Socratic standpoint
and the Christian view in religion are mutually exclusive, and
from the Christian standpoint the Socratic view of religion is
wrong.
Moreover, there are some special terms which make this 
difference clear: ’sin*, ’new birth’, ’conversion’, ’atonement’,
and ’saviour*. I take the meanings of these terms in their
traditional senses. If one tries to change the meanings of these 
terms, as in some of modern theologians, then one may say that sin
is only moral deficiency, that new birth and conversion are
metaphors for a change in one’s way of behaviour, and etc. In
such a case, the Christian who has experienced the new birth is
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just one who sincerely carries out the Kantian categorical 
imperative in relation to Christ. But if we take the meanings of
these terms in their traditional senses, then I think that the 
Christian who is defined in reinterpreted terms (as in Kant etc.) 
cannot be regarded as a Christian by Kierkegaard. Let us briefly
discuss how these terms are used in this book.
"Sin" is something which does not appear in the Socratic 
standpoint. So here "sin” is not an eternal recollection of guilt 
or ignorance as we can find in Socrates’ religiousness. And it is
not something which is innate in man who is created by God. If
this were the case, it would mean that something is wrong with 
God’s creation itself. In this case, sin is not sin, and man has
no responsibility for sin. Rather, God is the one who is 
responsible for it. Moreover, in this case "he previously [before 
being born again] would have been merely animal, and that teacher 
who gave him the condition along with the truth would make him a 
human being for the first time."(PF, p. 15=PFS, p. 18) But, as a 
matter of fact, man once had the condition for understanding the 
truth, yet has been deprived of it. "This [deprivation] cannot 
have been due to an act of the god...or to an accident...; it must 
therefore have been due to himself."(PF, p. 15=PFS, p. 18) This 
is sin. So it is difficult to think that in this book the concept
of ’sin’ is treated as some metaphysical concept as some scholars 
think.[21] For here "sin", as in The Sickness unto Death, is 
treated as something which man has positively committed, not only
something from which he has suffered. It is true that man suffers 
from the consequences of sin, but sin is regarded as something
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which man has caused.
The concept of becoming a new creature is also represented as 
something decisive. Man was created as man. Even in the state of 
being a sinner, man is man; even though he has lost the condition 
for understanding the truth, he is still man. "But he becomes 
another man" in the moment in which God gives him the condition
for understanding the truth which the God-Man has revealed.
Climacus describes this process of becoming another man very 
carefully. He says: "[Not] in the jesting sense - as if he 
became someone else of the same quality as before - but he becomes 
a person of a different quality."(PF, p. 18=PFS, pp. 22f.) So 
this becoming a new creature is not becoming a man in the ethical
sense or in the sense of religiousness A. For this process is not
something which can be done immanently. That is, we cannot become 
a new creature by relying on our resources, however sincerely we
may endeavour to do so. This is a process which only God can
effect; it is possible to be a new creature only in the hand of 
God. In his discussion of Kierkegaard, Mackintosh describes this
as follows: "When He [God] recreates a man in and by faith, the
thing is done by breaking all ties with the past and calling into 
existence what, not only in figure but in fact, is a wholly new 
personality. Discontinuity is all, continuity has nothing to 
say."[22] We have already discussed the life-giving work of the 
Holy Spirit in relation to Kierkegaard’s later writings. The 
process of becoming a new creature described in the Fragments may 
be compared to this life-giving work of the Holy Spirit. Even
though Climacus does not mention the Holy Spirit, he nevertheless
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says that it is the work of God.
As a result of being a new creature, one consciously changes 
one’s course of life. This change is called conversion. Climaous 
says: "[As] a result of receiving the condition in the moment, 
his course [of life] took the opposite direction, or he was turned 
around."(PF, p. 18=PFS, p. 23) Here the change in one’s 
direction in life is clearly expressed. If he went in the
direction of Socrates before, he has now turned his direction from
that of Socrates to that of Christ.
For both of these processes (i.e., becoming a new creature 
and conversion), a ’’saviour” is necessary. The saviour who "does 
indeed save the learner from unfreedom, saves him from 
himself."(PF, p. 17=PFS, p. 21) This expression intimates that 
before being saved, man was bound and enslaved. Perhaps, this is 
a good place to recall the fact that Kierkegaard is a faithful
Lutheran. As understood by Luther, man is enslaved, in captivity.
So man needs a redeemer (or deliverer) who "redeems the learner
from the captivity into which he had plunged himself, and no
captivity is so terrible and so impossible to break, as that in 
which the individual keeps himself."(PFS, p. 21=PF, p. 17)
So far we have discussed several terms In the scheme B
(Christianity represented in the form of a thought-experiment), 
which cannot but give us the impression that Climaous uses them in 
a fairly traditional sense.[23] At the very least, it is obvious 
that Climaous does not use these terms as they are used by someone 
like Schleiermacher. So in relation to these terms, we also think
Page 409
that the Christian standpoint opposes the Socratic. The fact that
Cliraacus uses these terms in the traditional sense can thus be
further reason to support the view that from the Christian
standpoint the Socratic view in religion is wrong.
Here one may ask a very interesting question: in
Philosophical Fragments does Kierkegaard think that the object of
faith is absurd, only later to change his mind about it? Does he,
in fact, think of the God-Man from the Socratic view, but assert 
that one may believe in the God-Man, which is absurd, if one wants
to be a Christian? I think we can point out several points which
weigh against this suspicion.
First of all, Kierkegaard himself asserts that what is
expressed in Philosophical Fragments is only what is asserted by
Climacus. Climacus, who is not a Christian, asserts that the 
God-Man is absurd. But Kierkegaard himself, even in this period,
does not think that the God-Man is absurd.[24] As Sullivan says:
Kierkegaard did not believe that the God-man in history was a 
logical impossibility. He did not think that something could 
be truly illogical, yet existentially possible.[25]
Hence, according to Sullivan’s interpretation, Kierkegaard does
not think that the God-Man is absurd. This means that even in
this period, Kierkegaard believes that the Christian should not
consider the God-Man absurd, even while the God-Man seems to be
absurd from the Socratic standpoint. Therefore, as Thomas says, 
there is ”the logic of the Christian’s belief in God.”[26] Roberts 
also says that ’’faith has a definite logic, which to violate is to 
lose the faith.”[27] Thus, if the Christian does not think that
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the God-Man is absurd, then this means that according to 
Kierkegaard, the Christian should think from the standpoint of 
faith, not from the Socratic standpoint.
Secondly, there is some discussion about the meaning of the 
term "Forstand" ("understanding” or "the Reason") in this 
book.[28] We cannot know God by our reason. This is an eternal
truth. God is the Personal Spirit who can be known by us only
when He reveals Himself. The trouble is that we tend to think
that even God’s revelation is something which should not be
accepted. By doing so, we indirectly assert that our reason is
self-sufficient reason. Swenson says that in this book ’the
Reason’[Forstandi is "the self-assurance and self-assertiveness of
man’s nature in its totality."[29] Hence we have to question 
whether one should regard this state in which reason asserts its
self-sufficiency is in fact normal or rather something abnormal.
Thulstrup says:
The basis for this [offence] is man’s sin, which constitutes 
the absolute unlikeness and makes it impossible for the human 
being in his actual situation to grasp with his power the 
Miracle, the Absolute Paradox.[30]
So according to Thulstrup, it is because human beings are in sin,
that they cannot immediately respond to God’s revelation in a
proper way. Stendahl also says:
Christianity...knows why we are unable to understand the 
miracle [of the God-Man], It is because of Sin. Sin beclouds 
the human mind and makes it incapable of understanding the 
paradox [of the God-Man], Sin separates man from the truth by 
making the two unlike each other.[31]
Dupr/ is of the same opinion. He says that "revelation and
redemption, by which God comes into contact with him [man], become
contradictions in the situation of sin.”[32] If we take this 
interpretation, then ”the Reason”[Forstand 1 in this book is only
self-sufficient reason. The God-Man confounds self-sufficient
reason which does not function in the way in which reason should 
do. As Miller says, ”to the self-sufficient reason, [the God-Man] 
appears as the absurd, the enemy of reason, because
self-sufficient reason is offended....”[33] In relation to God and
what God has done, however, reason in its proper state should
accept them as they are, for God is sovereign, not reason. But
the man who is in sin would try to make reason to be sovereign
even in relation to God. Thus, self-sufficient reason asserts
that the God-Man is absurd. In a sense, this assertion is better
than trying to relate to the God-Man through one’s self-sufficient 
reason, and thereby changing the God-Man into something else, as
Hegel does. If we interpret the relationship between reason and
the God-Man in this way, we may say that even in Philosophical
Fragments Kierkegaard clearly shows that the natural man who is in
sin reacts against the God-Man and the Christian standpoint.
Therefore, we can say that from the Christian standpoint, the 
Socratic view in religion is wrong. This is very obvious from the
text of Philosophical Fragments.
Let us then turn to the second question in this section: if
one becomes a Christian, then does one see the world anew from the 
Christian point of view? Does one’s Christian view in any way
affect one’s way of understanding the world? This is a very
difficult question to ask, especially in the post-Enlightenment 
world. And Climacus does not give us a very clear answer to this
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question. However, there is, I think, some evidence in this book 
which compels us to the conclusion that the Christian tries to see
even the world from the Christian standpoint.
First of all, I think that we have to ask whether we can 
think of the Christian who has two different standpoints: the 
Socratic standpoint (which he takes when he thinks of the world) 
and the Christian standpoint (which he takes when he relates to 
the Christian God in faith). If this is the case, then the 
Christian is at the very least double-minded, and at the worst 
schizophrenic. Climacus describes the Christian as one who used
to have the Socratic standpoint but now has the new perspective on
life. So the Christian is one who has changed his life-view;
there is a clear break in his view of life. The Christian even
tries to see the world from this changed perspective. His 
Christian perspective is not the Socratic standpoint (which is 
sufficient within the natural realm) plus the Christian view of 
religion (which cannot have any relationship with the realm of 
phenomena).
In relation to this, we may consider the "Motto" of this
book: "Better well hanged than ill wed," which in fact comes from
Shakespeare’s Twelfth Night. Act 1, Scene v. Some critics 
interpret this motto as meaning that it is better to hang two 
things in parallel (just like hanging two things on the wall) than 
to mix them together. If this is the interpretation of this
motto, then the Socratic view and Christianity must be parallel, 
and each right in its own realm. Only the mixture of them (e.g., 
Hegelian philosophy) is the object of criticism in this book.
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But I think it may be better to interpret this motto as in
the original Shakespearean context. Croxall explains the meaning
of this motto in the context in the following way: "Actually what 
Shakespeare wrote (they are the clown’s words to Maria when she 
threatens that her mistress will hang him for absenteeism) is, 
’Many a good hanging prevents a bad marriage.’”[34] So Croxall 
makes it clear that "hanging” in this context is not something 
like hanging something on the wall, but hanging as a means of
execution. Niels Thulstrup also interprets this motto in this way 
and he relates this hanging to the crucifixion.[35] In the new 
English translation of the Fragments. Hong and Hong also adopt 
this way of interpreting this motto.[36] Mackey also intimates a 
similar way of interpreting it.[37] I also think that it is more 
natural to interpret "hanging" as "hanging as an execution" than
to interpret it as "hanging on the wall." If we adopt this
interpretation, then the overall motive for writing this book can
be interpreted as showing that it is better to be put to death
than to try to simultaneously have the Socratic and the Christian
in any way. To be a Christian is the crucifixion of the natural 
understanding on the cross of the Paradox of the God-Man.(cf. 
CUP, pp. 531» 496, 501) In this case, the Socratic and the 
Christian appear as two things which are opposed to each other. 
So here, in relation to the "Motto" of the Fragments, we can have
still further reason to support the view that from the Christian
standpoint the Socratic view is wrong. Hence, it seems to me very 
difficult to say that the Christian has in his mind two different
kinds of truth: the Socratic and the Christian. One cannot
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simultaneously have these two epistemological standpoints. What
is demanded is either the Socratic or the Christian
epistemological standpoint. Insofar as the Christian is one who 
has an integrated view of life, we may say that he tries to see
even the Socratic realm from his Christian standpoint.
Secondly, let us think of the Christian’s conception of God.
In Philosophical Fragments God is described as ’’the God in time”.
Within the Christian perspective, God is understood as one who can
enter into the realm of time and space. We might even say that
God has entered into the Socratic realm. From the Socratic view,
this God who entered into the Spcratic realm is understood as
absurd, or a contradiction in terms; this particular individual
who indicates that he is the God-Man cannot be God at all. But
from the Christian perspective, he is the God-Man. Hence, from 
the Christian perspective, God can enter into the Socratic realm
which tries to exclude this kind of God. From the Christian
perspective, the God who cannot enter into the realm of time and
space is not God at all. And if the God-Man in time and space is
God at all, He should be regarded as the Lord of this realm as
well. He cannot be understood as one who must be subjected to the
rule of reason. Neither can he be understood merely as one who is
the law-giver of the natural realm and cannot break the natural
law, as understood by the deists from the seventeenth century
onwards. Then, He must be understood as the Lord of even the 
Socratic realm. From this perspective, the Christian tries to
relate the natural realm (Socratic realm) to God. For him, the
natural realm is not one which is autonomous and out of the reach
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of God. Hence one can make a point that the Christian tries to
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see the world from his Christian standpoint.
Thirdly, let us think of the state in which our reason is.
We have already discussed that in this book Forstand 
(understanding, or the reason) is understood as self-sufficient 
reason. How does Kierkegaard think of this self-sufficient
reason? There are some scholars who assert that according to 
Kierkegaard, our reason (which is regarded as of prime importance
in the Socratic view) is also under the influence of our sin. 
Pojman makes this point when he says that ’’the faculties of 
reason, emotion, and volition [are] all affected radically by 
sin.”[38] Nielsen also says: ”In short, if sin is an
"existence-determinant” that saturates the total life of an
individual, then it holds in the domain of thoughts as well as of 
conduct and feeling."[39] Miller also says that "reason is itself 
a human faculty susceptible to sin."[40] According to this 
interpretation, "what God has done for man" appears to be absurd
to human reason not because what God has done is essentially 
absurd, but because human reason functions wrongly. If there were 
no sin, man could immediately respond to God with his reason,
feeling, aua KlJ, that is, with his whole, .pens&ii. That is, he 
would be subject to God even in his use of reason as well as in
his emotion and volition. In describing this situation, Climacus 
says: "Inasmuch as the learner exists, he is indeed created, and, 
accordingly, God must have given him the condition for 
understanding the truth."(PF, p. 15=PFS, p. 18) This may mean 
that in the original state, man had immediate faith in God, and
that, in this faith relationship, when he thought he could accept
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the truth.[41]
But as we have seen, man has now lost this condition. He is 
in sin. Since there is sin, man now does not respond to God in a
proper way with his reason and feeling and will. Climacus says:
"The untruth...is not merely outside the truth but is polemical 
against the truth."(PF, p. 15=PFS, p. 19) This is the reason why
man in the untruth asserts that the Christian assertion that the
Christian should think of the world from the Christian standpoint
is absurd. Against this Christianity asserts that "the 
understanding [reason] is absurd"(PF p. 52=PFS, p. 65); "the 
paradox [of the God-Man] has made the understanding [reason] the 
absurd, what the understanding regards as very important is no 
distinguishing mark."(PF, p. 52=PFS, p. 65)
These passages admit of two kinds of interpretation.
According to one interpretation, the only object to which reason
cannot properly relate is the God-Man. According to this
interpretation, there is a normal realm in which reason is 
sovereign and to which there is but one exception, the God-Man.
In this view, the Christian standpoint must be something like the
following: as far as the things in the natural realm are
concerned, one should think as the natural man thinks, but only in 
relation to the things which are beyond the natural realm, may one
believe something which does not fit the Socratic standpoint.
Only in relation to religion is the Christian's somewhat different
from the natural man's standpoint. So the Socratic standpoint
must be sustained even if one adopts the Christian standpoint. In
contrast to this, there is another interpretation which runs as
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follows: reason becomes sinful when it asserts itself to be
sovereign. For if the God-Man is the truth and therefore the 
revealer and teacher of the truth, he must be the Lord even of the
things in the world. So everything in the world, including man 
with his reason, should be subject to Him. It is true that even
for the Christian, there is a difference between "things over
which man has control" and "the paradox of the God-Man over which
man has no control". But the Christian, after relating to the
God-Man in faith, thinks that even in relation to things over 
which man has control he should be subject to God. In this sense,
his reason is no longer a self-sufficient reason.
Climacus uses the expression "the Reason is set aside"(PFS, 
p. 79), or ’’the understanding is discharged. "(PF, p. 64) Let us 
briefly consider exactly what happens when "the understanding is
discharged". Does this mean that one’s thinking faculty ceases to
work if one has faith? I think it is difficult to answer this
question affirmatively. I do not believe that Kierkegaard thinks 
that the believer has no thinking at all in relation to the
God-Man. His faculty of thinking is still working even after
becoming a Christian. Yet, his faculty of thinking now works
differently from when he was not a Christian. Now he thinks that
he has to think and live in accord with what God thinks and has
revealed. So as a Christian he does not cease to think, and in 
his thinking, his faculty of thinking is subject to God and to 
what God has done.[42] Indeed, Kierkegaard is strongly opposed to 
giving up thinking as a Christian, and he emphasizes that one’s 
standpoint must be different from when he was not a Christian.[43]
Hence, as Shestov says, "it would be mistake to think that [the 
paradox of the God-Man] signifies in itself the end of 
thinking."[44] Therefore, the Christian thinks of the world as a 
man of faith. According to Christianity, this is the way in which 
one’s faculty of thinking should function. That is, even one’s 
reason should be subject to God. So the difference between "the 
reason against the paradox of the God-Man" (reason in offence, or 
the reason of the non-believer) and "the reason [which sets] 
itself aside"(the reason of the believer) is the difference
between the self-sufficient reason and the reason which subjects
itself to God. Hence, according to the Christian, the way in
which the Christian’s reason functions is in fact the proper way
for one’s reason to function.[45]
According to this state of mind, the Christian’s assertion
that he sees the world from the perspective of his Christian faith
is not absurd, but is true. However, this statement, for the
believer, is not the truth in the sense that the natural man
conceives of truth. For example, it is not truth as Hegel
conceives of truth, nor as Socrates does. But it is truth as the 
genuine Christian should conceive of truth (i.e., who God is, and 
what God has done) in relation to God. The Christian has changed 
his conception of truth. Now as a Christian he thinks that
Hegelian conception of truth is wrong, and he is against the
Enlightenment conception of truth in general. If we take this 
interpretation, then "the Reason"TForstand 1 in this book is only 
self-sufficient reason. The Christian standpoint confounds
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self-sufficient reason which does not function in the way in which
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reason should do. In relation to God and what God has done, 
however, reason in its proper state should accept them as they 
are, for God is sovereign, not reason. But the man who is in sin
would try to make reason to be sovereign in the world.
For those who are not still convinced that even in this book
Kierkegaard indicates that the Christian should see the world anew
from his Christian standpoint, I would suggest comparing 
Kierkegaard’s Christian with the believer as understood by Rudolf 
Bultmann. As is well known, Bultmann clearly separates the realm 
of facts and the realm of faith. If Kierkegaard's Christian is 
Bultmann’s believer, then he has the Socratic standpoint in
relation to the things in the world, and only in relation to faith 
he takes the Christian standpoint. In this case, both the 
Socratic and the Christian are trues the Socratic standpoint is
true in the Socratic realm and the Christian standpoint is true in 
the realm of faith. However, can we say that this is the case in 
Kierkegaard’s early thinking? I strongly doubt this. As I have 
discussed in this section, even in Philosophical Fragments
Kierkegaard gives some indications that the Christian tries to see
even the world from the Christian standpoint. For the Christian
the so-called Socratic realm is not an autonomous realm in which
self-sufficient reason is sovereign.
Let us summarize our supportive arguments for the Christian
view of the relationship between the Socratic standpoint and 
Christianity. According to this interpretation of the book, 
everyone in the world thinks and lives by the Socratic standpoint,
some in accordance with its ideal form and the rest adopting
somewhat distorted forms of it. (For this, see the first section 
of this chapter). But according to Christianity (as stated in the 
thought project which is contrasted with the Socratic standpoint), 
the Christian should not think and live by the Socratic
standpoint. If the so-called Christian thinks and lives according
to the Socratic standpoint, he is not a Christian in the genuine
sense of the word. In this view, the Christian is one who thinks
and lives according to a standpoint which is in stark contrast to
the Socratic standpoint. Thus, there must be a change in one’s
mode of existence, the new birth, in order to be a Christian.
This new birth involves a change in one’s standpoint as well.
After that new birth, the Christian should think and live only
according to the Christian standpoint which contrasts with the 
Socratic. Before becoming a Christian, one believes that human 
beings alone can discover the truth.(of. JP, II, 2266=Pap. II A 
523(1839)) But now, after becoming a Christian, one should think 
that insofar as one does not relate to God in the way in which God 
intends, one is in error. Formerly, he thought that sin concerns
only one's moral deficiencies: but now he thinks that sin
concerns every aspect of the human being - cognitive, emotive, and
volitional. Formerly, he thought that the realm of reason should
be autonomous and even God should be subject to the rule of
reason: but now he thinks that even the realm of reason must be
subject to God, that God must be sovereign even in the realm of
reason. Formerly, he thought that the God-Man was a contradiction
in terms: but now he passionately accepts the fact of the
God-Man. Now, for the Christian, ’’just as truth is index sui et
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falsi [the criterion of itself and of the false], so also is the
paradox [of the God-Man],...”(PF, p. 50=PFS, p. 63) Now he
thinks that the historical fact of the God-Man is the absolute
fact which can be contemporary with every generation. By the 
’’absolute fact’’ Kierkegaard does not mean that the fact of the
God-Man is an eternal fact as in the sense in which Hegel does. 
For Kierkegaard, the absolute fact is ”a historical fact."(PF, p. 
1OO=PFS, p. 125) There is no other absolute fact except the 
historical Jesus who is the God-Man. However, as a historical
fact, the fact of the God-Man differs from all other historical 
facts, for unlike them it can be contemporary with every
generation. Climacus says:
[Whatever] can be apportioned essentially by time is eo ipso 
not the absolute, because that would imply that the absolute 
itself is a casusT461 in life, a status in relation to 
something else, whereas the absolute, although declinable in 
all the casibus of life, is continually the same and in its 
continual relation to something else is continually status 
absolutus. But the absolute fact is indeed also 
historical.(PF, pp. 99f.=PFS, p. 125)
In this sense, the fact of the God-Man is called the absolute fact
in Philosophical Fragments. To reiterate, before becoming a
Christian one thinks that there is no such thing as the absolute
fact, but now the Christian thinks that the God-Man is the
absolute fact. Formerly he felt that essentially there was no
need of a divine teacher, but now he thinks that without the
God-Man as the divine teacher he cannot know the conclusive truth
at all. It would be a very long list, if we were to continue in
this manner, but I think this suffices to show that even in
Philosophical Fragments Kierkegaard indicates that the Christian
standpoint differs radically from the Socratic. Hence, according
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to our view, in this book the Socratic standpoint as a whole is
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contrasted with the Christian standpoint. What Climacus tries to
do is to set us before the either/or: either the Socratic
standpoint or the Christian standpoint. According to this view,
there is no such thing as thinking on the basis of the Christian 
standpoint only in relation to the God-Man and faith, and in
relation to everything else, thinking on the basis of the Socratic
standpoint. Christian revelation does not concern only what is
called spiritual in the restricted sense of the word; rather, it
concerns reality as a whole. Reality as understood by God is the 
truth. If this is so, reality partly understood correctly (i.e., 
as it is understood by God) and partly understood incorrectly is 
not the truth. Even though one can correctly know several facts,
unless these are related to God,,one’s knowledge is only partially 
true.[47] In this sense, according to our view, only in relation 
to God can one have the truth. Until one has the right 
relationship to God (i.e., insofar as one continues with the 
Socratic standpoint), one does not have the conclusive truth. 
This is the reason why the Christian tries consistently to
contrast the Socratic and Christian standpoints. The Christian
standpoint is opposed to the Socratic standpoint, and the
Christian sees the world anew from his Christian standpoint.[48]
That is, according to this view, the Christian should abandon the
presuppositions and general orientation of the Socratic standpoint
which he had in common with other persons before becoming a
Christian.[49]
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What I am arguing in this section is not that this way of 
interpreting Philosophical Fragments is the only way to interpret 
this book. But I think that this interpretation of Philosophical 
Fragments should be regarded as a viable one. For the person who 
accepts this interpretation, Kierkegaard’s early writings seem to 
have a kind of continuity with his later writings after 1846[5O], 
in which Kierkegaard clearly shows that the Christian standpoint 
as a whole is fundamentally different from the natural man’s
standpoint. But for the person who does not accept our 
interpretation, Kierkegaard’s early writings are somewhat 
different from his later writings; then, he has to say that there 
is a change in Kierkegaard’s thinking or in the way he expresses
his thought. I do not judge this matter here, but leave it to the 
judgnent of each reader. I merely want to suggest that it is
possible to interpret Philosophies! Zcagmejat^. in the way I have
described in this section.
***««
What then can we say in concluding on Kierkegaard’s views on the
question of epistemological standpoints? We have seen in the 
first section what the presuppositions and general orientation of 
the natural man’s standpoint are. In that section, we have seen 
that for the natural man, reason as self-sufficient is either the
absolute criterion of all things, or is that to which all things
must be plausible according to its judgement, even when those 
things fall outside the realm of pure reason. In contrast to this
natural man’s standpoint, the Christian standpoint, which we have
examined in the second section, is one which tries to subject
everything to God. We have seen that the Christian depicted in 
Kierkegaard’s writings asserts that not only in relation to the 
God-Man, but also in relation to other things, should one subject 
oneself to God. Kierkegaard himself sometimes finds that this is
too much for human beings, but nevertheless he says that we should
try to keep the pure Christian standpoint as it is, and not to try 
to mix this with the natural man’s standpoint (third section). In 
the last section, we have considered the question of whether or
not Kierkegaard’s early writings are consistent with his later
writings in this matter. Through an examination of the
relationship between the Socratic and Christian standpoints in
Philosophical Fragments, we have argued that at the very least it
is possible to interpret this book consistently with his later 
writings, even though there is room for different interpretations
because of the ambiguities of the text.
Based on this examination, we could conclude this chapter by 
saying that it is clear that in his later writings, Kierkegaard
thinks that the Christian epistemological standpoint is different 
from the natural man’s standpoint (so that becoming a Christian 
involves a change in one’s epistemological standpoint); and that 
it is possible to say that even in his early writings, Kierkegaard
thinks that the Christian should think differently from the
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natural man,
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Conclusion
We have now reached the end of our quest to understand the
relationship between the ethical sphere and Christianity in 
Kierkegaard’s thought. As suggested in the introduction to this 
study, we found that in Kierkegaard’s writings there was a very
strong emphasis on the difference and discontinuity between these 
two spheres. Let us (1) briefly summarize the discussion of this 
study, then (2) draw out some implications for Kierkegaard’s 
theory of the existence-spheres as a whole and (3) suggest some 
implications for Christian theology today.
We started by asking whether there is a difference and 
discontinuity between "rationalistic ethics" (the ethics of the 
person who is in the ethical sphere) and Christian ethics. {See 
Chapter One.} In the examination of Fear and Trembling we found 
Johannes de Silentio, the pseudonymous author of the book, could
not accept and understand Abraham’s act of faith. In this
examination, we saw that Johannes de Silentio had a religiousness
which was compatible with the ethical sphere. In this book, we
have also seen that there was some indication that the Christian
who has faith regards as ethical only loving others in the 
Christian way. Here we saw a hint of a new ethics which follows
from faith.
To answer the question as to whether there is any clear
description of this new ethics, we turned to Works of Love. In
this book, we identified the ethics of Christian love, according
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to which only a ethic based on a stance of faith is regarded as 
"genuine morality"(WL, p. 42). Christian love was analyzed as 
(1) love as a response to the trinitarian God’s love, (2) love 
which has God as its middle term, and (3) love which has social 
implications. In the course of our discussion, we found that
Christian love was regarded as something wholly different from
merely human love. Therefore, we concluded this section with the
assertion that the ethics of Christian love was different and
discontinuous from merely human love.
In the next section, we examined Christian ethics as the
ethics of Christian discipleship. Through an examination of some
parts of .Philosophical. fra.gme.rits and Xraining in Christianity we 
argued that Christian ethics, as understood by Kierkegaard, is 
different from merely ethical discipleship and semi-Pelagianism. 
It is not merely ethical discipleship, in that only in relation to 
God (to put it more clearly, under God’s grace) can one follow 
Christ. It is not semi-Pelagian in that even though the Christian 
endeavours to follow Christ, this endeavour itself comes from 
gratitude for God’s redemptive work. Moreover Kierkegaard’s
Christian does not attribute any merit to his own endeavour. We
concluded in this section that Kierkegaard’s Christian ethics was 
the ethics of Christian discipleship; only those who became
Christ’s disciples by believing that he is the God-Man could
follow Christ
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Throughout this chapter’s discussion we argued that Christian
ethics was not only different from the ethics of the ethical
person, but also antithetical to it. For ethics based on merely 
human love was criticized severely in Works of Love, and the 
merely ethical discipleship and semi-Pelagian discipleship were
regarded as misunderstandings of Christian ethics.
We turned, in the second chapter, to the consideration of the 
problem of becoming oneself. In this chapter, we firstly examined
the second volume of Either/Or, and found that for the ethical 
person, to be oneself was (1) to be ethical, (2) to choose oneself 
in one’s eternal validity, and (3) to be the absolute self. So we 
argued that the ethical self was an autonomous self which tried to
be itself by itself, and which almost made itself the absolute. 
Therefore, for the ethical person, in the final analysis, the self
became almost divine.
In contrast, the Christian self is totally dependent on God
in its becoming itself. We drew this conclusion from an 
examination of The Sickness unto Death. In our examination, we 
argued that even though there were some ambiguities in this book, 
despair as sin was clearly understood only by the Christian who 
believed in the forgiveness of sin by God and had faith. Only the 
existing individual who is in faith is regarded as overcoming the 
despair and having become a "self” (or "spirit’’). Thus, we 
identified the difference and discontinuity between the ethical 
understanding of the self and the Christian understanding of the 
self. We pointed out that in their understandings of the eternal, 
of the power of self, these two viewpoints were different from one
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another.
In the last section of this second chapter, we raised the
question of the understanding of the self of the person in
religiousness A. This question was raised because the person in 
religiousness A (which seemed to be quite compatible with the 
ethical sphere) asserted that one could be oneself only in 
relation to God. Therefore, we asked what he meant by "only in
relation to God". By an examination of the Socratic understanding 
of this phrase, and an analysis of Socratic inwardness, we argued
that those in religiousness A had a different God, or different
conception of God, from the Christian God. We also argued that
this difference between their respective conceptions of God was
the fundamental reason for the difference between the Christian
understanding of becoming a self and that of the person in
religiousness A. Through the discussion of this section, we found 
that insofar as one held such Socratic presuppositions, one’s 
religiousness could not be Christian religiousness.
In the third chapter, we examined the problem of
epistemology. Firstly, we drew out, from Kierkegaard’s various
pseudonymous writings, the presuppositions and epistemological
standpoint of the natural man. Then, we compared this with the
Christian epistemological standpoint which was drawn from
Kierkegaard’s later writings. We argued that in his later
writings there were very clear indications that the Christian has
an epistemological standpoint which is substantially different
from that of the natural man
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We turned then to an examination of Kierkegaard’s journal
entries in order to discern whether he himself always thought
according to his descriptions of how Christians should think. In
this examination, we found that he himself showed that he could
not always think in the way which he asserted that the Christian
should think. Nevertheless, we also found that in spite of this,
he did not compromise and say that it was proper and inevitable
for us to mix the Christian standpoint and the natural man’s
standpoint. Rather, he strongly resisted the Idea that such a 
mixture was Christian. Here we found one of the main reasons why
he always hesitated to call himself a Christian.
Next we returned to one of Kierkegaard’s early pseudonymous 
writings, Philosophical Fragments, to show that Kierkegaard’s 
ultimate intention in writing this book can be interpreted in a 
manner consistent with his later writings. We argued that even 
though, because of the ambiguity in this book, there are other 
ways of interpreting it, it is also possible that the Socratic 
standpoint and the Christian standpoint are two exclusive views of
reality as a whole, and that even in this book Kierkegaard tried
to show the difference and discontinuity of the Socratic 
(humanist) standpoint and the Christian standpoint. According to 
this interpretation of Kierkegaard’s intention, he who has the 
Christian point of view should see and consider everything from 
the Christian standpoint; for him, there is no autonomous realm to 
be thought of from the Socratic (humanistic) standpoint.
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Therefore, we can now conclude that for Kierkegaard Christian 
ethics follows from Christian theology (his Christian theistic 
faith), and the understanding of becoming oneself also follows 
from the Christian’s stance of faith (so that the Christian self 
is regarded as the "theological self”), and his epistemological 
standpoint is also Christian. For Kierkegaard’s Christian, as
Kierkegaard interpreted Paul, whatever comes not from faith is 
sin.(of. JP, III, 3194(Pap. X 1 A 392); SUD, p. 100) In this 
sense, there is a wide gap between the Christian sphere and the
ethical sphere, or to put this another way, their direction is 
different: one is theistic and one humanistic. For Kierkegaard, 
to be a Christian thus involves a change in one’s ethics, in one’s 
understanding of becoming oneself, and in one’s epistemological
standpoint. This study is of value if it makes clear the
difference between the ethical sphere and the Christian sphere.
At the very least, if this study has aroused the reader’s
attention in such a way as to make indifference impossible, then
it has performed its function.
Let us, then, turn to the consideration of
of this discussion.
the implications
Firstly, what are the implications of this study for 
Kierkegaard’s theory of spheres of life as a whole? The answer to
this question can be inferred from the relation between the 
ethical sphere and the Christian sphere (which was the main theme 
of our discussion) and the relation between the ethical sphere and 
religiousness A, and between religiousness A and the Christian 
sphere (at which we have glanced briefly in the course of the
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discussion). We have already seen that there is a clear-cut 
distinction between the ethical sphere and the Christian sphere.
We have also seen that religiousness A is quite compatible with 
the ethical sphere. And we argued that religiousness A and the
Christian sphere are far apart. They are different not simply in 
degree but in kind. Therefore, if we place these (i.e., the 
ethical, religiousness A, and religiousness B) side by side, we 
cannot help noticing that the gap between religiousness A and
Christianity is wider and deeper than that between religiousness A
and the ethical sphere. Since we have not discussed the aesthetic
sphere extensively, it would be somewhat unfair to make any
conclusive statements about the interrelationship between the 
aesthetic sphere, the ethical sphere, religiousness A, and 
religiousness B. However, insofar as the aesthetic sphere, with
the ethical sphere and religiousness A, is regarded by Kierkegaard
as being immanent in the sense that it does not know of real
transcendence, it is not too far from the truth to say that there
is the most serious either/or between these three immanent
life-views on the one hand, and the Christian sphere, on the
other.[1] For, as Stephen Crites says,
[Once] the category of [the Christian] faith in the absolute 
paradox is rigorously enunciated, all the intervening stages 
lose their sharpness of definition in this new light. They 
are reduced to more or less complex modes of recollection, and 
we are left with the simple alternatives: Socrates or Christ 
- either/or.[2]
The leap of faith is only applicable in relation to Christian
faith in the God-Man. It is true that there are also leaps 
between these three life-views (the aesthetic sphere, the ethical 
sphere and religiousness A). However, these are only within
immanence. As far as these leaps within immanence are concerned,
there is no need of the God-Man’s help; man can by himself make
these leaps. Only the leap of the Christian faith is something
which man cannot make fcy himself. It is something which can be
done only in relation to, or by the aid of, the God-Man.
Moreover, when we think that the Socratic is the highest within
the immanent life-views, we can have a kind of hierarchical system
between the three life-views of immanentism. However, all our
human attempts become nothing in the face of the God-Man. As
Climacus says:
Because of the Moment the learner is in Error; and man, who 
had [been understood] before [being] possessed self-knowledge, 
now becomes bewildered with respect to himself; instead of 
self-knowledge he receives the consciousness of sin, and so 
forth; for as soon as we posit the Moment everything follows 
of itself.(PFS, p. 64)
If there were no such thing as the Christ event in this world,
then each of us should try to be a Socrates. The Socratic
standpoint is the highest ideal for humanity. However, in the
face of the God-Man, the Socratic standpoint is declared to be
wrong. In this sense, there is a substantial gap between the
life-views of immanence and Christianity.
Hence we may say that the ethical life-view taken as a whole
is totally different and discontinuous from the Christian
life-view taken as a whole. Accordingly, we have to say that
being a Christian and being an ethical person are alternatives.
The relationship between the ethical sphere and religiousness A
may be considered as that of progression. For, as we have seen, 
religiousness A is quite compatible with the ethical sphere. By
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maximizing subjectivity without making any change in one’s
epistemological standpoint, the ethical person can become a
religious person, and in this case, his religiousness is 
religiousness A. But it is very difficult to say that one goes 
from the ethical or religiousness A to the Christian sphere in a 
similar way. Here the word "leap" has to be used in its genuine 
sense. First of all, this leap is not possible by one’s own 
power. Secondly, if one makes this leap of faith by receiving the 
condition from God, then one should change (1) one’s ethics, (2) 
one's understanding of oneself, and (3) one’s epistemological 
standpoint.
Now, let us turn to the next question: what implications for 
doing theology can we draw from this study? What I want to ask 
are complex questions about what we can learn from Kierkegaard 
today. What should we, who are doing theology at the end of the 
twentieth century, learn from Kierkegaard? In what follows, I 
will draw out from this study four implications for doing 
theology. The first one is concerned with the epistemological 
standpoint on which, and from which, the Christian should develop 
his theology; the second is concerned with Christology; the third 
with the relation between God and the world (especially, man); and 
the fourth with the existential character of Christian theology.
First of all, if what we have observed in this study is 
valid, then what we can learn from Kierkegaard is that Christian 
theology should be developed on the basis of the Christian
epistemological standpoint, which we have examined in the second 
section of the third chapter. It is impossible for Kierkegaard to
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develop a Christian theology either from the standpoint of the
natural man, or by mixing together the natural man’s standpoint
and the Christian standpoint. Moreover one should not present
Christian theology in the way in which the natural man can accept
it without any problem. One should not try to remove the
possibility of offence. In this sense, Christian theology should
make clear the difference between the Christian’s epistemological
standpoint and the natural man’s epistemological standpoint.
Trying to mix the Christian standpoint and the natural man’s
standpoint in one’s ’’Christian” theology would be severely
criticized by Kierkegaard. In this sense, for Kierkegaard,
Christian theology must be the theology which sheds light on the 
problem of being a Christian in every situation. A theology which 
has nothing to do with being a Christian in the Kierkegaardian 
sense of the word would be excluded by Kierkegaard from the domain 
of Christian theology. If one tries to develop a theology either
from a non-Christian perspective or from the mixed perspective of
the natural man and the Christian, Kierkegaard would say that it 
might just be called theology, but not ’’Christian” theology. He 
would say that one might develop one’s own theology, but in so far
as one’s theology is not based on the Christian standpoint, it is 
not a "Christian” theology. In this sense, Kierkegaard is close 
to Tertullian who claimed that any discussion about God from a
standpoint outside the Christian faith had nothing to do with 
Christianity and the Christian God.[3] In brief, the first lesson 
we can learn from Kierkegaard’s view of the relation of
Christianity to the ethical sphere is that Christian theological
thinking is thinking which arises out of the stance of Christian
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faith.
Secondly, in relation to a special point, Christology, one
must bear in mind the fact that Kierkegaard makes it clear that
Jesus whilst an individual human being is at the same time God. 
Surely, Kierkegaard himself thought that he was taking up 
Athanasian Nioene Christology. As Howard A. Johnson puts it:
"Throughout his authorship Kierkegaard’s point of reference was a
full, orthodox Athanasian Nicene Christianity, although for 
strategic reasons he usually kept it concealed."[4] What is 
interesting is that Kierkegaard saw the incommensurability between 
the idea of the God-Man and the presuppositions of the natural 
man’s thought which are clearly expressed in Enlightenment
thought. In order to show clearly that the fact of the God-Man
cannot be acceptable to the epistemological standpoint of the 
natural man, Kierkegaard lets Climacus use the terms "absurd", 
"contradiction" etc.[5] As a person who lives after the 
Enlightenment, Kierkegaard translates Chalcedonian Christology 
such a way as to bring it up to date for the modern age. A 
Christian theology which is faithful to Kierkegaard’s challenge
must be one which is faithful to the fact of the God-Man.
Especially in modern times, this aspect is very important. For, 
if we are not careful, then it is easy to give the impression 
either that the God-Man is what Kierkegaard calls "the divine 
uncle George", or that the God-Man is only in the realm which is 
beyond time and space. According to Kierkegaard, as he interprets 
Chalcedonian Christology, it is crucial for being a Christian and 
for Christian theology to regard Jesus as an individual human
being and at the same time as God.[6] Moreover, according to 
Kierkegaard, Christian theology must come from this God-Man’s 
activity of redemption.(JP, I, 4l2=Pap. I A 27)
Kierkegaard knew that the Christology which he asserted to be
true would be regarded as crazy by his contemporaries; it was 
something to be laughed at. But Kierkegaard thought that if one
wants to be a Christian, one should not be ashamed of being
laughed at. Kierkegaard says:
Formerly martyrdom always meant blood-martyrs; nowadays we 
perhaps can also think of the martyrdom of laughter. In a 
rational age the martyrdom of laughter is just what is 
expected for wanting to be [a Christian].n(JP, II, 2046=Pap. 
X 5 A 121, of. JP, III, 2645=Pap. IX A 435)
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Nowadays the situation is worse than in his day. People criticize 
Kierkegaard from the point of view of modernized Christianity.
From that perspective, Kierkegaard is regarded as being not at all
relevant today. However, here is Kierkegaard’s point: should we
accept God’s becoming an individual human being without ceasing to
be God, or should we try to modify this idea of incarnation in
order to make it acceptable to the post-Enlightenment man? This
is a very serious question, which Kierkegaard answered in his time
with the assertion that one should not try to remove the 
possibility of offence. Kierkegaard’s contribution is to show
that Christianity does not ’’fit’* easily into the
post-Enlightenment world. He shows us the offence of
Christianity. He sees the clash between Christianity and the
modern world. He sees that to say an individual was God runs
counter to post-Enlightenment thought. Accordingly, he reacted
against the attempts of people from Kant onwards to make sense of
Christology; he thought that attempting to translate Christianity
to make it more acceptable to the modern man, was mistaken.
Perhaps Kierkegaard’s description of Paul may be applied to
Kierkegaard himself as well:
Even if half the world had derided him and the other little 
half had taken offense, he would not have changed a thing, not 
a whit, even if he must then have taken the teaching with him 
to the grave without winning a single one.(JP, IV, 39l6(Pap. 
IV C 1))
In the light of this, what should we, who live at the end of 
the twentieth century, do? This is one of the most crucial
questions which confronts the twentieth century Christian. As a
matter of fact, it is more difficult nowadays to accept that the 
historical Jesus is God, because all sorts of problems concerning
historical criticism have come into prominence since Kierkegaard 
carried out his work. Many theologians today often try to make 
Christianity fit with modernity. By doing so they often fail to 
show us the offence of Christianity. They often fail to make it
clear that Christianity just does not fit easily with modernity. 
Therefore, I believe that Kierkegaard has an essential message for
us today, even though we are in a different situation from his.
We are still, to an even greater degree, in the situation of 
either/or: either accepting the paradox of the God-Man, or trying
to make the idea of the God-Man acceptable to the modern man.
Thirdly, concerning the relationship between God and the 
world (man, in particular) we may learn from Kierkegaard that 
Christian theology must keep away from both monism and absolute
dualism. By monism, I mean the view that there is no fundamental
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discontinuity between God on the one hand and man and the world on
the other. By absolute dualism, I mean the view which completely 
separates the realm of God and realm of time and space so that,
according to this dualism, even God cannot intervene in the
process of history. Let us consider how Kierkegaard’s position
can be a challenge to each of these views.
The clearest form of monism in modern thought is Hegelian 
monism. As is well-known, in the thought of Hegel everything is
integrated into the process of the self-development of the 
absolute Spirit. In this thought-system, in the final analysis, 
there is only One which integrates everything into Itself. Thus,
even the finite self, by its use of reason, can participate in the 
infinite thought of the Absolute Sprit. It is clear that
Kierkegaard is critical of this kind of monism. Accordingly, some
theological treatises of modern times which try to adopt Hegelian 
thought as one vital element in their theology or which try to 
base their theology on Hegelian thought would be the objects of 
Kierkegaard’s severe criticism. Especially, according to this 
absolute monism, there is only the totally immanent God; apart 
from nature and the process of history, there is no God.[7] God 
also must participate in and be modified by this concrete history. 
Therefore, in this absolute monism, there is a close relationship 
between God and man. Hegel says: "Human reason - the
consciousness of one’s being - is indeed reason; it is the divine 
in man."[8] Thus, as Jerry H. Gill says, "there is an essential 
unity between the knower and ultimate reality, which enables the 
mind of the former to reflect the latter - even though this unity 
is very often hidden behind the vicissitudes of sensory
Page 441
Page 442
experience”.[9] Hence the Absolute, for Hegel, only means the 
infinitization and eternalization of some quality or essence that
is supposed to be relatively present in human beings. For
instance, if man is characterized as rational, then God becomes
the absolutely rational being, the absolute reason. The
difference between God and man is only in degree, not in kind.
There cannot be any qualitative difference between them, only the
relative difference between a finite being and an infinite being.
This is the reason why Kierkegaard’s Christian cannot accept this 
monistic thought.
At the same time, Christian thought cannot be absolutely
dualistic either. Absolute dualism can take different forms. The
classical form of absolute dualism can be found in the thought of
Plato. The world of ideas is absolutely differentiated from the
world of phenomena. What is needed is to escape from the world of
phenomena to the world of Ideas. For the traditional Platonists,
"salvation” means being lifted out of the temporal into the
eternal. This is the reason why the body and the physical are 
consistently devalued in Plato’s and his followers’ thoughts. We 
have seen that in the last period of Kierkegaard’s thought, there 
are some elements which follow this dualistic pattern of thought, 
but we have argued that this is not in accordance with the
Christian standpoint.
In modern thought, absolute dualism exists in different forms
in the works of various thinkers. The most typical form of
absolute dualism can be seen in the work of the early Barth. The
absolute differentiation between the realm of value and the realm
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of fact observed in the theology of Rudolf Bultmann is also a form
of absolute dualism. These modern forms of absolute dualism can
be said to be based on Kantian dualism.
In a sense, Kierkegaard’s position is closer to dualism than 
Hegelian monism.(cf. JP, I, 704=Pap. IV A 192) For instance, for 
Kierkegaard, there is a qualitative difference between God and
man. As far as this difference between God and man is concerned, 
Kierkegaard is a dualist. However, in the God-Man, Kierkegaard
finds that there is the clear intimation that there will be a time
in which this dualistic structure will cease to be. This does not
mean that there will be no difference between God and man. In so
far as the difference between God and man is concerned, there will
always be a clear difference and distinction between God and man, 
even in a situation in which sin is removed.[10] However, there 
will be direct fellowship rcommuniol between God and men. Even
before that time, those who have faith in the God-Man must live in 
that fellowship and therefore must think in such a way that they 
overcome absolute monism and absolute dualism.(cf. JP, I, 
705=Pap. V A 68)
Insofar as Kierkegaard asserts that the God-Man is in time
and history, in the realm of phenomena as opposed to the realm of
noumena, we have to say that Kierkegaard!an dualism is not the
absolute dualism that we can see in Plato, the early Barth, and
Bultmann. According to this absolute dualism, God cannot be in 
time and space. What is in the realm of phenomena cannot be God
or what God does. In this sense, in a system which is one of
absolute dualism, God cannot directly intervene in the process of
time and history. But for Kierkegaard, since God comes into 
existence in time and history, there is the absolute paradox. God
can intervene in the process of history. In this sense,
Kierkegaard’s dualism is not one of absolute dualism: God can
break the dualistic structure. God is immanent without ceasing to
be transcendent.
However, Kierkegaard’s God who is both immanent and
transcendent is also different from Schleiermacher*s "immanently
transcendent God.” By ”immanently transcendent" I mean that
Schleiermacher’s conception of God is neither absolutely immanent
as Hegel’s God is, nor absolutely transcendent as the early
Barth’s God is. Schleiermacher’s God, however, is transcendent
only in his immanence. As we have seen, Schleiermacher thinks 
that it is difficult to conceive of a personal God who was before
the creation of the world. His God is God only in relation to
this world. Thus, God’s transcendence can only be defined 
immanently. Likewise, in his theology there is a naturalization
of the supernatural. In this sense, Schleiermacher himself calls 
his position "natural supernatural ism".[11] Hence, even though he 
says that Christianity is both supernatural and natural,
Christianity is presented in a way in which the supernatural
element is naturalized; the supernatural element is explained
away. This is the reason why the Incarnation, in the classical 
sense of the word, is impossible in his theology. So he is
beginning to respond to the modern age - in a way that Kierkegaard
is not. But for Kierkegaard, the God who came into the world in
Page 44*4
the Incarnation is the transcendent God, and He is the
transcendent, personal God even before the creation of the world.
In this sense, Kierkegaard’s way of overcoming absolute dualism is
fundamentally different from that of Schleiermacher who looks to
immanence for the answer.
One last thing we can learn from Kierkegaard is that
Christian theology developed on the basis of the Christian
standpoint must be lived out in practice. Christians should live
commensurately with their Christian theology. In this sense, 
Christian theology cannot be carried out by one’s thinking faculty
alone. One’s whole being must be mobilized in one’s theology. 
Without passion and will one cannot do theology. The theology 
which has nothing to do with the concrete problem of being an
existential Christian is regarded by Kierkegaard as not a
Christian theology. In this sense, as we asserted in the first 
chapter, Christian ethics follows from Christian faith. According 
to Kierkegaard, Christian theology should not be something which 
is "invented in order to evade doing God’s will."(JP, III,
3597(Pap. XI 2 A 376)) For "[after] all, the essentially
Christian thing to do is not to write but to exist. "(JP, VI,
6840(Pap. X 5 A 105)) In this sense, Christian theology must be
existential Christian theology, though not in the sense of 
Bultmannian theology or Tillichian theology. To develop further 
this theme, interesting though it is, is outside the scope of this 
study.[12] I merely want to say that what we have discussed in the 
second chapter must be borne in mind when we develop this new kind 
of existential Christian theology.
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These are the things which I think we can learn from
Kierkegaard, even though we are in a different situation from his.
Observing from our present situation how Kierkegaard in his age
avoided many attempts to adapt Christianity to the modern age, we
may learn from him hew to avoid the same kind of pitfalls in our
own age. Since, however, we are living in a different age,
managing to avoid these pitfalls may be difficult, because more
radical issues have arisen in biblical scholarship. It is true
that even Kierkegaard himself was not constantly faithful to the
Christian standpoint, as we have seen. Also it is doubtful
whether there is anyone, especially in today's more complex
situation, who is constantly faithful in his theology to the
Christian standpoint as defined by Kierkegaard. However,
Kierkegaard does not compromise by saying that one can regard such
lapses as acceptable. At the very least, he makes it clear that 
if one cannot think and live as a Christian, one should not regard
oneself as a Christian. Likewise, if one’s so-called Christian 
theology is not constantly faithful to what he regards as 
Christian presuppositions and the Christian standpoint, it is not 
regarded by Kierkegaard as Christian theology. In this sense, 
Kierkegaard can present a real challenge to our various
’’Christian" theologies, even though we are in a different 
situation from his. This conclusion comes from our interpretation
of the relation of Christianity to the ethical sphere in the
thought of Kierkegaard
What, then, is the relationship between the ethical sphere 
and Christianity in the thought of Sjzfren Kierkegaard? This 
study’s final answer to this question is that Christianity is 
different from and discontinuous from the ethical sphere. To be a 
Christian involves a change in one’s ethics, in one’s 
understanding of oneself, and in one’s epistemological standpoint.
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NOTES
1. For a similar view, see Weiland, Humanitas Christianitas, 
pp. 31-35.
2. Crites, ’’Pseudonymous Authorship as Art and as Act,” p. 
204. See also Weiland, pp. 32f.
3. Cf. Martin Redeker, Schleiermacher, Life and Thought, 
p. 107.
4. Hcward A. Johnson, "Introduction," to JP. I, pp.
xxvii-xxviii. See also Soe, 
p. 223; Geismar, p. 63; 
Subjectivity and Paradox,
"Kierkegaard’s Doctrine of Paradox,"
Bonifazi, pp, 
p. 108;
92, 172; Thomas,
Croxall, Kierkegaard 
78. W andCommentary, p. 206; Dewey, The New Obedience, pp.
Colette, p. 46.
Here three interesting questions can be raised, which I cannot 
try to answer in this study because of its limited scope. 
Firstly, what is the exact relationship between Kierkegaard’s 
understanding of the God-Man and Nicene-Chalcedonian Christology? 
This is worthwhile thinking about especially in relation to the 
modern interpretation of patristic Christology, which emphasizes 
the fact that the Nicene and Chalcedonian Church Fathers thought 
in accordance with the Greek conception of the universal. Cf. 
Frances Young, "A CLoud of Witnesses," in John Hick, ed. The Myth 
of God Incarnate (London: SCM, 1977)/ pp. 24ff.y 28f.; Richard A 
Norris, "Interpreting the Doctrine of the Incarnation," in D.R. 
McDonald, ed. The Myth/Truth of God Incarnate (Witon,
Connecticut: Morehouse-Barlow, 1979), p. 71; and Dennis Nineham, 
"God Incarnate: Why ’hfyth’, In ibid., pp. 54, 58. Hence, 
according to the modern interpreters, even though "within their 
contemporary context [their theology was] a remarkable 
3 0), it is considered 
context. Modern interpreters 
Neo-Platonic basis on which
achievement"(Frances Young, p. 
unintelligible in our different 
assert that since we have lost the 
patristic Christology was founded, we cannot go back to patristic 
sense of the God-Man. They wonder whether saying the same thing 
the Fathers said in the 4th and 5th centuries has the same meaning 
in the modern age quoting the aphorism "to say the same thing in a 
different age is to say something different". Secondly, what is 
the exact relationship between Kierkegaard’s understanding of the 
God-Man and the New Testament conception, or conceptions, of 
Jesus? This question can be raised because of the 
historical-critical reading of the New Testament. Cf. Maurice 
Wiles, "Christianity Without Incarnation?," in The Myth of God 
Incarnate, pp. 3f•; Michael Goulder, "The Two Roots of the
Christian Myth," in ibid., p. 65; and Don Cupitt, "The Jesus of 
Faith and the Christ of History," in The Myth/Truth of God
Incarnate, pp. 2ff., 6. Thirdly, what would this man,
Kierkegaard, have said today in the period after major biblical 
criticism? Would he change his view of Jesus, or would he stick 
to the belief that this individual human being (Jesus) is God? 
These questions are interesting and important for the proper
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understanding of Kierkegaardian Christology, and in order to put 
his Christology in historical perspective. However, in this 
study, I cannot enter into discussion of these problems, because 
they are too major to be discussed in one part of this studyj they 
require separate studies.
5. See, e.g., CUP, pp. 188f.; PF, p. 52=PFS, p. 65. One 
of the most extreme expressions about this phenomenon comes from 
Malcolm L. Diamond, "Kierkegaard and Apologetics," Journal of 
Religion (1964), p. 132.
6. For a good discussion of modern Christology from 
Kierkegaardian perspective, see Roberts, Faith, Reason, and 
History, pp. 30-41.
7. Hegel, Philosophy of Religion, I, p. 200­
8. Ibid., p. 33.
9. Jerry H. Gill, "Kant, Kierkegaard, and Religious 
Knowledge," in Essays on Kierkegaard, p. 66. For a good 
discussion of Hegelian monism, see Ussher, pp. 43f.. 48f., 52; 
and Bonifazi, pp. 74f.
10. Cf. PAL, p. 151.
11. Schleiermacher, On the Glaubenslehre, pp. 88f., 130, n. 
73.
12. For a study about Tillich’s theology frcm Kierkegaardian
perspective, see Hamilton, The System and the Gospel (Londons 
SCM, 1963). For a good study about Bultmann’s Theology from a 
similar perspective, see Robert C. Roberts, Rudolf Bultmann’s 
Theology: A Critical Interpretation (Grand Rapids: Eerdman,
1976; London: SCM, 1977).
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